Criminal Procedure: A Free Law School Casebook

Volume One
Second Edition

Ben Trachtenberg
Anne Alexander
Dedication

We dedicate this book to our students, our colleagues, and our families, as well as to all who support the mission of America’s public law schools.

Acknowledgements

From Ben Trachtenberg

First and foremost, I thank Joanna Trachtenberg for marrying me, agreeing to move with me to Missouri, and being a far better spouse than I could possibly deserve. I also thank Akiva and Shoshana Trachtenberg, who remind me of the importance of justice to the world.

I thank Anne Alexander for agreeing to join this project, which I began somewhat impulsively and could never have completed (at least not well and on time) without her assistance.

From Anne Alexander

I am most thankful to my husband Marc, whose support and love keeps me grounded in a way that helps me accomplish my dreams. I also thank our twin daughters, Lilly and Sydney Alexander; their perseverance and search for equality motivate me to ask the hard questions.

Thanks also goes to Ben Trachtenberg, who is a good friend and colleague. May his penchant for pushing me into different projects continue to lead to great unforeseen adventures in our academic careers.

From Ben Trachtenberg & Anne Alexander

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We also thank MU law student research assistants Callie Haslag, who provided support through the Shook, Hardy & Bacon research assistant program, and Samuel Thomas.

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We also thank The Center for Computer-Assisted Legal Instruction (CALI) for publishing the current edition. In particular, Deb Quentel has provided important support.

In addition, we thank faculty colleagues at other law schools who provided feedback on the 2020 edition of this book, generally after assigning the book to their students. Their comments have improved this new edition.
**Date & Edition**

The first edition of this book was compiled and released for the fall semester of 2018, and the book was used again during the spring 2019 semester. With a brief supplement (and no significant revisions), the book was republished for 2019-2020.

The book was then substantially revised and was released by the CALI eLangdell® Press for use during the 2020-2021 year and beyond. This 2022 edition is an update of the 2020 book. Page numbers in this edition will not match those of previous versions.

Due to page limitations for printing, this book has been divided into two parts. Volume 1 contains the first 21 chapters. Volume 2 starts with Chapter 22.

**Students should purchase both volumes of this printed casebook for a traditional law school course.**
Notices

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About the Authors

Ben Trachtenberg is the Isidor Loeb Professor of Law at the University of Missouri School of Law. He serves as Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and also as Director of Undergraduate Studies at the MU School of Law.

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Missouri School of Law and then worked as an associate attorney at Jenner & Block in Chicago. Prior to attending law school, she was an elementary school teacher.

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WHAT IS THIS BOOK?

This book introduces criminal procedure law in the United States, with a focus on the “investigation” stage of the criminal justice system. Specifically, the book focuses on legal constraints placed upon police and prosecutors, constraints largely derived from Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. Major topics include searches and seizures, warrants and when they are required, interrogations, witness identifications of suspects, and the right to counsel during various stages of investigation and prosecution.

At the end of the semester, students should have a solid foundation in the “black-letter law” of criminal procedure. This material is tested on the bar examination, and it is the sort of information that friends and family will expect lawyers to know, even lawyers who never practice criminal law. For example, a lawyer lacking basic familiarity with the Miranda Rule risks looking foolish at Thanksgiving dinner. In addition, the legal issues covered in this book relate to some of the most intense ongoing political and social debates in the country. The law governing stop-and-frisk procedures, for example, is not merely trivia one should learn for an exam. It affects the lives of real people. The reliability of eyewitness identifications affects the likelihood of wrongful convictions, a phenomenon persons of all political persuasions oppose. In short, policing and prosecution affect everyone in America, and an informed citizen—especially a lawyer—should understand the primary arguments raised in major controversies in criminal procedure law.

To be sure, understanding the holdings of major cases is essential to more nuanced participation in these debates, and this book devotes the bulk of its pages to Supreme Court opinions, which your authors have edited for length. (To save space, we have omitted internal citations, as well as portions of court opinions, without using ellipses to indicate our edits.) The book then aims to go beyond the information available in majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents. To do so, it includes supplementary material on developments in law and policy. For example, advances in technology raise questions about precedent concerning what counts as a “search” under Fourth Amendment law. The book also provides perspectives on the practical implications of Supreme Court decisions, perspectives often given scant attention by the Justices. For example, state courts have grappled with scientific evidence about witness reliability that has not yet been addressed in Supreme Court opinions resolving due process challenges related to identifications.

Further, in addition to helping students identify situations in which constitutional rights may have been violated, the book explores what remedies are available for different violations. For a criminal defendant, the most desirable remedy will normally be exclusion of evidence obtained though illegal means—for example, drugs found in a defendant’s car or home during an unlawful search. Contrary to common misconceptions among the general public, however, not all criminal procedure law violations result in the exclusion of evidence. Students will read the leading cases
on the exclusionary rule, confronting arguments on when the remedy of exclusion—which quite
often requires that a guilty person avoid conviction—is justified by the need to encourage
adherence by law enforcement to the rules presented in this book concerning searches, seizures,
interrogations, and so on.

Your authors have attempted to create a book that presents material clearly and does not hide
the ball. Students who read assigned material should be well prepared for class, armed with
knowledge of what rules the Supreme Court has announced, along with the main arguments for
and against the Court’s choices.

The remainder of this Introduction consists of further effort by your authors to convince you of
the importance of the material presented later in the book. Many students possess this book
because they are enrolled in a required course or know that this material is tested on the bar
exam. Others of you plan to practice criminal law. Still others study criminal procedure to learn
more about important societal controversies. Regardless, your authors do not take your attention
for granted.

Why Is Criminal Procedure So Important?

In this 1936 unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Supreme Court
reviewed a criminal case from Mississippi. Students will see immediately why the actions of
police, prosecutors, and judges upset the Supreme Court Justices.

Supreme Court of the United States

Ed Brown v. Mississippi
Decided Feb. 17, 1936 — 297 U.S. 278 (1936)

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the [unanimous] opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether convictions, which rest solely upon confessions shown to
have been extorted by officers of the state by brutality and violence, are consistent with the due
process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Petitioners were indicted for the murder of one Raymond Stewart, whose death occurred on
March 30, 1934. They were indicted on April 4, 1934 and were then arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Counsel were appointed by the court to defend them. Trial was begun the next morning
and was concluded on the following day, when they were found guilty and sentenced to death.

Aside from the confessions, there was no evidence sufficient to warrant the submission of the
case to the jury. After a preliminary inquiry, testimony as to the confessions was received over
the objection of defendants’ counsel. Defendants then testified that the confessions were false
and had been procured by physical torture. The case went to the jury with instructions, upon the
request of defendants’ counsel, that if the jury had reasonable doubt as to the confessions having
resulted from coercion, and that they were not true, they were not to be considered as evidence.
On their appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, defendants assigned as error the
inadmissibility of the confessions. The judgment was affirmed.
Defendants then moved in the Supreme Court of the State to arrest the judgment and for a new trial on the ground that all the evidence against them was obtained by coercion and brutality known to the court and to the district attorney, and that defendants had been denied the benefit of counsel or opportunity to confer with counsel in a reasonable manner. The motion was supported by affidavits. At about the same time, defendants filed in the Supreme Court a “suggestion of error” explicitly challenging the proceedings of the trial, in the use of the confessions and with respect to the alleged denial of representation by counsel, as violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The state court entertained the suggestion of error, considered the federal question, and decided it against defendants’ contentions. Two judges dissented. We granted a writ of certiorari.

The grounds of the decision were (1) that immunity from self-incrimination is not essential to due process of law; and (2) that the failure of the trial court to exclude the confessions after the introduction of evidence showing their incompetency, in the absence of a request for such exclusion, did not deprive the defendants of life or liberty without due process of law; and that even if the trial court had erroneously overruled a motion to exclude the confessions, the ruling would have been mere error reversible on appeal, but not a violation of constitutional right.

The opinion of the state court did not set forth the evidence as to the circumstances in which the confessions were procured. That the evidence established that they were procured by coercion was not questioned. The state court said: ‘After the state closed its case on the merits, the appellants, for the first time, introduced evidence from which it appears that the confessions were not made voluntarily but were coerced.’ There is no dispute as to the facts upon this point, and as they are clearly and adequately stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Griffith (with whom Judge Anderson concurred), showing both the extreme brutality of the measures to extort the confessions and the participation of the state authorities, we quote this part of his opinion in full, as follows:

“The crime with which these defendants, all ignorant [Black people], are charged, was discovered about 1 o’clock p.m. on Friday, March 30, 1934. On that night one Dial, a deputy sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the home of Ellington, one of the defendants, and requested him to accompany them to the house of the deceased, and there a number of white men were gathered, who began to accuse the defendant of the crime. Upon his denial they seized him, and with the participation of the deputy they hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and, having let him down, they hung him again, and when he was let down the second time, and he still protested his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped, and, still declining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was finally released, and he returned with some difficulty to his home, suffering intense pain and agony. The record of the testimony shows that the signs of the rope on his neck were plainly visible during the so-called trial. A day or two thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to the home of the said defendant and arrested him, and departed with the prisoner towards the jail in an adjoining county, but went by a route which led into the state of Alabama; and while on the way, in that state, the deputy stopped and again severely whipped the defendant, declaring that he would continue the whipping until he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess to such a statement as the deputy would dictate, and he did so, after which he was delivered to jail.
“The other two defendants, Ed Brown and Henry Shields, were also arrested and taken to the same jail. On Sunday night, April 1, 1934, the same deputy, accompanied by a number of white men, one of whom was also an officer, and by the jailer, came to the jail, and the two last named defendants were made to strip and they were laid over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it, and they were likewise made by the said deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would be continued unless and until they confessed, and not only confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded by those present; and in this manner the defendants confessed the crime, and, as the whippings progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of their torturers. When the confessions had been obtained in the exact form and contents as desired by the mob, they left with the parting admonition and warning that, if the defendants changed their story at any time in any respect from that last stated, the perpetrators of the outrage would administer the same or equally effective treatment.

“Further details of the brutal treatment to which these helpless prisoners were subjected need not be pursued. It is sufficient to say that in pertinent respects the transcript reads more like pages torn from some medieval account than a record made within the confines of a modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitutional government.

“All this having been accomplished, on the next day, that is, on Monday, April 2, when the defendants had been given time to recuperate somewhat from the tortures to which they had been subjected, the two sheriffs, one of the county where the crime was committed, and the other of the county of the jail in which the prisoners were confined, came to the jail, accompanied by eight other persons, some of them deputies, there to hear the free and voluntary confession of these miserable and abject defendants. The sheriff of the county of the crime admitted that he had heard of the whipping but averred that he had no personal knowledge of it. He admitted that one of the defendants, when brought before him to confess, was limping and did not sit down, and that this particular defendant then and there stated that he had been strapped so severely that he could not sit down, and, as already stated, the signs of the rope on the neck of another of the defendants were plainly visible to all. Nevertheless the solemn farce of hearing the free and voluntary confessions was gone through with, and these two sheriffs and one other person then present were the three witnesses used in court to establish the so-called confessions, which were received by the court and admitted in evidence over the objections of the defendants duly entered of record as each of the said three witnesses delivered their alleged testimony. There was thus enough before the court when these confessions were first offered to make known to the court that they were not, beyond all reasonable doubt, free and voluntary; and the failure of the court then to exclude the confessions is sufficient to reverse the judgment, under every rule of procedure that has heretofore been prescribed, and hence it was not necessary subsequently to renew the objections by motion or otherwise.

“The spurious confessions having been obtained—and the farce last mentioned having been gone through with on Monday, April 2d—the court, then in session, on the following day, Tuesday, April 3, 1934, ordered the grand jury to reassemble on the succeeding day, April 4, 1934, at 9 o’clock, and on the morning of the day last mentioned the grand jury returned an indictment against the defendants for murder. Late that afternoon the defendants were brought from the
jail in the adjoining county and arraigned, when one or more of them offered to plead guilty, which the court declined to accept, and, upon inquiry whether they had or desired counsel, they stated that they had none, and did not suppose that counsel could be of any assistance to them. The court thereupon appointed counsel, and set the case for trial for the following morning at 9 o’clock, and the defendants were returned to the jail in the adjoining county about thirty miles away.

“The defendants were brought to the courthouse of the county on the following morning, April 5th, and the so-called trial was opened, and was concluded on the next day, April 6, 1934, and resulted in a pretended conviction with death sentences. The evidence upon which the conviction was obtained was the so-called confessions. Without this evidence, a peremptory instruction to find for the defendants would have been inescapable. The defendants were put on the stand, and by their testimony the facts and the details thereof as to the manner by which the confessions were extorted from them were fully developed, and it is further disclosed by the record that the same deputy, Dial, under whose guiding hand and active participation the tortures to coerce the confessions were administered, was actively in the performance of the supposed duties of a court deputy in the courthouse and in the presence of the prisoners during what is denominated, in complimentary terms, the trial of these defendants. This deputy was put on the stand by the state in rebuttal, and admitted the whippings. It is interesting to note that in his testimony with reference to the whipping of the defendant Ellington, and in response to the inquiry as to how severely he was whipped, the deputy stated, ‘Not too much for a [Black man]; not as much as I would have done if it were left to me.’ Two others who had participated in these whippings were introduced and admitted it—not a single witness was introduced who denied it. The facts are not only undisputed, they are admitted, and admitted to have been done by officers of the state, in conjunction with other participants, and all this was definitely well known to everybody connected with the trial, and during the trial, including the state’s prosecuting attorney and the trial judge presiding.”

1. The state stresses the statement in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), that “exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution,” and the statement in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), that “the privilege against self-incrimination may be withdrawn and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for the state.” But the question of the right of the state to withdraw the privilege against self-incrimination is not here involved. The compulsion to which the quoted statements refer is that of the processes of justice by which the accused may be called as a witness and required to testify. Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a different matter.

The state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” The state may abolish trial by jury. It may dispense with indictment by a grand jury and substitute complaint or information. But the freedom of the state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of due process of law. Because a state may dispense with a jury trial,

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1 [Footnote by editors] This is no longer true. See further discussion following this opinion.
it does not follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand. The state may not permit an accused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination—where the whole proceeding is but a mask—without supplying corrective process. The state may not deny to the accused the aid of counsel. Nor may a state, through the action of its officers, contrive a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is “but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.” And the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence. The due process clause requires “that state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.” It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process.

2. It is in this view that the further contention of the State must be considered. That contention rests upon the failure of counsel for the accused, who had objected to the admissibility of the confessions, to move for their exclusion after they had been introduced and the fact of coercion had been proved. It is a contention which proceeds upon a misconception of the nature of petitioners’ complaint. That complaint is not of the commission of mere error, but of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void. We are not concerned with a mere question of state practice, or whether counsel assigned to petitioners were competent or mistakenly assumed that their first objections were sufficient. In an earlier case the Supreme Court of the State had recognized the duty of the court to supply corrective process where due process of law had been denied. In *Fisher v. State*, 145 Miss. 116 (1926), the court said: “Coercing the supposed state’s criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief iniquity, the crowning infamy of the Star Chamber, and the Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The Constitution recognized the evils that lay behind these practices and prohibited them in this country. ... The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.”

In the instant case, the trial court was fully advised by the undisputed evidence of the way in which the confessions had been procured. The trial court knew that there was no other evidence upon which conviction and sentence could be based. Yet it proceeded to permit conviction and to pronounce sentence. The conviction and sentence were void for want of the essential elements of due process, and the proceeding thus vitiating could be challenged in any appropriate manner. It was challenged before the Supreme Court of the State by the express invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment. That court entertained the challenge, considered the federal question thus presented, but declined to enforce petitioners’ constitutional right. The court thus denied a federal right fully established and specially set up and claimed, and the judgment must be reversed.
As noted in the footnote we added to the *Brown* opinion, the Court included a statement about jury trials that is no longer accurate. States are required to provide trial by jury for crimes punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment. *See Duncan v. Louisiana*, **391 U.S. 145** (1968). In 1936, the Supreme Court had not yet “incorporated” many provisions from the Bill of Rights against the states, meaning that the states were free to ignore them. For purposes of this course, students should presume that constitutional provisions apply with equal force against the states and the federal government, unless instructed otherwise. One key criminal procedure provision not incorporated is the right to indictment by a grand jury. *See Hurtado v. California*, **110 U.S. 516** (1884). In *Timbs v. Indiana*, **139 S. Ct. 682** (2019), the Court unanimously held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is incorporated against the states. In *Ramos v. Louisiana*, **140 S.Ct. 1390** (2020), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires states use only a unanimous jury verdict to convict defendants of serious offenses, setting aside a conviction based on a 10-to-2 vote. This continues the decades-long trend of incorporating the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Students may find one procedural aspect of *Brown* particularly upsetting, in addition to the terrible conduct that agents of the state committed against the defendants: After the defendants were convicted, they appealed to the highest court of their state, and the state court affirmed the convictions. Two dissenting members of that court set forth at length the terrible conduct—so carefully that the Supreme Court of the United States would later cut and paste much of the dissent. Whatever one’s position on theories related to federalism, one cannot avoid the conclusion that at least in this case, a state’s justice system was sorely in need of federal supervision. Throughout this course, students will notice an ongoing debate about how much Supreme Court oversight is necessary to protect Americans from police officers, prosecutors, and judges behaving badly. The Court’s assessment has changed over time, and justices serving together often disagree.

**What to Look for when Reading Cases**

As the semester progresses, students will learn to answer two key questions presented in every single criminal procedure case: First, were someone’s rights (usually constitutional rights) violated? Second, if so, so what?

Answering the first question requires knowledge of the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, among other provisions. For example, the Court has considered over several cases—decided over several decades—what counts as a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It has debated what the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require of police officers conducting interrogations. And it has weighed how to protect the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to all criminal defendants.

Answering the second question—“So what?”—requires knowledge of the remedies the Supreme Court has provided for violations of the rights of criminal suspects and defendants. For a defendant, the most desirable remedy is often the exclusion of evidence obtained illegally. When
the “exclusionary rule” applies, evidence gained during an unlawful search or interrogation, for example, may become unavailable to prosecutors, which may lead to the dismissal of criminal charges. The proper scope of the exclusionary rule has been hotly debated for decades, and even its existence is not taken for granted by everyone on the Supreme Court. When exclusion of evidence is not available, the best remedy may be money damages, although that remedy has its own shortcomings. Students will learn the basics of when various remedies are available for violations of criminal procedure rules.

In a sense, the rules governing searches, seizures, interrogations, and so on can be considered the “substantive” law of criminal procedure. These rules constitute the bulk of most criminal procedure courses, and this one is no exception. Questions in this category include: When do police need a warrant? When must police give “Miranda warnings”? What must states provide for criminal defendants too poor to hire a lawyer?

The remedies are what one might call the “procedural” aspect of criminal procedure law. Questions in this category include: If police executing a search warrant break down someone’s door without justification, can the homeowner exclude evidence found during the ensuing search? Does the answer change if the warrant was somehow defective? When can prosecutors use confessions obtained in violation of the Miranda Rule? The portion of assigned readings explicitly devoted to remedies is far less than that given to “substantive” criminal procedure rights. Keep in mind, however, that rights without remedies are largely worthless, and those students who one day prosecute crimes or represent defendants will care deeply about the practical consequences of Supreme Court doctrine.

The Scope of the Criminal Justice System

Before returning to the meat of criminal procedure law, let us consider for a moment just how large and important a system is being governed by nine Justices interpreting a handful of ancient clauses.

Beginning around 1970, the United States began a massive increase in incarceration. Between 1980 and 2010, the incarceration rate more than doubled. Despite a small drop in incarceration over the past decade, as of early 2022 the United States incarcerated about 2 million people, including inmates at prisons, local jails, and juvenile facilities, among other places. This chart (released to the public domain via Wikimedia Commons) shows how the incarceration rate (essentially, the number of inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents) was relatively flat for decades through the 1960s, began rising after 1970, and then increased rapidly after 1985. The rate has decreased slightly over the past few years.

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2 Don’t take our word for it. Sir John Holt, the Lord Chief Justice of England, wrote in Ashby v. White (1703), “If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal.” 14 St. Tr. 695, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136. Fans of Latin put it this way: “ubi jus ibi remedium.”
The U.S. 2021 incarceration rate was 664 per 100,000 residents, exceeding every other country in the world. The states with the highest incarceration rates in 2021 were Mississippi (1,031), Louisiana (1,094), and Oklahoma (993). The states with the lowest rates were Rhode Island (289), Vermont (288) and Massachusetts (275). Even these states have higher incarceration rates than most countries, including Iran (228), South Africa (248), Israel (234), New Zealand (188), Singapore (185), Poland (188), Jamaica (137), Iraq (126), France (93), and Ireland (72).³

The next chart (provided courtesy of The Sentencing Project) shows the raw numbers of prisoners in America. Note that this does not include inmates in jails or juvenile facilities.

Nationwide, the total prison and jail population as of December 31, 2020 was 1,691,600. In addition, 3,890,400 persons were under supervision—on parole or probation—creating a total correctional system population of 5,500,600.

Because states house the overwhelming bulk of U.S. prisoners, state budgets fund the overwhelming bulk of U.S. correctional expenses. In 1985—just before the American prison population began its sharp increase—states spent a combined $6.7 billion on corrections. By 1990, the cost had risen to $16.9 billion. It was $36.4 billion in 2000, $51.4 billion in 2010, and $56.6 billion in 2019.

The next chart (provided courtesy of the Prison Policy Initiative) shows where incarcerated women are housed and what offenses led them to confinement.

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4 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Correctional Populations in the United States, 2020” (March 2022, NCJ 303184).
The likelihood of imprisonment is not distributed evenly among different groups of Americans. Women constitute about half of the total U.S. population but only 7 percent of the total prison population. Racial disparities are also stark. In 2020, state and federal prisons housed (out of a total of 1,182,166 inmates) 389,500 Black inmates (33 percent of the total), 358,900 white inmates (30 percent of the total), and 275,300 Hispanic inmates (23 percent of the total). According to Census data taken around the same time (April 1, 2020), 76 percent of Americans described themselves as white alone (no other race), 13 percent as Black or African American alone, 3 percent as two or more races, and 18.5 percent as Hispanic or Latino. Although the demographic definitions—particularly for deciding who counts as Hispanic—used in various surveys are not always identical, the results are clear. Black and Hispanic Americans are significantly overrepresented among prisoners.

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6 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prisoners in the United States” (December 2021, NCJ 302776).
7 See US Census Bureau, “Quick Facts.”
Despite the high U.S. incarceration rate, most Americans will never serve time. Instead, the majority of Americans encounter the justice system through their interactions with police officers. U.S. law enforcement agencies employ about 665,000 officers at the local, state, and federal level. That works out to about one officer for every 500 Americans. In 2019, officers performed about 10 million arrests. As was noted for incarceration, arrest rates exhibit disparities by race and sex. Of those arrested in 2019, 69.4 percent were white, and 26.6 percent were black. Males constituted 72.5 percent of those arrested in 2019. Young men are especially likely to be arrested.\(^8\)

When suspects are arrested and prosecuted, states often provide legal counsel because the defendants otherwise could not afford it. The per capita expense on indigent defense varies tremendously among states. For example, in 2017 Wisconsin spent $86 million, or $14.83 per resident. That same year Texas spent $37 million, or $1.31 per resident.

### A Few Recent Cases

We will return now to the discussion we set aside after reading *Brown v. Mississippi*. “Yes, yes,” one might say, “the criminal justice system is important. As a nation we spend immense sums on police, prosecution, and prisons. And back in 1934, some goons in Mississippi abused criminal defendants, which required intervention by the Supreme Court. What about today?”

This is a fair question; otherwise, we would not have placed it in the mouths of our hypothetical students. We expect that by the end of the semester, few if any students will question whether police and prosecutors still require judicial oversight. The amount and proper form of that oversight will almost surely remain contested—indeed, the Justices themselves contest these issues every year—but the principle is likely to win near unanimous assent. To assuage skepticism without delay, however, we will present some evidence now.

In 2013, the State of California freed Kash Delano Register, whom the state had imprisoned for 34 years for a murder he did not commit.\(^9\) Mr. Register had been convicted on the basis of false identification testimony, and the lawyers who won his release produced proof that police and prosecutors had concealed from Register’s trial defense team evidence of his innocence, including reports of eyewitnesses who would have contradicted the testimony of prosecution witnesses, along with evidence of how police had used threats of unrelated criminal prosecution to pressure the witnesses against Register. Absent the work of students and faculty at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, Register might remain incarcerated today. Prosecutors opposed his release until 2013. In 2016, the Los Angeles City Council approved a $16.7 million settlement payment to Register.\(^10\) The city has paid tens of millions of dollars in other recent settlements related to police conduct.\(^11\)

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8 For arrest data, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “2019 Crime in the United States: Persons Arrested.”

9 See Lara Bazelon, “A Mistake Has Been Made Here, and No One Wants to Correct It,” Slate (Dec. 17, 2013).

10 See National Registry of Exonerations, “Kash Register.”

In 2012, the State of Missouri released George Allen, Jr., whom the state had imprisoned for 30 years for a St. Louis rape and murder he did not commit. Although prosecutors could not explain how Allen could have travelled from his University City home to the murder scene—St. Louis was paralyzed that day by a 20-inch snowstorm—a jury eventually convicted Allen on the basis of his confession. Decades after his conviction, new lawyers for Allen—from the Bryan Cave law firm and the Innocence Project—produced evidence that police had elicited a false confession from Allen, who was mentally ill. Missouri courts found that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence, including lab results, fingerprint records, and information about bizarre interrogation tactics such as hypnosis of a key witness. Allen died in 2016, and the City of St. Louis and Allen’s family settled his civil rights lawsuit in 2018 for $14 million.

The National Registry of Exonerations, maintained by the University of Michigan, lists 3,176 exonerations, representing “more than 27,200 years lost.” Because it covers only exonerations, it does not include cases in which misconduct is uncovered in time to prevent a wrongful conviction.

In 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that America’s “10 cities with the largest police departments paid out $248.7 million” in 2014 in settlements and court judgements in police misconduct cases. Students should keep in mind that because so much misconduct cannot be remedied through monetary damages, numbers like these understate the problem.

Chicago has settled several multi-million-dollar cases in recent years. Examples include: “A one-time death row inmate brutally beaten by police: $6.1 million. An unarmed man fatally shot by an officer as he lay on the ground: $4.1 million.” Another involved an officer who “posted messages on his Facebook page falsely calling [a] teen a drug dealer and criminal” and officers handcuffing this same teen without cause. (Settlement around $500,000.) More recent cases include “a police officer [who] pointed a gun at [the plaintiff’s] 3-year-old daughter’s chest during a 2013 raid of the family’s Chicago home” and a man who spent about 20 years in prison after being framed.

As the Baltimore Sun noted—in its 2014 report of how the “city has paid about $5.7 million since 2011 over lawsuits claiming that police officers brazenly beat up alleged suspects”—the “perception that officers are violent can poison the relationship between residents and police.”

The newspaper observed:

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13 As of July 3, 2022. See https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
14 See Zusha Elinson & Dan Frosch, “Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities,” Wall St. J. (July 15, 2015).
“Over ... four years, more than 100 people have won court judgments or settlements related to allegations of brutality and civil rights violations. Victims include a 15-year-old boy riding a dirt bike, a 26-year-old pregnant accountant who had witnessed a beating, a 50-year-old woman selling church raffle tickets, a 65-year-old church deacon rolling a cigarette and an 87-year-old grandmother aiding her wounded grandson.”

In multiple jurisdictions, class action lawsuits about unlawful strip searches have yielded large payments. In 2010, the Cook County (Illinois) Board of Commissioners agreed to a $55 million settlement with suspects stripped-searched at Cook County Jail. New York City reached a $50 million settlement in 2001 and another one for $33 million in 2010, both related to searches in city jails such as Rikers Island. Similar settlements (for smaller amounts) have been reached in places such as Kern County, California; Burlington County, New Jersey; and Washington, D.C. Massachusetts officials settled a suit concerning the Western Massachusetts Regional Women’s Correctional Center, agreeing to prohibit male guards from continuing their practice of videotaping the strip searches of female inmates.

Less sensational issues (nonetheless important to those involved) include the ongoing debate over “stop-and-frisk” tactics nationwide, in addition to racial profiling of motorists. These practices affect persons whose involvement with the criminal justice system might otherwise be fairly minimal. In New York City, a federal court found that NYPD officers violated the Fourth Amendment by performing unreasonable searches and seizures and further found that police violated the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment by stopping and frisking New Yorkers in a racially discriminatory manner.18 In Missouri, annual reports by the Attorney General regularly find racial disparities in vehicle stops.19 According to the 2017 report, Black motorists were far more likely to be stopped, despite police finding contraband less often when stopping Black motorists than when stopping white motorists. “African-Americans represent 10.9% of the driving-age population but 18.7% of all traffic stops .... The contraband hit rate for whites was 35.5%, compared with 32.9% for blacks and 27.9% for Hispanics. This means that, on average, searches of African-Americans and Hispanics are less likely than searches of whites to result in the discovery of contraband.”

In sum, the incidence of police and prosecutorial misconduct is not limited to dusty case files from the old Confederacy.

Meanwhile, crime remains a serious problem, one America has struggled with since colonial times. Since the 1800s, the United States has had a much higher murder rate than European countries otherwise similar to us in measures of economic power and educational attainment. Then, beginning around 1965, the U.S. homicide rate increased dramatically.20 Although the increase was not uniform (different decades saw different trends, and different locations experienced trends differently), the United States as a whole suffered a big increase in crime from the mid-1960s through the early-1990s, with the nationwide homicide rate peaking at

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20 Homicide is the best measure of crime rates. The definition has remained fairly constant over time (and from place to place), and homicide is generally noticed and recorded. Data for crimes such as rape and theft are far less reliable.
around 10 per 100,000 persons. Since then, crime has dropped significantly, returning over twenty years to what was observed in the early 1960s.\(^\text{21}\) By 2000, the homicide rate had dropped to around 5.5 per 100,000, which is close to the rates observed over the subsequent two decades.\(^\text{22}\) (Time will tell whether the rising homicide rates observed during 2020 and 2021—that is, during first years of the COVID pandemic—represent an aberration or a new normal.) In other words, American crime rates remain well above those of Western Europe, Canada, and Australia, but they are far better than American rates of a generation ago. The sharp increase in crime between the 1960s and 1990s may explain in part the rapid increase in American incarceration, as politicians offered “tough-on-crime” solutions. The causes of the huge increase in crime beginning around 1965, as well as of the subsequent decrease, are hotly disputed.\(^\text{23}\) In any event, crime remains an important political and social issue in America. Court decisions about how police may behave will be better understood if given broader social context. For example, judicial decisions that prevent the convictions of undisputedly guilty defendants may be unpopular among voters, and voters elect the politicians who appoint and confirm Supreme Court Justices. Further, Justices may recognize their relative lack of expertise in the fields of policing and criminology, and they may hesitate to mandate practices (or to prohibit practices) without thoughtfully considering how their decisions could affect ongoing national efforts to fight crime. The debate over how much the Court should meddle in the affairs of police departments is a thread that runs through the course material.

**Outline of the Book**

After the first chapter, the book will proceed as follows: First, we will examine the Fourth Amendment, beginning with considering what counts as a “search” in Fourth Amendment cases. After studying the concepts of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, we will discuss warrants, including what police must do to obtain them, when they are required, and when the Supreme Court has said police may conduct searches and seizures without warrants. Having spent about a third of the book on searches, we will turn to seizures, including arrests and “stop and frisk.”

Around the halfway point of the book, we will move from the Fourth Amendment and begin our study of interrogations, examining how the Court has used the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to regulate police questioning of suspects. This portion of the book will cover the Due Process Clauses, the *Miranda* Rule, and regulations arising from the right to counsel.

Having studied “substantive” criminal procedure rules at some length—learning what the Court has told police officers they can and cannot do—we will turn to the remedies available when these rules are broken. Primarily, we will focus on the exclusionary rule, a judicially-created remedy

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\(^{22}\) *See* FBI, “Crime in the United States 2016.”

that prevents prosecutors from using certain evidence obtained illegally. We will also consider when money damages are available as a remedy for violations of criminal procedure rules.

Near the end of the book, we will study the criminal defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. In particular, we will learn when the state must provide counsel and how effective counsel must be to satisfy the constitutional guarantee.

Then we will study identification procedures, including how police can avoid mistaken identifications by victims and other witnesses, along with the limited requirements that have been imposed by the Supreme Court.

As the book ends, we will consider some new challenges presented by terrorism, such as torture, and by technological advances, such as electronic surveillance.

A Note on the Text

Universities exist to promote the search for knowledge and to transmit human knowledge to future generations. Public universities in particular have a tradition of sharing knowledge with the broader populace, not merely their own students, and they also have a tradition of providing excellent education at affordable prices. This book exists to further these important missions of the University of Missouri. Designed by MU professors, it suits the pedagogical preferences of its authors. Available at no cost, it reduces students’ cost of attendance.

In addition, this book is available under a Creative Commons license, meaning that anyone—inside or outside the university—can use it to study criminal procedure and can share it at will. Faculty at other universities are free to adopt it, and some have done so.

The project was inspired, in part, by an article one of your authors published in 2016, calling on law schools and law faculty to create free casebooks for students. It turned out that calling upon others to create books did not in itself produce these books. Your authors have since become the change they wished to see in legal education. Because the book is relatively new—and is the first casebook produced by either of your authors—student feedback is especially welcome. Future students will benefit from any improvements.

To increase the book’s value as a free resource, the text when possible contains links to sources at which students can learn more at no cost. For example, Supreme Court cases are freely available online, and anyone who wishes to read the full unedited version of any case may do so. (Even when a link has not been provided, when naming cases we usually have included a full citation, which should allow students easy access to free versions of the text.) Your authors have edited cases so that reading assignments would be kept reasonable for a one-semester course; however, there is always more to learn.

In addition, this book aims to go beyond providing a “nutshell” summary of American criminal procedure law. From time to time, particularly when assigned cases raise issues about which there are important ongoing debates in American society, the readings will investigate these

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24 See Ben Trachtenberg, Choosing a Criminal Procedure Casebook: On Lesser Evils and Free Books, 60 St. Louis U. L.J. 543, 552 (2016) (“I hope authors and money can be found to create excellent, inexpensive books and thereby reduce the cost of legal education.”).
issues in greater depth than might be possible were the text confined to opinions written by Supreme Court Justices. More than one hundred years ago, Roscoe Pound—then dean of the University of Nebraska College of Law, later dean at Harvard—published the great legal realist article “Law in Books and Law in Action.” If this book is successful, students will spend time considering the practical effects—the law in action—of the opinions contained in Supreme Court reporters.

The Key Constitutional Language

In this course, students will focus on Supreme Court cases arising from a handful of constitutional provisions. Four Amendments to the Constitution of the United States are reprinted here (three in full, one in part) for your convenience:

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Amendment XIV

Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

*S*  *  *  *

Savvy students will have noticed that the constitutional provisions reprinted above lack definitions for terms such as “unreasonable,” “search,” “seizure,” “probable cause,” “put in jeopardy,” “due process of law,” “confronted with the witnesses against him,” and “Assistance of Counsel.” The remainder of this book is, essentially, a summary of the Supreme Court’s ongoing efforts to provide the missing definitions.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Chapter 2
What Is a Search? The Basics

With the readings for this chapter, we begin our exploration of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment is short, just 54 words, and it reflects the desires of those who wrote and ratified it to protect Americans against unreasonable government intrusion into their lives. The Amendment mentions some of the more important aspects of a person’s life—her house, her papers, her effects, even her “person,” that is, her body—and declares that government agents may not unreasonably search or seize those things. Here is the text:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

These words have inspired arguments about their meanings. For example, what counts as a “house” and thereby merits protection from unreasonable searches? Is it limited to physical buildings in which people live, or is some area outside the structure included? We will see later that the Court eventually defined the concept of “curtilage,” which is an outdoor area that the Court treats as part of the “house.”

Over the coming weeks, students will encounter vigorous debate over the meaning of “reasonable.” When is it reasonable for a police officer to stop and frisk a pedestrian about whom the officer has suspicion? When is it reasonable for police to search cars without warrants? For now, we will set aside the concept of reasonableness for one simple reason: Before something can be an “unreasonable search,” it must first be a “search.” The cases assigned for this chapter concern the definition of “search” for purposes of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. (Similarly, before something can be an “unreasonable seizure,” it must first be a “seizure.” We will consider the definition of “seizure” later in the semester.)

In the first case, *Katz v. United States*, the Justices attempt to bring their definition of “search” into the modern world.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Charles Katz v. United States**

Decided Dec. 18, 1967 — 389 U.S. 347

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal statute. At trial the Government was permitted, over the petitioner’s objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner’s end of
telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because “[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner].” We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional questions thus presented.

The petitioner had phrased those questions as follows:

“A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.

“B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase “constitutionally protected area.” Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional “right to privacy.” That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.

Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a “constitutionally protected area.” The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or not a given “area,” viewed in the abstract, is “constitutionally protected” deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.

The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.
The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438; *Goldman v. United States*, 316 U.S. 129, 134—136, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible property. But “(t)he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in *Olmstead* that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overhead without any “technical trespass under … local property law.” Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply “areas”—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.

We conclude that the underpinnings of *Olmstead* and *Goldman* have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the “trespass” doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.

Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored “the procedure of antecedent justification … that is central to the Fourth Amendment,” a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it led to the petitioner’s conviction, the judgment must be reversed.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.

As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a “place.” My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.

The critical fact in this case is that “(o)ne who occupies it, (a telephone booth) shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume” that his conversation is not being intercepted. The point is not that the booth is “accessible to the public” at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.

Finally, I do not read the Court’s opinion to declare that no interception of a conversation one-half of which occurs in a public telephone booth can be reasonable in the absence of a warrant. As elsewhere under the Fourth Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions. It will be time enough to consider any such exceptions when an appropriate occasion presents itself, and I agree with the Court that this is not one.

Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.

If I could agree with the Court that eavesdropping carried on by electronic means (equivalent to wiretapping) constitutes a “search” or “seizure,” I would be happy to join the Court’s opinion.

My basic objection is twofold: (1) I do not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by today’s decision, and (2) I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite the Amendment in order “to bring it into harmony with the times” and thus reach a result that many people believe to be desirable.

While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as privacy, for me the language of the Amendment is the crucial place to look in construing a written document such as our Constitution. The Fourth Amendment says that

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The first clause protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures … .” These words connote the idea of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, or both. The second clause of the Amendment still further establishes its Framers’ purpose to limit its protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched nor seized. In addition, the language of the second clause
indicates that the Amendment refers not only to something tangible so it can be seized but to something already in existence so it can be described. Yet the Court’s interpretation would have the Amendment apply to overhearing future conversations which by their very nature are nonexistent until they take place. How can one “describe” a future conversation, and, if one cannot, how can a magistrate issue a warrant to eavesdrop one in the future? It is argued that information showing what is expected to be said is sufficient to limit the boundaries of what later can be admitted into evidence; but does such general information really meet the specific language of the Amendment which says “particularly describing”? Rather than using language in a completely artificial way, I must conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping.

Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping (and wiretapping is nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone) was, as even the majority opinion in Berger, supra, recognized, “an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. In those days the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private discourse.” There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment. They certainly would not have left such a task to the ingenuity of language-stretching judges. No one, it seems to me, can read the debates on the Bill of Rights without reaching the conclusion that its Framers and critics well knew the meaning of the words they used, what they would be understood to mean by others, their scope and their limitations. Under these circumstances it strikes me as a charge against their scholarship, their common sense and their candor to give to the Fourth Amendment’s language the eavesdropping meaning the Court imputes to it today.

I do not deny that common sense requires and that this Court often has said that the Bill of Rights’ safeguards should be given a liberal construction. This principle, however, does not justify construing the search and seizure amendment as applying to eavesdropping or the “seizure” of conversations. The Fourth Amendment was aimed directly at the abhorred practice of breaking in, ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing people’s personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates. The Amendment deserves, and this Court has given it, a liberal construction in order to protect against warrantless searches of buildings and seizures of tangible personal effects. But until today this Court has refused to say that eavesdropping comes within the ambit of Fourth Amendment restrictions.

Since I see no way in which the words of the Fourth Amendment can be construed to apply to eavesdropping, that closes the matter for me. In interpreting the Bill of Rights, I willingly go as far as a liberal construction of the language takes me, but I simply cannot in good conscience give a meaning to words which they have never before been thought to have and which they certainly do not have in common ordinary usage. I will not distort the words of the Amendment in order to “keep the Constitution up to date” or “to bring it into harmony with the times.” It was never meant that this Court have such power, which in effect would make us a continuously functioning constitutional convention.

With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth
Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual’s privacy. By clever word juggling the Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations that can neither be searched nor seized. Few things happen to an individual that do not affect his privacy in one way or another. Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court’s language, designed to protect privacy, for the Constitution’s language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court’s broadest concept of privacy.

The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything which affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history of governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.

For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

In *Katz*, the Court made clear that a physical trespass is not essential to a Fourth Amendment search. In subsequent chapters, students will explore the Court’s efforts to flesh out this ruling, applying it to contexts such as police officers flying over houses, police officers using thermal imaging devices to examine a home, and police searching garbage left outside for collection.

In our next case, however, the Court reminds readers that although trespass is not necessary to a Fourth Amendment search, it can be sufficient. That is, although the line of cases following *Katz* remains essential reading for a student of criminal procedure, not every Fourth Amendment search necessarily invades a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Forty-five years after the Court decided *Katz*, the Justices handed down *United States v. Jones*, reiterating the importance of the law of trespass to the Court’s vision of the Fourth Amendment.

Supreme Court of the United States

**United States v. Antoine Jones**

Decided Jan. 23, 2012 — 565 U.S. 400

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In 2004 respondent Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub in the District of Columbia, came under suspicion of trafficking in narcotics and was made the target of an investigation by a joint FBI and Metropolitan Police Department task force.

Agents installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot. Over the next 28 days, the Government used the device to track the vehicle’s movements, and once had to replace the device’s battery. By means of signals from multiple satellites, the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that location by cellular phone to a Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over the 4-week period.

The Government ultimately obtained a multiple-count indictment charging Jones with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base. Before trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the GPS device. The District Court granted the motion only in part, suppressing the data obtained while the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. It held the remaining data admissible, because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”

The Government introduced at trial the GPS-derived locational data, which connected Jones to the alleged conspirators’ stash house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97 kilograms of cocaine, and 1 kilogram of cocaine base. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the District Court sentenced Jones to life imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction because of admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device which, it said, violated the Fourth Amendment. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government’s petition for rehearing en banc, with four judges dissenting. We granted certiorari.

The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an “effect” as that term is used in the Amendment. We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search.”

It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), is a “case we have described as a ‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American
statesman’ at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ ” with regard to search and seizure. In that case, Lord Camden expressed in plain terms the significance of property rights in search-and-seizure analysis:

 “[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.”

The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to “the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures”; the phrase “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” would have been superfluous.

Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century. Thus, in *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, we held that wiretaps attached to telephone wires on the public streets did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”

Our later cases, of course, have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach. In *Katz v. United States*, we said that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” and found a violation in attachment of an eavesdropping device to a public telephone booth. Our later cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in that case, which said that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”

The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows that no search occurred here, since Jones had no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area of the Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of the Jeep on the public roads, which were visible to all. But we need not address the Government’s contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the *Katz* formulation. At bottom, we must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) it enumerates. *Katz* did not repudiate that understanding. Less than two years later the Court upheld defendants’ contention that the Government could not introduce against them conversations between other people obtained by warrantless placement of electronic surveillance devices in their homes. The opinion rejected the dissent’s contention that there was no Fourth Amendment violation “unless the conversational privacy of the homeowner himself is invaded.” *Alderman v. United States*, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969). “[W]e [do not] believe that *Katz*, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home....” Id., at 180.

More recently, in *Soldal v. Cook County*, 506 U.S. 56 (1992), the Court unanimously rejected the argument that although a “seizure” had occurred “in a ‘technical’ sense” when a trailer home was forcibly removed, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because law enforcement had not “inva[de]d the [individuals’] privacy.” *Katz*, the Court explained, established that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,” but did not “snuff[f] out the
previously recognized protection for property.” As Justice Brennan explained in his concurrence in *Knotts, Katz* did not erode the principle “that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” We have embodied that preservation of past rights in our very definition of “reasonable expectation of privacy” which we have said to be an expectation “that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” *Katz* did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope.

The Government contends that several of our post-*Katz* cases foreclose the conclusion that what occurred here constituted a search. It relies principally on two cases in which we rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to “beepers,” electronic tracking devices that represent another form of electronic monitoring. The first case, *Knotts*, upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge the use of a “beeper” that had been placed in a container of chloroform, allowing law enforcement to monitor the location of the container. We said that there had been no infringement of Knotts’ reasonable expectation of privacy since the information obtained—the location of the automobile carrying the container on public roads, and the location of the off-loaded container in open fields near Knotts’ cabin—had been voluntarily conveyed to the public. But as we have discussed, the *Katz* reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been *added to, not substituted for*, the common-law trespassory test. The holding in *Knotts* addressed only the former, since the latter was not at issue. The beeper had been placed in the container before it came into Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner. *Knotts* did not challenge that installation, and we specifically declined to consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. *Knotts* would be relevant, perhaps, if the Government were making the argument that what would otherwise be an unconstitutional search is not such where it produces only public information. The Government does not make that argument, and we know of no case that would support it.

The second “beeper” case, *United States v. Karo*, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), does not suggest a different conclusion. There we addressed the question left open by *Knotts*, whether the installation of a beeper in a container amounted to a search or seizure. As in *Knotts*, at the time the beeper was installed the container belonged to a third party, and it did not come into possession of the defendant until later. Thus, the specific question we considered was whether the installation “*with the consent of the original owner constitute[d] a search or seizure ... when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper.*” We held not. The Government, we said, came into physical contact with the container only before it belonged to the defendant Karo; and the transfer of the container with the unmonitored beeper inside did not convey any information and thus did not invade Karo’s privacy. That conclusion is perfectly consistent with the one we reach here. Karo accepted the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was used to monitor the container’s location. *Cf. On Lee v. United States*, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (no search or seizure where an informant, who was wearing a concealed microphone, was invited into the defendant’s business). Jones, who possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device, is on much different footing.

The Government also points to our exposition in *New York v. Class*, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), that “[t]he exterior of a car ... is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’” That statement is of marginal relevance here since, as the Government acknowledges,
“the officers in this case did more than conduct a visual inspection of respondent’s vehicle.” By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area. In Class itself we suggested that this would make a difference, for we concluded that an officer’s momentary reaching into the interior of a vehicle did constitute a search.

Finally, the Government’s position gains little support from our conclusion in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), that officers’ information-gathering intrusion on an “open field” did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search even though it was a trespass at common law. Quite simply, an open field, unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of those protected areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. The Government’s physical intrusion on such an area—unlike its intrusion on the “effect” at issue here—is of no Fourth Amendment significance.

B

The concurrence begins by accusing us of applying “18th-century tort law.” That is a distortion. What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted. The concurrence does not share that belief. It would apply exclusively Katz’s reasonable-expectation of-privacy test, even when that eliminates rights that previously existed.

The concurrence [by Justice Alito] faults our approach for “present[ing] particularly vexing problems” in cases that do not involve physical contact, such as those that involve the transmission of electronic signals. We entirely fail to understand that point. For unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.

In fact, it is the concurrence’s insistence on the exclusivity of the Katz test that needlessly leads us into “particularly vexing problems” in the present case. This Court has to date not deviated from the understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search. We accordingly held in Knotts that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” Thus, even assuming that the concurrence is correct to say that “[t]raditional surveillance” of Jones for a 4–week period “would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” our cases suggest that such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.

And answering it affirmatively leads us needlessly into additional thorny problems. The concurrence posits that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets” is okay, but that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses” is no good. That introduces yet another novelty into our jurisprudence. There is no precedent for the proposition that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a 4–week investigation is “surely” too long and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an “extraordinary offens[e]” which may permit longer
observation. What of a 2–day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6–month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple with these “vexing problems” in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is affirmed.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion because I agree that a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, “[w]here, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” “[W]hen the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Nonetheless, as Justice ALITO notes, physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS- enabled smartphones. In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance. But “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” As Justice ALITO incisively observes, the same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations. Under that rubric, I agree with Justice ALITO that, at the very least, “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”

In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future. And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: “limited police resources and community hostility.” Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”

I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques. I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent “a too permeating police surveillance.”

More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps, as Justice ALITO notes, some people may find the “tradeoff” of privacy for convenience “worthwhile,” or come to accept this “diminution of privacy” as “inevitable,” and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.

Resolution of these difficult questions in this case is unnecessary, however, because the Government’s physical intrusion on Jones’ Jeep supplies a narrower basis for decision. I therefore join the majority’s opinion.

Justice ALITO, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice KAGAN join, concurring in the judgment.

This case requires us to apply the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21st-century surveillance technique, the use of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device to monitor a vehicle’s movements for an extended period of time. Ironically, the Court has chosen to decide this case based on 18th-century tort law.

This holding, in my judgment, is unwise. It strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.

I would analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.

I

A

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the Court makes
very little effort to explain how the attachment or use of the GPS device fits within these terms. The Court does not contend that there was a seizure ... and here there was none.

The Court does claim that the installation and use of the GPS constituted a search, but this conclusion is dependent on the questionable proposition that these two procedures cannot be separated for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. If these two procedures are analyzed separately, it is not at all clear from the Court’s opinion why either should be regarded as a search. It is clear that the attachment of the GPS device was not itself a search; if the device had not functioned or if the officers had not used it, no information would have been obtained. And the Court does not contend that the use of the device constituted a search either. On the contrary, the Court accepts the holding in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, that the use of a surreptitiously planted electronic device to monitor a vehicle’s movements on public roads did not amount to a search.

The Court argues—and I agree—that “we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” But it is almost impossible to think of late–18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case. (Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?) The Court’s theory seems to be that the concept of a search, as originally understood, comprehended any technical trespass that led to the gathering of evidence, but we know that this is incorrect. At common law, any unauthorized intrusion on private property was actionable but a trespass on open fields, as opposed to the “curtilage” of a home, does not fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment because private property outside the curtilage is not part of a “hous[e]” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

B

The Court’s reasoning in this case is very similar to that in the Court’s early decisions involving wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, namely, that a technical trespass followed by the gathering of evidence constitutes a search. In the early electronic surveillance cases, the Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when private conversations were monitored as a result of an “unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied” by the defendant. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961). In Silverman, police officers listened to conversations in an attached home by inserting a “spike mike” through the wall that this house shared with the vacant house next door. This procedure was held to be a search because the mike made contact with a heating duct on the other side of the wall and thus “usurp[ed] ... an integral part of the premises.”

1 [Court’s footnote 3 in concurrence] The Court suggests that something like this might have occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and patience.
By contrast, in cases in which there was no trespass, it was held that there was no search. Thus, in *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because “[t]he taps from house lines were made in the streets near the houses.” Similarly, the Court concluded that no search occurred in *Goldman v. United States*, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), where a “detectaphone” was placed on the outer wall of defendant’s office for the purpose of overhearing conversations held within the room.

This trespass-based rule was repeatedly criticized. In *Olmstead*, Justice Brandeis wrote that it was “immaterial where the physical connection with the telephone wires was made.”

*Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), finally did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not required for a Fourth Amendment violation. [T]he *Katz* Court, “repudiate[ed]” the old doctrine and held that “[t]he fact that the electronic device employed ... did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.” What mattered, the Court held, was whether the conduct at issue “violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth.”

Under this approach, as the Court later put it when addressing the relevance of a technical trespass, “an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”

[T]he majority is hard pressed to find support in post-*Katz* cases for its trespass-based theory.

III

Disharmony with a substantial body of existing case law is only one of the problems with the Court’s approach in this case.

I will briefly note four others. First, the Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation). Attaching such an object is generally regarded as so trivial that it does not provide a basis for recovery under modern tort law. But under the Court’s reasoning, this conduct may violate the Fourth Amendment. By contrast, if long-term monitoring can be accomplished without committing a technical trespass—suppose, for example, that the Federal Government required or persuaded auto manufacturers to include a GPS tracking device in every car—the Court’s theory would provide no protection.

Second, the Court’s approach leads to incongruous results. If the police attach a GPS device to a car and use the device to follow the car for even a brief time, under the Court’s theory, the Fourth Amendment applies. But if the police follow the same car for a much longer period using unmarked cars and aerial assistance, this tracking is not subject to any Fourth Amendment constraints.

In the present case, the Fourth Amendment applies, the Court concludes, because the officers installed the GPS device after respondent’s wife, to whom the car was registered, turned it over
to respondent for his exclusive use. But if the GPS had been attached prior to that time, the Court’s theory would lead to a different result. The Court proceeds on the assumption that respondent “had at least the property rights of a bailee,” but a bailee may sue for a trespass to chattel only if the injury occurs during the term of the bailment. So if the GPS device had been installed before respondent’s wife gave him the keys, respondent would have no claim for trespass—and, presumably, no Fourth Amendment claim either.

Third, under the Court’s theory, the coverage of the Fourth Amendment may vary from State to State. If the events at issue here had occurred in a community property State or a State that has adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act, respondent would likely be an owner of the vehicle, and it would not matter whether the GPS was installed before or after his wife turned over the keys. In non-community-property States, on the other hand, the registration of the vehicle in the name of respondent’s wife would generally be regarded as presumptive evidence that she was the sole owner.

Fourth, the Court’s reliance on the law of trespass will present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked. For example, suppose that the officers in the present case had followed respondent by surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection system that came with the car when it was purchased. Would the sending of a radio signal to activate this system constitute a trespass to chattels? Trespass to chattels has traditionally required a physical touching of the property. In recent years, courts have wrestled with the application of this old tort in cases involving unwanted electronic contact with computer systems, and some have held that even the transmission of electrons that occurs when a communication is sent from one computer to another is enough. But may such decisions be followed in applying the Court’s trespass theory? Assuming that what matters under the Court’s theory is the law of trespass as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, do these recent decisions represent a change in the law or simply the application of the old tort to new situations?

IV

A

The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and complications noted above, but it is not without its own difficulties. It involves a degree of circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. In addition, the Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.
On the other hand, concern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions. This is what ultimately happened with respect to wiretapping. After Katz, Congress did not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive statute and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and not by case law.

B

Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit the monitoring of a person’s movements. In some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of the movements of motorists who choose to make use of that convenience. Many motorists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain the car’s location at any time so that roadside assistance may be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is stolen.

Perhaps most significant, cell phones and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the location of users—and as of June 2011, it has been reported, there were more than 322 million wireless devices in use in the United States. For older phones, the accuracy of the location information depends on the density of the tower network, but new “smart phones,” which are equipped with a GPS device, permit more precise tracking. For example, when a user activates the GPS on such a phone, a provider is able to monitor the phone’s location and speed of movement and can then report back real-time traffic conditions after combining (“crowdsourcing”) the speed of all such phones on any particular road. Similarly, phone-location-tracking services are offered as “social” tools, allowing consumers to find (or to avoid) others who enroll in these services. The availability and use of these and other new devices will continue to shape the average person’s expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.

V

In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The surveillance at issue in this case—constant monitoring of the location of a vehicle for four weeks—would have required a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance. Only an investigation of unusual importance could have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement resources. Devices like the one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap. In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.

To date, however, Congress and most States have not enacted statutes regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes. The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.
Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period. In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark. Other cases may present more difficult questions. But where uncertainty exists with respect to whether a certain period of GPS surveillance is long enough to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, the police may always seek a warrant. We also need not consider whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of privacy. In such cases, long-term tracking might have been mounted using previously available techniques.

For these reasons, I conclude that the lengthy monitoring that occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. I therefore agree with the majority that the decision of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

Although the Jones Court held that Katz is not the sole touchstone of Fourth Amendment “search” analysis, it also made clear that Katz has not in any way been overruled. When considering whether certain state action constitutes a “search,” students should consider both whether it satisfies the criteria set forth in Katz and whether it satisfies the more recent standard articulated in Jones. A person complaining about state action need not satisfy both standards; either one will do.

As Justice Alito noted in his concurrence, “the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and not by case law.” This is the first example of what will become a common theme in the course. Put simply, much of criminal procedure—like criminal law more generally—is not regulated by constitutional law. Witness identification procedures, for example, are largely left to the discretion of police departments, with minimal oversight by courts. Once states meet bare minimum standards for providing the assistance of counsel for indigent defendants, they decide how much additional money to devote to the effort. States decide how many police officers they want to patrol various neighborhoods, how strictly to enforce various criminal laws, and how much to punish convicted defendants. As the semester progresses, students should pay careful attention to the policy decisions not dictated by Supreme Court doctrine. Those are decisions that, after students become lawyers, they may have the opportunity to guide.

The majority in Jones relies on the trespassory nature of the police contact with the jeep to find a search rather than a Katz-style “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis. As Justice Sotomayor predicted, though, police surveillance of GPS-enabled smartphones without trespassory invasion has quickly become a reality, and police can now access this data without a physical trespass. Moreover, police can obtain GPS information about all cell phone users in a
particular area. Consider the “reverse location search warrant.” This warrant allows police, without touching anyone’s phone, to gather cell phone GPS data on all phones within the vicinity of a crime. Is this tactic a search under Jones? Under Katz? Why or why not? Consider the reasonable expectations of privacy for private individuals who are in the general locality of a crime by happenstance.

What result if the police do not trespass to place the GPS, but instead local ordinances or state legislation requires vehicles to be outfitted with GPS? Consider a Chicago ordinance that requires all food trucks to be outfitted with GPS and allows the city to access that GPS data for six months without a warrant.

One final note: In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), a case concerning “whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.” Students should consider now (and perhaps write down) how they would answer this question, using the reasoning set forth in Katz and Jones. In the next few chapters, students will read several cases in which the Court applies the doctrines of Katz and Jones to different scenarios. Then, in Chapter 5, the Court’s decision in Carpenter is presented. Will the Court’s reasoning match yours?
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Chapter 3
What Is a Search? Some Specifics

In the material assigned for this chapter, we begin applying the rules set forth in *Katz* and *Jones* to specific activities. As the cases make clear, the word “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment does not have its normal English meaning, that is, something to the effect of “try to find something” or “look for something.” Instead, the Supreme Court has created a legal term of art. Some activities that one might normally describe with the word “search” (such as looking through someone’s garbage in the hope of finding something interesting) turn out not to count as “searches” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Students should consider when reading these cases whether the Court’s reasoning is persuasive. Further, they should consider whether a unifying set of principles can be found that (at least most of the time) allows one to predict whether a given activity will count as a “search.” Absent such a set of principles, it may appear that the Court’s doctrine in this area is somewhat arbitrary.

Supreme Court of the United States
*California v. Billy Greenwood*
Decided May 16, 1988 — 486 U.S. 35

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue here is whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home. We conclude, in accordance with the vast majority of lower courts that have addressed the issue, that it does not.

I

In early 1984, Investigator Jenny Stracner of the Laguna Beach Police Department received information indicating that respondent Greenwood might be engaged in narcotics trafficking. Stracner sought to investigate this information by conducting a surveillance of Greenwood’s home.

On April 6, 1984, Stracner asked the neighborhood’s regular trash collector to pick up the plastic garbage bags that Greenwood had left on the curb in front of his house and to turn the bags over to her without mixing their contents with garbage from other houses. The trash collector cleaned his truck bin of other refuse, collected the garbage bags from the street in front of Greenwood’s house, and turned the bags over to Stracner. The officer searched through the rubbish and found items indicative of narcotics use. She recited the information that she had gleaned from the trash search in an affidavit in support of a warrant to search Greenwood’s home.

Police officers encountered both respondents at the house later that day when they arrived to execute the warrant. The police discovered quantities of cocaine and hashish during their search of the house. Respondents were arrested on felony narcotics charges. They subsequently posted bail.
The police continued to receive reports of many late-night visitors to the Greenwood house. On May 4, Investigator Robert Rahaeuser obtained Greenwood’s garbage from the regular trash collector in the same manner as had Stracner. The garbage again contained evidence of narcotics use.

Rahaeuser secured another search warrant for Greenwood’s home based on the information from the second trash search. The police found more narcotics and evidence of narcotics trafficking when they executed the warrant. Greenwood was again arrested.

II

The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable. Respondents do not disagree with this standard.

They assert, however, that they had, and exhibited, an expectation of privacy with respect to the trash that was searched by the police: The trash, which was placed on the street for collection at a fixed time, was contained in opaque plastic bags, which the garbage collector was expected to pick up, mingle with the trash of others, and deposit at the garbage dump. The trash was only temporarily on the street, and there was little likelihood that it would be inspected by anyone.

It may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents of their garbage bags would become known to the police or other members of the public. An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.

Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having deposited their garbage “in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it,” respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.

Furthermore, as we have held, the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public. Hence, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”

The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Justice KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Every week for two months, and at least once more a month later, the Laguna Beach police clawed through the trash that respondent Greenwood left in opaque, sealed bags on the curb outside his home. Complete strangers minutely scrutinized their bounty, undoubtedly dredging up intimate details of Greenwood’s private life and habits. The intrusions proceeded without a warrant, and no court before or since has concluded that the police acted on probable cause to believe Greenwood was engaged in any criminal activity.

Scrutiny of another’s trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior. I suspect, therefore, that members of our society will be shocked to learn that the Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems unreasonable our expectation that the aspects of our private lives that are concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public.

I

“A container which can support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a warrant.” Thus, as the Court observes, if Greenwood had a reasonable expectation that the contents of the bags that he placed on the curb would remain private, the warrantless search of those bags violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Framers of the Fourth Amendment understood that “unreasonable searches” of “paper[s] and effects”—no less than “unreasonable searches” of “person[s] and houses”—infringe privacy. As early as 1878, this Court acknowledged that the contents of “[l]etters and sealed packages ... in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection ... as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.” In short, so long as a package is “closed against inspection,” the Fourth Amendment protects its contents, “wherever they may be,” and the police must obtain a warrant to search it just “as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.”

With the emergence of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis, see Katz v. United States, we have reaffirmed this fundamental principle. Accordingly, we have found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a 200-pound “double-locked footlocker,” a “comparatively small, unlocked suitcase,” a “totebag,” and “packages wrapped in green opaque plastic,”

Our precedent, therefore, leaves no room to doubt that had respondents been carrying their personal effects in opaque, sealed plastic bags—identical to the ones they placed on the curb—their privacy would have been protected from warrantless police intrusion. So far as Fourth Amendment protection is concerned, opaque plastic bags are every bit as worthy as “packages wrapped in green opaque plastic” and “double-locked footlocker[s].”
Respondents deserve no less protection just because Greenwood used the bags to discard rather than to transport his personal effects. Their contents are not inherently any less private, and Greenwood’s decision to discard them, at least in the manner in which he did, does not diminish his expectation of privacy.

A trash bag, like any of the above-mentioned containers, “is a common repository for one’s personal effects” and, even more than many of them, is “therefore ... inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.” A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced it. A search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target’s financial and professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic interests. It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’” which the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect.

In evaluating the reasonableness of Greenwood’s expectation that his sealed trash bags would not be invaded, the Court has held that we must look to “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Most of us, I believe, would be incensed to discover a meddler—whether a neighbor, a reporter, or a detective—scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to discover some detail of our personal lives. That was, quite naturally, the reaction to the sole incident on which the Court bases its conclusion that “snoops” and the like defeat the expectation of privacy in trash. When a tabloid reporter examined then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s trash and published his findings, Kissinger was “really revolted” by the intrusion and his wife suffered “grave anguish.” The public response roundly condemning the reporter demonstrates that society not only recognized those reactions as reasonable, but shared them as well. Commentators variously characterized his conduct as “a disgusting invasion of personal privacy,” and contrary to “the way decent people behave in relation to each other.”

Had Greenwood flaunted his intimate activity by strewing his trash all over the curb for all to see, or had some nongovernmental intruder invaded his privacy and done the same, I could accept the Court’s conclusion that an expectation of privacy would have been unreasonable. Similarly, had police searching the city dump run across incriminating evidence that, despite commingling with the trash of others, still retained its identity as Greenwood’s, we would have a different case. But all that Greenwood “exposed ... to the public,” were the exteriors of several opaque, sealed containers. Until the bags were opened by police, they hid their contents from the public’s view every bit as much as did Chadwick’s double-locked footlocker and Robbins’ green, plastic wrapping. Faithful application of the warrant requirement does not require police to “avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public.” Rather, it only requires them to adhere to norms of privacy that members of the public plainly acknowledge.

The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage through the containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in their contents any more than the
possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home; or the possibility of a private intrusion negates an expectation of privacy in an unopened package; or the possibility that an operator will listen in on a telephone conversation negates an expectation of privacy in the words spoken on the telephone. “What a person ... seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” We have therefore repeatedly rejected attempts to justify a State's invasion of privacy on the ground that the privacy is not absolute.

Nor is it dispositive that “respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, ... who might himself have sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.” In the first place, Greenwood can hardly be faulted for leaving trash on his curb when a county ordinance commanded him to do so and prohibited him from disposing of it in any other way. Unlike in other circumstances where privacy is compromised, Greenwood could not “avoid exposing personal belongings ... by simply leaving them at home.” More importantly, even the voluntary relinquishment of possession or control over an effect does not necessarily amount to a relinquishment of a privacy expectation in it. Were it otherwise, a letter or package would lose all Fourth Amendment protection when placed in a mailbox or other depository with the “express purpose” of entrusting it to the postal officer or a private carrier; those bailees are just as likely as trash collectors (and certainly have greater incentive) to “sort through” the personal effects entrusted to them, “or permit[ting] others, such as police to do so.” Yet, it has been clear for at least 110 years that the possibility of such an intrusion does not justify a warrantless search by police in the first instance.

III

In holding that the warrantless search of Greenwood’s trash was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Court paints a grim picture of our society. It depicts a society in which local authorities may command their citizens to dispose of their personal effects in the manner least protective of the “sanctity of [the] home and the privacies of life,” and then monitor them arbitrarily and without judicial oversight—a society that is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an individual’s expectation of privacy in the most private of personal effects sealed in an opaque container and disposed of in a manner designed to commingle it imminently and inextricably with the trash of others. The American society with which I am familiar “chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance,” and is more dedicated to individual liberty and more sensitive to intrusions on the sanctity of the home than the Court is willing to acknowledge.

I dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

The Greenwood Court determined there was no search because there was no objective expectation of privacy in trash placed by the curb; the narcotics evidence in that trash was readily accessible to the public, placed at the curb for conveyance to a third party, and police are not expected to “avert their eyes” from publicly observable criminal behavior. Should there be a
different outcome if the illegality of the contents is not so readily observable?

Consider the case of a tax preparer suspected of defrauding the government. The IRS agents collect his curbside trash for weeks only to discover the trash bags are filled with documents shredded into 5/32 inch strips. After reconstructing the documents (take a moment to consider the time and effort necessary to do so), the IRS has sufficient probable cause for a search warrant. Search or no search? Why or why not?

Consider police who extract DNA evidence from curbside trash. Does a defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA evidence on cups, bottles, or condoms placed in the trash on the curb? Several recent murders have been solved using a combination genetic ancestry research (to narrow the suspect pool) and DNA from trash to zero in on the defendant. https://abcnews.go.com/US/dna-tissue-alleged-golden-state-killers-trash-led/story?id=55602892

When interpreting its own law (such as a state constitution), a state court can recognize a “search” where courts applying the federal constitution would not. What are some arguments for and against states using different definitions of “search” than the Supreme Court has used when interpreting the Fourth Amendment? See State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 92–93 (Vt 1996) (“One may accept the possibility that one’s garbage is susceptible to invasion by raccoons or other scavengers, and yet at the same time reasonably expect that the government will not systematically examine one’s trash bags in the hopes of finding evidence of criminal conduct.”).

* * *

In Katz, the Court decided that not all Fourth Amendment “searches” involve physical intrusion into an area in which someone enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the next case, the Court applies this principle to the use of thermal imaging technology.

Supreme Court of the United States

Danny Lee Kyllo v. United States

Decided June 11, 2001 — 533 U.S. 27

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

I

In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of the Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home belonging to petitioner Danny Kyllo, part of a triplex on Rhododendron Drive in Florence, Oregon. Indoor marijuana growth typically requires
high-intensity lamps. In order to determine whether an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner’s home consistent with the use of such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott and Dan Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the triplex. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth—black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images. The scan of Kyllo’s home took only a few minutes and was performed from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott’s vehicle across the street from the front of the house and also from the street in back of the house. The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner’s home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex. Agent Elliott concluded that petitioner was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house, which indeed he was. Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of petitioner’s home, and the agents found an indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants. Petitioner was indicted on one count of manufacturing marijuana. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the intrusiveness of thermal imaging. On remand the District Court found that the Agema 210 “is a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house”; it “did not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure”; “[t]he device used cannot penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activities”; and “[n]o intimate details of the home were observed.” Based on these findings, the District Court upheld the validity of the warrant that relied in part upon the thermal imaging, and reaffirmed its denial of the motion to suppress. A divided Court of Appeals initially reversed, but that opinion was withdrawn and the panel (after a change in composition) affirmed, with Judge Noonan dissenting. The court held that petitioner had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager “did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo’s life,” only “amorphous ‘hot spots’ on the roof and exterior wall.” We granted certiorari.

II

“At the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.

On the other hand, the antecedent question whether or not a Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred is not so simple under our precedent. The permissibility of ordinary visual surveillance of a home used to be clear because, well into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass. Visual surveillance was unquestionably lawful because “the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.” We have since decoupled
violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property, but the lawfulness of warrantless visual surveillance of a home has still been preserved. As we observed in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), “[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”

One might think that the new validating rationale would be that examining the portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it is a “search” despite the absence of trespass, is not an “unreasonable” one under the Fourth Amendment. But in fact we have held that visual observation is no “search” at all—perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional. In assessing when a search is not a search, we have applied somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States. As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. We have subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment search does not occur—even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned—unless “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,” and “society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” We have applied this test in holding that it is not a search for the police to use a pen register at the phone company to determine what numbers were dialed in a private home, and we have applied the test on two different occasions in holding that aerial surveillance of private homes and surrounding areas does not constitute a search.

The present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a home. We have previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if any, is too much. While we upheld enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex in Dow Chemical, we noted that we found “it important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.” 476 U.S. 227 (1986).

III

It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology. The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.

The Katz test—whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable. While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of residences is at issue, in the case of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a constitutionally protected area” constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search.

The Government maintains, however, that the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected “only heat radiating from the external surface of the house.” But just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating from a house, so also a powerful directional microphone picks up only sound emanating from a house—and a satellite capable of scanning from many miles away would pick up only visible light emanating from a house. We rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in *Katz*, where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home. While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.

The Government also contends that the thermal imaging was constitutional because it did not “detect private activities occurring in private areas.” The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained. In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.

Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to “intimate details” would not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application, failing to provide “a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.” To begin with, there is no necessary connection between the sophistication of the surveillance equipment and the “intimacy” of the details that it observes—which means that one cannot say (and the police cannot be assured) that use of the relatively crude equipment at issue here will always be lawful. The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider “intimate”; and a much more sophisticated system might detect nothing more intimate than the fact that someone left a closet light on. We could not, in other words, develop a rule approving only that through-the-wall surveillance which identifies objects no smaller than 36 by 36 inches, but would have to develop a jurisprudence specifying which home activities are “intimate” and which are not. And even when (if ever) that jurisprudence were fully developed, no police officer would be able to know in advance whether his through-the-wall surveillance picks up “intimate” details—and thus would be unable to know in advance whether it is constitutional.

We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws “a firm line at the entrance to the house.” That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in this case that no “significant” compromise of the homeowner’s privacy has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning...
of the Fourth Amendment forward.

Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

Since we hold the Thermovision imaging to have been an unlawful search, it will remain for the District Court to determine whether, without the evidence it provided, the search warrant issued in this case was supported by probable cause—and if not, whether there is any other basis for supporting admission of the evidence that the search pursuant to the warrant produced.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice O'CONNOR, and Justice KENNEDY join, dissenting.

There is, in my judgment, a distinct constitutional magnitude between “through-the-wall surveillance” that gives the observer or listener direct access to information in a private area, on the one hand, and the thought processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain, on the other hand. The Court has crafted a rule that purports to deal with direct observations of the inside of the home, but the case before us merely involves indirect deductions from “off-the-wall” surveillance, that is, observations of the exterior of the home. Those observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of petitioner’s home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Moreover, I believe that the supposedly “bright-line” rule the Court has created in response to its concerns about future technological developments is unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.

I

There is no need for the Court to craft a new rule to decide this case, as it is controlled by established principles from our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. One of those core principles, of course, is that “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” But it is equally well settled that searches and seizures of property in plain view are presumptively reasonable. “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” That is the principle implicated here.

While the Court “take[s] the long view” and decides this case based largely on the potential of yet-to-be-developed technology that might allow “through-the-wall surveillance,” this case involves nothing more than off-the-wall surveillance by law enforcement officers to gather information exposed to the general public from the outside of petitioner’s home. All that the infrared camera did in this case was passively measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of petitioner’s home; all that those measurements showed were relative differences in emission levels, vaguely indicating that some areas of the roof and outside walls were warmer than others.
As still images from the infrared scans show, no details regarding the interior of petitioner’s home were revealed. Unlike an x-ray scan, or other possible “through-the-wall” techniques, the detection of infrared radiation emanating from the home did not accomplish “an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises,” nor did it “obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.”

Indeed, the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, particularly if it is vented, as was the case here. Additionally, any member of the public might notice that one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces. Such use of the senses would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead, an adjoining neighbor allowed an officer onto her property to verify her perceptions with a sensitive thermometer. Nor, in my view, does such observation become an unreasonable search if made from a distance with the aid of a device that merely discloses that the exterior of one house, or one area of the house, is much warmer than another. Nothing more occurred in this case.

Thus, the notion that heat emissions from the outside of a dwelling are a private matter implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment (the text of which guarantees the right of people “to be secure in their ... houses” against unreasonable searches and seizures (emphasis added)) is not only unprecedented but also quite difficult to take seriously. Heat waves, like aromas that are generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building. A subjective expectation that they would remain private is not only implausible but also surely not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”

To be sure, the homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning what takes place within the home, and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against physical invasions of the home should apply to their functional equivalent. But the equipment in this case did not penetrate the walls of petitioner’s home, and while it did pick up “details of the home” that were exposed to the public, it did not obtain “any information regarding the interior of the home.” In the Court’s own words, based on what the thermal imager “showed” regarding the outside of petitioner’s home, the officers “concluded” that petitioner was engaging in illegal activity inside the home. It would be quite absurd to characterize their thought processes as “searches,” regardless of whether they inferred (rightly) that petitioner was growing marijuana in his house, or (wrongly) that “the lady of the house [was taking] her daily sauna and bath.” In either case, the only conclusions the officers reached concerning the interior of the home were at least as indirect as those that might have been inferred from the contents of discarded garbage, or, as in this case, subpoenaed utility records. For the first time in its history, the Court assumes that an inference can amount to a Fourth Amendment violation.

Notwithstanding the implications of today’s decision, there is a strong public interest in avoiding constitutional litigation over the monitoring of emissions from homes, and over the inferences drawn from such monitoring. Just as “the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public,” so too public officials should not have to avert their senses or their equipment from detecting emissions in the public domain such as excessive heat, traces of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases, airborne particulates, or radioactive emissions, any of which could identify
hazards to the community. In my judgment, monitoring such emissions with “sense-enhancing technology,” and drawing useful conclusions from such monitoring, is an entirely reasonable public service.

On the other hand, the countervailing privacy interest is at best trivial. After all, homes generally are insulated to keep heat in, rather than to prevent the detection of heat going out, and it does not seem to me that society will suffer from a rule requiring the rare homeowner who both intends to engage in uncommon activities that produce extraordinary amounts of heat, and wishes to conceal that production from outsiders, to make sure that the surrounding area is well insulated. The interest in concealing the heat escaping from one’s house pales in significance to “the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,” the “physical entry of the home.”

Since what was involved in this case was nothing more than drawing inferences from off-the-wall surveillance, rather than any “through-the-wall” surveillance, the officers’ conduct did not amount to a search and was perfectly reasonable.

II

Instead of trying to answer the question whether the use of the thermal imager in this case was even arguably unreasonable, the Court has fashioned a rule that is intended to provide essential guidance for the day when “more sophisticated systems” gain the “ability to ‘see’ through walls and other opaque barriers.” The newly minted rule encompasses “obtaining [1] by sense-enhancing technology [2] any information regarding the interior of the home [3] that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area ... [4] at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.” In my judgment, the Court’s new rule is at once too broad and too narrow, and is not justified by the Court’s explanation for its adoption. As I have suggested, I would not erect a constitutional impediment to the use of sense-enhancing technology unless it provides its user with the functional equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched.

Despite the Court’s attempt to draw a line that is “not only firm but also bright,” the contours of its new rule are uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is “in general public use.” Yet how much use is general public use is not even hinted at by the Court’s opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not satisfy that criterion. In any event, putting aside its lack of clarity, this criterion is somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.

The application of the Court’s new rule to “any information regarding the interior of the home,” is unnecessarily broad. If it takes sensitive equipment to detect an odor that identifies criminal conduct and nothing else, the fact that the odor emanates from the interior of a home should not provide it with constitutional protection. The criterion, moreover, is too sweeping in that information “regarding” the interior of a home apparently is not just information obtained through its walls, but also information concerning the outside of the building that could lead to (however many) inferences “regarding” what might be inside. Under that expansive view, I
suppose, an officer using an infrared camera to observe a man silently entering the side door of a house at night carrying a pizza might conclude that its interior is now occupied by someone who likes pizza, and by doing so the officer would be guilty of conducting an unconstitutional “search” of the home.

Because the new rule applies to information regarding the “interior” of the home, it is too narrow as well as too broad. Clearly, a rule that is designed to protect individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment should not be limited to a home. If such equipment did provide its user with the functional equivalent of access to a private place—such as, for example, the telephone booth involved in Katz, or an office building—then the rule should apply to such an area as well as to a home.

The final requirement of the Court’s new rule, that the information “could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” also extends too far as the Court applies it. As noted, the Court effectively treats the mental process of analyzing data obtained from external sources as the equivalent of a physical intrusion into the home. As I have explained, however, the process of drawing inferences from data in the public domain should not be characterized as a search.

III

Although the Court is properly and commendably concerned about the threats to privacy that may flow from advances in the technology available to the law enforcement profession, it has unfortunately failed to heed the tried and true counsel of judicial restraint. Instead of concentrating on the rather mundane issue that is actually presented by the case before it, the Court has endeavored to craft an all-encompassing rule for the future. It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to grapple with these emerging issues rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional constraints.

I respectfully dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

The Kyllo majority reasoned in 2001 (in a case about police conduct that occurred in 1991) that the use of thermal imaging constituted a search because the technology was “not in general public use.”

Today, however, the general public has many uses for thermal imaging, from HVAC performance testing to hunting to wildlife rescue to evaluating the performance of kitchen devices.

Agema Infrared Systems, the Swedish corporation that manufactured the “Agema Thermovision 210” at issue in Kyllo, was acquired by FLIR Systems Inc. in 1998. Headquartered in Oregon, FLIR now sells a $200 thermal imaging camera (the “FLIR ONE”) that can attach to a smartphone, with fancier versions available for higher prices. According to the FLIR product page, one can use the FLIR ONE to “[f]ind problems around the home fast, like where you’re
losing heat, how your insulation’s holding up, electrical problems, and water damage – all of which are point-and-shoot easy to find.” It also suggests, “See in the dark and explore the natural world safely with the FLIR ONE. Watch animals in their natural habitat and even use it to find your lost pet ... or what they might have left behind in the yard.” Another suggested use from the advertisement: “Detecting tiny variations in heat means that you can see in total darkness, create new kinds of art, and discover new things about your world every day... or help your child with their science fair experiment.”

Consider a police officer who uses such a device to investigate a suspected drug-grower’s home. He sees images consistent with growing drugs. He shows the images to a judge, who grants a search warrant. Officers find drugs in the house, and prosecutors have charged the owner with drug crimes. Search or no search? Why or why not?

In January 2020, the City Counsel of Bessemer, Michigan voted to purchase “an odor-detecting device as a means of addressing growing complaints about marijuana odor.” The device is called a “Nasal Ranger,” and the company that sells it describes it as “the ‘state-of-the-art’ in field olfactometry for confidently measuring and quantifying odor strength in the ambient air.” According to St. Croix Sensory, Inc., “The portable Nasal Ranger Field Olfactometer determines ambient odor Dilution-to-Threshold (D/T) concentration objectively with your trained nose.” If a Bessmer police officer stands on a public sidewalk and uses the Nasal Ranger to detect marijuana odors emanating from a house, is that a search? Why or why not?

* * *

In his majority opinion in United States v. Jones, Justice Scalia distinguished the facts before the Court in that case from those of a previous case—involving a “beeper”—upon which the government attempted to rely in its effort to justify placing a GPS device on a vehicle. Here is the “beeper” case.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Leroy Carlton Knotts

Decided March 2, 1983 — 460 U.S. 276

REHNQUIST, Justice.

A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver. In this case, a beeper was placed in a five gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by one of respondent’s codefendants. By monitoring the progress of a car carrying the chloroform Minnesota law enforcement agents were able to trace the can of chloroform from its place of purchase in Minneapolis, Minnesota to respondent’s secluded cabin near Shell Lake, Wisconsin. The issue presented by the case is whether such use of a beeper violated respondent’s rights secured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Respondent and two codefendants were charged in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota with conspiracy to manufacture controlled substances, including but not limited to methamphetamine.

Suspicion attached to this trio when the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, notified a narcotics investigator for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension that Armstrong, a former 3M employee, had been stealing chemicals which could be used in manufacturing illicit drugs. Visual surveillance of Armstrong revealed that after leaving the employ of 3M Company, he had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in Minneapolis. The Minnesota narcotics officers observed that after Armstrong had made a purchase, he would deliver the chemicals to codefendant Petschen.

With the consent of the Hawkins Chemical Company, officers installed a beeper inside a five gallon container of chloroform, one of the so-called “precursor” chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs. Hawkins agreed that when Armstrong next purchased chloroform, the chloroform would be placed in this particular container. When Armstrong made the purchase, officers followed the car in which the chloroform had been placed, maintaining contact by using both visual surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from the beeper. Armstrong proceeded to Petschen’s house, where the container was transferred to Petschen’s automobile. Officers then followed that vehicle eastward towards the state line, across the St. Croix River, and into Wisconsin. During the latter part of this journey, Petschen began making evasive maneuvers, and the pursuing agents ended their visual surveillance. At about the same time officers lost the signal from the beeper, but with the assistance of a monitoring device located in a helicopter the approximate location of the signal was picked up again about one hour later. The signal now was stationary and the location identified was a cabin occupied by respondent near Shell Lake, Wisconsin. The record before us does not reveal that the beeper was used after the location in the area of the cabin had been initially determined.

Relying on the location of the chloroform derived through the use of the beeper and additional information obtained during three days of intermittent visual surveillance of respondent’s cabin, officers secured a search warrant. During execution of the warrant, officers discovered a fully operable, clandestine drug laboratory in the cabin. In the laboratory area officers found formulas for amphetamine and methamphetamine, over $10,000 worth of laboratory equipment, and chemicals in quantities sufficient to produce 14 pounds of pure amphetamine. Under a barrel outside the cabin, officers located the five gallon container of chloroform.
After his motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless monitoring of the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted for conspiring to manufacture controlled substances. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the monitoring of the beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because its use had violated respondent’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and that all information derived after the location of the cabin was a fruit of the illegal beeper monitoring. We granted certiorari, and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II

The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways. We have commented more than once on the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile:

“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”

A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When Petschen travelled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.

Respondent Knotts, as the owner of the cabin and surrounding premises to which Petschen drove, undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place insofar as the cabin was concerned:

“Crime, even in the privacy of one’s own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also of grave concern, not only to the individual, but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.”

But no such expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of Petschen’s automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway, nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the “open fields.”
Visual surveillance from public places along Petschen’s route or adjoining Knotts’ premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen’s automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.

Respondent specifically attacks the use of the beeper insofar as it was used to determine that the can of chloroform had come to rest on his property at Shell Lake, Wisconsin. He repeatedly challenges the “use of the beeper to determine the location of the chemical drum at Respondent’s premises[;]” he states that “[t]he government thus overlooks the fact that this case involves the sanctity of Respondent’s residence, which is accorded the greatest protection available under the Fourth Amendment.”

We think that respondent’s contentions to some extent lose sight of the limited use which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper. As we have noted, nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the drum containing the chloroform had ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent’s premises in rural Wisconsin. Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual surveillance, the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when they would not have been able to do so had they relied solely on their naked eyes. But scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also raise. A police car following Petschen at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car. This fact, along with others, was used by the government in obtaining a search warrant which led to the discovery of the clandestine drug laboratory. But there is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin.

We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of our inquiry in discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the beeper signals complained of by respondent invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part? For the reasons previously stated, we hold they did not. Since they did not, there was neither a “search” nor a “seizure” within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN, and Justice MARSHALL join, concurring in the judgment.

Since the respondent in this case has never questioned the installation of the radio transmitter in the chloroform drum, I agree that it was entirely reasonable for the police officers to make use of the information received over the airwaves when they were trying to ascertain the ultimate destination of the chloroform. I do not join the Court’s opinion, however, because it contains two unnecessarily broad dicta: one distorts the record in this case, and both may prove confusing to courts that must apply this decision in the future.

First, the Court implies that the chloroform drum was parading in “open fields” outside of the cabin, in a manner tantamount to its public display on the highways. The record does not support that implication.

Second, the Court suggests that the Fourth Amendment does not inhibit “the police from augmenting the sensory facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.” But the Court held to the contrary in Katz v. United States. Although the augmentation in this case was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that the use of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive concerns.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.

*   *   *

The ubiquitous use of mobile phones, by which users not only have conversations but also transmit all sorts of sensitive data, has raised important questions about when the government may intercept information transmitted by phone users. This is not, however, a new issue. More than four decades ago, police obtained certain information from a suspect’s telephone company, and prosecutors used that information against the defendant at trial. Here is the resulting Fourth Amendment case.

Supreme Court of the United States

Michael Lee Smith v. Maryland

Decided June 20, 1979 — 442 U.S. 735

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the installation and use of a pen register1 constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

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1 [Footnote 1 by the Court] “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.” A pen register is “usually installed at a central telephone facility [and] records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from [the] line” to which it is attached.
I

On March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Md., Patricia McDonough was robbed. She gave the police a description of the robber and of a 1975 Monte Carlo automobile she had observed near the scene of the crime. After the robbery, McDonough began receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. On one occasion, the caller asked that she step out on her front porch; she did so, and saw the 1975 Monte Carlo she had earlier described to police moving slowly past her home. On March 16, police spotted a man who met McDonough’s description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in her neighborhood. By tracing the license plate number, police learned that the car was registered in the name of petitioner, Michael Lee Smith.

The next day, the telephone company, at police request, installed a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at petitioner’s home. The police did not get a warrant or court order before having the pen register installed. The register revealed that on March 17 a call was placed from petitioner’s home to McDonough’s phone. On the basis of this and other evidence, the police obtained a warrant to search petitioner’s residence. The search revealed that a page in petitioner’s phone book was turned down to the name and number of Patricia McDonough; the phone book was seized. Petitioner was arrested, and a six-man lineup was held on March 19. McDonough identified petitioner as the man who had robbed her.

Petitioner was indicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for robbery. By pretrial motion, he sought to suppress “all fruits derived from the pen register” on the ground that the police had failed to secure a warrant prior to its installation. The trial court denied the suppression motion, holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner then waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts. The pen register tape (evidencing the fact that a phone call had been made from petitioner’s phone to McDonough’s phone) and the phone book seized in the search of petitioner’s residence were admitted into evidence against him. Petitioner was convicted, and was sentenced to six years. He appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari to the intermediate court in advance of its decision in order to consider whether the pen register evidence had been properly admitted at petitioner’s trial.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that “there is no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a telephone system and hence no search within the fourth amendment is implicated by the use of a pen register installed at the central offices of the telephone company.” Because there was no “search,” the court concluded, no warrant was needed. Certiorari was granted.

II

A

In determining whether a particular form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a “justifiable,” a “reasonable,” or a “legitimate expectation of privacy” that has been invaded by government action. This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”—whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that “he seeks to preserve [something] as private.” The second question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”—whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is “justifiable” under the circumstances.

B

In applying the Katz analysis to this case, it is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged. The activity here took the form of installing and using a pen register. Since the pen register was installed on telephone company property at the telephone company’s central offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim that his “property” was invaded or that police intruded into a “constitutionally protected area.” Petitioner’s claim, rather, is that, notwithstanding the absence of a trespass, the State, as did the Government in Katz, infringed a “legitimate expectation of privacy” that petitioner held. Yet a pen register differs significantly from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications. This Court recently noted:

“Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed—a means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”

Given a pen register’s limited capabilities, therefore, petitioner’s argument that its installation and use constituted a “search” necessarily rests upon a claim that he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone.

This claim must be rejected. First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must “convey” phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies “for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud and preventing violations of law.” Electronic equipment is used not only to keep billing records of toll calls, but also “to keep a record of all calls dialed from a telephone which is subject to a special rate structure.” Pen registers are regularly employed “to determine whether a home phone is being used to conduct a business, to check for a defective dial, or to check for overbilling.” Although most people may be oblivious to a pen register’s esoteric functions, they presumably have some awareness of one common use: to aid in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene calls. Most phone books tell subscribers,
on a page entitled “Consumer Information,” that the company “can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls.” Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.

Petitioner argues, however, that, whatever the expectations of telephone users in general, he demonstrated an expectation of privacy by his own conduct here, since he “us[ed] the telephone in his house to the exclusion of all others.” But the site of the call is immaterial for purposes of analysis in this case. Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed. Regardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same way if he wished to complete his call. The fact that he dialed the number on his home phone rather than on some other phone could make no conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber rationally think that it would.

Second, even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.

This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here. When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and “exposed” that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required because the telephone company has decided to automate.

We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not “legitimate.” The installation and use of a pen register, consequently, was not a “search,” and no warrant was required. The judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Mr. Justice POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

I am not persuaded that the numbers dialed from a private telephone fall outside the constitutional protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In *Katz v. United States*, the Court acknowledged the “vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication[s].” The role played by a private telephone is even more
vital, and since *Katz* it has been abundantly clear that telephone conversations carried on by people in their homes or offices are fully protected.

Nevertheless, the Court today says that those safeguards do not extend to the numbers dialed from a private telephone, apparently because when a caller dials a number the digits may be recorded by the telephone company for billing purposes. But that observation no more than describes the basic nature of telephone calls. A telephone call simply cannot be made without the use of telephone company property and without payment to the company for the service. The telephone conversation itself must be electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment. Yet we have squarely held that the user of even a public telephone is entitled “to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”

The central question in this case is whether a person who makes telephone calls from his home is entitled to make a similar assumption about the numbers he dials. What the telephone company does or might do with those numbers is no more relevant to this inquiry than it would be in a case involving the conversation itself. It is simply not enough to say, after *Katz*, that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because the caller assumes the risk that the telephone company will disclose them to the police.

I think that the numbers dialed from a private telephone—like the conversations that occur during a call—are within the constitutional protection recognized in *Katz*. It seems clear to me that information obtained by pen register surveillance of a private telephone is information in which the telephone subscriber has a legitimate expectation of privacy. The information captured by such surveillance emanates from private conduct within a person’s home or office—locations that without question are entitled to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection. Further, that information is an integral part of the telephonic communication that under *Katz* is entitled to constitutional protection, whether or not it is captured by a trespass into such an area.

The numbers dialed from a private telephone—although certainly more prosaic than the conversation itself—are not without “content.” Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers listed in a publicly distributed directory, but I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they have called. This is not because such a list might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.

I respectfully dissent.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

The Court concludes that because individuals have no actual or legitimate expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily relinquish to telephone companies, the use of pen registers by government agents is immune from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. I respectfully dissent.

Applying the standards set forth in *Katz v. United States*, the Court first determines that telephone subscribers have no subjective expectations of privacy concerning the numbers they dial. To reach this conclusion, the Court posits that individuals somehow infer from the long-
distance listings on their phone bills, and from the cryptic assurances of “help” in tracing obscene calls included in “most” phone books, that pen registers are regularly used for recording local calls. But even assuming, as I do not, that individuals “typically know” that a phone company monitors calls for internal reasons, it does not follow that they expect this information to be made available to the public in general or the government in particular. Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.

The crux of the Court’s holding, however, is that whatever expectation of privacy petitioner may in fact have entertained regarding his calls, it is not one “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.” In so ruling, the Court determines that individuals who convey information to third parties have “assumed the risk” of disclosure to the government. This analysis is misconceived in two critical respects.

Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice. At least in the third-party consensual surveillance cases, which first incorporated risk analysis into Fourth Amendment doctrine, the defendant presumably had exercised some discretion in deciding who should enjoy his confidential communications. By contrast here, unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of “assuming” risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.

More fundamentally, to make risk analysis dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of privacy expectations would allow the government to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. For example, law enforcement officials, simply by announcing their intent to monitor the content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations, could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such communications. Yet, although acknowledging this implication of its analysis, the Court is willing to concede only that, in some circumstances, a further “normative inquiry would be proper.” No meaningful effort is made to explain what those circumstances might be, or why this case is not among them.

In my view, whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society. By its terms, the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures assigns to the judiciary some prescriptive responsibility. As Mr. Justice Harlan, who formulated the standard the Court applies today, himself recognized: “[s]ince it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not ... merely recite ... risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.” In making this assessment, courts must evaluate the “intrinsic character” of investigative practices with reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth Amendment. And for those “extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize [individuals’] sense of security ... more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is required.”

The use of pen registers, I believe, constitutes such an extensive intrusion. To hold otherwise ignores the vital role telephonic communication plays in our personal and professional relationships, as well as the First and Fourth Amendment interests implicated by unfettered
official surveillance. Privacy in placing calls is of value not only to those engaged in criminal activity. The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts. Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free society. Particularly given the Government’s previous reliance on warrantless telephonic surveillance to trace reporters’ sources and monitor protected political activity, I am unwilling to insulate use of pen registers from independent judicial review.

Just as one who enters a public telephone booth is “entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world,” so too, he should be entitled to assume that the numbers he dials in the privacy of his home will be recorded, if at all, solely for the phone company’s business purposes. Accordingly, I would require law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before they enlist telephone companies to secure information otherwise beyond the government’s reach.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

For nearly forty years, the third-party disclosure doctrine stood as a broad general rule. The advance of technology, however, has raised questions about the doctrine. Consider, for example, the sort of data commonly transmitted by mobile phones. A person using GPS mapping on a phone is transmitting her location to a third party. Consider too the use of email, whether on a phone or on a computer. When someone sends email, the sender knows (at least at some basic level) that the contents of the message are transmitted to a third party before reaching the intended recipient. (Indeed, many third parties are likely involved.)

Does a person who sends email despite knowing that messages travel via third-party servers (for example, on Gmail) forfeit any reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the content of the messages?

Imagine that a phone company routinely retains data concerning the locations of customers’ mobile phones. If police contact a phone company and obtain the location data for a particular customer’s phone from the previous month, is that a “search” or not? (We will confront this issue again in Chapter 5. Jot down your answer now, along with your reasoning, so that you can compare it with the reasoning used by the Court.)

*   *   *

In the next chapter, we will study the concept of “open fields,” to which the majority and dissent referred in Knotts. We will also consider police use of aerial surveillance, which required further elaboration of the Court’s definition of “search.”
Then, in Chapter 5, during which we will wrap up our discussion of “what is a search,” we will consider (1) more recent judicial analysis inspired by modern phone technology and (2) police use of dogs.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Chapter 4

What Is a Search?: More Specifics

The Fourth Amendment protects the people’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” While this language is quite broad, it does not include everything someone might possess or wish to protect from intrusion. For example, if one owns agricultural land far from any “house,” that land is not a person, a house, a paper, or an effect. Police searches of such land, therefore, are not “searches” regulated by the Fourth Amendment. In the next two cases, the Court attempts to define the barrier separating the “curtilage” (an area near a house that is treated as a “house” for Fourth Amendment purposes) from the “open fields” (which enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection).

The Supreme Court of the United States

Ray Oliver v. United States

Decided April 17, 1984 – 466 U.S. 170

Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The “open fields” doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), permits police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant. We granted certiorari to clarify confusion that has arisen as to the continued vitality of the doctrine.

I

Acting on reports that marihuana was being raised on the farm of petitioner Oliver, two narcotics agents of the Kentucky State Police went to the farm to investigate. Arriving at the farm, they drove past petitioner’s house to a locked gate with a “No Trespassing” sign. A footpath led around one side of the gate. The agents walked around the gate and along the road for several hundred yards, passing a barn and a parked camper. At that point, someone standing in front of the camper shouted: “No hunting is allowed, come back up here.” The officers shouted back that they were Kentucky State Police officers, but found no one when they returned to the camper. The officers resumed their investigation of the farm and found a field of marihuana over a mile from petitioner’s home.

Petitioner was arrested and indicted for “manufactur[ing]” a “controlled substance.” After a pretrial hearing, the District Court suppressed evidence of the discovery of the marihuana field. Applying Katz v. United States, the court found that petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the field would remain private because petitioner “had done all that could be expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm that was searched.” He had posted “No Trespassing” signs at regular intervals and had locked the gate at the entrance to the center of the farm. Further, the court noted that the field itself is highly secluded: it is bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and embankments and cannot be seen from any point of public access. The court concluded that this was not an “open” field that invited casual intrusion.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the District Court. The court concluded that *Katz*, upon which the District Court relied, had not impaired the vitality of the open fields doctrine of *Hester*. Rather, the open fields doctrine was entirely compatible with *Katz*’ emphasis on privacy. The court reasoned that the “human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place” in open fields, and that the property owner’s common-law right to exclude trespassers is insufficiently linked to privacy to warrant the Fourth Amendment’s protection. We granted certiorari.

II

The rule announced in *Hester v. United States* was founded upon the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment indicates with some precision the places and things encompassed by its protections. As Justice Holmes explained for the Court in his characteristically laconic style: “[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law.”

Nor are the open fields “effects” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In this respect, it is suggestive that James Madison’s proposed draft of what became the Fourth Amendment preserves “[t]he rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures....” Although Congress’ revisions of Madison’s proposal broadened the scope of the Amendment in some respects, the term “effects” is less inclusive than “property” and cannot be said to encompass open fields. We conclude, as did the Court in deciding *Hester v. United States*, that the government’s intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those “unreasonable searches” proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.

III

This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s language is consistent with the understanding of the right to privacy expressed in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Since *Katz v. United States*, the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” The Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those “expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant. In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion. These factors are equally relevant to determining whether the government’s intrusion upon open fields without a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations of privacy and is therefore a search proscribed by the Amendment.

In this light, the rule of *Hester v. United States* that we reaffirm today may be understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home. This rule is true to the conception of the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference. For example, the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed “the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”

In contrast, open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that fences or “No Trespassing” signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. [P]etitioner Oliver concede[s] that the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that “society recognizes as reasonable.”

The historical underpinnings of the open fields doctrine also demonstrate that the doctrine is consistent with respect for “reasonable expectations of privacy.” As Justice Holmes observed in *Hester*, the common law distinguished “open fields” from the “curtilage,” the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private. Conversely, the common law implies, as we reaffirm today, that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.

We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and from the historical and contemporary understanding of its purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by government officers.
Nor would a case-by-case approach provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under this approach, police officers would have to guess before every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a right of privacy. The lawfulness of a search would turn on “[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions ....” This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances.

IV

Nor is the government’s intrusion upon an open field a “search” in the constitutional sense because that intrusion is a trespass at common law. The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. “The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” “[E]ven a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity conducted thereon.”

The common law may guide consideration of what areas are protected by the Fourth Amendment by defining areas whose invasion by others is wrongful. The law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. For trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest. Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of property protected by the common law of trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.

V

We conclude that the open fields doctrine, as enunciated in Hester, is consistent with the plain language of the Fourth Amendment and its historical purposes. Moreover, Justice Holmes’ interpretation of the Amendment in Hester accords with the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis developed in subsequent decisions of this Court. We therefore affirm Oliver v. United States.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNA and Justice STEVENS join, dissenting.

Police officers, ignoring clearly visible “No Trespassing” signs, entered upon private land in search of evidence of a crime. At a spot that could not be seen from any vantage point accessible to the public, the police discovered contraband, which was subsequently used to incriminate the owner of the land. Police [did not] have a warrant authorizing their activities.

The Court holds that police conduct of this sort does not constitute an “unreasonable search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reaches that startling conclusion by two independent analytical routes. First, the Court argues that, because the Fourth Amendment
by its terms renders people secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” it is inapplicable to trespasses upon land not lying within the curtilage of a dwelling. Second, the Court contends that “an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home.” Because I cannot agree with either of these propositions, I dissent.

I

The first ground on which the Court rests its decision is that the Fourth Amendment “indicates with some precision the places and things encompassed by its protections,” and that real property is not included in the list of protected spaces and possessions. This line of argument has several flaws. Most obviously, it is inconsistent with the results of many of our previous decisions, none of which the Court purports to overrule. For example, neither a public telephone booth nor a conversation conducted therein can fairly be described as a person, house, paper, or effect; yet we have held that the Fourth Amendment forbids the police without a warrant to eavesdrop on such a conversation. Nor can it plausibly be argued that an office or commercial establishment is covered by the plain language of the Amendment; yet we have held that such premises are entitled to constitutional protection if they are marked in a fashion that alerts the public to the fact that they are private.

Indeed, the Court’s reading of the plain language of the Fourth Amendment is incapable of explaining even its own holding in this case. The Court rules that the curtilage, a zone of real property surrounding a dwelling, is entitled to constitutional protection. We are not told, however, whether the curtilage is a “house” or an “effect”—or why, if the curtilage can be incorporated into the list of things and spaces shielded by the Amendment, a field cannot.

II

The second ground for the Court’s decision is its contention that any interest a landowner might have in the privacy of his woods and fields is not one that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” The mode of analysis that underlies this assertion is certainly more consistent with our prior decisions than that discussed above. But the Court’s conclusion cannot withstand scrutiny.

A

We have frequently acknowledged that privacy interests are not coterminous with property rights. However, because “property rights reflect society’s explicit recognition of a person’s authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, [they] should be considered in determining whether an individual’s expectations of privacy are reasonable.” Indeed, the Court has suggested that, insofar as “[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, ... one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”

It is undisputed that Oliver owned the land into which the police intruded. That fact alone provides considerable support for their assertion of legitimate privacy interests in their woods and fields. But even more telling is the nature of the sanctions that Oliver could invoke, under
local law, for violation of their property rights. In Kentucky, a knowing entry upon fenced or otherwise enclosed land, or upon unenclosed land conspicuously posted with signs excluding the public, constitutes criminal trespass. Thus, positive law not only recognizes the legitimacy of Oliver’s insistence that strangers keep off [his] land, but subjects those who refuse to respect [his] wishes to the most severe of penalties—criminal liability. Under these circumstances, it is hard to credit the Court’s assertion that Oliver’s expectations of privacy were not of a sort that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

* * *

In United States v. Dunn, decided three years after Oliver v. United States, the Court applied the principles set forth in Oliver to new facts.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Ronald Dunn

Decided March 3, 1987 – 480 U.S. 294

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to decide whether the area near a barn, located approximately 50 yards from a fence surrounding a ranch house, is, for Fourth Amendment purposes, within the curtilage of the house. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the barn lay within the house’s curtilage, and that the District Court should have suppressed certain evidence obtained as a result of law enforcement officials’ intrusion onto the area immediately surrounding the barn. We conclude that the barn and the area around it lay outside the curtilage of the house, and accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

Respondent Ronald Dale Dunn and a codefendant, Robert Lyle Carpenter, were convicted by a jury of conspiring to manufacture phenylacetone and amphetamine, and to possess amphetamine with intent to distribute. Respondent was also convicted of manufacturing these two controlled substances and possessing amphetamine with intent to distribute. The events giving rise to respondent’s apprehension and conviction began in 1980 when agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) discovered that Carpenter had purchased large quantities of chemicals and equipment used in the manufacture of amphetamine and phenylacetone. DEA agents obtained warrants from a Texas state judge authorizing installation of miniature electronic transmitter tracking devices, or “beepers,” in an electric hot plate stirrer, a drum of acetic anhydride, and a container holding phenylacetic acid, a precursor to phenylacetone. All of these items had been ordered by Carpenter. On September 3, 1980, Carpenter took possession of the electric hot plate stirrer, but the agents lost the signal from the “beeper” a few days later. The agents were able to track the “beeper” in the container of chemicals, however, from October 27, 1980, until November 5, 1980, on which date Carpenter’s pickup truck, which was carrying the container, arrived at respondent’s ranch. Aerial
photographs of the ranch property showed Carpenter’s truck backed up to a barn behind the ranch house. The agents also began receiving transmission signals from the “beeper” in the hot plate stirrer that they had lost in early September and determined that the stirrer was on respondent’s ranch property.

Respondent’s ranch comprised approximately 198 acres and was completely encircled by a perimeter fence. The property also contained several interior fences, constructed mainly of posts and multiple strands of barbed wire. The ranch residence was situated ½ mile from a public road. A fence encircled the residence and a nearby small greenhouse. Two barns were located approximately 50 yards from this fence. The front of the larger of the two barns was enclosed by a wooden fence and had an open overhang. Locked, waist-high gates barred entry into the barn proper, and netting material stretched from the ceiling to the top of the wooden gates.

On the evening of November 5, 1980, law enforcement officials made a warrantless entry onto respondent’s ranch property. A DEA agent accompanied by an officer from the Houston Police Department crossed over the perimeter fence and one interior fence. Standing approximately midway between the residence and the barns, the DEA agent smelled what he believed to be phenylacetic acid, the odor coming from the direction of the barns. The officers approached the smaller of the barns—crossing over a barbed wire fence—and, looking into the barn, observed only empty boxes. The officers then proceeded to the larger barn, crossing another barbed wire fence as well as a wooden fence that enclosed the front portion of the barn. The officers walked under the barn’s overhang to the locked wooden gates and, shining a flashlight through the netting on top of the gates, peered into the barn. They observed what the DEA agent thought to be a phenylacetone laboratory. The officers did not enter the barn. At this point the officers departed from respondent’s property, but entered it twice more on November 6 to confirm the presence of the phenylacetone laboratory.

On November 6, 1980, at 8:30 p.m., a Federal Magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of respondent’s ranch. DEA agents and state law enforcement officials executed the warrant on November 8, 1980. The officers arrested respondent and seized chemicals and equipment, as well as bags of amphetamines they discovered in a closet in the ranch house.

The District Court denied respondent’s motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant and respondent [was] convicted. [T]he Court of Appeals reversed respondent’s conviction. The court concluded that the search warrant had been issued based on information obtained during the officers’ unlawful warrantless entry onto respondent’s ranch property and, therefore, all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should have been suppressed. Underpinning this conclusion was the court’s reasoning that “the barn in question was within the curtilage of the residence and was within the protective ambit of the fourth amendment.” The Government thereupon submitted a petition for certiorari [questioning] whether the barn lay within the curtilage of the house. We granted the petition and now reverse.

II

The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself.
The concept plays a part, however, in interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment.

Drawing upon the Court’s own cases and the cumulative experience of the lower courts that have grappled with the task of defining the extent of a home’s curtilage, we believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a “correct” answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration—whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment protection. Applying these factors to respondent’s barn and to the area immediately surrounding it, we have little difficulty in concluding that this area lay outside the curtilage of the ranch house.

First. The record discloses that the barn was located 50 yards from the fence surrounding the house and 60 yards from the house itself. Standing in isolation, this substantial distance supports no inference that the barn should be treated as an adjunct of the house.

Second. It is also significant that respondent’s barn did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence. Viewing the physical layout of respondent’s ranch in its entirety, it is plain that the fence surrounding the residence serves to demark a specific area of land immediately adjacent to the house that is readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house. Conversely, the barn—the front portion itself enclosed by a fence—and the area immediately surrounding it, stands out as a distinct portion of respondent’s ranch, quite separate from the residence.

Third. It is especially significant that the law enforcement officials possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home. The aerial photographs showed that the truck Carpenter had been driving that contained the container of phenylacetic acid was backed up to the barn, “apparently,” in the words of the Court of Appeals, “for the unloading of its contents.” When on respondent’s property, the officers’ suspicion was further directed toward the barn because of “a very strong odor” of phenylacetic acid. As the DEA agent approached the barn, he “could hear a motor running, like a pump motor of some sort ....” Furthermore, the officers detected an “extremely strong” odor of phenylacetic acid coming from a small crack in the wall of the barn. Finally, as the officers were standing in front of the barn, immediately prior to looking into its interior through the netting material, “the smell was very, very strong ... [and the officers] could hear the motor running very loudly.” When considered together, the above facts indicated to the officers that the use to which the barn was being put could not fairly be characterized as so associated with the activities and privacies of domestic life that the officers should have deemed the barn as part of respondent’s home.
Fourth. Respondent did little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the open fields. Nothing in the record suggests that the various interior fences on respondent’s property had any function other than that of the typical ranch fence; the fences were designed and constructed to corral livestock, not to prevent persons from observing what lay inside the enclosed areas.

III

Respondent submits an alternative basis for affirming the judgment below, one that was presented to but ultimately not relied upon by the Court of Appeals. Respondent asserts that he possessed an expectation of privacy, independent from his home’s curtilage, in the barn and its contents, because the barn is an essential part of his business.

We may accept, for the sake of argument, respondent’s submission that his barn enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection and could not be entered and its contents seized without a warrant. But it does not follow on the record before us that the officers’ conduct and the ensuing search and seizure violated the Constitution. It follows that no constitutional violation occurred here when the officers crossed over respondent’s ranch-style perimeter fence, and over several similarly constructed interior fences, prior to stopping at the locked front gate of the barn. As previously mentioned, the officers never entered the barn, nor did they enter any other structure on respondent’s premises. Once at their vantage point, they merely stood, outside the curtilage of the house and in the open fields upon which the barn was constructed, and peered into the barn’s open front. And, standing as they were in the open fields, the Constitution did not forbid them to observe the phenylacetone laboratory located in respondent’s barn.

Under Oliver and Hester, there is no constitutional difference between police observations conducted while in a public place and while standing in the open fields. Similarly, the fact that the objects observed by the officers lay within an area that we have assumed, but not decided, was protected by the Fourth Amendment does not affect our conclusion. The Fourth Amendment “has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.” Here, the officers’ use of the beam of a flashlight, directed through the essentially open front of respondent’s barn, did not transform their observations into an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The officers lawfully viewed the interior of respondent’s barn, and their observations were properly considered by the Magistrate in issuing a search warrant for respondent’s premises. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

The Government agents’ intrusions upon Ronald Dunn’s privacy and property violated the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, the barnyard invaded by the agents lay within the protected curtilage of Dunn’s farmhouse. Second, the agents infringed upon Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn and its contents. Our society is not so exclusively urban that it is unable to perceive or unwilling to preserve the expectation of farmers and ranchers that barns and their contents are protected from (literally) unwarranted government intrusion.
The Court states that curtilage questions are often resolved through evaluation of four factors. The Court applies this test and concludes that Dunn’s barn and barnyard were not within the curtilage of his dwelling. This conclusion overlooks the role a barn plays in rural life and ignores extensive authority holding that a barn, when clustered with other outbuildings near the residence, is part of the curtilage.

State and federal courts have long recognized that a barn, like many other outbuildings, is “a domestic building constituting an integral part of that group of structures making up the farm home.” Consequently, the general rule is that the “[c]urtilage includes all outbuildings used in connection with a residence, such as garages, sheds, [and] barns ... connected with and in close vicinity of the residence.”

The overwhelming majority of state courts have consistently held that barns are included within the curtilage of a farmhouse. Federal courts, too, have held that barns, like other rural outbuildings, lie within the curtilage of the farmhouse. Thus, case law demonstrates that a barn is an integral part of a farm home and therefore lies within the curtilage. The Court’s opinion provides no justification for its indifference to the weight of state and federal precedent.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police activity which, if left unrestricted, would jeopardize individuals’ sense of security or would too heavily burden those who wished to guard their privacy. In this case, in order to look inside respondent’s barn, the DEA agents traveled a one-half mile off a public road over respondent’s fenced-in property, crossed over three additional wooden and barbed wire fences, stepped under the eaves of the barn, and then used a flashlight to peer through otherwise opaque fishnetting. For the police habitually to engage in such surveillance—without a warrant—is constitutionally intolerable. Because I believe that farmers’ and ranchers’ expectations of privacy in their barns and other outbuildings are expectations society would regard as reasonable, and because I believe that sanctioning the police behavior at issue here does violence to the purpose and promise of the Fourth Amendment, I dissent.

In both *Oliver* and *Dunn*, police walked onto someone’s land without permission. In describing the “open fields doctrine,” the *Oliver* Court stated: “The “open fields” doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in *Hester v. United States*, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), permits police officers to enter and search a field without a warrant.”

Consider whether that statement is truly accurate. Is it truly lawful for police to wander uninvited on the open fields of suspects? Perhaps it would be more accurate to state: “Police should not do this, but if they do, the Fourth Amendment has nothing to say about it.” The *Hester case* cited by the Court in *Oliver* may provide a clue. In the syllabus, the Court describes police witnesses who “held no warrant and were trespassers on the land.” By definition, trespassers are violating the law. We do not call it a “trespass” when someone walks on the property of another to visit as an invited guest, or to knock on the door and leave literature about religion or politics, or to execute a valid search warrant.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

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If officers who find useful (and admissible) evidence while trespassing in the open fields of suspects are breaking the law, should they be punished? Is it plausible to believe that they will be? If, as seems more likely, police departments would laud such behavior rather than condemning it, does that raise questions about the sensibility of the open fields doctrine?

At common law, the crimes of arson and burglary (which are both crimes against the dwelling), defined “house” as both a dwelling house and buildings located within the curtilage. Fourth Amendment law essentially imports this principle.

So what is curtilage? Curtilage is: “The land or yard adjoining a house, usually within an enclosure. Under the Fourth Amendment, the curtilage is an area usually protected from warrantless searches.” *Black's Law Dictionary* (11th ed. 2019).

Some students may wonder if *United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), which was decided well after *Dunn* and *Oliver*, invalidates the open fields doctrine. The answer is no. Yes, *Jones* does reiterate the importance of trespass to Fourth Amendment law. And yes, officers who wander uninvited on the “open fields” of suspects likely commit trespass as defined by state law. Nonetheless, according to cases like *Dunn* and *Oliver*, the open fields are not among the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” protected by the Fourth Amendment. While *Jones* affects how courts will decide whether police have acted improperly with respect to someone’s “house,” the case does not affect how “house” is defined. The “open fields” remain excluded from Fourth Amendment protection.

Because the Court treats the curtilage surrounding a home as part of a “house” for Fourth Amendment purposes, police officers normally cannot walk on to curtilage and look around with neither permission nor a warrant. In response to this restriction, police have flown over houses and curtilage, using their eyes and cameras to gain information relevant to criminal investigations.

The next two cases consider whether the Fourth Amendment applies when police observe the curtilage from the air.

Supreme Court of the United States

**California v. Ciraolo**

Decided May 19, 1986 – 476 U.S. 207

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth Amendment is violated by aerial observation without a warrant from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home.
On September 2, 1982, Santa Clara Police received an anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was growing in respondent’s backyard. Police were unable to observe the contents of respondent’s yard from ground level because of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard. Later that day, Officer Shutz, who was assigned to investigate, secured a private plane and flew over respondent’s house at an altitude of 1,000 feet, within navigable airspace; he was accompanied by Officer Rodriguez. Both officers were trained in marijuana identification. From the overflight, the officers readily identified marijuana plants 8 feet to 10 feet in height growing in a 15- by 25-foot plot in respondent’s yard; they photographed the area with a standard 35mm camera.

On September 8, 1982, Officer Shutz obtained a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit describing the anonymous tip and their observations; a photograph depicting respondent’s house, the backyard, and neighboring homes was attached to the affidavit as an exhibit. The warrant was executed the next day and 73 plants were seized; it is not disputed that these were marijuana.

After the trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence of the search, respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeal reversed, however, on the ground that the warrantless aerial observation of respondent’s yard which led to the issuance of the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. That court held first that respondent’s backyard marijuana garden was within the “curtilage” of his home, under Oliver v. United States. The court emphasized that the height and existence of the two fences constituted “objective criteria from which we may conclude he manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy by any standard.”

Examining the particular method of surveillance undertaken, the court then found it “significant” that the flyover “was not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any other legitimate law enforcement or public safety objective, but was undertaken for the specific purpose of observing this particular enclosure within [respondent’s] curtilage.” It held this focused observation was “a direct and unauthorized intrusion into the sanctity of the home” which violated respondent’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The California Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for review.

We granted the State’s petition for certiorari. We reverse.

The State argues that respondent has “knowingly exposed” his backyard to aerial observation, because all that was seen was visible to the naked eye from any aircraft flying overhead. The State analogizes its mode of observation to a knothole or opening in a fence: if there is an opening, the police may look.

The California Court of Appeal accepted the analysis that unlike the casual observation of a private person flying overhead, this flight was focused specifically on a small suburban yard, and was not the result of any routine patrol overflight. Respondent contends he has done all that can reasonably be expected to tell the world he wishes to maintain the privacy of his garden within
the curtilage without covering his yard. Such covering, he argues, would defeat its purpose as an outside living area; he asserts he has not “knowingly” exposed himself to aerial views.

II

The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” *Katz* posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?

Clearly—and understandably—respondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits. It can reasonably be assumed that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop from at least street-level views. So far as the normal sidewalk traffic was concerned, this fence served that purpose, because respondent “took normal precautions to maintain his privacy.”

Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus. Whether respondent therefore manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from *all* observations of his backyard, or whether instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these circumstances. Respondent appears to challenge the authority of government to observe his activity from any vantage point or place if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and not the result of a casual, accidental observation.

We turn, therefore, to the second inquiry under *Katz*, i.e., whether that expectation is reasonable. In pursuing this inquiry, we must keep in mind that “[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly ‘private’ activity,” but instead “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.”

Respondent argues that because his yard was in the curtilage of his home, no governmental aerial observation is permissible under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened. The claimed area here was immediately adjacent to a suburban home, surrounded by high double fences. This close nexus to the home would appear to encompass this small area within the curtilage. Accepting, as the State does, that this yard and its crop fall within the curtilage, the question remains whether naked-eye observation of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully operating at an altitude of 1,000 feet violates an expectation of privacy that is reasonable.

That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer’s
observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.

The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took place within public navigable airspace in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this point they were able to observe plants readily discernible to the naked eye as marijuana. That the observation from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed. On this record, we readily conclude that respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.

Reversed.

Justice POWELL, with whom Justice BRENNAN, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

Concurring in *Katz v. United States*, Justice Harlan warned that any decision to construe the Fourth Amendment as proscribing only physical intrusions by police onto private property “is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.” Because the Court today ignores that warning in an opinion that departs significantly from the standard developed in *Katz* for deciding when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, I dissent.

The Court [holds] that respondent’s expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his home, although reasonable as to intrusions on the ground, was unreasonable as to surveillance from the navigable airspace. In my view, the Court’s holding rests on only one obvious fact, namely, that the airspace generally is open to all persons for travel in airplanes. The Court does not explain why this single fact deprives citizens of their privacy interest in outdoor activities in an enclosed curtilage.

The Court’s holding must rest solely on the fact that members of the public fly in planes and may look down at homes as they fly over them. The Court does not explain why it finds this fact to be significant. One may assume that the Court believes that citizens bear the risk that air travelers will observe activities occurring within backyards that are open to the sun and air. This risk, the Court appears to hold, nullifies expectations of privacy in those yards even as to purposeful police surveillance from the air.

This line of reasoning is flawed. First, the actual risk to privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually nonexistent. Travelers on commercial flights, as well as private planes used for business or personal reasons, normally obtain at most a fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which they pass. The risk that a passenger on such a plane might observe private activities, and might connect those activities with particular people, is simply too trivial to protect against. It is no accident that, as a matter of common experience, many people build fences around their residential areas, but few build...
roofs over their backyards. Therefore, contrary to the Court’s suggestion, people do not “knowingly expos[e]” their residential yards “to the public” merely by failing to build barriers that prevent aerial surveillance.

Since respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his yard, aerial surveillance undertaken by the police for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The indiscriminate nature of aerial surveillance, illustrated by Officer Shutz’ photograph of respondent’s home and enclosed yard as well as those of his neighbors, poses “far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.” Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the California Court of Appeal ordering suppression of the marijuana plants. I dissent.

* * *

In the next case, the Court applies the rule set forth in Ciraolo, which concerned fixed-wing aircraft, to police use of helicopters.

Supreme Court of the United States

Florida v. Michael Riley


Justice WHITE announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice SCALIA, and Justice KENNEDY join.

On certification to it by a lower state court, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the following question: “Whether surveillance of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above the greenhouse constitutes a ‘search’ for which a warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment.” The court answered the question in the affirmative, and we granted the State’s petition for certiorari challenging that conclusion.

Respondent Riley lived in a mobile home located on five acres of rural property. A greenhouse was located 10 to 20 feet behind the mobile home. Two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed. The other two sides were not enclosed but the contents of the greenhouse were obscured from view from surrounding property by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home. The greenhouse was covered by corrugated roofing panels, some translucent and some opaque. At the time relevant to this case, two of the panels, amounting to approximately 10% of the roof area, were missing. A wire fence surrounded the mobile home and the greenhouse, and the property was posted with a “DO NOT ENTER” sign.

This case originated with an anonymous tip to the Pasco County Sheriff’s office that marijuana was being grown on respondent’s property. When an investigating officer discovered that he could not see the contents of the greenhouse from the road, he circled twice over respondent’s property in a helicopter at the height of 400 feet. With his naked eye, he was able to see through the openings in the roof and one or more of the open sides of the greenhouse and to identify what
he thought was marijuana growing in the structure. A warrant was obtained based on these observations, and the ensuing search revealed marijuana growing in the greenhouse. Respondent was charged with possession of marijuana under Florida law. The trial court granted his motion to suppress; the Florida Court of Appeals reversed but certified the case to the Florida Supreme Court, which quashed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s suppression order.

We agree with the State’s submission that our decision in California v. Ciraolo controls this case.

In this case, as in Ciraolo, the property surveyed was within the curtilage of respondent’s home. Riley no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the precautions he took protected against ground-level observation. Because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open, however, what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air. Under the holding in Ciraolo, Riley could not reasonably have expected the contents of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an officer seated in a fixed-wing aircraft flying in navigable airspace at an altitude of 1,000 feet or, as the Florida Supreme Court seemed to recognize, at an altitude of 500 feet, the lower limit of the navigable airspace for such an aircraft. Here, the inspection was made from a helicopter, but as is the case with fixed-wing planes, “private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public airways is routine” in this country, and there is no indication that such flights are unheard of in Pasco County, Florida. Riley could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a helicopter had it been flying within the navigable airspace for fixed-wing aircraft.

Nor on the facts before us, does it make a difference for Fourth Amendment purposes that the helicopter was flying at 400 feet when the officer saw what was growing in the greenhouse through the partially open roof and sides of the structure. We would have a different case if flying at that altitude had been contrary to law or regulation. But helicopters are not bound by the lower limits of the navigable airspace allowed to other aircraft. Any member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s greenhouse. The police officer did no more. This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law. But it is of obvious importance that the helicopter in this case was not violating the law, and there is nothing in the record or before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to respondent’s claim that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude. Neither is there any intimation here that the helicopter interfered with respondent’s normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage. As far as this record reveals, no intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury. In these circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Justice O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment reversing the Supreme Court of Florida because I agree that police observation of the greenhouse in Riley’s curtilage from a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet violates the Fourth Amendment.
feet did not violate an expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” I write separately, however, to clarify the standard I believe follows from California v. Ciraolo. In my view, the plurality’s approach rests the scope of Fourth Amendment protection too heavily on compliance with FAA regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety, not to protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Ciraolo’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable not because the airplane was operating where it had a “right to be,” but because public air travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently routine part of modern life that it is unreasonable for persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will not be observed from the air at that altitude. Although “helicopters are not bound by the lower limits of the navigable airspace allowed to other aircraft,” there is no reason to assume that compliance with FAA regulations alone determines “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Because the FAA has decided that helicopters can lawfully operate at virtually any altitude so long as they pose no safety hazard, it does not follow that the expectations of privacy “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” simply mirror the FAA’s safety concerns.

In determining whether Riley had a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation, the relevant inquiry after Ciraolo is not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under FAA regulations. Rather, consistent with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Thus, in determining “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment,” it is not conclusive to observe, as the plurality does, that “[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s greenhouse.” Nor is it conclusive that police helicopters may often fly at 400 feet. If the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally used by the public and Riley cannot be said to have “knowingly expose[d]” his greenhouse to public view. However, if the public can generally be expected to travel over residential backyards at an altitude of 400 feet, Riley cannot reasonably expect his curtilage to be free from such aerial observation.

Because there is reason to believe that there is considerable public use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet and above, and because Riley introduced no evidence to the contrary before the Florida courts, I conclude that Riley’s expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked-eye aerial observation from that altitude was not a reasonable one. However, public use of altitudes lower than that—particularly public observations from helicopters circling over the curtilage of a home—may be sufficiently rare that police surveillance from such altitudes would violate reasonable expectations of privacy, despite compliance with FAA air safety regulations.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL and Justice STEVENS, join, dissenting.

The Court holds today that police officers need not obtain a warrant based on probable cause before circling in a helicopter 400 feet above a home in order to investigate what is taking place
behind the walls of the curtilage. I cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution tolerates such an intrusion on privacy and personal security.

The opinion for a plurality of the Court reads almost as if *Katz v. United States* had never been decided. Notwithstanding the disclaimers of its final paragraph, the opinion relies almost exclusively on the fact that the police officer conducted his surveillance from a vantage point where, under applicable Federal Aviation Administration regulations, he had a legal right to be.

The plurality undertakes no inquiry into whether low-level helicopter surveillance by the police of activities in an enclosed backyard is consistent with the “aims of a free and open society.” Instead, it summarily concludes that Riley’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable because “[a] ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s greenhouse.” This observation is, in turn, based solely on the fact that the police helicopter was within the airspace within which such craft are allowed by federal safety regulations to fly. It is a curious notion that the reach of the Fourth Amendment can be so largely defined by administrative regulations issued for purposes of flight safety.

The question before us must be not whether the police were where they had a right to be, but whether public observation of Riley’s curtilage was so commonplace that Riley’s expectation of privacy in his backyard could not be considered reasonable. To say that an invasion of Riley’s privacy from the skies was not impossible is most emphatically not the same as saying that his expectation of privacy within his enclosed curtilage was not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”

Perhaps the most remarkable passage in the plurality opinion is its suggestion that the case might be a different one had any “intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage [been] observed.” What, one wonders, is meant by “intimate details”? If the police had observed Riley embracing his wife in the backyard greenhouse, would we then say that his reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed? Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases is there any warrant for imposing a requirement that the activity observed must be “intimate” in order to be protected by the Constitution?

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the plurality has allowed its analysis of Riley’s expectation of privacy to be colored by its distaste for the activity in which he was engaged. It is indeed easy to forget, especially in view of current concern over drug trafficking, that the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection does not turn on whether the activity disclosed by a search is illegal or innocuous. But we dismiss this as a “drug case” only at the peril of our own liberties. Justice Frankfurter once noted that “[i]t is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice

1 [Footnote 2 by the Court] The plurality’s use of the FAA regulations as a means for determining whether Riley enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy produces an incredible result. Fixed-wing aircraft may not be operated below 500 feet (1,000 feet over congested areas), while helicopters may be operated below those levels. Therefore, whether Riley’s expectation of privacy is reasonable turns on whether the police officer at 400 feet above his curtilage is seated in an airplane or a helicopter. This cannot be the law.
people,” *United States v. Rabinowitz*, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (dissenting opinion), and nowhere is this observation more apt than in the area of the Fourth Amendment, whose words have necessarily been given meaning largely through decisions suppressing evidence of criminal activity. The principle enunciated in this case determines what limits the Fourth Amendment imposes on aerial surveillance of any person, for any reason. If the Constitution does not protect Riley’s marijuana garden against such surveillance, it is hard to see how it will prohibit the government from aerial spying on the activities of a law-abiding citizen on her fully enclosed outdoor patio. As Professor Amsterdam has eloquently written: “The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.” 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 403.

The issue in this case is, ultimately, “how tightly the Fourth Amendment permits people to be driven back into the recesses of their lives by the risk of surveillance.” The Court today approves warrantless helicopter surveillance from an altitude of 400 feet. The Fourth Amendment demands that we temper our efforts to apprehend criminals with a concern for the impact on our fundamental liberties of the methods we use. I hope it will be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance methods they would sanction were among those described 40 years ago in George Orwell’s dread vision of life in the 1980’s:

“The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from every commanding corner. There was one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said. ... In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.” *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949).

Who can read this passage without a shudder, and without the instinctive reaction that it depicts life in some country other than ours? I respectfully dissent.

### Notes, Comments, and Questions

Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests that as long as police pilots obey the law (such as FAA regulations on minimum altitudes), the “reasonable expectation of privacy test” will not prevent police from flying over a home. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence argues that legality is not everything, and her vote was necessary to assemble a majority of votes to affirm the conviction in *Riley*. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how a lower court could hold that flights similar to those in *Ciraolo* and *Riley*—which the Supreme Court deemed not to be “searches”—have somehow violated the Fourth Amendment, at least under *Katz*. (Because *Ciraolo* and *Riley* were decided before the Court reinvigorated trespass-based Fourth Amendment analysis in *Jones*, new arguments may be available under that case’s reasoning.)

Diligent defense counsel may wish to examine whether state or local laws restrict overflights more strictly than FAA regulations. Especially as remote-controlled helicopters (a.k.a. “drones”) become widely available at low prices, police can easily fly camera-toting aircraft over the homes of suspects. If a municipality prohibits such conduct by the general public, then perhaps police
who violate local ordinances will also violate reasonable expectations of privacy.

What are the limits for observations from the air? Consider an officer who uses a drone equipped with a video camera to monitor a suspect through his bedroom window. There is nothing to suggest that drones flying in neighborhoods are sufficiently rare; a drone with streaming video can be purchased for about $60 at Target. Search or no search? Why or why not? Does the outcome change if there is a local ordinance limiting the public’s use of drones to public spaces?

Students interested in the law regulating drones (also known as “unmanned aircraft”) can find information on the website of Jonathan Rupprecht, a Florida lawyer specializing in drones. He has collected various sources of drone law, including federal statutes, federal regulations (issued by several agencies, not solely by the Federal Aviation Administration), and state laws. As Rupprecht observes, it remains undecided how much of state drone law will be preempted by federal law.

Additionally, students can look at CALI’s lesson Drones: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, to learn more about the legal aspects of drones in both military and civilian settings.
For Chapter 3, we read Smith v. Maryland, in which the Court decided in 1979 that installation and use of a "pen register" to learn what numbers a suspect called from his home telephone was not a Fourth Amendment "search." Nearly 40 years later, the Court considered whether the holding of Smith allowed the government to gather a suspect's cell phone records to learn where that suspect has been. The question sharply divided the Court. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a five-Justice majority. Each Justice who dissented wrote his own dissenting opinion. The dissents and the majority opinion combined to fill 119 pages in the Court's slip opinion.

Supreme Court of the United States
Timothy Carpenter v. United States
Decided June 22, 2018 – 138 S. Ct. 2206

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user's past movements.

I

A

There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million people. Cell phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by connecting to a set of radio antennas called "cell sites." Although cell sites are usually mounted on a tower, they can also be found on light posts, flagpoles, church steeples, or the sides of buildings. Cell sites typically have several directional antennas that divide the covered area into sectors.

Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking for the best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site. Most modern devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless network several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of the phone's features. Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI). The precision of this information depends on the size of the geographic area covered by the cell site. The greater the concentration of cell sites, the smaller the coverage area. As data usage from cell phones has increased, wireless carriers have installed more cell sites to handle the traffic. That has led to increasingly compact coverage areas, especially in urban areas.

Wireless carriers collect and store CSLI for their own business purposes, including finding weak spots in their network and applying "roaming" charges when another carrier routes data through their cell sites. In addition, wireless carriers often sell aggregated location records to data
brokers, without individual identifying information of the sort at issue here. While carriers have long retained CSLI for the start and end of incoming calls, in recent years phone companies have also collected location information from the transmission of text messages and routine data connections. Accordingly, modern cell phones generate increasingly vast amounts of increasingly precise CSLI.

B

In 2011, police officers arrested four men suspected of robbing a series of Radio Shack and (ironically enough) T–Mobile stores in Detroit. One of the men confessed that, over the previous four months, the group (along with a rotating cast of getaway drivers and lookouts) had robbed nine different stores in Michigan and Ohio. The suspect identified 15 accomplices who had participated in the heists and gave the FBI some of their cell phone numbers; the FBI then reviewed his call records to identify additional numbers that he had called around the time of the robberies.

Based on that information, the prosecutors applied for court orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for petitioner Timothy Carpenter and several other suspects. That statute, as amended in 1994, permits the Government to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when it “offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” Federal Magistrate Judges issued two orders directing Carpenter’s wireless carriers—MetroPCS and Sprint—to disclose “cell/site sector [information] for [Carpenter’s] telephone[ ] at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls” during the four-month period when the string of robberies occurred. The first order sought 152 days of cell-site records from MetroPCS, which produced records spanning 127 days. The second order requested seven days of CSLI from Sprint, which produced two days of records covering the period when Carpenter’s phone was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio. Altogether the Government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.

Carpenter was charged with six counts of robbery and an additional six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence. Prior to trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the cell-site data provided by the wireless carriers. He argued that the Government’s seizure of the records violated the Fourth Amendment because they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause. The District Court denied the motion.

At trial, seven of Carpenter’s confederates pegged him as the leader of the operation. In addition, FBI agent Christopher Hess offered expert testimony about the cell-site data. Hess explained that each time a cell phone taps into the wireless network, the carrier logs a time-stamped record of the cell site and particular sector that were used. With this information, Hess produced maps that placed Carpenter’s phone near four of the charged robberies. In the Government’s view, the location records clinched the case: They confirmed that Carpenter was “right where the ... robbery was at the exact time of the robbery.” Carpenter was convicted on all but one of the firearm counts and sentenced to more than 100 years in prison.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers. Given that cell phone users voluntarily convey cell-site data to their carriers as “a means of establishing communication,” the court concluded that the resulting business records are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. We granted certiorari.

II

A

The Founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a “response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.” In fact, as John Adams recalled, the patriot James Otis’s 1761 speech condemning writs of assistance was “the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain” and helped spark the Revolution itself.

For much of our history, Fourth Amendment search doctrine was “tied to common-law trespass” and focused on whether the Government “obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” More recently, the Court has recognized that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.” In *Katz v. United States*, we established that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” and expanded our conception of the Amendment to protect certain expectations of privacy as well.

Although no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection, the analysis is informed by historical understandings “of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.” On this score, our cases have recognized some basic guideposts. First, that the Amendment seeks to secure “the privacies of life” against “arbitrary power.” Second, and relatedly, that a central aim of the Framers was “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”

We have kept this attention to Founding-era understandings in mind when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools. As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to “assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”

B

The case before us involves the Government’s acquisition of wireless carrier cell-site records revealing the location of Carpenter’s cell phone whenever it made or received calls. This sort of digital data—personal location information maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents. Instead, requests for cell-site records lie at the intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of the privacy interests at stake.

The first set of cases addresses a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location and
movements. The Court [has] concluded that “augment[ed]” visual surveillance [does] not constitute a search because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” Since the movements of the vehicle and its final destination [are] “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look,” [defendant] could not assert a privacy interest in the information obtained.

In a second set of decisions, the Court has drawn a line between what a person keeps to himself and what he shares with others. We have previously held that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” That remains true “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.” As a result, the Government is typically free to obtain such information from the recipient without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.

III

The question we confront today is how to apply the Fourth Amendment to a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals. Such tracking partakes of many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring we considered in Jones. Much like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.

At the same time, the fact that the individual continuously reveals his location to his wireless carrier implicates the third-party principle. But while the third-party doctrine applies to telephone numbers and bank records, it is not clear whether its logic extends to the qualitatively different category of cell-site records. After all, when Smith was decided in 1979, few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements.

We decline to extend [the third-party principle] to cover these novel circumstances. Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. The location information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search.

A

A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” For that reason, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”
Allowing government access to cell-site records contravenes that expectation. Although such records are generated for commercial purposes, that distinction does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his physical location. Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts. As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” These location records “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life.’” And like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of a button, the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense.

In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered in Jones. Unlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell phone—almost a “feature of human anatomy,”—tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner. While individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales. Accordingly, when the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.

Moreover, the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, the Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only to the retention [policies] of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five years. Critically, because location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to persons who might happen to come under investigation—this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone. Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when.

Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police may—in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.

Accordingly, when the Government accessed CSLI from the wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.

B

The Government’s primary contention to the contrary is that the third-party doctrine governs this case. In its view, cell-site records are fair game because they are “business records” created and maintained by the wireless carriers. The Government recognizes that this case features new
technology, but asserts that the legal question nonetheless turns on a garden-variety request for information from a third-party witness.

The Government’s position fails to contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years. Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible. There is a world of difference between limited types of personal information and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today. The Government thus is not asking for a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.

The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another. But the fact of “diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.”

Neither does the second rationale underlying the third-party doctrine—voluntary exposure—hold up when it comes to CSLI. Cell phone location information is not truly “shared” as one normally understands the term. In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society. Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily “assume[ ] the risk” of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.

Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or “tower dumps” (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval). We do not call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information. Further, our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations in airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that we do not “embarrass the future.”

We decline to grant the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier’s database of physical location information. In light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that
such information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records here was a search under that Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice KENNEDY, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice ALITO join, dissenting.

This case involves new technology, but the Court’s stark departure from relevant Fourth Amendment precedents and principles is, in my submission, unnecessary and incorrect, requiring this respectful dissent.

The new rule the Court seems to formulate puts needed, reasonable, accepted, lawful, and congressionally authorized criminal investigations at serious risk in serious cases, often when law enforcement seeks to prevent the threat of violent crimes. And it places undue restrictions on the lawful and necessary enforcement powers exercised not only by the Federal Government, but also by law enforcement in every State and locality throughout the Nation. Adherence to this Court’s longstanding precedents and analytic framework would have been the proper and prudent way to resolve this case.

The Court has twice held that individuals have no Fourth Amendment interests in business records which are possessed, owned, and controlled by a third party. This is true even when the records contain personal and sensitive information. So when the Government uses a subpoena to obtain, for example, bank records, telephone records, and credit card statements from the businesses that create and keep these records, the Government does not engage in a search of the business’s customers within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

In this case petitioner challenges the Government’s right to use compulsory process to obtain a now-common kind of business record: cell-site records held by cell phone service providers. The Government acquired the records through an investigative process enacted by Congress. Upon approval by a neutral magistrate, and based on the Government’s duty to show reasonable necessity, it authorizes the disclosure of records and information that are under the control and ownership of the cell phone service provider, not its customer.

Cell-site records are no different from the many other kinds of business records the Government has a lawful right to obtain by compulsory process. Customers like petitioner do not own, possess, control, or use the records, and for that reason have no reasonable expectation that they cannot be disclosed pursuant to lawful compulsory process.

In concluding that the Government engaged in a search, the Court unhinges Fourth Amendment doctrine from the property-based concepts that have long grounded the analytic framework that pertains in these cases. In doing so it draws an unprincipled and unworkable line between cell-site records on the one hand and financial and telephonic records on the other. According to today’s majority opinion, the Government can acquire a record of every credit card purchase and phone call a person makes over months or years without upsetting a legitimate expectation of privacy. But, in the Court’s view, the Government crosses a constitutional line when it obtains a
court’s approval to issue a subpoena for more than six days of cell-site records in order to
determine whether a person was within several hundred city blocks of a crime scene. That
distinction is illogical and will frustrate principled application of the Fourth Amendment in
many routine yet vital law enforcement operations.

Justice THOMAS, dissenting.

[Justice Thomas raised two primary arguments in his dissent. First, he noted that the “property”
at issue belonged to MetroPCS and Sprint, and that Carpenter accordingly had no ground upon
which to object to a search of the property. Second, he argued that the Court should reject
entirely the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, which Justice Thomas wrote has served “to
distort Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”]

Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting.

I share the Court’s concern about the effect of new technology on personal privacy, but I fear that
today’s decision will do far more harm than good. The Court’s reasoning fractures two
fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law, and in doing so, it guarantees a blizzard of
litigation while threatening many legitimate and valuable investigative practices upon which law
enforcement has rightfully come to rely.

First, the Court ignores the basic distinction between an actual search (dispatching law
enforcement officers to enter private premises and root through private papers and effects) and
an order merely requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified
documents. The former, which intrudes on personal privacy far more deeply, requires probable
cause; the latter does not. Treating an order to produce like an actual search, as today’s decision
does, is revolutionary. It violates both the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment and
more than a century of Supreme Court precedent. Unless it is somehow restricted to the
particular situation in the present case, the Court’s move will cause upheaval. Must every grand
jury subpoena *duces tecum* be supported by probable cause? If so, investigations of terrorism,
political corruption, white-collar crime, and many other offenses will be stymied. And what
about subpoenas and other document-production orders issued by administrative agencies?

Second, the Court allows a defendant to object to the search of a third party’s property. This also
is revolutionary. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in *their*
persons, houses, papers, and effects” (emphasis added), not the persons, houses, papers, and
effects of others. Until today, we have been careful to heed this fundamental feature of the
Amendment’s text.

By departing dramatically from these fundamental principles, the Court destabilizes long-
established Fourth Amendment doctrine. We will be making repairs—or picking up the pieces—
for a long time to come.

Although the majority professes a desire not to “embarrass the future,” we can guess where
today’s decision will lead.
One possibility is that the broad principles that the Court seems to embrace will be applied across the board. All subpoenas *duces tecum* and all other orders compelling the production of documents will require a demonstration of probable cause, and individuals will be able to claim a protected Fourth Amendment interest in any sensitive personal information about them that is collected and owned by third parties. Those would be revolutionary developments indeed.

The other possibility is that this Court will face the embarrassment of explaining in case after case that the principles on which today’s decision rests are subject to all sorts of qualifications and limitations that have not yet been discovered. If we take this latter course, we will inevitably end up “mak[ing] a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment.”

The desire to make a statement about privacy in the digital age does not justify the consequences that today’s decision is likely to produce.

Justice GORSUCH, dissenting.

[Justice Gorsuch echoed some of the arguments raised by Justice Thomas concerning the wisdom of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. He then suggested that Carpenter might have prevailed on a different theory, based on the trespass test reinvigorated by *United States v. Jones* (2012) and *Florida v. Jardines*, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (part of the reading for our next chapter). Under this theory, perhaps Carpenter had standing to object to a search of property held by MetroPCS and Sprint. One often retains rights to property deposited with a third party; recall the concept of a “bailment.” Because Justice Gorsuch “reluctantly” concluded that Carpenter “forfeited perhaps his most promising line of argument” by not raising it, Justice Gorsuch could not concur in the judgment (in favor of Carpenter) and instead dissented.]

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

In Chapter 2, students were encouraged to consider how the doctrines set forth in *Katz* and *Jones* would resolve the question presented in *Carpenter*. Now, having read *Carpenter*, students should review their analysis. Did the Court reach the result you expected? If not, why do you think the Court’s reasoning differed from yours?

As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in *United States v. Jones* (Chapter 2), technological advances will demand continued attention from the Court. Students should also consider when and how the legislative and executive branches of the federal government (as well as the states) should regulate privacy related to smart phones and other technological marvels.

In many cities, drivers can use an app called “ParkMobile” to pay for parking, saving them the trouble of finding change for parking meters. The app allows users to look up their parking “history,” which is a list of times and places of prior transactions. Imagine that after a bank robbery, police contact ParkMobile corporate headquarters and obtain a list of all users who parked within a mile of the bank within an hour of the robbery. Search or no search? Why or why not? Now, imagine instead that police suspect a particular person of robbing the bank, and police contact ParkMobile to obtain that single person’s parking history for the day of the robbery. Search or no search? Why or why not?
Consider this commentary by Evan Caminker, a professor at and former dean of the University of Michigan Law School. Caminker briefed and argued Carpenter on behalf of the United States when the case was at the Sixth Circuit; he was on academic leave and was working with the federal prosecutors in Michigan. After Caminker was back in academia—and the Supreme Court had decided the case—he published these reflections:

How should courts square Katz in the future? The Court in Carpenter said there are two separate rationales underlying the third-party doctrine—lack of special sensitivity and voluntary exposure—and that CSLI triggers neither. As with its involuntary arguments, however, the Court does not explain how the two rationales relate as part of the overall doctrine.

The Court might mean that the third-party doctrine applies when either of the two rationales is present. In other words, if highly sensitive information was voluntarily conveyed (think Fitbit health data), or if nonsensitive information was involuntarily shared (perhaps computer internet protocol addresses?), then the privacy interest dissipates. This reading fits with the Court’s decision to address both variables, rather than to end its analysis after finding no voluntary sharing.

Or, the Court might mean that privacy dissipates only if both rationales apply, and the information is both voluntarily shared and nonsensitive. That seems perfectly logical too, though it seems less likely because it would mean that the third-party doctrine can never apply to sensitive information, no matter how clearly it was voluntarily shared (think of Carpenter posting his own location history on Facebook, or celebrities publishing tell-all memoirs).

And then there is a third possibility, raised and criticized by the dissents: an open-ended multifactor test. Justice Gorsuch, for example, lamented a “second Katz-like balancing inquiry, asking whether the fact of disclosure … outweighs privacy interests in the ‘category of information’ so disclosed.” Justice Kennedy also viewed the Court as announcing a balancing test that encompassed both privacy interests and CSLI tracking properties by “considering intimacy, comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity, and voluntariness.” Of course, the Court often articulates doctrine through multifactor tests, but Justice Kennedy feared that this one would particularly put “the law on a new and unstable foundation” as lower courts would be left to figure out for themselves how the doctrinal variables relate when they address other surveillance technologies and types of digital data.


Less than two years after Carpenter was decided, reporters revealed that federal agents had “bought access to a commercial database that maps the movements of millions of cellphones in America” and were “using it for immigration and border enforcement.” See Bryan Tau & Michelle Hackman, Federal Agencies Use Cellphone Location Data for Immigration Enforcement, Wall
St. J. (Feb. 7, 2020). Asked about whether Fourth Amendment law might regulate this tactic, a former Homeland Security official said, “In this case, the government is a commercial purchaser like anybody else. Carpenter is not relevant.” He added, “The government is just buying a widget.”

* * *

In our remaining material for this chapter, we will see how the Court has applied its Fourth Amendment principles to a more old-fashioned investigatory tool: the use of dogs by police. Depending on the context—a dog sniffing bags at an airport, a dog sniffing a car during a traffic stop, a dog sniffing someone’s porch—the Court has reached different conclusions on whether using a dog is a “search.”

Supreme Court of the United States

**United States v. Raymond J. Place**

Decided June 20, 1983 – 462 U.S. 696

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Raymond J. Place’s behavior aroused the suspicions of law enforcement officers as he waited in line at the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket to New York’s LaGuardia Airport. As Place proceeded to the gate for his flight, the agents approached him and requested his airline ticket and some identification. Place complied with the request and consented to a search of the two suitcases he had checked. Because his flight was about to depart, however, the agents decided not to search the luggage.

Prompted by Place’s parting remark that he had recognized that they were police, the agents inspected the address tags on the checked luggage and noted discrepancies in the two street addresses. Further investigation revealed that neither address existed and that the telephone number Place had given the airline belonged to a third address on the same street. On the basis of their encounter with Place and this information, the Miami agents called Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorities in New York to relay their information about Place.

Two DEA agents waited for Place at the arrival gate at LaGuardia Airport in New York. There again, his behavior aroused the suspicion of the agents. After he had claimed his two bags and called a limousine, the agents decided to approach him. They identified themselves as federal narcotics agents, to which Place responded that he knew they were “cops” and had spotted them as soon as he had deplaned. One of the agents informed Place that, based on their own observations and information obtained from the Miami authorities, they believed that he might be carrying narcotics. After identifying the bags as belonging to him, Place stated that a number of police at the Miami Airport had surrounded him and searched his baggage. The agents responded that their information was to the contrary. The agents requested and received identification from Place—a New Jersey driver’s license, on which the agents later ran a computer check that disclosed no offenses, and his airline ticket receipt. When Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, one of the agents told him that they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to try to obtain a search warrant and that Place was free to accompany
them. Place declined, but obtained from one of the agents telephone numbers at which the agents could be reached.

The agents then took the bags to Kennedy Airport, where they subjected the bags to a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics detection dog. The dog reacted positively to the smaller of the two bags but ambiguously to the larger bag. Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning, when they secured a search warrant from a magistrate for the smaller bag. Upon opening that bag, the agents discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine.

Place was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. In the District Court, Place moved to suppress the contents of the luggage seized from him at LaGuardia Airport, claiming that the warrantless seizure of the luggage violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied the motion.

On appeal of the conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. We granted certiorari and now affirm.

The purpose for which respondent’s luggage was seized was to arrange its exposure to a narcotics detection dog. Obviously, if this investigative procedure is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent’s luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test—no matter how brief—could not be justified on less than probable cause.

The Fourth Amendment “protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy.” We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.

In these respects, the canine sniff is *sui generis*. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here—exposure of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

[Although the Court found that the dog sniff was not a “search,” Place prevailed because the Court held that police committed an unlawful seizure of Place’s property by detaining his luggage for 90 minutes and not informing him of their plans for the luggage. The concurring opinion below disagrees with the majority’s conclusion about the dog sniff.]
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, concurring in the result.

The Court suggests today that exposure of respondent’s luggage to a narcotics detection dog “did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”

[T]he issue is more complex than the Court’s discussion would lead one to believe. As Justice STEVENS suggested in objecting to “unnecessarily broad dicta” in United States v. Knotts, the use of electronic detection techniques that enhance human perception implicates “especially sensitive concerns.” Obviously, a narcotics detection dog is not an electronic detection device. Unlike the electronic “beeper” in Knotts, however, a dog does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what they could do using only their own senses. A dog adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human perception. The use of dogs, therefore, represents a greater intrusion into an individual’s privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection devices.

I have expressed the view that dog sniffs of people constitute searches. In any event, I would leave the determination of whether dog sniffs of luggage amount to searches, and the subsidiary question of what standards should govern such intrusions, to a future case providing an appropriate, and more informed, basis for deciding these questions.

* * *

In Place, the Court focused on the use of dogs in an airport, which is a public place that persons visit by choice. In the next case, the Court turned its attention to the use of dogs during traffic stops, in which motorists are detained involuntarily.

Supreme Court of the United States
Illinois v. Roy I. Caballes
Decided Jan. 24, 2005 – 543 U.S. 405

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped respondent for speeding on an interstate highway. When Gillette radioed the police dispatcher to report the stop, a second trooper, Craig Graham, a member of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team, overheard the transmission and immediately headed for the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. When they arrived, respondent’s car was on the shoulder of the road and respondent was in Gillette’s vehicle. While Gillette was in the process of writing a warning ticket, Graham walked his dog around respondent’s car. The dog alerted at the trunk. Based on that alert, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent. The entire incident lasted less than 10 minutes.

Respondent was convicted of a narcotics offense and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment and a $256,136 fine. The trial judge denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence and to quash his arrest. He held that the officers had not unnecessarily prolonged the stop and that the dog alert was sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to conduct the search. Although the Appellate Court affirmed, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that because the
canine sniff was performed without any “specific and articulable facts” to suggest drug activity, the use of the dog “unjustifiably enlarg[ed] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.”

The question on which we granted certiorari is narrow: “Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop.” Thus, we proceed on the assumption that the officer conducting the dog sniff had no information about respondent except that he had been stopped for speeding; accordingly, we have omitted any reference to facts about respondent that might have triggered a modicum of suspicion.

[The Illinois Supreme Court held that the initially lawful traffic stop became an unlawful seizure solely as a result of the canine sniff that occurred outside respondent’s stopped car. That is, the court characterized the dog sniff as the cause rather than the consequence of a constitutional violation. In its view, the use of the dog converted the citizen-police encounter from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation, and because the shift in purpose was not supported by any reasonable suspicion that respondent possessed narcotics, it was unlawful. In our view, conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Our cases hold that it did not.

Official conduct that does not “compromise any legitimate interest in privacy” is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed “legitimate,” and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy interest.” This is because the expectation “that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities” is not the same as an interest in “privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.” Respondent concedes that “drug sniffs are designed, and if properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal only the presence of contraband.” Although respondent argues that the error rates, particularly the existence of false positives, call into question the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to contraband, the record contains no evidence or findings that support his argument. Moreover, respondent does not suggest that an erroneous alert, in and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case, the trial judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the trunk.

Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one that “does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,” during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent’s car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondent’s privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.

This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details in a home, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” The legitimate expectation
that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically
distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of
contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop
that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any
right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice SOUTER, dissenting.

I would hold that using the dog for the purposes of determining the presence of marijuana in the
car’s trunk was a search unauthorized as an incident of the speeding stop and unjustified on any
other ground. I would accordingly affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and I
respectfully dissent.

At the heart both of Place and the Court’s opinion today is the proposition that sniffs by a trained
dog are sui generis because a reaction by the dog in going alert is a response to nothing but the
presence of contraband. Hence, the argument goes, because the sniff can only reveal the presence
of items devoid of any legal use, the sniff “does not implicate legitimate privacy interests” and is
not to be treated as a search.

The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois
did not get into the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed infallibility is belied by judicial
opinions describing well-trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy,
whether owing to errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the
pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine. Indeed, a study cited by Illinois in this case for
the proposition that dog sniffs are “generally reliable” shows that dogs in artificial testing
situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, depending on the
length of the search. In practical terms, the evidence is clear that the dog that alerts hundreds of
times will be wrong dozens of times.

Once the dog’s fallibility is recognized, however, that ends the justification claimed in Place for
treating the sniff as sui generis under the Fourth Amendment: the sniff alert does not necessarily
signal hidden contraband, and opening the container or enclosed space whose emanations the
dog has sensed will not necessarily reveal contraband or any other evidence of crime. This is not,
of course, to deny that a dog’s reaction may provide reasonable suspicion, or probable cause, to
search the container or enclosure; the Fourth Amendment does not demand certainty of success
to justify a search for evidence or contraband. The point is simply that the sniff and alert cannot
claim the certainty that Place assumed, both in treating the deliberate use of sniffing dogs as sui
generis and then taking that characterization as a reason to say they are not searches subject to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. And when that aura of uniqueness disappears, there is no basis in
Place’s reasoning, and no good reason otherwise, to ignore the actual function that dog sniffs
perform. They are conducted to obtain information about the contents of private spaces beyond
anything that human senses could perceive, even when conventionally enhanced. The
information is not provided by independent third parties beyond the reach of constitutional
limitations, but gathered by the government’s own officers in order to justify searches of the
traditional sort, which may or may not reveal evidence of crime but will disclose anything meant to be kept private in the area searched. Thus in practice the government’s use of a trained narcotics dog functions as a limited search to reveal undisclosed facts about private enclosures, to be used to justify a further and complete search of the enclosed area. And given the fallibility of the dog, the sniff is the first step in a process that may disclose “intimate details” without revealing contraband, just as a thermal-imaging device might do, as described in *Kyllo v. United States*.

It makes sense, then, to treat a sniff as the search that it amounts to in practice, and to rely on the body of our Fourth Amendment cases, including *Kyllo*, in deciding whether such a search is reasonable. As a general proposition, using a dog to sniff for drugs is subject to the rule that the object of enforcing criminal laws does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth Amendment intrusions. Since the police claim to have had no particular suspicion that Caballes was violating any drug law, this sniff search must stand or fall on its being ancillary to the traffic stop that led up to it.

For the sake of providing a workable framework to analyze cases on facts like these, which are certain to come along, I would treat the dog sniff as the familiar search it is in fact, subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.¹

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice SOUTER joins, dissenting.

The Court has never removed police action from Fourth Amendment control on the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend the guilty. Under today’s decision, every traffic stop could become an occasion to call in the dogs, to the distress and embarrassment of the law-abiding population.

The Illinois Supreme Court, it seems to me, correctly apprehended the danger in allowing the police to search for contraband despite the absence of cause to suspect its presence. Today’s decision, in contrast, clears the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots. Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for complaint should police with dogs, stationed at long traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to turn green.

Today’s decision also undermines this Court’s situation-sensitive balancing of Fourth Amendment interests in other contexts. For example, in *Bond v. United States*, 529 U.S. 334 (2000), the Court held that a bus passenger had an expectation of privacy in a bag placed in an overhead bin and that a police officer’s physical manipulation of the bag constituted an illegal search. If canine drug sniffs are entirely exempt from Fourth Amendment inspection, a sniff could substitute for an officer’s request to a bus passenger for permission to search his bag, with

¹ [Footnote 7 by the Court] I should take care myself to reserve judgment about a possible case significantly unlike this one. All of us are concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority to detect explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no individualized suspicion. Suffice it to say here that what is a reasonable search depends in part on demonstrated risk. Unreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly material if suicide bombs are a societal risk.
this significant difference: The passenger would not have the option to say “No.”

The dog sniff in this case, it bears emphasis, was for drug detection only. A dog sniff for explosives, involving security interests not presented here, would be an entirely different matter.

For the reasons stated, I would hold that the police violated Caballes’ Fourth Amendment rights when, without cause to suspect wrongdoing, they conducted a dog sniff of his vehicle. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court.

* * *

The previous two cases analyzed the use of dogs under the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test derived from Katz. In the next case, which came one year after United States v. Jones, the Court considered the use of dogs under the law of trespass.

Supreme Court of the United States

Florida v. Joelis Jardines

Decided March 26, 2013 – 569 U.S. 1

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the home is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

I

In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home of respondent Joelis Jardines. One month later, the Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance team to Jardines’ home. Detective Pedraja was part of that team. He watched the home for fifteen minutes and saw no vehicles in the driveway or activity around the home, and could not see inside because the blinds were drawn. Detective Pedraja then approached Jardines’ home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, a trained canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his drug-sniffing dog. The dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs, indicating the presence of any of these substances through particular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.

Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing in part to the dog’s “wild” nature and tendency to dart around erratically while searching. As the dog approached Jardines’ front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog “began tracking that airborne odor by ... tracking back and forth,” engaging in what is called “bracketing,” “back and forth, back and forth.” Detective Bartelt gave the dog “the full six feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he could] give him” to do this—he testified that he needed to give the dog “as much distance as I can.” And Detective Pedraja stood back while this was occurring, so that he would not “get knocked over” when the dog was “spinning around trying to find” the source.
After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor’s strongest point. Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and returned to his vehicle. He left the scene after informing Detective Pedraja that there had been a positive alert for narcotics.

On the basis of what he had learned at the home, Detective Pedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the residence. When the warrant was executed later that day, Jardines attempted to flee and was arrested; the search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged with trafficking in cannabis.

At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search. The trial court granted the motion, and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed. On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and approved the trial court’s decision to suppress, holding (as relevant here) that the use of the trained narcotics dog to investigate Jardines’ home was a Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable cause, rendering invalid the warrant based upon information gathered in that search.

We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the officers’ behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

II

[When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment’s “very core” stands “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” This right would be of little practical value if the State’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right to retreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man’s property to observe his repose from just outside the front window.

We therefore regard the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home”—what our cases call the curtilage—as “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Here there is no doubt that the officers entered it: The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and “to which the activity of home life extends.”

Since the officers’ investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area, we turn to the question of whether it was accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion. While law enforcement officers need not “shield their eyes” when passing by the home “on public thoroughfares,” an officer’s leave to gather information is sharply circumscribed when he steps off those thoroughfares and enters the Fourth Amendment’s protected areas. As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of their companion’s firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension of Jardines’ home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (even implicitly) for them to do so. He had not.

We have recognized that “the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.”
This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is “no more than any private citizen might do.”

But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is something else. There is no customary invitation to do that. An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker. To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to—well, call the police. The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose. Consent at a traffic stop to an officer’s checking out an anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk does not permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics. Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search.

The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore affirmed.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

Does the outcome change if the dog is sniffing the door of an apartment instead of a home? Consider a police officer who is investigating an individual for methamphetamine production. The individual lives on the third floor of an apartment building. The police officer leads a dog to the third-floor hallway; the dog sniffs several doors in the hallway without alerting. While sniffing the suspect’s door, the dog alerts to the presence of drugs. Search or no search? Why or why not? See *State v. Edstrom*, 916 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1262 (2019).

This chapter’s final dog case differs somewhat from the previous cases. Instead of considering what activity by dogs counts as a “search,” the Court considers how well trained a police dog must be for its “alert” to count toward the probable cause needed to justify a vehicle search. The more reliable a dog is, the more reasonable it is for police to search an area to which the dog has alerted. The less reliable the dog, the less reasonable police reliance becomes.
Supreme Court of the United States

**Florida v. Clayton Harris**

Decided Feb. 19, 2013 – *568 U.S. 237*

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court.

In this case, we consider how a court should determine if the “alert” of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court held that the State must in every case present an exhaustive set of records, including a log of the dog’s performance in the field, to establish the dog’s reliability. We think that demand inconsistent with the “flexible, common-sense standard” of probable cause.

I

William Wheetley is a K–9 Officer in the Liberty County, Florida Sheriff’s Office. On June 24, 2006, he was on a routine patrol with Aldo, a German shepherd trained to detect certain narcotics (methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy). Wheetley pulled over respondent Clayton Harris’s truck because it had an expired license plate. On approaching the driver’s-side door, Wheetley saw that Harris was “visibly nervous,” unable to sit still, shaking, and breathing rapidly. Wheetley also noticed an open can of beer in the truck’s cup holder. Wheetley asked Harris for consent to search the truck, but Harris refused. At that point, Wheetley retrieved Aldo from the patrol car and walked him around Harris’s truck for a “free air sniff.” Aldo alerted at the driver’s-side door handle—signaling, through a distinctive set of behaviors, that he smelled drugs there.

Wheetley concluded, based principally on Aldo’s alert, that he had probable cause to search the truck. His search did not turn up any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect. But it did reveal 200 loose pseudoephedrine pills, 8,000 matches, a bottle of hydrochloric acid, two containers of antifreeze, and a coffee filter full of iodine crystals—all ingredients for making methamphetamine. Wheetley accordingly arrested Harris, who admitted after proper Miranda warnings that he routinely “cooked” methamphetamine at his house and could not go “more than a few days without using” it. The State charged Harris with possessing pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing methamphetamine.

While out on bail, Harris had another run-in with Wheetley and Aldo. This time, Wheetley pulled Harris over for a broken brake light. Aldo again sniffed the truck’s exterior, and again alerted at the driver’s-side door handle. Wheetley once more searched the truck, but on this occasion discovered nothing of interest.

Harris moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given Wheetley probable cause for a search. At the hearing on that motion, Wheetley testified about both his and Aldo’s training in drug detection. Wheetley (and a different dog) completed a 160-hour course in narcotics detection offered by the Dothan, Alabama Police Department, while Aldo (and a different handler) completed a similar, 120-hour course given by the Apopka, Florida Police Department. That same year, Aldo received a one-year certification from Drug Beat, a private company that specializes in testing and certifying K-9 dogs. Wheetley and Aldo
teamed up in 2005 and went through another, 40-hour refresher course in Dothan together. They also did four hours of training exercises each week to maintain their skills. Wheetley would hide drugs in certain vehicles or buildings while leaving others “blank” to determine whether Aldo alerted at the right places. According to Wheetley, Aldo’s performance in those exercises was “really good.” The State introduced “Monthly Canine Detection Training Logs” consistent with that testimony: They showed that Aldo always found hidden drugs and that he performed “satisfactorily” (the higher of two possible assessments) on each day of training.

On cross-examination, Harris’s attorney chose not to contest the quality of Aldo’s or Wheetley’s training. She focused instead on Aldo’s certification and his performance in the field, particularly the two stops of Harris’s truck. Wheetley conceded that the certification (which, he noted, Florida law did not require) had expired the year before he pulled Harris over. Wheetley also acknowledged that he did not keep complete records of Aldo’s performance in traffic stops or other field work; instead, he maintained records only of alerts resulting in arrests. But Wheetley defended Aldo’s two alerts to Harris’s seemingly narcotics-free truck: According to Wheetley, Harris probably transferred the odor of methamphetamine to the door handle, and Aldo responded to that “residual odor.”

The trial court concluded that Wheetley had probable cause to search Harris’s truck and so denied the motion to suppress. Harris then entered a no-contest plea while reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling. An intermediate state court summarily affirmed.

The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wheetley lacked probable cause to search Harris’s vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. “[W]hen a dog alerts,” the court wrote, “the fact that the dog has been trained and certified is simply not enough to establish probable cause.” To demonstrate a dog’s reliability, the State needed to produce a wider array of evidence:

“[T]he State must present ... the dog’s training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification, field performance records (including any unverified alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of the officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about the dog’s reliability.”

The court particularly stressed the need for “evidence of the dog’s performance history,” including records showing “how often the dog has alerted in the field without illegal contraband having been found.” That data, the court stated, could help to expose such problems as a handler’s tendency (conscious or not) to “cue [a] dog to alert” and “a dog’s inability to distinguish between residual odors and actual drugs.” Accordingly, an officer like Wheetley who did not keep full records of his dog’s field performance could never have the requisite cause to think “that the dog is a reliable indicator of drugs.”

We granted certiorari and now reverse.

II

A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when “the facts available to [him] would ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief’” that contraband or evidence of a crime is present. The test for probable cause is not reducible to “precise definition or quantification.”
"Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence ... have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.” All we have required is the kind of “fair probability” on which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.”

In evaluating whether the State has met this practical and common-sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the totality of the circumstances. We have rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach. Probable cause, is “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”

The Florida Supreme Court flouted this established approach to determining probable cause. To assess the reliability of a drug-detection dog, the court created a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick off. Most prominently, an alert cannot establish probable cause under the Florida court’s decision unless the State introduces comprehensive documentation of the dog’s prior “hits” and “misses” in the field. (One wonders how the court would apply its test to a rookie dog.) No matter how much other proof the State offers of the dog’s reliability, the absent field performance records will preclude a finding of probable cause. That is the antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. [A] finding of a drug-detection dog’s reliability cannot depend on the State’s satisfaction of multiple, independent evidentiary requirements. No more for dogs than for human informants is such an inflexible checklist the way to prove reliability, and thus establish probable cause.

Making matters worse, the decision below treats records of a dog’s field performance as the gold standard in evidence, when in most cases they have relatively limited import. Errors may abound in such records. If a dog on patrol fails to alert to a car containing drugs, the mistake usually will go undetected because the officer will not initiate a search. Field data thus may not capture a dog’s false negatives. Conversely (and more relevant here), if the dog alerts to a car in which the officer finds no narcotics, the dog may not have made a mistake at all. The dog may have detected substances that were too well hidden or present in quantities too small for the officer to locate. Or the dog may have smelled the residual odor of drugs previously in the vehicle or on the driver’s person. Field data thus may markedly overstate a dog’s real false positives. By contrast, those inaccuracies—in either direction—do not taint records of a dog’s performance in standard training and certification settings. There, the designers of an assessment know where drugs are hidden and where they are not—and so where a dog should alert and where he should not. The better measure of a dog’s reliability thus comes away from the field, in controlled testing environments.

For that reason, evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search. The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed a training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs. After all, law enforcement units have their own strong incentive to use effective training and certification programs, because only accurate drug-detection dogs enable officers to locate contraband without incurring unnecessary risks or wasting limited time and resources.
A defendant, however, must have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog’s reliability, whether by cross-examining the testifying officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses. The defendant, for example, may contest the adequacy of a certification or training program, perhaps asserting that its standards are too lax or its methods faulty. So too, the defendant may examine how the dog (or handler) performed in the assessments made in those settings. Indeed, evidence of the dog’s (or handler’s) history in the field, although susceptible to the kind of misinterpretation we have discussed, may sometimes be relevant, as the Solicitor General acknowledged at oral argument. And even assuming a dog is generally reliable, circumstances surrounding a particular alert may undermine the case for probable cause—if, say, the officer cued the dog (consciously or not), or if the team was working under unfamiliar conditions.

In short, a probable-cause hearing focusing on a dog’s alert should proceed much like any other. The court should allow the parties to make their best case, consistent with the usual rules of criminal procedure. And the court should then evaluate the proffered evidence to decide what all the circumstances demonstrate. If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then the court should find probable cause. If, in contrast, the defendant has challenged the State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the dog overall or of a particular alert), then the court should weigh the competing evidence. In all events, the court should not prescribe, as the Florida Supreme Court did, an inflexible set of evidentiary requirements. The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.

III

And here, Aldo’s did. The record in this case amply supported the trial court’s determination that Aldo’s alert gave Wheetley probable cause to search Harris’s truck.

Because training records established Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed to undermine that showing, we agree with the trial court that Wheetley had probable cause to search Harris’s truck. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

In Harris, the Court held that Aldo (the police dog) was reliable enough that his “alert” provided sufficient evidence of crime that officers had “probable cause” to search a vehicle. The term “probable cause” appears in the text of the Fourth Amendment, and its definition is essential to understanding when police may obtain warrants, when they may search cars, and many other important questions. We examine the concept of probable cause in some detail in the next chapter.

When studying dog alerts, students should remember that lawyers have many opportunities to object to what they consider unreliable dog-alert evidence. In Harris, defense counsel’s goal was to exclude the evidence police found while searching a truck. A different Florida case, State v.
**Merrit Alonzo Sims (Fla. 2007)**, the Supreme Court of Florida considered a lawyer’s failure to object to dog-alert evidence for a different reason. In that case, a police dog handler testified at a murder trial “that his dog alerted him to the presence of narcotics in the passenger side of the car that Sims was driving.” Sims had admitted to killing a police officer with the officer’s police pistol; the issue at trial was whether the killing was murder or self-defense. Sims claimed the officer “had choked him, used racial epithets, and repeatedly threatened to kill him.”

The state, by contrast, argued that because Sims had drugs in his car, he had a motive to kill the officer to avoid being returned to prison (drug possession was against the terms of Sims’s parole). One difficulty for the state was that drugs were not found when the car was searched sometime after the killing. The state argued “that the dog would alert to the scent of narcotics after the drugs had been removed, and ... used this to develop its theory of Sims’ motive.” After Sims had spent more than a decade on death row, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the dog-alert evidence (that is, to the testimony by the dog handler). The court held that the evidence was so unreliable that it would have been excluded had counsel properly objected, that counsel had no good justification for that failure, and that Sims’s conviction must be set aside. Sims would later plead guilty, taking a deal that included a sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment—and no death penalty.

This is but one example of a reason one might object to unreliable evidence (of all kinds). Further, even if a lawyer cannot win the exclusion of unreliable evidence, she can still argue to the jury that the evidence is lousy and should be disregarded. When studying legal doctrines related to the exclusion of evidence, students should not forget that the most common ways to attack “bad” evidence involve a combination of argument and contrary evidence.
Search Review

Fourth Amendment: What Is a Search?

Before moving to the next chapter, students may wish to review the definition of “search” by considering these examples. Instructions: Write “is,” “is not,” or “may be” in each blank. If your answer is “may be,” jot down in the margin why you are unsure. Each problem is independent of all other ones.

1) If a police officer uses a car to follow a suspect who is driving from home to work, that ________________ a search.

2) If a police officer flies a helicopter fifty feet above the ground and uses binoculars to look into a house window, that ________________ a search.

3) If a police officer rifles through a suspect’s paper recycling before the sanitation department collects it (and removes an itemized credit card bill), that ________________ a search.

4) If a police officer borrows a rare super-sensitive microphone from the CIA and points it at a living room window from across the street, thereby capturing the window vibrations and listening to the conversations of people inside, that ________________ a search.

5) If a police department deploys officers in shifts 24/7 to watch a house, writing down the description of everyone who comes and goes, that ________________ a search.

6) If a police officer chases a robbery suspect from the scene of a bank robbery, and the officer follows the sprinting subject into a nearby house, that ________________ a search.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Accordingly, warrants (and the searches that followed in the wake of their issuance) have been challenged on the ground that police did not provide sufficient evidence when obtaining the warrants from judges. In addition, the Court has held that in several common situations, police may conduct searches and seizures without a warrant, but only with probable cause. For example, the vehicle searches described in Florida v. Harris (Chapter 5) were permissible under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, about which we will learn more later. In Illinois v. Gates, the Court set forth a new standard for when an informant’s tip provides probable cause to justify a search or arrest.

Supreme Court of the United States

Illinois v. Lance Gates

Decided June 8, 1983 – 462 U.S. 213

Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for violation of state drug laws after police officers, executing a search warrant, discovered marijuana and other contraband in their automobile and home. Prior to trial the Gateses moved to suppress evidence seized during this search. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state courts, granting the motion. It held that the affidavit submitted in support of the State’s application for a warrant to search the Gateses’ property was inadequate under this Court’s decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).

We granted certiorari to consider the application of the Fourth Amendment to a magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous informant’s tip.

We conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively.

II

We now decide whether respondents’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the search of their car and house. A chronological statement of events usefully introduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb of Chicago located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter which read as follows:

“This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida,
where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.

“They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on pushers.”

“I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often.”

The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the Bloomingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, who decided to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of the Illinois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license had been issued to one Lance Gates, residing at a stated address in Bloomingdale. He contacted a confidential informant, whose examination of certain financial records revealed a more recent address for the Gates, and he also learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that “L. Gates” had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 5 at 4:15 p.m.

Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration for surveillance of the May 5 Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported that Gates went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and that, at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidentified woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates and drove northbound on an interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition, the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate number on the Mercury registered to a Hornet station wagon owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale was approximately 22 to 24 hours.

Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts, and submitted it to a judge of the Circuit Court of DuPage County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The judge of that court thereupon issued a search warrant for the Gateses’ residence and for their automobile. The judge, in deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the modus operandi of the Gates had been substantially corroborated. As the anonymous letter predicted, Lance Gates had flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the name of his wife, and, at 7:00 a.m. the following morning, had headed north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, out of West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a license plate issued to him.

At 5:15 a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hours after he had flown out of Chicago, Lance Gates, and his wife, returned to their home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left West Palm Beach some 22 hours earlier. The Bloomingdale police were awaiting them, searched the trunk of the Mercury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of the Gateses’ home revealed marijuana, weapons, and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge
failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause to believe that the Gateses’ automobile and home contained the contraband in question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois Appellate Court and by a divided vote of the Supreme Court of Illinois.

The Illinois Supreme Court concluded—and we are inclined to agree—that, standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the basis for a magistrate’s determination that there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gateses’ car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that its author is either honest or his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer’s predictions regarding the Gateses’ criminal activities. Something more was required, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses’ home and car.

The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that Detective Mader’s affidavit might be capable of supplementing the anonymous letter with information sufficient to permit a determination of probable cause. In holding that the affidavit in fact did not contain sufficient additional information to sustain a determination of probable cause, the Illinois court applied a “two-pronged test,” derived from our decision in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Illinois Supreme Court, like some others, apparently understood Spinelli as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each of two independent requirements before it could be relied on. According to this view, the letter, as supplemented by Mader’s affidavit, first had to adequately reveal the “basis of knowledge” of the letter writer—the particular means by which he came by the information given in his report. Second, it had to provide facts sufficiently establishing either the “veracity” of the affiant’s informant, or, alternatively, the “reliability” of the informant’s report in this particular case.

The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules that have developed among various lower courts to enforce the “two-pronged test,” found that the test had not been satisfied. First, the “veracity” prong was not satisfied because, “there was simply no basis [for] ... conclud[ing] that the anonymous person [who wrote the letter to the Bloomingdale Police Department] was credible.” The court indicated that corroboration by police of details contained in the letter might never satisfy the “veracity” prong, and in any event, could not do so if, as in the present case, only “innocent” details are corroborated. In addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its writer’s knowledge of the Gateses’ activities. The Illinois court understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a tip to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for his statements, but it thought that the anonymous letter failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an inference. Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable cause had been made.

We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant’s “veracity,” “reliability” and “basis of knowledge” are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case, which the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed below, they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is “probable cause” to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific “tests” be satisfied by every informant’s tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a “practical, nontechnical conception.” “In dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Our observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) regarding “particularized suspicion,” is also applicable to the probable cause standard:

“The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”

As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants’ tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons.

Moreover, the “two-pronged test” directs analysis into two largely independent channels—the informant’s “veracity” or “reliability” and his “basis of knowledge.” There are persuasive arguments against according these two elements such independent status. Instead, they are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.

If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip. Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant’s motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. Unlike a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip, the “two-pronged test” has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants’ tips, with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.
Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s decision. While an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to “probable cause” may not be helpful, it is clear that “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.”

We also have recognized that affidavits “are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper place in this area.” Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of “probable cause.” The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are—quite properly—issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings.

Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s “determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.”

If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search. In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring “the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”

Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli poorly serves “the most basic function of any government”: “to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.” The strictures that inevitably accompany the “two-pronged test” cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement. If, as the Illinois Supreme Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips would be of greatly diminished value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise, as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise “perfect crimes.” While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants is not.

For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the “two-pronged test” established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for ... concluding” that probable cause existed. We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed from *Aguilar* and *Spinelli*.

Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant. A sworn statement of an affiant that “he has cause to suspect and does believe that” liquor illegally brought into the United States is located on certain premises will not do. An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and [a] wholly conclusory statement fail[s] to meet this requirement. An officer’s statement that “affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and believe” that heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. [T]his is a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate’s duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the “bare bones” affidavits this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed set of rules, like that which had developed from *Spinelli*. Instead, the flexible, common-sense standard better serves the purposes of the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement.

**IV**

Our decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work. Likewise, we recognized the probative value of corroborative efforts of police officials in *Aguilar* — the source of the “two-pronged test” — by observing that if the police had made some effort to corroborate the informant’s report at issue, “an entirely different case” would have been presented.

The showing of probable cause in the present case was fully compelling. Even standing alone, the facts obtained through the independent investigation of Mader and the DEA at least suggested that the Gateses were involved in drug trafficking. In addition to being a popular vacation site, Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics and other illegal drugs. Lance Gates’ flight to Palm Beach, his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip.

In addition, the judge could rely on the anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in major part by Mader’s efforts. The corroboration of the letter’s predictions that the Gateses’ car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the informant’s other assertions also were true. “Because an informant is right about some things, he is more
probably right about other facts” including the claim regarding the Gateses’ illegal activity. This may well not be the type of “reliability” or “veracity” necessary to satisfy some views of the “veracity prong” of Spinelli, but we think it suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment called for in making a probable cause determination. It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that “corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,” thus providing “a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”

Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted. The letter writer’s accurate information as to the travel plans of each of the Gateses was of a character likely obtained only from the Gateses themselves, or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable information of the Gateses’ alleged illegal activities. Of course, the Gateses’ travel plans might have been learned from a talkative neighbor or travel agent; under the “two-pronged test” developed from Spinelli, the character of the details in the anonymous letter might well not permit a sufficiently clear inference regarding the letter writer’s “basis of knowledge.” But, as discussed previously, probable cause does not demand the certainty we associate with formal trials. It is enough that there was a fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained his entire story either from the Gateses or someone they trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the letter’s predictions provides just this probability. It is apparent, therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a “substantial basis for ... concluding” that probable cause to search the Gateses’ home and car existed. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois therefore must be

Reversed.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.


I

In recognition of the judiciary’s role as the only effective guardian of Fourth Amendment rights, this Court has developed over the last half century a set of coherent rules governing a magistrate’s consideration of a warrant application and the showings that are necessary to support a finding of probable cause. We start with the proposition that a neutral and detached magistrate, and not the police, should determine whether there is probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant.

In order to emphasize the magistrate’s role as an independent arbiter of probable cause and to insure that searches or seizures are not effected on less than probable cause, the Court has insisted that police officers provide magistrates with the underlying facts and circumstances that support the officers’ conclusions. The Court stated that “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable
cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough."

[Our previous cases] advance an important [ ] substantive value: Findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, should not be authorized unless there is some assurance that the information on which they are based has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible person. As applied to police officers, the rules focus on the way in which the information was acquired. As applied to informants, the rules focus both on the honesty or credibility of the informant and on the reliability of the way in which the information was acquired. Insofar as it is more complicated, an evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay involves a more difficult inquiry. This suggests a need to structure the inquiry in an effort to insure greater accuracy. The standards announced in Aguilar, as refined by Spinelli, fulfill that need. The standards inform the police of what information they have to provide and magistrates of what information they should demand. The standards also inform magistrates of the subsidiary findings they must make in order to arrive at an ultimate finding of probable cause. By requiring police to provide certain crucial information to magistrates and by structuring magistrates’ probable cause inquiries, Aguilar and Spinelli assure the magistrate’s role as an independent arbiter of probable cause, insure greater accuracy in probable cause determinations, and advance the substantive value identified above.

Until today the Court has never squarely addressed the application of the Aguilar and Spinelli standards to tips from anonymous informants. By definition nothing is known about an anonymous informant’s identity, honesty, or reliability. One commentator has suggested that anonymous informants should be treated as presumptively unreliable. In any event, there certainly is no basis for treating anonymous informants as presumptively reliable. Nor is there any basis for assuming that the information provided by an anonymous informant has been obtained in a reliable way. If we are unwilling to accept conclusory allegations from the police, who are presumptively reliable, or from informants who are known, at least to the police, there cannot possibly be any rational basis for accepting conclusory allegations from anonymous informants.

II

In rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli standards, the Court suggests that a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied by every informant’s tip.” In support of this proposition the Court relies on the “practical, nontechnical” nature of probable cause.

[O]ne can concede that probable cause is a “practical, nontechnical” concept without betraying the values that Aguilar and Spinelli reflect. As noted, Aguilar and Spinelli require the police to provide magistrates with certain crucial information. They also provide structure for magistrates’ probable cause inquiries. In so doing, Aguilar and Spinelli preserve the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of probable cause, insure greater accuracy in probable cause determinations, and advance the substantive value of precluding findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything less than information from an honest or credible person who has acquired his information in a reliable way. Neither the standards nor their effects are inconsistent with a “practical, nontechnical” conception of probable cause.
has determined that he has information before him that he can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by a credible person, he has ample room to use his common sense and to apply a practical, nontechnical conception of probable cause.

At the heart of the Court’s decision to abandon *Aguilar* and *Spinelli* appears to be its belief that “the direction taken by decisions following *Spinelli* poorly serves ‘the most basic function of any government: to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.’” This conclusion rests on the judgment that *Aguilar* and *Spinelli* “seriously impede[] the task of law enforcement,” and render anonymous tips valueless in police work. Surely, the Court overstates its case. But of particular concern to all Americans must be that the Court gives virtually no consideration to the value of insuring that findings of probable cause are based on information that a magistrate can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible person.

### III

The Court’s complete failure to provide any persuasive reason for rejecting *Aguilar* and *Spinelli* doubtlessly reflects impatience with what it perceives to be “overly technical” rules governing searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Words such as “practical,” “nontechnical,” and “commonsense,” as used in the Court’s opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Everyone shares the Court’s concern over the horrors of drug trafficking, but under our Constitution only measures consistent with the Fourth Amendment may be employed by government to cure this evil. We must be ever mindful of Justice Stewart’s admonition in *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), that “[i]n times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or ‘extravagant’ to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts.” In the same vein, *Glasser v. United States*, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), warned that “[s]teps innocently taken may, one by one, lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.”

Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are particularly difficult to protect because their “advocates are usually criminals.” But the rules “we fashion [are] for the innocent and guilty alike.” By replacing *Aguilar* and *Spinelli* with a test that provides no assurance that magistrates, rather than the police, or informants, will make determinations of probable cause; imposes no structure on magistrates’ probable cause inquiries; and invites the possibility that intrusions may be justified on less than reliable information from an honest or credible person, today’s decision threatens to “obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are the law.”

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**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

The *Gates* Court rejects the *Aguilar-Spinelli* test’s insistence on using two specific measures to compose a (somewhat) mathematical formula for probable cause. As the Court explains, the existence of probable cause will not be found by entering “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” into a formula which yields the total weight of evidence presented to a magistrate. (The graph below exemplifies how such a formula might work.)
As the Court puts it:

“This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied by every informant’s tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception.’”

When police have probable cause to believe either (1) that evidence of crime will be found in a particular place or (2) that a certain person has committed a crime, important police action becomes lawful that would have remained unlawful absent probable cause. One important example involves vehicle stops; police may stop a car based on probable cause to believe that its driver has committed a traffic law violation. It is widely believed that many officers use this power for reasons other than traffic enforcement—for example, stopping drivers who violate trivial traffic rules in the hope of discovering evidence of more serious lawbreaking. In addition, some critics of police allege that at least some officers use their traffic-stop authority in ways that constitute unlawful discrimination, such as on the basis of race. Based on these beliefs and allegations, motorists have sought review of vehicle stops, justified by probable cause, on the basis of police officers’ “real” or “true” reasons for conducting the stops. The Court has resisted engaging in such review.
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court.

In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.

I

On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a “high drug area” of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the driver looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time—more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn in order to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an “unreasonable” speed. The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up alongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver’s door, identifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver’s window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle.

Petitioners were charged in a four-count indictment with violating various federal drug laws. At a pretrial suppression hearing, they challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to believe, or even reasonable suspicion, that petitioners were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity; and that Officer Soto’s asserted ground for approaching the vehicle—to give the driver a warning concerning traffic violations—was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression motion, concluding that “the facts of the stop were not controverted,” and “[t]here was nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of the officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop.”

Petitioners were convicted of the counts at issue here. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding with respect to the suppression issue that, “regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation.” We granted certiorari.
II

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a “seizure” of “persons” within the meaning of this provision. An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be “unreasonable” under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.

Petitioners accept that Officer Soto had probable cause to believe that various provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code had been violated. They argue, however, that “in the unique context of civil traffic regulations” probable cause is not enough. Since, they contend, the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists. Petitioners, who are both black, further contend that police officers might decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car’s occupants. To avoid this danger, they say, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be, not the normal one (applied by the Court of Appeals) of whether probable cause existed to justify the stop; but rather, whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given.

A

Petitioners contend that the standard they propose is consistent with our past cases’ disapproval of police attempts to use valid bases of action against citizens as pretexts for pursuing other investigatory agendas. We are reminded that [in previous cases] we stated that “an inventory search” must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence”; that in approving an inventory search, we apparently thought it significant that there had been “no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation”; and that we observed, in upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless administrative inspection, that the search did not appear to be “a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence of ... violation of ... penal laws.” But only an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. In each case we were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the absence of probable cause. Our statements simply explain that the exemption from the need for probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those purposes.
We think [our prior decisions] foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.

B

Recognizing that we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers, petitioners disavow any intention to make the individual officer’s subjective good faith the touchstone of “reasonableness.” They insist that the standard they have put forward—whether the officer’s conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given—is an “objective” one.

But although framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations. Its whole purpose is to prevent the police from doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for different reasons. Petitioners’ proposed standard may not use the word “pretext,” but it is designed to combat nothing other than the perceived “danger” of the pretextual stop, albeit only indirectly and over the run of cases. Instead of asking whether the individual officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have us ask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had the proper state of mind.

Why one would frame a test designed to combat pretext in such fashion that the court cannot take into account actual and admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be explained by the fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option. If those cases were based only upon the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent, petitioners’ attempt to root out subjective vices through objective means might make sense. But they were not based only upon that, or indeed even principally upon that. Their principal basis—which applies equally to attempts to reach subjective intent through ostensibly objective means—is simply that the Fourth Amendment’s concern with “reasonableness” allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent. But even if our concern had been only an evidentiary one, petitioners’ proposal would by no means assuage it. Indeed, it seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a “reasonable officer” would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation. While police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provide objective assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable—an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity.

Moreover, police enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary from place to place and from time to time. We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are so variable and can be made to turn upon such trivialisations. The difficulty is illustrated by petitioners’ arguments in this case. Their claim that a reasonable officer would not have made this stop is based largely on District of Columbia police
regulations which permit plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic laws “only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.” This basis of invalidation would not apply in jurisdictions that had a different practice. And it would not have applied even in the District of Columbia, if Officer Soto had been wearing a uniform or patrolling in a marked police cruiser.

III

In what would appear to be an elaboration on the “reasonable officer” test, petitioners argue that the balancing inherent in any Fourth Amendment inquiry requires us to weigh the governmental and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop such as we have here. That balancing, petitioners claim, does not support investigation of minor traffic infractions by plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles; such investigation only minimally advances the government’s interest in traffic safety, and may indeed retard it by producing motorist confusion and alarm—a view said to be supported by the Metropolitan Police Department’s own regulations generally prohibiting this practice. And as for the Fourth Amendment interests of the individuals concerned, petitioners point out that our cases acknowledge that even ordinary traffic stops entail “a possibly unsettling show of authority”; that they at best “interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time” and at worst “may create substantial anxiety.” That anxiety is likely to be even more pronounced when the stop is conducted by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars.

It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a “reasonableness” determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.

Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary actually to perform the “balancing” analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual’s privacy or even physical interests—such as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force, unannounced entry into a home, entry into a home without a warrant, or physical penetration of the body. The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been broken “outbalances” private interest in avoiding police contact.

Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the “multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations” is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they wish for a stop. But we are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or what right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement.

For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.
Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible, and the upholding of the convictions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correct. The judgment is

*Affirmed.*

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

The unanimous decision by the Court illustrates how important it is to the Justices to avoid creating legal rules and tests that require judges to guess what officers were thinking when performing certain actions. If the admissibility of evidence depends upon the mental state of a police officer during a stressful moment months or even years before a resulting evidentiary hearing, multiple problems are created. First, as a practical matter, determining what the officer was thinking when (for example) stopping a car will not be easy. Second, the officer may be tempted to commit perjury if her mental state was not the “correct” one under the relevant test.

In addition, the result in *Whren* exemplifies the Court’s apparent desire to avoid becoming in charge of day-to-day management of police departments. If the Court finds a constitutional requirement for departments to adopt certain best practices, then the Justices must (1) learn enough about policing to decide what practices should be required and (2) eventually hear more cases on whether departments are sufficiently obedient to the Court’s command. These prospects seem unappealing to the Justices. (Similar feelings may inform the Court’s decisions in education law cases. The Court has retreated from supervising school districts despite evidence that school segregation remains a serious problem.)

The *Whren* majority noted that if police indeed performed traffic stops on the basis of impermissible reasons related to the race of motorists, the stops might violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The savvy reader might ask whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies at all. The traffic stop was in Washington, D.C. If the District of Columbia is not a “state,” and accordingly is not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, then is racial discrimination allowed (or, to be more precise, is there no constitutional remedy)? The Court decided that there is a remedy. See *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), *supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan.*, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (establishing “reverse incorporation” of equal protection against the federal government) (“In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”).

Unfortunately for *Whren*, the Court has not allowed evidence to be excluded from criminal trials on the basis of Equal Protection violations; the legal remedy for such violations would come from civil lawsuits.
The Court’s holding in *Whren* illustrates the power of probable cause. Because the Court is so resistant to examining the motives of officers who take investigatory steps on the basis of probable cause, the term’s definition is of exceptional importance. In a 2018 case, the Court applied the standard set forth in *Illinois v. Gates* to new facts.

Supreme Court of the United States

**District of Columbia v. Theodore Wesby**

Decided Jan. 22, 2018 – 138 S. Ct. 577

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves a civil suit against the District of Columbia and five of its police officers, brought by 16 individuals who were arrested for holding a raucous, late-night party in a house they did not have permission to enter. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that there was no probable cause to arrest the partygoers, and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. We reverse on both grounds.

I

Around 1 a.m. on March 16, 2008, the District’s Metropolitan Police Department received a complaint about loud music and illegal activities at a house in Northeast D.C. The caller, a former neighborhood commissioner, told police that the house had been vacant for several months. When officers arrived at the scene, several neighbors confirmed that the house should have been empty. The officers approached the house and, consistent with the complaint, heard loud music playing inside.

After the officers knocked on the front door, they saw a man look out the window and then run upstairs. One of the partygoers opened the door, and the officers entered. They immediately observed that the inside of the house “was in disarray” and looked like “a vacant property.” The officers smelled marijuana and saw beer bottles and cups of liquor on the floor. In fact, the floor was so dirty that one of the partygoers refused to sit on it while being questioned. Although the house had working electricity and plumbing, it had no furniture downstairs other than a few padded metal chairs. The only other signs of habitation were blinds on the windows, food in the refrigerator, and toiletries in the bathroom.

In the living room, the officers found a makeshift strip club. Several women were wearing only bras and thongs, with cash tucked into their garter belts. The women were giving lap dances while other partygoers watched. Most of the onlookers were holding cash and cups of alcohol. After seeing the uniformed officers, many partygoers scattered into other parts of the house.

The officers found more debauchery upstairs. A naked woman and several men were in the bedroom. A bare mattress—the only one in the house—was on the floor, along with some lit candles and multiple open condom wrappers. A used condom was on the windowsill. The officers found one partygoer hiding in an upstairs closet, and another who had shut himself in the bathroom and refused to come out.
The officers found a total of 21 people in the house. After interviewing all 21, the officers did not get a clear or consistent story. Many partygoers said they were there for a bachelor party, but no one could identify the bachelor. Each of the partygoers claimed that someone had invited them to the house, but no one could say who. Two of the women working the party said that a woman named “Peaches” or “Tasty” was renting the house and had given them permission to be there. One of the women explained that the previous owner had recently passed away, and Peaches had just started renting the house from the grandson who inherited it. But the house had no boxes or moving supplies. She did not know Peaches’ real name. And Peaches was not there.

An officer asked the woman to call Peaches on her phone so he could talk to her. Peaches answered and explained that she had just left the party to go to the store. When the officer asked her to return, Peaches refused because she was afraid of being arrested. The sergeant supervising the investigation also spoke with Peaches. At first, Peaches claimed to be renting the house from the owner, who was fixing it up for her. She also said that she had given the attendees permission to have the party. When the sergeant again asked her who had given her permission to use the house, Peaches became evasive and hung up. The sergeant called her back, and she began yelling and insisting that she had permission before hanging up a second time. The officers eventually got Peaches on the phone again, and she admitted that she did not have permission to use the house.

The officers then contacted the owner. He told them that he had been trying to negotiate a lease with Peaches, but they had not reached an agreement. He confirmed that he had not given Peaches (or anyone else) permission to be in the house—let alone permission to use it for a bachelor party. At that point, the officers arrested the 21 partygoers for unlawful entry. The police transported the partygoers to the police station, where the lieutenant decided to charge them with disorderly conduct. The partygoers were released, and the charges were eventually dropped.

II

Respondents, 16 of the 21 partygoers, sued the District and five of the arresting officers. They sued the officers for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment. The partygoers’ claims were all “predicated upon the allegation that [they] were arrested without probable cause.”

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court awarded partial summary judgment to the partygoers. It concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry. The officers were told that Peaches had invited the partygoers to the house, the District Court reasoned, and nothing the officers learned in their investigation suggested the partygoers “knew or should have known that [they were] entering against the [owner’s] will.” The District Court also concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983. It noted that, under District case law, “probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry requires evidence that the alleged intruder knew or should have known, upon entry, that such entry was against the will of the owner.” And in its view, the officers had no such evidence.

[Footnote 2 by the Court] Because probable cause is an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking. Because unlawful entry is the only offense that the District and its officers discuss in their briefs to this Court, we likewise limit our analysis to that offense.
With liability resolved, the case proceeded to trial on damages. The jury awarded the partygoers a total of $680,000 in compensatory damages. After the District Court awarded attorney’s fees, the total award was nearly $1 million.

On appeal, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed. [T]he panel majority made Peaches’ invitation “central” to its determination that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry. The panel majority asserted that, “in the absence of any conflicting information, Peaches’ invitation vitiates the necessary element of [the partygoers’] intent to enter against the will of the lawful owner.” And the panel majority determined that “there is simply no evidence in the record that [the partygoers] had any reason to think the invitation was invalid.”

We granted certiorari to resolve [] whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers.

III

To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, “we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.” Because probable cause “deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances,” it is “a fluid concept” that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” It “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Probable cause “is not a high bar.”

A

There is no dispute that the partygoers entered the house against the will of the owner. Nonetheless, the partygoers contend that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest them because the officers had no reason to believe that they “knew or should have known” their “entry was unwanted.” We disagree. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers made an “entirely reasonable inference” that the partygoers were knowingly taking advantage of a vacant house as a venue for their late-night party.

Consider first the condition of the house. Multiple neighbors, including a former neighborhood official, informed the officers that the house had been vacant for several months. The house had no furniture, except for a few padded metal chairs and a bare mattress. The rest of the house was empty, save for some fixtures and large appliances. The house had a few signs of inhabitance—working electricity and plumbing, blinds on the windows, toiletries in the bathroom, and food in the refrigerator. But those facts are not necessarily inconsistent with the house being unoccupied. The owner could have paid the utilities and kept the blinds while he looked for a new tenant, and the partygoers could have brought the food and toiletries. Although one woman told the officers that Peaches had recently moved in, the officers had reason to doubt that was true. There were no boxes or other moving supplies in the house; nor were there other possessions, such as clothes in the closet, suggesting someone lived there.
In addition to the condition of the house, consider the partygoers’ conduct. The party was still going strong when the officers arrived after 1 a.m., with music so loud that it could be heard from outside. Upon entering the house, multiple officers smelled marijuana. The partygoers left beer bottles and cups of liquor on the floor, and they left the floor so dirty that one of them refused to sit on it. The living room had been converted into a makeshift strip club. Strippers in bras and thongs, with cash stuffed in their garter belts, were giving lap dances. Upstairs, the officers found a group of men with a single, naked woman on a bare mattress—the only bed in the house—along with multiple open condom wrappers and a used condom.

Taken together, the condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the officers to make several “common-sense conclusions about human behavior.” Most homeowners do not live in near-barren houses. And most homeowners do not invite people over to use their living room as a strip club, to have sex in their bedroom, to smoke marijuana inside, and to leave their floors filthy. The officers could thus infer that the partygoers knew their party was not authorized.

The partygoers’ reaction to the officers gave them further reason to believe that the partygoers knew they lacked permission to be in the house. Many scattered at the sight of the uniformed officers. Two hid themselves, one in a closet and the other in a bathroom. “[U]nprovoked flight upon noticing the police,” we have explained, “is certainly suggestive” of wrongdoing and can be treated as “suspicious behavior” that factors into the totality of the circumstances. In fact, “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of ... law officers are strong indicia of mens rea.” A reasonable officer could infer that the partygoers’ scattering and hiding was an indication that they knew they were not supposed to be there.

The partygoers’ answers to the officers’ questions also suggested their guilty state of mind. When the officers asked who had given them permission to be there, the partygoers gave vague and implausible responses. They could not say who had invited them. Only two people claimed that Peaches had invited them, and they were working the party instead of attending it. If Peaches was the hostess, it was odd that none of the partygoers mentioned her name. Additionally, some of the partygoers claimed the event was a bachelor party, but no one could identify the bachelor. The officers could have disbelieved them, since people normally do not throw a bachelor party without a bachelor. Based on the vagueness and implausibility of the partygoers’ stories, the officers could have reasonably inferred that they were lying and that their lies suggested a guilty mind.

The panel majority relied heavily on the fact that Peaches said she had invited the partygoers to the house. But when the officers spoke with Peaches, she was nervous, agitated, and evasive. After initially insisting that she had permission to use the house, she ultimately confessed that this was a lie—a fact that the owner confirmed. Peaches’ lying and evasive behavior gave the officers reason to discredit everything she had told them. For example, the officers could have inferred that Peaches lied to them when she said she had invited the others to the house, which was consistent with the fact that hardly anyone at the party knew her name. Or the officers could have inferred that Peaches told the partygoers (like she eventually told the police) that she was not actually renting the house, which was consistent with how the partygoers were treating it.
Viewing these circumstances as a whole, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house.

B

In concluding otherwise, the panel majority engaged in an “excessively technical dissection” of the factors supporting probable cause. Indeed, the panel majority failed to follow two basic and well-established principles of law.

First, the panel majority viewed each fact “in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances.” This was “mistaken in light of our precedents.” The “totality of the circumstances” requires courts to consider “the whole picture.” Our precedents recognize that the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in isolation. Instead of considering the facts as a whole, the panel majority took them one by one. For example, it dismissed the fact that the partygoers “scattered or hid when the police entered the house” because that fact was “not sufficient standing alone to create probable cause.” Similarly, it found “nothing in the record suggesting that the condition of the house, on its own, should have alerted the [partygoers] that they were unwelcome.” The totality-of-the-circumstances test “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.”

Second, the panel majority mistakenly believed that it could dismiss outright any circumstances that were “susceptible of innocent explanation.” For example, the panel majority brushed aside the drinking and the lap dances as “consistent with” the partygoers’ explanation that they were having a bachelor party. And it similarly dismissed the condition of the house as “entirely consistent with” Peaches being a “new tenant.” But probable cause does not require officers to rule out [sic] a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts. As we have explained, “the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” Thus, the panel majority should have asked whether a reasonable officer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity.”

For all of these reasons, we reverse the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest. Accordingly, the District and its officers are entitled to summary judgment on all of the partygoers’ claims.

The judgment of the D.C. Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment in part.

This case, well described in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, leads me to question whether this Court, in assessing probable cause, should continue to ignore why police in fact acted. No arrests of plaintiffs-respondents were made until Sergeant Suber so instructed. His instruction, when conveyed to the officers he superintended, was based on an error of law. Sergeant Suber believed that the absence of the premises owner’s consent, an uncontested fact in this case, sufficed to justify arrest of the partygoers for unlawful entry. An essential element of unlawful
entry in the District of Columbia is that the defendant “knew or should have known that his entry was unwanted.” But under Sergeant Suber’s view of the law, what the arrestees knew or should have known was irrelevant. They could be arrested, as he comprehended the law, even if they believed their entry was invited by a lawful occupant.

Ultimately, plaintiffs-respondents were not booked for unlawful entry. Instead, they were charged at the police station with disorderly conduct. Yet no police officers at the site testified to having observed any activities warranting a disorderly conduct charge. Quite the opposite. The officers at the scene of the arrest uniformly testified that they had neither seen nor heard anything that would justify such a charge, and Sergeant Suber specifically advised his superiors that the charge was unwarranted.

The Court’s jurisprudence, I am concerned, sets the balance too heavily in favor of police unaccountability to the detriment of Fourth Amendment protection. A number of commentators have criticized the path we charted in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and follow-on opinions, holding that “an arresting officer’s state of mind ... is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” I would leave open, for reexamination in a future case, whether a police officer’s reason for acting, in at least some circumstances, should factor into the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Given the current state of the Court’s precedent, however, I agree that the disposition gained by plaintiffs-respondents [i.e., a ruling that officers violated their rights] was not warranted by “settled law.” The defendants-petitioners are therefore sheltered by qualified immunity.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

Does the procedural posture of this case change your view on the outcome? This is not a criminal prosecution, in which the defendants are arguing about probable cause to get their charges dismissed. This is a lawsuit by the people at the party, alleging that police violated their clearly established constitutional rights when arresting them.

The standard for probable cause is not especially high. It’s nothing like proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even preponderance of the evidence. In addition to “probable cause,” the Court has used several cases to define “reasonable suspicion,” which is more than a mere hunch but requires less evidence than probable cause. Certain police conduct—most importantly “stop and frisk”—is permissible on the basis of reasonable suspicion even if officers lack probable cause. We will review reasonable suspicion at length when studying stop and frisk.

As the semester progresses, students should make a point of noting (1) which police tactics are permissible with no evidence or suspicion whatsoever (for example, investigatory tactics that are not “searches,” such as opening a bag of trash left out for collection), (2) which tactics may not be conducted with no suspicion but are allowed with “reasonable suspicion,” and (3) which police tactics require probable cause. Among those police tactics requiring probable cause, students should note which require warrants.
The Phenomenon of “Driving While Black” or “Driving While Brown”

For decades, observers have documented that Black and brown drivers are more likely than white drivers to be stopped by police, a phenomenon sometimes described as “Driving While [Black/Brown]” or “DWB.” (Similar observations have been made about which pedestrians police choose to stop and frisk, a topic to which we will return.) U.S. Senator Tim Scott (R-S.C.) described in a 2016 speech his experiences as a Black motorist, along with incidents in which Capitol police questioned whether he really was a member of the Senate. Reporting that he had been stopped by police while driving seven times over the prior year, he asked colleagues to “imagine the frustration, the irritation the sense of a loss of dignity that accompanies each of those stops.”

Noting that in most of the incidents, “[He] was doing nothing more than driving a new car, in the wrong neighborhood, or some other reason just as trivial,” he said, “I have felt the anger, the frustration, the sadness and the humiliation that comes with feeling that you’re being targeted for nothing more than just being yourself.”

After being stopped by Capitol police, Sen. Scott received apologies on multiple occasions from police leadership. Most Americans, however, lack the social capital possessed by Senators and cannot expect that sort of response to complaints.

Although the cause of “DWB” stops is disputed, the existence of the phenomenon is well-documented, as are its effects on relations between police departments and minority communities. For example, one of your authors once attended an event in St. Louis at which a leader of the St. Louis City police said that certain St. Louis County police departments treat minority residents so badly, City police have trouble getting cooperation from potential witnesses, impeding the City department’s ability to solve serious crimes.

Robert Wilkins, now a federal appellate judge, was a plaintiff in 1990s litigation related to DWB stops in Maryland. A 2016 CBS News interview in which he describes his experiences is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYsl6AQBZn4

In the spring and summer of 2020, police treatment of members of minority communities—especially African Americans—once again received a national spotlight. The May 2020 killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis and the March 2020 killing of Breonna Taylor by police in Louisville aroused particular indignation, inspiring protests across the country. Police response to protests in some cities, including violence captured on video, inspired further calls for reform, along with more radical proposals.

As you read subsequent chapters, consider how Supreme Court criminal procedure decisions affect how police departments interact with communities they exist to serve. For example, does the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine encourage police officers to act in ways that build

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confidence among community members? When police officers violate rules set forth by the Court, do existing legal remedies encourage better future behavior? If you are unhappy with the state of policing, how might things be improved? If instead you think policing is going fairly well, to what do you attribute the discontent exhibited during the 2020 protests?

One purpose of this book is to help you consider questions like these. Recall, however, that most Americans will never attend law school. Knowledge of criminal procedure doctrine among the public is sketchy at best. If Americans better understood Supreme Court doctrine related to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, do you think they would have more or less faith in the criminal justice system? Why? After finishing this book, answer these questions again and examine whether your own opinions have changed.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Chapter 7

Warrants

The Court has stated repeatedly that searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively “unreasonable” and, accordingly, are presumptive violations of the Fourth Amendment. Although one can argue whether the Court truly enforces a “warrant requirement” — see Justice Thomas’s dissent in Groh v. Ramirez below — one cannot deny the importance of valid warrants to a huge range of police conduct. For example, absent exceptional circumstances (such as officers chasing a fleeing felon), police normally must have a valid warrant to search a residence without the occupant’s permission.

To be valid, a warrant must obey the Fourth Amendment’s command that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This portion of the Amendment is known as the “Warrant Clause.” It requires: (1) that the evidence presented to the issuing judge or magistrate be sufficient to qualify as “probable cause,” (2) that the officers bringing the evidence to the judge or magistrate swear or affirm that the evidence is true to the best of their knowledge, (3) that the warrant specify where officers can search, and (4) that the warrant specify what things or persons officers may look for and may seize if found.

In addition, the Court has held that only a “neutral and detached magistrate” may issue a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). That means the judge or magistrate must be independent of law enforcement; a state attorney general cannot issue warrants. In Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977), the Court held that a justice of the peace who received payment upon issuing a warrant, but no fee upon denying a warrant application, was not “neutral and detached.”

We have already studied the Court’s definition of “probable cause.” In the next cases, we examine the particularity requirement — the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that warrants specify in some detail where officers may search and what they may seize.

Supreme Court of the United States

Peter C. Andresen v. Maryland

Decided June 29, 1976 – 427 U.S. 463

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether the introduction into evidence of a person’s business records, seized during a search of his offices, violates the Fifth Amendment’s command that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”1 We also must determine whether the particular searches and seizures here were “unreasonable” and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.

1 [Footnote by editors] We have removed the Court’s Fifth Amendment analysis.
In early 1972, a Bi-County Fraud Unit, acting under the joint auspices of the State’s Attorneys’ Offices of Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, Md., began an investigation of real estate settlement activities in the Washington, D.C., area. At the time, petitioner Andresen was an attorney who, as a sole practitioner, specialized in real estate settlements in Montgomery County. During the Fraud Unit’s investigation, his activities came under scrutiny, particularly in connection with a transaction involving Lot 13T in the Potomac Woods subdivision of Montgomery County. The investigation, which included interviews with the purchaser, the mortgage holder, and other lienholders of Lot 13T, as well as an examination of county land records, disclosed that petitioner, acting as settlement attorney, had defrauded Standard-Young Associates, the purchaser of Lot 13T. Petitioner had represented that the property was free of liens and that, accordingly, no title insurance was necessary, when in fact, he knew that there were two outstanding liens on the property. In addition, investigators learned that the lienholders, by threatening to foreclose their liens, had forced a halt to the purchaser’s construction on the property. When Standard-Young had confronted petitioner with this information, he responded by issuing, as an agent of a title insurance company, a title policy guaranteeing clear title to the property. By this action, petitioner also defrauded that insurance company by requiring it to pay the outstanding liens.

The investigators, concluding that there was probable cause to believe that petitioner had committed the state crime of false pretenses against Standard-Young, applied for warrants to search petitioner’s law office and the separate office of Mount Vernon Development Corporation, of which petitioner was incorporator, sole shareholder, resident agent, and director. The application sought permission to search for specified documents pertaining to the sale and conveyance of Lot 13T. A judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Montgomery County concluded that there was probable cause and issued the warrants.

Petitioner eventually was charged, partly by information and partly by indictment, with the crime of false pretenses, based on his misrepresentation to Standard-Young concerning Lot 13T, and with fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary, based on similar false claims made to three home purchasers. Before trial began, petitioner moved to suppress the seized documents. The trial court held a full suppression hearing. [T]he only item seized from the corporation’s offices that was not returned by the State or suppressed was a single file labeled “Potomac Woods General.”

With respect to all the items not suppressed or returned, the trial court ruled that admitting them into evidence would not violate the Fourth Amendment[ ]. [T]he search warrants were based on probable cause, and the documents not returned or suppressed were either directly related to Lot 13T, and therefore within the express language of the warrants, or properly seized and otherwise admissible to show a pattern of criminal conduct relevant to the charge concerning Lot 13T.

At trial, the State proved its case primarily by public land records and by records provided by the complaining purchasers, lienholders, and the title insurance company. It did introduce into evidence, however, a number of the seized items. Three documents from the “Potomac Woods General” file, seized during the search of petitioner’s corporation, were admitted. These were notes in the handwriting of an employee who used them to prepare abstracts in the course of his
duties as a title searcher and law clerk. The notes concerned deeds of trust affecting the Potomac Woods subdivision and related to the transaction involving Lot 13T. Five items seized from petitioner’s law office were also admitted. One contained information relating to the transactions with one of the defrauded home buyers. The second was a file partially devoted to the Lot 13T transaction; among the documents were settlement statements, the deed conveying the property to Standard-Young Associates, and the original and a copy of a notice to the buyer about releases of liens. The third item was a file devoted exclusively to Lot 13T. The fourth item consisted of a copy of a deed of trust, dated March 27, 1972, from the seller of certain lots in the Potomac Woods subdivision to a lienholder. The fifth item contained drafts of documents and memoranda written in petitioner’s handwriting.

After a trial by jury, petitioner was found guilty upon five counts of false pretenses and three counts of fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary. He was sentenced to eight concurrent two-year prison terms. [T]he Court of Special Appeals rejected petitioner’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims. Specifically, it held that the warrants were supported by probable cause, that they did not authorize a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the items admitted into evidence against petitioner at trial were within the scope of the warrants or were otherwise properly seized. We granted certiorari limited to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues.

III

We turn to petitioner’s contention that rights guaranteed him by the Fourth Amendment were violated because the descriptive terms of the search warrants were so broad as to make them impermissible “general” warrants.

The specificity of the search warrants. Although petitioner concedes that the warrants for the most part were models of particularity, he contends that they were rendered fatally “general” by the addition, in each warrant, to the exhaustive list of particularly described documents, of the phrase “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown.” The quoted language, it is argued, must be read in isolation and without reference to the rest of the long sentence at the end of which it appears. When read “properly,” petitioner contends, it permits the search for and seizure of any evidence of any crime.

General warrants of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he problem [posed by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings. ... [The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem] by requiring a ‘particular description’ of the things to be seized.” This requirement “makes general searches ... impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”

In this case we agree with the determination of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland that the challenged phrase must be read as authorizing only the search for and seizure of evidence relating to “the crime of false pretenses with respect to Lot 13T.” The challenged phrase is not a separate sentence. Instead, it appears in each warrant at the end of a sentence containing a
lengthy list of specified and particular items to be seized, all pertaining to Lot 13T.\(^2\) We think it clear from the context that the term “crime” in the warrants refers only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of Lot 13T. The “other fruits” clause is one of a series that follows the colon after the word “Maryland.” All clauses in the series are limited by what precedes that colon, namely, “items pertaining to … lot 13, block T.” The warrants, accordingly, did not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for evidence of other crimes but only to search for and seize evidence relevant to the crime of false pretenses and Lot 13T.\(^3\)

The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland is affirmed.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

I believe that the warrants under which petitioner’s papers were seized were impermissibly general. I therefore dissent.

[T]he warrants under which those papers were seized were impermissibly general. General warrants are specially prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The problem to be avoided is “not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Thus the requirement plainly appearing on the face of the Fourth Amendment that a warrant specify with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized is imposed to the end that “unauthorized invasions of ‘the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life’” be prevented. “As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”

The Court recites these requirements, but their application in this case renders their limitation on unlawful governmental conduct an empty promise. After a lengthy and admittedly detailed listing of items to be seized, the warrants in this case further authorized the seizure of “other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown.” The Court construes this sweeping authorization to be limited to evidence pertaining to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of Lot 13T. However, neither this Court’s construction of the warrants nor the similar construction by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was available to the investigators at the time they executed the warrants. The question is not how those warrants are to be viewed in hindsight, but how they were in fact viewed by those executing them. The overwhelming quantity of seized material that was either suppressed or returned to petitioner is irrefutable testimony to the unlawful generality of the warrants. The Court’s attempt to cure this

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\(^2\) [Footnote 10 by the Court] Petitioner also suggests that the specific list of the documents to be seized constitutes a “general” warrant. We disagree. Under investigation was a complex real estate scheme whose existence could be proved only by piecing together many bits of evidence. Like a jigsaw puzzle, the whole “picture” of petitioner’s false-pretense scheme with respect to Lot 13T could be shown only by placing in the proper place the many pieces of evidence that, taken singly, would show comparatively little. The complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection when the State has demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and probable cause to believe that evidence of this crime is in the suspect’s possession.

\(^3\) [Footnote 11 by the Court] We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person’s papers that are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized. Similar dangers, of course, are present in executing a warrant for the “seizure” of telephone conversations. In both kinds of searches, responsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.
defect by post hoc judicial construction evades principles settled in this Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions. “The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge ....” It is not the function of a detached and neutral review to give effect to warrants whose terms unassailably authorize the far-reaching search and seizure of a person’s papers especially where that has in fact been the result of executing those warrants.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

In Andresen, the long list of items (even with the “other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence” language does not constitute a “general warrant.” What if instead the list of items subject to seizure had read (in its entirety), “Evidence of real estate fraud”? Would that be sufficient? Should it be?

Or, to move away from the complicated context of searching a lawyer’s office, consider a case in which police lawfully arrest someone for marijuana possession. The suspect tells police that he purchased the marijuana at a certain house and provides the address. If police obtain a warrant to search the house, is it sufficient for the warrant to list the items subject to seizure as “marijuana and other evidence of marijuana possession and sale”?

Students may wonder why the inclusion of “the persons or things to be seized” in a warrant will matter in practice. The following scenarios may help explain:

Imagine that police have probable cause to believe that a stolen piano is located in a suspect’s house. If the warrant authorizes police to search the house for “a black Steinway Model B grand piano,” the police may search any location in the house at which the piano might reasonably be found. That means police likely can enter any room. But unless the house contains unusually massive medicine cabinets, police likely cannot open a medicine cabinet. Therefore, drugs found in a medicine cabinet would be the fruits of an unlawful search.

By contrast, if police seek stolen earrings, and the warrant authorizes police to search the house for “two diamond stud earrings, with platinum settings,” then police can open medicine cabinets, drawers, and all sorts of places in which earrings can be hidden but pianos cannot.

In addition, imagine that police are searching for both the piano and the earrings. If the warrant lists only the piano, then police should end their search promptly if they find the piano just inside the front door; they have no other items listed in the warrant to find. If instead the warrant lists both the piano and the earrings, then police may continue their search after finding the piano—examining every crevice in which earrings might be found.
In the next case, the Court considered a warrant that failed entirely to state what items officers were permitted to seize when searching a certain house.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jeff Groh v. Joseph R. Ramirez

Decided Feb. 24, 2004 – 540 U.S. 551

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner conducted a search of respondents’ home pursuant to a warrant that failed to describe the “persons or things to be seized.” The question presented is whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment.

I

Respondents, Joseph Ramirez and members of his family, live on a large ranch in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana. Petitioner, Jeff Groh, has been a Special Agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) since 1989. In February 1997, a concerned citizen informed petitioner that on a number of visits to respondents’ ranch the visitor had seen a large stock of weaponry, including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher. Based on that information, petitioner prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch. The application stated that the search was for “any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or launchers.” Petitioner supported the application with a detailed affidavit, which he also prepared and executed, that set forth the basis for his belief that the listed items were concealed on the ranch. Petitioner then presented these documents to a Magistrate, along with a warrant form that petitioner also had completed. The Magistrate signed the warrant form.

Although the application particularly described the place to be searched and the contraband petitioner expected to find, the warrant itself was less specific; it failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. In the portion of the form that called for a description of the “person or property” to be seized, petitioner typed a description of respondents’ two-story blue house rather than the alleged stockpile of firearms. The warrant did not incorporate by reference the itemized list contained in the application. It did, however, recite that the Magistrate was satisfied the affidavit established probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed on the premises, and that sufficient grounds existed for the warrant’s issuance.

The day after the Magistrate issued the warrant, petitioner led a team of law enforcement officers, including both federal agents and members of the local sheriff’s department, in the search of respondents’ premises. Although respondent Joseph Ramirez was not home, his wife and children were. Petitioner states that he orally described the objects of the search to Mrs. Ramirez in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone. According to Mrs. Ramirez, however, petitioner explained only that he was searching for “an explosive device in a box.” At any rate, the officers’ search uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. When the officers left, petitioner
gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant, but not a copy of the application, which had been sealed. The following day, in response to a request from respondents’ attorney, petitioner faxed the attorney a copy of the page of the application that listed the items to be seized. No charges were filed against the Ramirezes.

Respondents sued petitioner and the other officers, raising eight claims, including violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court entered summary judgment for all defendants. The court found no Fourth Amendment violation, because it considered the case comparable to one in which the warrant contained an inaccurate address, and in such a case, the court reasoned, the warrant is sufficiently detailed if the executing officers can locate the correct house.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with respect to all defendants and all claims, with the exception of respondents’ Fourth Amendment claim against petitioner. On that claim, the court held that the warrant was invalid because it did not “describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized,” and that oral statements by petitioner during or after the search could not cure the omission. The court observed that the warrant’s facial defect “increased the likelihood and degree of confrontation between the Ramirezes and the police” and deprived respondents of the means “to challenge officers who might have exceeded the limits imposed by the magistrate.” The court also expressed concern that “permitting officers to expand the scope of the warrant by oral statements would broaden the area of dispute between the parties in subsequent litigation.”

II

The warrant was plainly invalid. The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Emphasis added.) The warrant in this case complied with the first three of these requirements: It was based on probable cause and supported by a sworn affidavit, and it described particularly the place of the search. On the fourth requirement, however, the warrant failed altogether. Indeed, petitioner concedes that “the warrant ... was deficient in particularity because it provided no description of the type of evidence sought.”

The fact that the application adequately described the “things to be seized” does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents. And for good reason: “The presence of a search warrant serves a high function,” and that high function is not necessarily vindicated when some other document, somewhere, says something about the objects of the search, but the contents of that document are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection. We do not say that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrant from cross-referencing other documents. Indeed, most Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant. But in this case the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference, nor did either the affidavit or the application (which had been placed under seal) accompany the warrant. Hence, we need not further explore the matter of incorporation.
Petitioner argues that even though the warrant was invalid, the search nevertheless was “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. He notes that a Magistrate authorized the search on the basis of adequate evidence of probable cause, that petitioner orally described to respondents the items to be seized, and that the search did not exceed the limits intended by the Magistrate and described by petitioner. Thus, petitioner maintains, his search of respondents’ ranch was functionally equivalent to a search authorized by a valid warrant.

We disagree. This warrant did not simply omit a few items from a list of many to be seized, or misdescribe a few of several items. Nor did it make what fairly could be characterized as a mere technical mistake or typographical error. Rather, in the space set aside for a description of the items to be seized, the warrant stated that the items consisted of a “single dwelling residence ... blue in color.” In other words, the warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all. In this respect the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as “warrantless” within the meaning of our case law. “We are not dealing with formalities.” Because “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” stands “[a]t the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment,” our cases have firmly established the “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Thus, “absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within.”

We have clearly stated that the presumptive rule against warrantless searches applies with equal force to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant.

Petitioner asks us to hold that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant lacking particularity should be exempt from the presumption of unreasonableness if the goals served by the particularity requirement are otherwise satisfied. He maintains that the search in this case satisfied those goals—which he says are “to prevent general searches, to prevent the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another, and to prevent warrants from being issued on vague or dubious information” because the scope of the search did not exceed the limits set forth in the application. But unless the particular items described in the affidavit are also set forth in the warrant itself (or at least incorporated by reference, and the affidavit present at the search), there can be no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause to search for, and to seize, every item mentioned in the affidavit. In this case, for example, it is at least theoretically possible that the Magistrate was satisfied that the search for weapons and explosives was justified by the showing in the affidavit, but not convinced that any evidentiary basis existed for rummaging through respondents’ files and papers for receipts pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of such items. Or, conceivably, the Magistrate might have believed that some of the weapons mentioned in the affidavit could have been lawfully possessed and therefore should not be seized. The mere fact that the Magistrate issued a warrant does not necessarily establish that he agreed that the scope of the search should be as broad as the affiant’s request. Even though petitioner acted with restraint in conducting the search, “the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.”
We have long held, moreover, that the purpose of the particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention of general searches. A particular warrant also “assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”

Petitioner argues that even if the goals of the particularity requirement are broader than he acknowledges, those goals nevertheless were served because he orally described to respondents the items for which he was searching. Thus, he submits, respondents had all of the notice that a proper warrant would have accorded. But this case presents no occasion even to reach this argument, since respondents, as noted above, dispute petitioner's account. According to Mrs. Ramirez, petitioner stated only that he was looking for an “‘explosive device in a box.’” Because this dispute is before us on petitioner's motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor.” The posture of the case therefore obliges us to credit Mrs. Ramirez's account, and we find that petitioner's description of “an explosive device in a box” was little better than no guidance at all.

It is incumbent on the officer executing a search warrant to ensure the search is lawfully authorized and lawfully conducted. Because petitioner did not have in his possession a warrant particularly describing the things he intended to seize, proceeding with the search was clearly “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the search was unconstitutional.

Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice SCALIA joins, dissenting.

The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The precise relationship between the Amendment’s Warrant Clause and Unreasonableness Clause is unclear. But neither Clause explicitly requires a warrant. While “it is of course textually possible to consider [a warrant requirement] implicit within the requirement of reasonableness,” the text of the Fourth Amendment certainly does not mandate this result. Nor does the Amendment’s history, which is clear as to the Amendment’s principal target (general warrants), but not as clear with respect to when warrants were required, if ever. Indeed, because of the very different nature and scope of federal authority and ability to conduct searches and arrests at the founding, it is possible that neither the history of the Fourth Amendment nor the common law provides much guidance.

As a result, the Court has vacillated between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and applying a general reasonableness standard. Today the Court holds that the warrant in this case was “so obviously deficient” that the ensuing search must be regarded as a warrantless search and thus presumptively unreasonable. However, the text of the Fourth Amendment, its history, and the sheer number of exceptions to the Court’s categorical warrant requirement seriously undermine the bases upon which the Court today rests its holding. Instead of adding to this confusing jurisprudence, as the Court has done, I would turn to first principles in order to determine the relationship between the Warrant Clause and the Unreasonableness Clause. But
even within the Court’s current framework, a search conducted pursuant to a defective warrant is constitutionally different from a “warrantless search.” Consequently, despite the defective warrant, I would still ask whether this search was unreasonable and would conclude that it was not. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

I

“[A]ny Fourth Amendment case may present two separate questions: whether the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the second Clause, and, if not, whether it was nevertheless ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the first.” By categorizing the search here to be a “warrantless” one, the Court declines to perform a reasonableness inquiry and ignores the fact that this search is quite different from searches that the Court has considered to be “warrantless” in the past. Our cases involving “warrantless” searches do not generally involve situations in which an officer has obtained a warrant that is later determined to be facially defective, but rather involve situations in which the officers neither sought nor obtained a warrant. By simply treating this case as if no warrant had even been sought or issued, the Court glosses over what should be the key inquiry: whether it is always appropriate to treat a search made pursuant to a warrant that fails to describe particularly the things to be seized as presumptively unreasonable.

The Court also rejects the argument that the details of the warrant application and affidavit save the warrant, because “[t]he presence of a search warrant serves a high function.” But it is not only the physical existence of the warrant and its typewritten contents that serve this high function. The Warrant Clause’s principal protection lies in the fact that the “Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police ... so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade [the searchee’s] privacy in order to enforce the law.”’ The Court has further explained:

“The point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers .... When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.”

But the actual contents of the warrant are simply manifestations of this protection. Hence, in contrast to the case of a truly warrantless search, where a warrant (due to a mistake) does not specify on its face the particular items to be seized but the warrant application passed on by the magistrate judge contains such details, a searchee still has the benefit of a determination by a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to search a particular place and to seize particular items. In such a circumstance, the principal justification for applying a rule of presumptive unreasonableness falls away.
In the instant case, the items to be seized were clearly specified in the warrant application and set forth in the affidavit, both of which were given to the Judge (Magistrate). The Magistrate reviewed all of the documents and signed the warrant application and made no adjustment or correction to this application. It is clear that respondents here received the protection of the Warrant Clause. Under these circumstances, I would not hold that any ensuing search constitutes a presumptively unreasonable warrantless search. Instead, I would determine whether, despite the invalid warrant, the resulting search was reasonable and hence constitutional.

II

Because the search was not unreasonable, I would conclude that it was constitutional. Prior to execution of the warrant, petitioner briefed the search team and provided a copy of the search warrant application, the supporting affidavit, and the warrant for the officers to review. Petitioner orally reviewed the terms of the warrant with the officers, including the specific items for which the officers were authorized to search. Petitioner and his search team then conducted the search entirely within the scope of the warrant application and warrant; that is, within the scope of what the Magistrate had authorized. Finding no illegal weapons or explosives, the search team seized nothing. When petitioner left, he gave respondents a copy of the search warrant. Upon request the next day, petitioner faxed respondents a copy of the more detailed warrant application. Indeed, putting aside the technical defect in the warrant, it is hard to imagine how the actual search could have been carried out any more reasonably.

The Court argues that this eminently reasonable search is nonetheless unreasonable because “there can be no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause to search for, and to seize, every item mentioned in the affidavit” “unless the particular items described in the affidavit are also set forth in the warrant itself.” The Court argues that it was at least possible that the Magistrate intended to authorize a much more limited search than the one petitioner requested. As a theoretical matter, this may be true. But the more reasonable inference is that the Magistrate intended to authorize everything in the warrant application, as he signed the application and did not make any written adjustments to the application or the warrant itself.

The Court also attempts to bolster its focus on the faulty warrant by arguing that the purpose of the particularity requirement is not only to prevent general searches, but also to assure the searchee of the lawful authority for the search. But as the Court recognizes, neither the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 requires an officer to serve the warrant on the searchee before the search. Thus, a search should not be considered per se unreasonable for failing to apprise the searchee of the lawful authority prior to the search, especially where, as here, the officer promptly provides the requisite information when the defect in the papers is detected. Additionally, unless the Court adopts the Court of Appeals’ view that the Constitution protects a searchee’s ability to “be on the lookout and to challenge officers,” while the officers are actually carrying out the search, petitioner’s provision of the requisite information the following day is sufficient to satisfy this interest.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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Chapter 7 — Page 155
In the next two cases, the Court considers a recurring question related to how officers may execute a valid warrant. Specifically, the question is whether officers must “knock and announce” before breaking in someone’s door to conduct a search pursuant to a warrant. Even more specifically, the question is whether the Fourth Amendment generally requires the knocking and announcing and, if so, what exceptions limit the general rule.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Sharlene Wilson v. Arkansas**

Decided May 22, 1995 – 514 U.S. 927

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court.

At the time of the framing, the common law of search and seizure recognized a law enforcement officer’s authority to break open the doors of a dwelling, but generally indicated that he first ought to announce his presence and authority. In this case, we hold that this common-law “knock and announce” principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.

I

During November and December 1992, petitioner Sharlene Wilson made a series of narcotics sales to an informant acting at the direction of the Arkansas State Police. In late November, the informant purchased marijuana and methamphetamine at the home that petitioner shared with Bryson Jacobs. On December 30, the informant telephoned petitioner at her home and arranged to meet her at a local store to buy some marijuana. According to testimony presented below, petitioner produced a semiautomatic pistol at this meeting and waved it in the informant’s face, threatening to kill her if she turned out to be working for the police. Petitioner then sold the informant a bag of marijuana.

The next day, police officers applied for and obtained warrants to search petitioner’s home and to arrest both petitioner and Jacobs. Affidavits filed in support of the warrants set forth the details of the narcotics transactions and stated that Jacobs had previously been convicted of arson and firebombing. The search was conducted later that afternoon. Police officers found the main door to petitioner’s home open. While opening an unlocked screen door and entering the residence, they identified themselves as police officers and stated that they had a warrant. Once inside the home, the officers seized marijuana, methamphetamine, valium, narcotics paraphernalia, a gun, and ammunition. They also found petitioner in the bathroom, flushing marijuana down the toilet. Petitioner and Jacobs were arrested and charged with delivery of marijuana, delivery of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana.

Before trial, petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. Petitioner asserted that the search was invalid on various grounds, including that the officers had failed to “knock and announce” before entering her home. The trial court summarily denied the suppression motion. After a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of all charges and sentenced to 32 years in prison.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction on appeal. The court noted that “the officers entered the home while they were identifying themselves,” but it rejected petitioner’s argument that “the Fourth Amendment requires officers to knock and announce prior to entering the residence.” Finding “no authority for [petitioner’s] theory that the knock and announce principle is required by the Fourth Amendment,” the court concluded that neither Arkansas law nor the Fourth Amendment required suppression of the evidence.

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the lower courts as to whether the common-law knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. We hold that it does, and accordingly reverse and remand.

II

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” In evaluating the scope of this right, we have looked to the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing. “Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable,” our effort to give content to this term may be guided by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment. An examination of the common law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to entering.

Although the common law generally protected a man’s house as “his castle of defense and asylum,” common-law courts long have held that “when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party’s house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K[ing]’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter.” To this rule, however, common-law courts appended an important qualification:

“But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors ..., for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it....”

Several prominent founding-era commentators agreed on this basic principle. According to Sir Matthew Hale, the “constant practice” at common law was that “the officer may break open the door, if he be sure the offender is there, if after acquainting them of the business, and demanding the prisoner, he refuses to open the door.” William Hawkins propounded a similar principle: “the law doth never allow” an officer to break open the door of a dwelling “but in cases of necessity,” that is, unless he “first signify to those in the house the cause of his coming, and request them to give him admittance.” Sir William Blackstone stated simply that the sheriff may “justify breaking open doors, if the possession be not quietly delivered.”
The common-law knock and announce principle was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law. Most of the States that ratified the Fourth Amendment had enacted constitutional provisions or statutes generally incorporating English common law, and a few States had enacted statutes specifically embracing the common-law view that the breaking of the door of a dwelling was permitted once admittance was refused.

Our own cases have acknowledged that the common law principle of announcement is “embedded in Anglo-American law,” but we have never squarely held that this principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. We now so hold. Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Contrary to the decision below, we hold that in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

This is not to say, of course, that every entry must be preceded by an announcement. The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests. As even petitioner concedes, the common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances.

Indeed, at the time of the framing, the common-law admonition that an officer “ought to signify the cause of his coming” had not been extended conclusively to the context of felony arrests. The common-law principle gradually was applied to cases involving felonies, but at the same time the courts continued to recognize that under certain circumstances the presumption in favor of announcement necessarily would give way to contrary considerations.

Thus, because the common-law rule was justified in part by the belief that announcement generally would avoid “the destruction or breaking of any house ... by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue,” courts acknowledged that the presumption in favor of announcement would yield under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence. Similarly, courts held that an officer may dispense with announcement in cases where a prisoner escapes from him and retreats to his dwelling. Proof of “demand and refusal” was deemed unnecessary in such cases because it would be a “senseless ceremony” to require an officer in pursuit of a recently escaped arrestee to make an announcement prior to breaking the door to retake him. Finally, courts have indicated that unannounced entry may be justified where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.

We need not attempt a comprehensive catalog of the relevant countervailing factors here. For now, we leave to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We simply hold that although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.
Respondent contends that the judgment below should be affirmed because the unannounced entry in this case was justified for two reasons. First, respondent argues that police officers reasonably believed that a prior announcement would have placed them in peril, given their knowledge that petitioner had threatened a government informant with a semiautomatic weapon and that Mr. Jacobs had previously been convicted of arson and firebombing. Second, respondent suggests that prior announcement would have produced an unreasonable risk that petitioner would destroy easily disposable narcotics evidence.

These considerations may well provide the necessary justification for the unannounced entry in this case. Because the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address their sufficiency, however, we remand to allow the state courts to make any necessary findings of fact and to make the determination of reasonableness in the first instance. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

In *Wilson*, the Court stated that obeying the “knock and announce” rule was part of conducting a “reasonable” search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court also stated, however, that certain searches may be conducted without knocking and announcing. Indeed, after the Court remanded Sharlene Wilson’s case to the Arkansas court system, she was not released. It seems that Arkansas courts determined that under the facts presented, it was reasonable for officers to enter Wilson’s home without knocking and announcing.

Although best known to today’s students for her role in knock-and-announce doctrine, Sharlene Wilson was briefly famous two decades ago—at least among followers of certain conspiracy theories—for other reasons. During her imprisonment, it was reported that Wilson claimed to have seen then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton using cocaine and attending “cocaine parties.” It was also suggested that Wilson had been sent to prison in an effort to prevent her from harming Clinton’s political ambitions. Her case was celebrated by certain activists who sought her release, and Governor Mike Huckabee (father of future White House press secretary Sarah Sanders) reduced her sentence in 1999, making Wilson eligible for parole. Then, after marrying Bryson Jacobs—the boyfriend mentioned in the *Wilson* opinion—she began a ministry tour.

In the next case, the Court attempted to provide more guidance about when knocking and announcing is not required.
In *Wilson v. Arkansas*, we held that the Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry. At the same time, we recognized that the “flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests,” and left “to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that police officers are *never* required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation. In so doing, it reaffirmed a pre-*Wilson* holding and concluded that *Wilson* did not preclude this *per se* rule. We disagree with the court’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for this entire category of criminal activity. But because the evidence presented to support the officers’ actions in this case establishes that the decision not to knock and announce was a reasonable one under the circumstances, we affirm the judgment of the Wisconsin court.

I

On December 31, 1991, police officers in Madison, Wisconsin, obtained a warrant to search Steiney Richards’ motel room for drugs and related paraphernalia. The search warrant was the culmination of an investigation that had uncovered substantial evidence that Richards was one of several individuals dealing drugs out of motel rooms in Madison. The police requested a warrant that would have given advance authorization for a “no-knock” entry into the motel room, but the Magistrate explicitly deleted those portions of the warrant.

The officers arrived at the motel room at 3:40 a.m. Officer Pharo, dressed as a maintenance man, led the team. With him were several plainclothes officers and at least one man in uniform. Officer Pharo knocked on Richards’ door and, responding to the query from inside the room, stated that he was a maintenance man. With the chain still on the door, Richards cracked it open. Although there is some dispute as to what occurred next, Richards acknowledges that when he opened the door he saw the man in uniform standing behind Officer Pharo. He quickly slammed the door closed and, after waiting two or three seconds, the officers began kicking and ramming the door to gain entry to the locked room. At trial, the officers testified that they identified themselves as police while they were kicking the door in. When they finally did break into the room, the officers caught Richards trying to escape through the window. They also found cash and cocaine hidden in plastic bags above the bathroom ceiling tiles.

Richards sought to have the evidence from his motel room suppressed on the ground that the officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to forcing entry into the room.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the officers could gather from Richards’ strange behavior when they first sought entry that he knew they were police officers and that he might try to destroy evidence or to escape. The judge emphasized that the easily disposable nature of the drugs the police were searching for further justified their decision to identify themselves as they crossed the threshold instead of announcing their presence before seeking entry. Richards appealed the decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and that court affirmed.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not delve into the events underlying Richards’ arrest in any detail, but accepted the following facts: “[O]n December 31, 1991, police executed a search warrant for the motel room of the defendant seeking evidence of the felonious crime of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance in violation of Wis. Stat. § 161.41(1m) (1991-92). They did not knock and announce prior to their entry. Drugs were seized.”

II

We recognized in Wilson that the knock-and-announce requirement could give way “under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence,” or “where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.” It is indisputable that felony drug investigations may frequently involve both of these circumstances. The question we must resolve is whether this fact justifies dispensing with case-by-case evaluation of the manner in which a search was executed.

The Wisconsin court explained its blanket exception as necessitated by the special circumstances of today’s drug culture, and the State asserted at oral argument that the blanket exception was reasonable in “felony drug cases because of the convergence in a violent and dangerous form of commerce of weapons and the destruction of drugs.” But creating exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule based on the “culture” surrounding a general category of criminal behavior presents at least two serious concerns.

First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization. For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree. For example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry. Wisconsin’s blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cases from judicial review.

A second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category exception to the knock-and-announce requirement is that the reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. Armed bank robbers, for example, are, by definition, likely to have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much difficulty. If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable—albeit hypothetical—risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.
Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.

In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standard—as opposed to a probable-cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries. This showing is not high, but the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged.

III

Although we reject the Wisconsin court’s blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement, we conclude that the officers’ no-knock entry into Richards’ motel room did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the trial court that the circumstances in this case show that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Richards might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so.

The judge who heard testimony at Richards’ suppression hearing concluded that it was reasonable for the officers executing the warrant to believe that Richards knew, after opening the door to his motel room the first time, that the men seeking entry to his room were the police. Once the officers reasonably believed that Richards knew who they were, the court concluded, it was reasonable for them to force entry immediately given the disposable nature of the drugs.

In arguing that the officers’ entry was unreasonable, Richards places great emphasis on the fact that the Magistrate who signed the search warrant for his motel room deleted the portions of the proposed warrant that would have given the officers permission to execute a no-knock entry. But this fact does not alter the reasonableness of the officers’ decision, which must be evaluated as of the time they entered the motel room. At the time the officers obtained the warrant, they did not have evidence sufficient, in the judgment of the Magistrate, to justify a no-knock warrant. Of course, the Magistrate could not have anticipated in every particular the circumstances that would confront the officers when they arrived at Richards’ motel room. These actual circumstances—petitioner’s apparent recognition of the officers combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs—justified the officers’ ultimate decision to enter without first announcing their presence and authority.

Accordingly, although we reject the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is affirmed.
When police “knock and announce,” they are often not obligated to wait very long before forcing entry. In *United States v. Banks*, 540 U.S. 31 (2003), the Court found that a “15-to-20-second wait before a forcible entry” was justified by the circumstances, and federal courts have approved even shorter wait times. Short wait times are especially likely to be deemed reasonable if officers are searching for drugs and hear no response after knocking and announcing. The necessary time officers must wait before “reasonably” breaking a door varies depending on factors such as what police seek, the anticipated dangerousness of persons likely to be on the premises, and how persons react to the arrival of officers.

The 2017 news that federal agents conducted a no-knock raid against Paul Manafort, the former presidential campaign manager for Donald Trump, inspired new interest in the phenomenon of no-knock entries and the breaking of doors by police. Although some commentators suggested that such raids are unusual, it would have been more accurate to say that such raids are unusual for suspects like Paul Manafort. In drug cases, no-knock raids are not unusual at all.

Students interested in what happens when police execute warrants, particularly without knocking and announcing, may appreciate Radley Balko’s book *Rise of the Warrior Cop* (2013). Balko observed:

> Today in America SWAT teams violently smash into private homes more than one hundred times per day. The vast majority of these raids are to enforce laws against consensual crimes. In many cities, police departments have given up the traditional blue uniforms for “battle dress uniforms” modeled after soldier attire. Police departments across the country now sport armored personnel carriers designed for use on a battlefield. ... They carry military-grade weapons. Most of this equipment comes from the military itself. Many SWAT teams today are trained by current and former personnel from special forces units.

Balko notes also that despite the Supreme Court’s guidance concerning no-knock raids—that is, holdings that the Fourth Amendment limits the use of such tactics—“the police officers interviewed for this book unanimously told me that beginning in about the mid-1980s, judges almost never denied their requests for a search warrant” and that “knock-and-announce requests were never a problem.”

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4 See *Banks* at 38, n. 5 (collecting cases).
5 See Radley Balko, “No-Knock Raids like the one against Paul Manafort are more Common than You Think,” Wash. Post (Aug. 10, 2017).
6 [Footnote by editors] Balko is referring to drug crimes and illegal gambling—or, more generally, crimes with no apparent “victim.”
8 *Id.* at 183; see also Radley Balko, “How Little Rock’s Illegal Police Raids Validate the Exclusionary Rule,” Wash. Post (Oct. 19, 2018) (reporting routine issuance of no-knock warrants despite lack of any specific information in application about “why the suspect named in the warrant merited a no-knock raid”).
In March 2020, no-knock warrants gained national attention after police in Louisville, Kentucky shot and killed Breonna Taylor, a 26-year-old emergency room technician. Police entered her apartment soon after midnight on March 13, under authority of a no-knock warrant issued by a judge. Taylor’s boyfriend, Kenneth Walker, said later that when police entered, he and Taylor believed they were victims of a burglary and did not know that the persons entering their home were police officers. Officers said later that they did knock and announce. After police entered, Walker shot at the officers, hitting one in the leg. Police fired back, killing Taylor. She was shot at least eight times. The warrant had been issued as part of an investigation into drug sales. No drugs were found in Taylor’s apartment. Taylor’s death was one of several—including the May 2020 killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis—that inspired nationwide protests. Louisville officials announced new policies relating to no-knock warrants in the wake of protests. In addition, some have argued that under existing law set forth in Wilson and Richards, the no-knock warrant in Taylor’s case was not lawfully issued.

In our next chapter, we will continue examining how the Court regulates the execution of warrants by police. In particular, we will review how officers may treat persons who happen to be present while officers are searching pursuant to a warrant (including whether such persons may be detained and searched), as well as how mistakes by police in the execution of warrants (such as searching the wrong place) affect the “reasonableness” of searches.

After that, we will spend several chapters studying the circumstances in which the Court has declared that warrants are not required.
Chapter 8
Execution of Warrants

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The execution of warrants presents several opportunities for disaster, as well as more minor problems. Straightforward risks include efforts by persons present at the search location to disrupt the search, such as by destroying evidence or barring entry. In addition, the possibility that suspects will assault officers cannot be ignored. The Court has attempted to balance concern about these risks with concern for the civil liberties of persons present during a search. Two common recurring questions include: (1) when officers may detain those present at the search location and (2) when officers may search them.

In addition to hazards faced by law enforcement officers, other problems can be created by officers themselves or by the judges who issue warrants. For example, a warrant listing the wrong address can cause officers to search the wrong house. Officers who do not read a warrant carefully can search locations beyond those authorized by a warrant. And rough search methods can cause needless property damage.

We begin with the Court’s rulings about how police may treat persons who are present during the execution of a valid search warrant.

Supreme Court of the United States

Darin L. Muehler v. Iris Mena

Decided March 22, 2005 – 544 U.S. 93

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises that she and several others occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises. She sued the officers and the District Court found in her favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. We hold that Mena’s detention in handcuffs for the length of the search was consistent with our opinion in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and that the officers’ questioning during that detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
Based on information gleaned from the investigation of a gang-related, driveby shooting, petitioners Muehler and Brill had reason to believe at least one member of a gang—the West Side Locos—lived at 1363 Patricia Avenue. They also suspected that the individual was armed and dangerous, since he had recently been involved in the driveby shooting. As a result, Muehler obtained a search warrant for 1363 Patricia Avenue that authorized a broad search of the house and premises for, among other things, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. In light of the high degree of risk involved in searching a house suspected of housing at least one, and perhaps multiple, armed gang members, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team was used to secure the residence and grounds before the search.

At 7 a.m. on February 3, 1998, petitioners, along with the SWAT team and other officers, executed the warrant. Mena was asleep in her bed when the SWAT team, clad in helmets and black vests adorned with badges and the word “POLICE,” entered her bedroom and placed her in handcuffs at gunpoint. The SWAT team also handcuffed three other individuals found on the property. The SWAT team then took those individuals and Mena into a converted garage, which contained several beds and some other bedroom furniture. While the search proceeded, one or two officers guarded the four detainees, who were allowed to move around the garage but remained in handcuffs.

Aware that the West Side Locos gang was composed primarily of illegal immigrants, the officers had notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that they would be conducting the search, and an INS officer accompanied the officers executing the warrant. During their detention in the garage, an officer asked for each detainee’s name, date of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. The INS officer later asked the detainees for their immigration documentation. Mena’s status as a permanent resident was confirmed by her papers.¹

The search of the premises yielded a .22 caliber handgun with .22 caliber ammunition, a box of .25 caliber ammunition, several baseball bats with gang writing, various additional gang paraphernalia, and a bag of marijuana. Before the officers left the area, Mena was released.

In her § 1983 suit against the officers she alleged that she was detained “for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition, she claimed that the warrant and its execution were overbroad, that the officers failed to comply with the “knock and announce” rule, and that the officers had needlessly destroyed property during the search. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the District Court denied their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed that denial, except for Mena’s claim that the warrant was overbroad; on this claim the Court of Appeals held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. After a trial, a jury, pursuant to a special verdict form, found that Officers Muehler and Brill violated Mena’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by detaining her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and for a longer period than that which was reasonable. The jury awarded Mena $10,000 in actual damages and $20,000 in punitive damages against each petitioner for a total of $60,000.

¹ [Footnote by editors] A Lawful Permanent Resident, also known as a “green card” holder, is a non-citizen authorized to live permanently within the United States.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds. Reviewing the denial of qualified immunity *de novo*, it first held that the officers’ detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and keep her in handcuffs during the search. In the Court of Appeals’ view, the officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she posed no immediate threat. The court additionally held that the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that those rights were clearly established at the time of Mena’s questioning, and thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. We granted certiorari and now vacate and remand.

In *Michigan v. Summers*, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), we held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority “to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Such detentions are appropriate, we explained, because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. We made clear that the detention of an occupant is “surely less intrusive than the search itself,” and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Against this incremental intrusion, we posited three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: “preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found”; “minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”; and facilitating “the orderly completion of the search,” as detainees’ “self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force.”

Mena’s detention was, under *Summers*, plainly permissible. An officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the “quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.” Thus, Mena’s detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under *Summers* because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.

Inherent in *Summers’* authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. Indeed, *Summers* itself stressed that the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized “if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”

The officers’ use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Mena’s detention in the garage, as well as the detention of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion. The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs on Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in the converted garage. The detention was thus more intrusive than that which we upheld in *Summers*.

But this was no ordinary search. The governmental interests in not only detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises. In such inherently dangerous situations, the use of handcuffs minimizes the risk of harm to both officers and occupants. Though this safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs, the need to detain multiple occupants made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable.
Mena argues that, even if the use of handcuffs to detain her in the garage was reasonable as an initial matter, the duration of the use of handcuffs made the detention unreasonable. The duration of a detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests. However, the 2–to-3-hour detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the government’s continuing safety interests. As we have noted, this case involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons. We conclude that the detention of Mena in handcuffs during the search was reasonable.

The Court of Appeals also determined that the officers violated Mena’s Fourth Amendment rights by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention. This holding, it appears, was premised on the assumption that the officers were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth Amendment event. But the premise is faulty. We have “held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual’s identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage.” As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.

In summary, the officers’ detention of Mena in handcuffs during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the officers’ questioning of Mena did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BRYER join, concurring in the judgment.

In its opinion affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeals made two mistakes. First, as the Court explains, it erroneously held that the immigration officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status was an independent violation of the Fourth Amendment. Second, instead of merely deciding whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict, the Court of Appeals appears to have ruled as a matter of law that the officers should have released her from the handcuffs sooner than they did. I agree that it is appropriate to remand the case to enable the Court of Appeals to consider whether the evidence supports Mena’s contention that she was held longer than the search actually lasted. In doing so, the Court of Appeals must of course accord appropriate deference to the jury’s reasonable factual findings, while applying the correct legal standard.

In my judgment, however, the Court’s discussion of the amount of force used to detain Mena is analytically unsound. Although the Court correctly purports to apply the “objective reasonableness” test announced in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), it misapplies that test. Given the facts of this case—and the presumption that a reviewing court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of supporting the verdict—I think it clear that the jury could properly have found that this 5-foot-2-inch young lady posed no threat to the officers at the scene, and that they used excessive force in keeping her in handcuffs for up to three hours. Although Summers authorizes the detention of any individual who is present when a valid search warrant is being executed, that case does not give officers carte blanche to keep individuals who pose no threat in handcuffs throughout a search, no matter how long it may last. On remand, I would therefore instruct the Court of Appeals to consider whether the evidence supports Mena’s contention that the petitioners used excessive force in detaining her when it considers the length of the Summers detention.

As the Court notes, the warrant in this case authorized the police to enter the Mena home to search for a gun belonging to Raymond Romero that may have been used in a gang-related driveby shooting. Romero, a known member of the West Side Locos gang, rented a room from the Mena family. The house, described as a “poor house,” was home to several unrelated individuals who rented from the Menas. Each resident had his or her own bedroom, which could be locked with a padlock on the outside, and each had access to the living room and kitchen. In addition, several individuals lived in trailers in the back yard and also had access to the common spaces in the Mena home.

In addition to Romero, police had reason to believe that at least one other West Side Locos gang member had lived at the residence, although Romero’s brother told police that the individual had returned to Mexico. The officers in charge of the search, petitioners Muehler and Brill, had been at the same residence a few months earlier on an unrelated domestic violence call, but did not see any other individuals they believed to be gang members inside the home on that occasion.

In light of the fact that the police believed that Romero possessed a gun and that there might be other gang members at the residence, petitioner Muehler decided to use a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team to execute the warrant. As described in the majority opinion, eight members of the SWAT team forceably entered the home at 7 a.m. In fact, Mena was the only occupant of the house, and she was asleep in her bedroom. The police woke her up at gunpoint, and immediately handcuffed her. At the same time, officers served another search warrant at the home of Romero’s mother, where Romero was known to stay several nights each week. In part because Romero’s mother had previously cooperated with police officers, they did not use a SWAT team to serve that warrant. Romero was found at his mother's house; after being cited for possession of a small amount of marijuana, he was released.

Meanwhile, after the SWAT team secured the Mena residence and gave the “all clear,” police officers transferred Mena and three other individuals (who had been in trailers in the back yard) to a converted garage. To get to the garage, Mena, who was still in her bedclothes, was forced to walk barefoot through the pouring rain. The officers kept her and the other three individuals in the garage for up to three hours while they searched the home. Although she requested them to remove the handcuffs, they refused to do so. For the duration of the search, two officers guarded Mena and the other three detainees. A .22-caliber handgun, ammunition, and gang-related paraphernalia were found in Romero’s bedroom, and other gang-related paraphernalia was found in the living room. Officers found nothing of significance in Mena’s bedroom.
Police officers’ legitimate concern for their own safety is always a factor that should weigh heavily in balancing the relevant *Graham* factors. But, as Officer Brill admitted at trial, if that justification were always sufficient, it would authorize the handcuffing of every occupant of the premises for the duration of every *Summers* detention. Nothing in either the *Summers* or the *Graham* opinion provides any support for such a result. Rather, the decision of what force to use must be made on a case-by-case basis. There is evidence in this record that may well support the conclusion that it was unreasonable to handcuff Mena throughout the search. On remand, therefore, I would instruct the Ninth Circuit to consider that evidence, as well as the possibility that Mena was detained after the search was completed, when deciding whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

### Notes, Comments, and Questions

Although the Court has authorized officers executing a search warrant to detain persons found on the premises, officers do not necessarily have authority to search the persons who are detained. In *Ybarra v. Illinois*, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), the Court considered a search that police had conducted at a bar pursuant to a warrant. The warrant allowed police to search the bar and the bartender for drugs, and it was based on reports of “tinfoil packets” possessed by the bartender and stored behind the bar.

When officers arrived at the bar, they told patrons to prepare to be searched for weapons, and officers then patted down the patrons. During one pat down, an officer felt a cigarette pack that seemed to have objects in it. The officer later removed the package from the suspect’s pocket and opened it, finding tinfoil packets containing heroin.

The suspect, charged with possession of the heroin, moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that officers lacked probable cause to believe that any particular customer possessed drugs. “It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed. But, a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.” *Id.* at 91. (The Court also rejected an argument that the initial pat down was a lawful “stop and frisk” authorized by the Court’s decision in *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a topic to which we will return.) See also *United States v. Di Re*, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (holding that even if the search of a certain car was lawful, that did not justify the ensuing search of its occupant).

A magazine aimed at a police officer readership stated the Court’s holding clearly and succinctly in a 2016 article called “Serving the Search Warrant.” One heading reads: “Occupants Can be Detained.” The next heading is: “Occupants Cannot be Searched.” The article advises officers, “To justify searching detainees who are not authorized to be searched by the warrant, try to develop grounds for warrantless search, such as consent or probationary/parole search terms, where available.” We will examine these police tactics later in the book.

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If mere presence during the execution of a search warrant does not justify the search of a person, it follows that mere presence surely does not justify arresting everyone present. To reinforce this message, the Legal Bureau of the New York Police Department issued a bulletin in 2013 to this effect.\(^3\) In response to the question, “May a police officer arrest all persons found in a location during the execution of a search warrant?,” the bulletin answered, “No. An individual’s mere presence in a search location does not establish probable cause to arrest.”

Note that while police may detain persons present at the location to be searched, they may not detain persons who happened to be at the location earlier but have already left before police arrive to execute the warrant. In *Bailey v. United States*, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), the Court held that the rule of *Michigan v. Summers*, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) applies only to those in “the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.” The Court explained, “Because detention is justified by the interests in executing a safe and efficient search, the decision to detain must be acted upon at the scene of the search and not at a later time in a more remote place.” In *Bailey*, officers had followed two men 0.7 miles after seeing them leave the building officers had been about to search. The Court found the detention unreasonable. In a dissent, Justice Breyer complained that “immediate vicinity” was not defined by the majority.

In the next two cases, we examine what happens when police search the wrong location when executing a warrant. In one case, a building turned out to have more apartments than officers realized when obtaining the warrant, causing officers to search the wrong person’s home. In the other, officers entered a house looking for suspects who had moved out months earlier, causing an unpleasant surprise to the new residents.

**Supreme Court of the United States**

**Maryland v. Harold Garrison**
Decided Feb. 24, 1987 – 480 U.S. 79

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Baltimore police officers obtained and executed a warrant to search the person of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When the police applied for the warrant and when they conducted the search pursuant to the warrant, they reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the premises described in the warrant. In fact, the third floor was divided into two apartments, one occupied by McWebb and one by respondent Garrison. Before the officers executing the warrant became aware that they were in a separate apartment occupied by respondent, they had discovered the contraband that provided the basis for respondent’s conviction for violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. The question presented is whether the seizure of that contraband was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

The trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded with instructions to remand the case for a new trial.

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There is no question that the warrant was valid and was supported by probable cause. The trial court found, and the two appellate courts did not dispute, that after making a reasonable investigation, including a verification of information obtained from a reliable informant, an exterior examination of the three-story building at 2036 Park Avenue, and an inquiry of the utility company, the officer who obtained the warrant reasonably concluded that there was only one apartment on the third floor and that it was occupied by McWebb. When six Baltimore police officers executed the warrant, they fortuitously encountered McWebb in front of the building and used his key to gain admittance to the first-floor hallway and to the locked door at the top of the stairs to the third floor. As they entered the vestibule on the third floor, they encountered respondent, who was standing in the hallway area. The police could see into the interior of both McWebb’s apartment to the left and respondent’s to the right, for the doors to both were open. Only after respondent’s apartment had been entered and heroin, cash, and drug paraphernalia had been found did any of the officers realize that the third floor contained two apartments. As soon as they became aware of that fact, the search was discontinued. All of the officers reasonably believed that they were searching McWebb’s apartment. No further search of respondent’s apartment was made.

The matter on which there is a difference of opinion concerns the proper interpretation of the warrant. A literal reading of its plain language, as well as the language used in the application for the warrant, indicates that it was intended to authorize a search of the entire third floor. This is the construction adopted by the intermediate appellate court and it also appears to be the construction adopted by the trial judge. One sentence in the trial judge’s oral opinion, however, lends support to the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, namely, that the warrant authorized a search of McWebb’s apartment only. Under that interpretation, the Court of Appeals concluded that the warrant did not authorize the search of respondent’s apartment and the police had no justification for making a warrantless entry into his premises.

Because the result that the Court of Appeals reached did not appear to be required by the Fourth Amendment, we granted certiorari. We reverse.

In our view, the case presents two separate constitutional issues, one concerning the validity of the warrant and the other concerning the reasonableness of the manner in which it was executed.

I

The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one “particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. Thus, the scope of a lawful search is “defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase.”
In this case there is no claim that the “persons or things to be seized” were inadequately described or that there was no probable cause to believe that those things might be found in “the place to be searched” as it was described in the warrant. With the benefit of hindsight, however, we now know that the description of that place was broader than appropriate because it was based on the mistaken belief that there was only one apartment on the third floor of the building at 2036 Park Avenue. The question is whether that factual mistake invalidated a warrant that undoubtedly would have been valid if it had reflected a completely accurate understanding of the building’s floor plan.

Plainly, if the officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue, they would have been obligated to exclude respondent’s apartment from the scope of the requested warrant. But we must judge the constitutionality of their conduct in light of the information available to them at the time they acted. Those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. Just as the discovery of contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid when issued, so is it equally clear that the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant. The validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and to disclose, to the issuing Magistrate. On the basis of that information, we agree with the conclusion of all three Maryland courts that the warrant, insofar as it authorized a search that turned out to be ambiguous in scope, was valid when it issued.

II

The question whether the execution of the warrant violated respondent’s constitutional right to be secure in his home is somewhat less clear. We have no difficulty concluding that the officers’ entry into the third-floor common area was legal; they carried a warrant for those premises, and they were accompanied by McWebb, who provided the key that they used to open the door giving access to the third-floor common area. If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb’s apartment. Moreover, as the officers recognized, they were required to discontinue the search of respondent’s apartment as soon as they discovered that there were two separate units on the third floor and therefore were put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously included within the terms of the warrant. The officers’ conduct and the limits of the search were based on the information available as the search proceeded. While the purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent of the search, the Court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants.

[T]he validity of the search of respondent’s apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third floor depends on whether the officers’ failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. Here it unquestionably was. The objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction between McWebb’s apartment and the third-floor premises.
For that reason, the officers properly responded to the command contained in a valid warrant even if the warrant is interpreted as authorizing a search limited to McWebb’s apartment rather than the entire third floor. Prior to the officers’ discovery of the factual mistake, they perceived McWebb’s apartment and the third-floor premises as one and the same; therefore their execution of the warrant reasonably included the entire third floor. Under either interpretation of the warrant, the officers’ conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Under this Court’s precedents, the search of respondent Garrison’s apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. While executing a warrant specifically limited to McWebb’s residence, the officers expanded their search to include respondent’s adjacent apartment, an expansion made without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances. In my view, Maryland’s highest court correctly concluded that the trial judge should have granted respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of this warrantless search of his apartment. Moreover, even if I were to accept the majority’s analysis of this case as one involving a mistake on the part of the police officers, I would find that the officers’ error, either in obtaining or in executing the warrant, was not reasonable under the circumstances.

The Fourth Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The particularity-of-description requirement is satisfied where “the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” In applying this requirement to searches aimed at residences within multiunit buildings, such as the search in the present case, courts have declared invalid those warrants that fail to describe the targeted unit with enough specificity to prevent a search of all the units.

Applying the above principle[1] to this case, I conclude that the search of respondent’s apartment was improper. The words of the warrant were plain and distinctive: the warrant directed the officers to seize marijuana and drug paraphernalia on the person of McWebb and in McWebb’s apartment, i.e., “on the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” As the Court of Appeals observed, this warrant specifically authorized a search only of McWebb’s—not respondent’s—residence. In its interpretation of the warrant, the majority suggests that the language of this document, as well as that in the supporting affidavit, permitted a search of the entire third floor. It escapes me why the language in question, “third floor apartment,” when used with reference to a single unit in a multiple-occupancy building and in the context of one person’s residence, plainly has the meaning the majority discerns, rather than its apparent and, indeed, obvious signification—one apartment located on the third floor. Accordingly, if, as appears to be the case, the warrant was limited in its description to the third-floor apartment of
McWebb, then the search of an additional apartment—respondent’s—was warrantless and is presumed unreasonable “in the absence of some one of a number of well defined ‘exigent circumstances.’” Because the State has not advanced any such exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence obtained as a result of this search should have been excluded.

II

Because the Court cannot justify the officers’ search under the “exceptional circumstances” rubric, it analyzes the police conduct here in terms of “mistake.” According to the Court, hindsight makes it clear that the officers were mistaken, first, in not describing McWebb’s apartment with greater specificity in the warrant, and second, in including respondent’s apartment within the scope of the execution of the warrant. The Court’s inquiry focuses on what the officers knew or should have known at these particular junctures. The Court reasons that if, in light of the officers’ actual or imputed knowledge, their behavior was reasonable, then their mistakes did not constitute an infringement on respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights. In this case, the Court finds no Fourth Amendment violation because the officers could not reasonably have drawn the warrant with any greater particularity and because, until the moment when the officers realized that they were in fact searching two different apartments, they had no reason to believe that McWebb’s residence did not cover the entire third floor.

Even if one accepts the majority’s view that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where the officers’ mistake is reasonable, it is questionable whether that standard was met in this case. To repeat Justice Harlan’s observation, although the proper question in Fourth Amendment analysis is “what protection it affords to ... people, ... that question requires reference to a ‘place.’” The “place” at issue here is a small multiple-occupancy building. Such forms of habitation are now common in this country, particularly in neighborhoods with changing populations and of declining affluence. Accordingly, any analysis of the “reasonableness” of the officers’ behavior here must be done with this context in mind.

The efforts of Detective Marcus, the officer who procured the search warrant, do not meet a standard of reasonableness, particularly considering that the detective knew the search concerned a unit in a multiple-occupancy building. Upon learning from his informant that McWebb was selling marijuana in his third-floor apartment, Marcus inspected the outside of the building. He did not approach it, however, to gather information about the configuration of the apartments. Had he done so, he would have discovered, as did another officer on the day of executing the warrant, that there were seven separate mailboxes and bells on the porch outside the main entrance to the house. Although there is some dispute over whether names were affixed near these boxes and bells, their existence alone puts a reasonable observer on notice that the three-story structure (with, possibly, a basement) had seven individual units. The detective, therefore, should have been aware that further investigation was necessary to eliminate the possibility of more than one unit’s being located on the third floor. Moreover, when Detective Marcus’ informant told him that he had purchased drugs in McWebb’s apartment, it appears that the detective never thought to ask the informant whether McWebb’s apartment was the only one on the third floor. These efforts, which would have placed a slight burden upon the detective, are necessary in order to render reasonable the officer’s behavior in seeking the warrant.

Moreover, even if one believed that Marcus’ efforts in providing information for issuance of the
warrant were reasonable, I doubt whether the officers’ execution of the warrant could meet such a standard. In the Court’s view, the “objective facts” did not put the officers on notice that they were dealing with two separate apartments on the third floor until the moment, considerably into the search after they had rummaged through a dresser and a closet in respondent’s apartment and had discovered evidence incriminating him, when they realized their “mistake.” The Court appears to base its conclusion that the officers’ error here was reasonable on the fact that neither McWebb nor respondent ever told the officers during the search that they lived in separate apartments.

In my view, however, the “objective facts” should have made the officers aware that there were two different apartments on the third floor well before they discovered the incriminating evidence in respondent’s apartment. Before McWebb happened to drive up while the search party was preparing to execute the warrant, one of the officers, Detective Shea, somewhat disguised as a construction worker, was already on the porch of the row house and was seeking to gain access to the locked first-floor door that permitted entrance into the building. From this vantage point he had time to observe the seven mailboxes and bells; indeed, he rang all seven bells, apparently in an effort to summon some resident to open the front door to the search party. A reasonable officer in Detective Shea’s position, already aware that this was a multiunit building and now armed with further knowledge of the number of units in the structure, would have conducted at that time more investigation to specify the exact location of McWebb’s apartment before proceeding further. For example, he might have questioned another resident of the building.

It is surprising, moreover, that the Court places so much emphasis on the failure of McWebb to volunteer information about the exact location of his apartment. When McWebb drove up, one of the police vehicles blocked his car and the officers surrounded him and his passenger as they got out. Although the officers had no arrest warrant for McWebb, but only a search warrant for his person and apartment, and although they testified that they did not arrest him at that time, it was clear that neither McWebb nor his passenger was free to leave. In such circumstances, which strongly suggest that McWebb was already in custody, it was proper for the officers to administer to him [Miranda] warnings. It would have been reasonable for the officers, aware of the problem, from Detective Shea’s discovery, in the specificity of their warrant, to ask McWebb whether his apartment was the only one on the third floor. As it is, the officers made several requests of and questioned McWebb, without giving him Miranda warnings, and yet failed to ask him the question, obvious in the circumstances, concerning the exact location of his apartment.

Moreover, a reasonable officer would have realized the mistake in the warrant during the moments following the officers’ entrance to the third floor. The officers gained access to the vestibule separating McWebb’s and respondent’s apartments through a locked door for which McWebb supplied the key. There, in the open doorway to his apartment, they encountered respondent. Once again, the officers were curiously silent. The informant had not led the officers to believe that anyone other than McWebb lived in the third-floor apartment; the search party had McWebb, the person targeted by the search warrant, in custody when it gained access to the vestibule; yet when they met respondent on the third floor, they simply asked him who he was but never where he lived. Had they done so, it is likely that they would have discovered the mistake in the warrant before they began their search.
Finally and most importantly, even if the officers had learned nothing from respondent, they should have realized the error in the warrant from their initial security sweep. Once on the third floor, the officers first fanned out through the rooms to conduct a preliminary check for other occupants who might pose a danger to them. As the map of the third floor demonstrates, the two apartments were almost a mirror image of each other—each had a bathroom, a kitchen, a living room, and a bedroom. Given the somewhat symmetrical layout of the apartments, it is difficult to imagine that, in the initial security sweep, a reasonable officer would not have discerned that two apartments were on the third floor, realized his mistake, and then confined the ensuing search to McWebb’s residence.

Accordingly, even if a reasonable error on the part of police officers prevents a Fourth Amendment violation, the mistakes here, both with respect to obtaining and executing the warrant, are not reasonable and could easily have been avoided.

I respectfully dissent.

*   *   *

In the next case, the Supreme Court forcefully rejects the reasoning of a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court not only decided the case *per curiam*—that is, in an unsigned opinion—but also did so immediately upon the grant of certiorari, without allowing briefing or oral argument on the merits.

**Supreme Court of the United States**

**Los Angeles County, California v. Max Rettele**


**PER CURIAM.**

Deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department obtained a valid warrant to search a house, but they were unaware that the suspects being sought had moved out three months earlier. When the deputies searched the house, they found in a bedroom two residents who were of a different race than the suspects. The deputies ordered these innocent residents, who had been sleeping unclothed, out of bed. The deputies required them to stand for a few minutes before allowing them to dress.

The residents brought suit, naming the deputies and other parties and accusing them of violating the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court granted summary judgment to all named defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding both that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment and that they were not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable deputy would have stopped the search upon discovering that respondents were of a different race than the suspects and because a reasonable deputy would not have ordered respondents from their bed. We grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals by this summary disposition.
From September to December 2001, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Dennis Watters investigated a fraud and identity-theft crime ring. There were four suspects of the investigation. One had registered a 9-millimeter Glock handgun. The four suspects were known to be African-Americans.

On December 11, Watters obtained a search warrant for two houses in Lancaster, California, where he believed he could find the suspects. The warrant authorized him to search the homes and three of the suspects for documents and computer files. In support of the search warrant an affidavit cited various sources showing the suspects resided at respondents’ home. The sources included Department of Motor Vehicles reports, mailing address listings, an outstanding warrant, and an Internet telephone directory. In this Court respondents do not dispute the validity of the warrant or the means by which it was obtained.

What Watters did not know was that one of the houses (the first to be searched) had been sold in September to a Max Rettele. He had purchased the home and moved into it three months earlier with his girlfriend Judy Sadler and Sadler’s 17-year-old son Chase Hall. All three, respondents here, are Caucasians.

On the morning of December 19, Watters briefed six other deputies in preparation for the search of the houses. Watters informed them they would be searching for three African-American suspects, one of whom owned a registered handgun. The possibility a suspect would be armed caused the deputies concern for their own safety. Watters had not obtained special permission for a night search, so he could not execute the warrant until 7 a.m. Around 7:15 Watters and six other deputies knocked on the door and announced their presence. Chase Hall answered. The deputies entered the house after ordering Hall to lie face down on the ground.

The deputies’ announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler. The deputies entered their bedroom with guns drawn and ordered them to get out of their bed and to show their hands. They protested that they were not wearing clothes. Rettele stood up and attempted to put on a pair of sweatpants, but deputies told him not to move. Sadler also stood up and attempted, without success, to cover herself with a sheet. Rettele and Sadler were held at gunpoint for one to two minutes before Rettele was allowed to retrieve a robe for Sadler. He was then permitted to dress. Rettele and Sadler left the bedroom within three to four minutes to sit on the couch in the living room.

By that time the deputies realized they had made a mistake. They apologized to Rettele and Sadler, thanked them for not becoming upset, and left within five minutes. They proceeded to the other house the warrant authorized them to search, where they found three suspects. Those suspects were arrested and convicted.

Rettele and Sadler, individually and as guardians ad litem for Hall, filed this § 1983 suit against Los Angeles County, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Watters, and other members of the sheriff’s department. Respondents alleged petitioners violated their Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining a warrant in reckless fashion and conducting an unreasonable search and detention. The District Court held that the warrant was obtained by proper
procedures and the search was reasonable. It concluded in the alternative that any Fourth Amendment rights the deputies violated were not clearly established and that, as a result, the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity.

On appeal respondents did not challenge the validity of the warrant; they did argue that the deputies had conducted the search in an unreasonable manner. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in an unpublished opinion.

II

Because respondents were of a different race than the suspects the deputies were seeking, the Court of Appeals held that “[a]fter taking one look at [respondents], the deputies should have realized that [respondents] were not the subjects of the search warrant and did not pose a threat to the deputies’ safety.” We need not pause long in rejecting this unsound proposition. When the deputies ordered respondents from their bed, they had no way of knowing whether the African–American suspects were elsewhere in the house. The presence of some Caucasians in the residence did not eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived there as well. As the deputies stated in their affidavits, it is not uncommon in our society for people of different races to live together. Just as people of different races live and work together, so too might they engage in joint criminal activity. The deputies, who were searching a house where they believed a suspect might be armed, possessed authority to secure the premises before deciding whether to continue with the search.

In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), this Court held that officers executing a search warrant for contraband may “detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” In weighing whether the search in Summers was reasonable the Court first found that “detention represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant.” Against that interest, it balanced “preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found”; “minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”; and facilitating “the orderly completion of the search.”

In executing a search warrant officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search. The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is an objective one. Unreasonable actions include the use of excessive force or restraints that cause unnecessary pain or are imposed for a prolonged and unnecessary period of time.

The orders by the police to the occupants, in the context of this lawful search, were permissible, and perhaps necessary, to protect the safety of the deputies. Blankets and bedding can conceal a weapon, and one of the suspects was known to own a firearm, factors which underscore this point. The Constitution does not require an officer to ignore the possibility that an armed suspect may sleep with a weapon within reach. The reports are replete with accounts of suspects sleeping close to weapons.
The deputies needed a moment to secure the room and ensure that other persons were not close by or did not present a danger. Deputies were not required to turn their backs to allow Rettele and Sadler to retrieve clothing or to cover themselves with the sheets. Rather, “[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”

This is not to say, of course, that the deputies were free to force Rettele and Sadler to remain motionless and standing for any longer than necessary. We have recognized that “special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention,” might render a search unreasonable. There is no accusation that the detention here was prolonged. The deputies left the home less than 15 minutes after arriving. The detention was shorter and less restrictive than the 2– to 3–hour handcuff detention upheld in Mena. And there is no allegation that the deputies prevented Sadler and Rettele from dressing longer than necessary to protect their safety. Sadler was unclothed for no more than two minutes, and Rettele for only slightly more time than that. Sadler testified that once the police were satisfied that no immediate threat was presented, “they wanted us to get dressed and they were pressing us really fast to hurry up and get some clothes on.”

The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause, a standard well short of absolute certainty. Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people like Rettele and Sadler unfortunately bear the cost. Officers executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity; and the resulting frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as was true here. When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm, however, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.

Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

One issue potentially raised by the facts of Rettele—although not addressed by the Justices—is the question of when a warrant goes “stale.” A warrant based upon probable cause to believe that contraband or suspects will be found in a certain place becomes less reliable over time. To pick an extreme example, if police receive a warrant in 2018 to search a particular house for a suspect, news that the suspect died in 2019 would make it unreasonable for police to execute the warrant in 2021. Actual cases will present closer questions. For example, a warrant to search for drugs recently delivered to the house of a dealer might go stale relatively quickly because the dealer is likely to sell the drugs soon. By contrast, courts have found that collectors of child pornography rarely destroy their material, meaning that warrants to search their computers for illicit images do not go stale. Similarly, a warrant to search an accountant’s office for documents proving a client’s tax fraud would probably remain “fresh” for a long time.

A 2010 raid on a Columbia, Missouri home illustrates the issue. Police had an eight-day-old warrant to search the house of Jonathan Whitworth for drugs. The raid went poorly, and officers shot two dogs, killing one. Officers pointed guns at Whitworth’s wife and her seven-year-old daughter. While some contraband was found, police did not discover evidence of significant drug
dealing. Whitworth and his family sued the police, alleging among other things that the warrant was stale when executed. Although the court dismissed the lawsuit, Columbia police adopted new policies in response to outcry over the incident. (A video of the raid—which is unpleasant to watch—is available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WF2nM9wsBYs)


Sample Search Warrant Application Form (available online)

AO 106 (Rev. 04/10) Application for a Search Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

In the Matter of the Search of
(Briefly describe the property to be searched or identify the person by name and address) Case No.

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

located in the District of , there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

☐ evidence of a crime;
☐ contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
☐ property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
☐ a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

| Code Section | Offense Description |

The application is based on these facts:

☐ Continued on the attached sheet.
☐ Delayed notice of ___ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: __________) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3109a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

___________________________________________

Applicant’s signature

___________________________________________

Printed name and title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: ____________________

Judge’s signature

City and state: ____________

Printed name and title
Warrant Exceptions

The Court has stated repeatedly over the decades that searches and seizures conducted without warrants are presumptively unlawful. The Court has also, however, created several exceptions to the warrant requirement. We will spend the next several chapters exploring these exceptions.

For every warrant exception, students should consider: (1) when the exception applies and (2) what the exception allows police to do. In particular, students should note whether probable cause is necessary for the exception to apply and, if not, what other quantum of evidence is required.

In this chapter, we consider the “plain view exception” and the “automobile exception,” each of which has grown over time. In our first case, the Court considered both exceptions.

The Plain View Exception

The “plain view” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be.¹

Supreme Court of the United States

Edward H. Coolidge, Jr. v. New Hampshire

Decided June 21, 1971 – 403 U.S. 443

Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.²

We are called upon in this case to decide issues under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments arising in the context of a state criminal trial for the commission of a particularly brutal murder. As in every case, our single duty is to determine the issues presented in accord with the Constitution and the law.

Pamela Mason, a 14-year-old girl, left her home in Manchester, New Hampshire, on the evening of January 13, 1964, during a heavy snowstorm, apparently in response to a man’s telephone call for a babysitter. Eight days later, after a thaw, her body was found by the site of a major north-south highway several miles away. She had been murdered. The event created great alarm in the area, and the police immediately began a massive investigation.

¹ See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1982).
² [Footnote ** by the court] Part[] II-C of this opinion [is] joined only by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice BRENNAN, and Mr. Justice MARSHALL.
On January 28, having learned from a neighbor that the petitioner, Edward Coolidge, had been away from home on the evening of the girl’s disappearance, the police went to his house to question him. They asked him, among other things, if he owned any guns, and he produced three, two shotguns and a rifle. They also asked whether he would take a lie-detector test concerning his account of his activities on the night of the disappearance. He agreed to do so on the following Sunday, his day off. The police later described his attitude on the occasion of this visit as fully “cooperative.” His wife was in the house throughout the interview.

On the following Sunday, a policeman called Coolidge early in the morning and asked him to come down to the police station for the trip to Concord, New Hampshire, where the lie-detector test was to be administered. That evening, two plainclothes policemen arrived at the Coolidge house, where Mrs. Coolidge was waiting with her mother-in-law for her husband’s return. These two policemen were not the two who had visited the house earlier in the week, and they apparently did not know that Coolidge had displayed three guns for inspection during the earlier visit. The plainclothesmen told Mrs. Coolidge that her husband was in “serious trouble” and probably would not be home that night. They asked Coolidge’s mother to leave, and proceeded to question Mrs. Coolidge. During the course of the interview they obtained from her four guns belonging to Coolidge, and some clothes that Mrs. Coolidge thought her husband might have been wearing on the evening of Pamela Mason’s disappearance.

Coolidge was held in jail on an unrelated charge that night, but he was released the next day. During the ensuing two and a half weeks, the State accumulated a quantity of evidence to support the theory that it was he who had killed Pamela Mason. On February 19, the results of the investigation were presented at a meeting between the police officers working on the case and the State Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial. At this meeting, it was decided that there was enough evidence to justify the arrest of Coolidge on the murder charge and a search of his house and two cars. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Manchester police chief made formal application, under oath, for the arrest and search warrants. The complaint supporting the warrant for a search of Coolidge’s Pontiac automobile, the only warrant that concerns us here, stated that the affiant “has probable cause to suspect and believe, and does suspect and believe, and herewith offers satisfactory evidence, that there are certain objects and things used in the Commission of said offense, now kept, and concealed in or upon a certain vehicle, to wit: 1951 Pontiac two-door sedan ....” The warrants were then signed and issued by the Attorney General himself, acting as a justice of the peace. Under New Hampshire law in force at that time, all justices of the peace were authorized to issue search warrants.

The police arrested Coolidge in his house on the day the warrant issued. Mrs. Coolidge asked whether she might remain in the house with her small child, but was told that she must stay elsewhere, apparently in part because the police believed that she would be harassed by reporters if she were accessible to them. When she asked whether she might take her car, she was told that both cars had been “impounded,” and that the police would provide transportation for her. Some time later, the police called a towing company, and about two and a half hours after Coolidge had been taken into custody the cars were towed to the police station. It appears that at the time of the arrest the cars were parked in the Coolidge driveway, and that although dark had fallen they were plainly visible both from the street and from inside the house where Coolidge was actually arrested. The 1951 Pontiac was searched and vacuumed on February 21, two days after it was seized, again a year later, in January 1965, and a third time in April 1965.
At Coolidge’s subsequent jury trial on the charge of murder, vacuum sweepings, including particles of gun powder, taken from the Pontiac were introduced in evidence against him, as part of an attempt by the State to show by microscopic analysis that it was highly probable that Pamela Mason had been in Coolidge’s car. Also introduced in evidence was one of the guns taken by the police on their Sunday evening visit to the Coolidge house—a 22-caliber Mossberg rifle, which the prosecution claimed was the murder weapon. Conflicting ballistics testimony was offered on the question whether the bullets found in Pamela Mason’s body had been fired from this rifle. Finally, the prosecution introduced vacuum sweepings of the clothes taken from the Coolidge house that same Sunday evening, and attempted to show through microscopic analysis that there was a high probability that the clothes had been in contact with Pamela Mason’s body. Pretrial motions to suppress all this evidence were referred by the trial judge to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which ruled the evidence admissible. The jury found Coolidge guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, and we granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions raised by the admission of this evidence against Coolidge at his trial.

I

The petitioner’s first claim is that the warrant authorizing the seizure and subsequent search of his 1951 Pontiac automobile was invalid because not issued by a “neutral and detached magistrate.” Since we agree with the petitioner that the warrant was invalid for this reason, we need not consider his further argument that the allegations under oath supporting the issuance of the warrant were so conclusory as to violate relevant constitutional standards.

The classic statement of the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that of Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court:

“The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.... When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.”

We find no escape from the conclusion that the seizure and search of the Pontiac automobile cannot constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the state official who was the chief investigator and prosecutor in this case. Since he was not the neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution, the search stands on no firmer ground than if there had been no warrant at all. If the seizure and search are to be justified, they must, therefore, be justified on some other theory.
II

The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” The exceptions are “jealously and carefully drawn,” and there must be “a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” “[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.” In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or “extravagant” to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. In times not altogether unlike our own they won—by legal and constitutional means in England, and by revolution on this continent—a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power. If times have changed, reducing everyman’s scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world, the changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.

B

The majority rejected the state’s claim that the automobile exception justified the search. Because the Court’s analysis of the automobile exception is both confusing and at odds with current law, it is not included here at length. Certain language, however, is well known and illustrates the Court’s early thinking on the exception. For example, citing precedent, the Court stated:

“[E]xigent circumstances’ justify the warrantless search of ‘an automobile stopped on the highway,’ where there is probable cause, because the car is ‘movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.’ ‘[T]he opportunity to search is fleeting ....’"

Failing to find the necessary circumstances in this case, the Court wrote, “The word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.”

Although the Court separated the concept of “exigent circumstances” from the automobile exception in subsequent cases, it continues to justify the automobile exception’s existence with references to the easy mobility of vehicles.

The dissent of Justice Black, which disputed the Court’s automobile exception analysis, has been omitted.]

C

The State’s [] theory in support of the warrantless seizure and search of the Pontiac car is that the car itself was an “instrumentality of the crime,” and as such might be seized by the police on Coolidge’s property because it was in plain view. [F]or the reasons that follow, we hold that the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable to this case.
It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. But it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. The problem with the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain view has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal.

An example of the applicability of the “plain view” doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Thus the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect. And an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Finally, the “plain view” doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification—whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the “plain view” doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.

The rationale for the “plain view” exception is evident if we keep in mind the two distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. First, the magistrate’s scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause. The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of necessity. The second, distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil is the “general warrant” abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings. The warrant accomplishes this second objective by requiring a “particular description” of the things to be seized.

The “plain view” doctrine is not in conflict with the first objective because plain view does not occur until a search is in progress. In each case, this initial intrusion is justified by a warrant or by an exception such as “hot pursuit” or search incident to lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer’s presence. And, given the initial intrusion, the seizure of an object in plain view is consistent with the second objective, since it does not convert the search into a general or exploratory one. As against the minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections, there is a major gain in effective law enforcement. Where, once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous—to the evidence or to the police themselves—to require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant particularly describing it.
The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. The first of these is that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent “exigent circumstances.” Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.

The second limitation is that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent. The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement, as just stated, is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into a “general” one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as “per se unreasonable” in the absence of “exigent circumstances.”

If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it, then there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of “Warrants ... particularly describing ... [the] things to be seized.” The initial intrusion may, of course, be legitimated not by a warrant but by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as hot pursuit or search incident to lawful arrest. But to extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects—not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves—which the police know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure.

In the light of what has been said, it is apparent that the “plain view” exception cannot justify the police seizure of the Pontiac car in this case. The police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile’s exact description and location well in advance; they intended to seize it when they came upon Coolidge’s property. And this is not a case involving contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous in themselves.

The seizure was therefore unconstitutional, and so was the subsequent search at the station house. Since evidence obtained in the course of the search was admitted at Coolidge’s trial, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

In Coolidge, the Court stated that the “plain view exception” existed but did not justify the search at issue in the case. In Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), the Court explained the plain view exception further. As the Hicks Court sets forth, the plain view exception can apply only if an officer conducts a seizure (1) while the officer is somewhere the officer has the lawful right to be
(e.g., while on a public sidewalk, or inside a house executing a warrant) and (2) the officer has probable cause to believe that the object is subject to seizure. Objects are subject to seizure if they are contraband or are otherwise evidence of, fruits of, or instrumentalities of a crime. (“Contraband” refers to items that are unlawful to possess, such as illegal drugs.) In *Hicks*, an officer was lawfully inside a house and spotted an object the officer believed to be stolen. But because the officer lacked probable cause to support his belief upon picking up the item, the officer’s seizure of the object (a stolen stereo) was deemed outside the scope of the exception—that is, it was unlawful.

In *Horton v. California*, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), the Court expanded the scope of the plain view exception by removing the “inadvertence requirement” set forth in Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion in *Coolidge*. Although the *Horton* Court described *Coolidge* as “binding precedent,” it held that the inadvertence requirement was not “essential” to the Court’s result in *Coolidge*. As the *Horton* majority put it, for the exception to apply, “not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” In addition, “not only must the item be in plain view; its incriminating character must also be ‘immediately apparent.’”

After restating Justice Stewart’s arguments in support of the inadvertence requirement, the *Horton* Court rejected it as follows:

“We find two flaws in this reasoning. First, even-handed law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. If the officer has knowledge approaching certainty that the item will be found, we see no reason why he or she would deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the application for a search warrant. Specification of the additional item could only permit the officer to expand the scope of the search. On the other hand, if he or she has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first.”

“Second, the suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive, because that interest is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it ‘particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,’” and that a warrantless search be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, noted in dissent that “Forty-six States and the District of Columbia and 12 United States Courts of Appeals” had adopted the inadvertence requirement and that there had “been no outcry from law enforcement officials that the inadvertent discovery requirement unduly burdens their efforts.” It is possible, however, that many of the courts cited by the dissent felt bound by *Coolidge*, regardless of their opinions on the wisdom of the inadvertence requirement.
In the next case, the Court explored the concept of a “plain feel” exception, which was analogized to the plain view exception.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Minnesota v. Timothy Dickerson**

Decided June 7, 1993 – 508 U.S. 366

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer’s sense of touch during a protective patdown search.

I

On the evening of November 9, 1989, two Minneapolis police officers were patrolling an area on the city’s north side in a marked squad car. At about 8:15 p.m., one of the officers observed respondent leaving a 12-unit apartment building on Morgan Avenue North. The officer, having previously responded to complaints of drug sales in the building’s hallways and having executed several search warrants on the premises, considered the building to be a notorious “crack house.” According to testimony credited by the trial court, respondent began walking toward the police but, upon spotting the squad car and making eye contact with one of the officers, abruptly halted and began walking in the opposite direction. His suspicion aroused, this officer watched as respondent turned and entered an alley on the other side of the apartment building. Based upon respondent’s seemingly evasive actions and the fact that he had just left a building known for cocaine traffic, the officers decided to stop respondent and investigate further.

The officers pulled their squad car into the alley and ordered respondent to stop and submit to a patdown search. The search revealed no weapons, but the officer conducting the search did take an interest in a small lump in respondent’s nylon jacket. The officer later testified:

“[A]s I pat-searched the front of his body, I felt a lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I examined it with my fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.” The officer then reached into respondent’s pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag containing one fifth of one gram of crack cocaine. Respondent was arrested and charged in Hennepin County District Court with possession of a controlled substance.

Before trial, respondent moved to suppress the cocaine. The trial court first concluded that the officers were justified under *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in stopping respondent to investigate whether he might be engaged in criminal activity. The court further found that the officers were justified in frisking respondent to ensure that he was not carrying a weapon. Finally, analogizing to the “plain-view” doctrine, under which officers may make a warrantless seizure of contraband found in plain view during a lawful search for other items, the trial court ruled that the officers’ seizure of the cocaine did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

His suppression motion having failed, respondent proceeded to trial and was found guilty.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court agreed with the trial court that
the investigative stop and protective patdown search of respondent were lawful under *Terry*
because the officers had a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that
respondent was engaged in criminal behavior and that he might be armed and dangerous. The
court concluded, however, that the officers had overstepped the bounds allowed by *Terry* in
seizing the cocaine. In doing so, the Court of Appeals “decline[d] to adopt the plain feel
exception” to the warrant requirement.

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Like the Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court
held that both the stop and the frisk of respondent were valid under *Terry*, but found the seizure
of the cocaine to be unconstitutional. The court expressly refused “to extend the plain view
document to the sense of touch” on the grounds that “the sense of touch is inherently less
immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight” and that “the sense of touch is far more
intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts over whether
contraband detected through the sense of touch during a patdown search may be admitted into
evidence. We now affirm.

II

A

The question presented today is whether police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband
detected during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by *Terry*. We think the answer
is clearly that they may, so long as the officers’ search stays within the bounds marked by *Terry*.

B

We have already held that police officers, at least under certain circumstances, may seize
contraband detected during the lawful execution of a *Terry* search. The Court [has] held: “If,
while conducting a legitimate *Terry* search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should,
as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the
contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such
circumstances.”

The Court justified this latter holding by reference to our cases under the “plain-view” doctrine.
Under that doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access
to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. If, however, the police lack probable cause to
believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the
object—*i.e.*, if “its incriminating character [is not] ‘immediately apparent,’”—the plain-view
document cannot justify its seizure.

We think that this doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an officer
discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search. The
rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a
police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point. The warrantless seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner is deemed justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be impracticable and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment. The same can be said of tactile discoveries of contraband. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.

III

It remains to apply these principles to the facts of this case. Respondent has not challenged the finding made by the trial court and affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the State Supreme Court that the police were justified under Terry in stopping him and frisking him for weapons. Thus, the dispositive question before this Court is whether the officer who conducted the search was acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry at the time he gained probable cause to believe that the lump in respondent’s jacket was contraband. The State District Court did not make precise findings on this point, instead finding simply that the officer, after feeling “a small, hard object wrapped in plastic” in respondent’s pocket, “formed the opinion that the object ... was crack ... cocaine.” The District Court also noted that the officer made “no claim that he suspected this object to be a weapon,” a finding affirmed on appeal. The Minnesota Supreme Court, after “a close examination of the record,” held that the officer’s own testimony “belies any notion that he ‘immediately’ recognized the lump as crack cocaine. Rather, the court concluded, the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket”—a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon.

Under the State Supreme Court’s interpretation of the record before it, it is clear that the court was correct in holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the “strictly circumscribed” search for weapons allowed under Terry. Where, as here, “an officer who is executing a valid search for one item seizes a different item,” this Court rightly “has been sensitive to the danger ... that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at will.” Here, the officer’s continued exploration of respondent’s pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to “[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry: ] ... the protection of the police officer and others nearby.” It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize and that we have condemned in subsequent cases.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is [a]ffirmed.
Students often ask for examples of what would satisfy the “plain feel” standard that the Court found was not met in *Dickerson*. The simplest examples likely involve guns and other weapons that have fairly obvious shapes, such as a club.

When one of your authors taught bar review, he employed a different example, desiring to use something memorable not involving a weapon. Imagine that the Museum of Natural History has reported stolen a rare starfish from its Asteroidea collection. A few hours later, a police officer notices a person walking in an unusual way near the museum and—based on reasonable suspicion—lawfully stops and frisks the suspect. Upon patting down the suspect’s jacket, the officer feels sharp pains in her hand. When she looks at her hand, she notices five rows of indentations on her palm, each radiating from a central point. It seems likely that the officer could reach into the suspect’s jacket to seize (what she expects to be) the stolen starfish.

**The Automobile Exception**

In the early 2000s, hip hop mogul Jay-Z released “99 Problems,” a song that concerned—among other things—the law governing when police may search the vehicles of criminal suspects. The song recounts a conversation between the rapper and a police officer who pulled him over in 1994.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Officer:} & \quad \text{Do you mind if I look around the car a little bit?} \\
\text{Jay-Z:} & \quad \text{Well, my glove compartment is locked, so is the trunk and the back,} \\
& \quad \text{And I know my rights so you go’ n need a warrant for that} \\
\text{Officer:} & \quad \text{Aren’t you sharp as a tack, some type of lawyer or something} \\
& \quad \text{Or somebody important or something?”} \\
\text{Jay-Z:} & \quad \text{Nah I ain’ t pass the bar but I know a little bit ...}^3
\end{align*}
\]

Professor Caleb Mason published an essay in 2012 that examines “99 Problems” in great detail, focusing particularly on its relevance to criminal procedure.\(^4\)

If this Essay serves no other purpose, I hope it serves to debunk, for any readers who persist in believing it, the myth that locking your trunk will keep the cops from searching it. Based on the number of my students who arrived at law school believing that if you lock your trunk and glove compartment, the police will need a warrant to search them, I surmise that it’s even more widespread among the lay public. But it’s completely, 100% wrong.

There is no warrant requirement for car searches. The Supreme Court has declared unequivocally that because cars are inherently mobile (and are pervasively regulated, and operated in public spaces), it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the police to search the car—the whole car, and everything in the car, including containers—whenever they have probable cause to believe that the

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car contains evidence of crime. You don’t have to arrest the person, or impound the vehicle. You just need probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of crime. So, in any vehicle stop, the officers may search the entire car, without consent, if they develop probable cause to believe that car contains, say, drugs.

All the action, in short, is about probable cause. Warrants never come into the picture. The fact that the trunk and glove compartments are locked is completely irrelevant. Now, Jay-Z may have just altered the lyrics for dramatic effect, but that would be unfortunate insofar as the song is going to reach many more people than any criminal procedure lecture, and everyone should really know the outline of the law in this area. What the line should say is: “You’ll need some p.c. for that.”

In the next case, the Court sets forth what counts as an “automobile” for purposes of the automobile exception.

Supreme Court of the United States

**California v. Charles R. Carney**

Decided May 13, 1985 – 471 U.S. 386

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether law enforcement agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search, based on probable cause, of a fully mobile “motor home” located in a public place.

I

On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Robert Williams watched respondent, Charles Carney, approach a youth in downtown San Diego. The youth accompanied Carney to a Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot. Carney and the youth closed the window shades in the motor home, including one across the front window. Agent Williams had previously received uncorroborated information that the same motor home was used by another person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, with assistance from other agents, kept the motor home under surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours that Carney and the youth remained inside. When the youth left the motor home, the agents followed and stopped him. The youth told the agents that he had received marijuana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts.

At the agents’ request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on its door; Carney stepped out. The agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. Without a warrant or consent, one agent entered the motor home and observed marihuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table. Agent Williams took Carney into custody and took possession of the motor home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and refrigerator.
Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home. The Magistrate denied the motion, upholding the initial search as a justifiable search for other persons, and the subsequent search as a routine inventory search.

Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Superior Court. The Superior Court also rejected the claim, holding that there was probable cause to arrest respondent, that the search of the motor home was authorized under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and that the motor home itself could be seized without a warrant as an instrumentality of the crime. Respondent then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against him, and was placed on probation for three years.

Respondent appealed from the order placing him on probation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the vehicle exception applied to respondent’s motor home.

The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court did not disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agents had probable cause to arrest respondent and to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime; however, the court held that the search was unreasonable because no warrant was obtained, rejecting the State’s argument that the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement should apply. That court reached its decision by concluding that the mobility of a vehicle “is no longer the prime justification for the automobile exception; rather, ‘the answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile.’” The California Supreme Court held that the expectations of privacy in a motor home are more like those in a dwelling than in an automobile because the primary function of motor homes is not to provide transportation but to “provide the occupant with living quarters.”

We granted certiorari. We reverse.

II

[The automobile] exception to the [Fourth Amendment] warrant requirement was first set forth by the Court 60 years ago in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). There, the Court recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. The Court rested this exception on a long-recognized distinction between stationary structures and vehicles.

The capacity to be “quickly moved” was clearly the basis of the holding in Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile exception.... The mobility of automobiles, we have observed, “creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.”

However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception. The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said, are twofold. “Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with
respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.”

Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception. In some cases, the configuration of the vehicle contributed to the lower expectations of privacy; for example, we held in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), that because the passenger compartment of a standard automobile is relatively open to plain view, there are lesser expectations of privacy. But even when enclosed “repository” areas have been involved, we have concluded that the lesser expectations of privacy warrant application of the exception. We have applied the exception in the context of a locked car trunk, a sealed package in a car trunk, a closed compartment under the dashboard, the interior of a vehicle’s upholstery, or sealed packages inside a covered pickup truck.

These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways. As we explained in South Dakota v. Opperman [428 U.S. 364 (1976)], an inventory search case:

“Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.”

The public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this compelling governmental need for regulation. Historically, “individuals always [have] been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate’s prior evaluation of those facts.” In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.

When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes—temporary or otherwise—the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. At least in these circumstances, the overriding societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.
While it is true that respondent’s vehicle possessed some, if not many of the attributes of a home, it is equally clear that the vehicle falls clearly within the scope of the exception laid down in Carroll and applied in succeeding cases. Like the automobile in Carroll, respondent’s motor home was readily mobile. Absent the prompt search and seizure, it could readily have been moved beyond the reach of the police. Furthermore, the vehicle was licensed to “operate on public streets; [was] serviced in public places; ... and [was] subject to extensive regulation and inspection.” And the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle.

Respondent urges us to distinguish his vehicle from other vehicles within the exception because it was capable of functioning as a home. In our increasingly mobile society, many vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used not only for transportation but for shelter, i.e., as a “home” or “residence.” To distinguish between respondent’s motor home and an ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would require that we apply the exception depending upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appointments. Moreover, to fail to apply the exception to vehicles such as a motor home ignores the fact that a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic and other illegal activity. We decline today to distinguish between “worthy” and “unworthy” vehicles which are either on the public roads and highways, or situated such that it is reasonable to conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a residence.

Our application of the vehicle exception has never turned on the other uses to which a vehicle might be put. The exception has historically turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation.5 These two requirements for application of the exception ensure that law enforcement officials are not unnecessarily hamstrung in their efforts to detect and prosecute criminal activity, and that the legitimate privacy interests of the public are protected. Applying the vehicle exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the exception will acknowledge legitimate privacy interests.

The judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

The character of “the place to be searched” plays an important role in Fourth Amendment analysis. In this case, police officers searched a Dodge/Midas Mini Motor Home. The California Supreme Court correctly characterized this vehicle as a “hybrid” which combines “the mobility attribute of an automobile ... with most of the privacy characteristics of a house.”

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5 [Footnote 3 by the Court] We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor home that is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence. Among the factors that might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would be required in such a circumstance is its location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road.
The hybrid character of the motor home places it at the crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid warrantless invasions of the home and the law enforcement interests that support the exception for warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause. By choosing to follow the latter route, the Court errs in three respects: it has entered new territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to an exception rather than to the general rule [of the warrant requirement], and it has abandoned the limits on the exception imposed by prior cases.

If the motor home were parked in the exact middle of the intersection between the general rule and the exception for automobiles, priority should be given to the rule rather than the exception.

The motor home, however, was not parked in the middle of that intersection. Our prior cases teach us that inherent mobility is not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an exception to the warrant requirement, especially in the face of heightened expectations of privacy in the location searched. Motor homes, by their common use and construction, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within. When a motor home is parked in a location that is removed from the public highway, I believe that society is prepared to recognize that the expectations of privacy within it are not unlike the expectations one has in a fixed dwelling. As a general rule, such places may only be searched with a warrant based upon probable cause. Warrantless searches of motor homes are only reasonable when the motor home is traveling on the public streets or highways, or when exigent circumstances otherwise require an immediate search without the expenditure of time necessary to obtain a warrant.

In this case, the motor home was parked in an off-the-street lot only a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens of magistrates were available to entertain a warrant application. The officers clearly had the element of surprise with them, and with curtains covering the windshield, the motor home offered no indication of any imminent departure. The officers plainly had probable cause to arrest the respondent and search the motor home, and on this record, it is inexplicable why they eschewed the safe harbor of a warrant.

In my opinion, searches of places that regularly accommodate a wide range of private human activity are fundamentally different from searches of automobiles which primarily serve a public transportation function. Although it may not be a castle, a motor home is usually the functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin. These places may be as spartan as a humble cottage when compared to the most majestic mansion, but the highest and most legitimate expectations of privacy associated with these temporary abodes should command the respect of this Court.

I respectfully dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

Imagine that Andy, along with his friends Akiva and T-Pain, is on a boat. Police have probable cause to believe that the boat contains evidence of crime. May police search the boat without a warrant?
It turns out that the answer is “yes.” Police can search the boat. As indicated by the Court’s references to “movable vessels” searched during the earliest days of the Republic, the automobile exception is not limited to cars, trucks, and other land-based vehicles. It has been applied to boats and airplanes in the same way as to cars. See United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1988) (houseboats); United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670, 673 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that when a houseboat is “permanently moored” and therefore not easily mobile, the exception may not apply); United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1980) (airplanes); United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 107 (6th Cir. 1984) (same).

The next case allowed the Court to reconsider whether closed containers found inside an automobile are subject to the automobile exception. Students should note that if the answer is yes, then an object not subject to lawful warrantless search (for example, a duffel bag sitting on a sidewalk next to its owner) becomes subject to a lawful warrantless search simply by being moved into a vehicle.

Supreme Court of the United States

California v. Charles Steven Acevedo


Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us once again to consider the so-called “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and its application to the search of a closed container in the trunk of a car.

I

On October 28, 1987, Officer Coleman of the Santa Ana, Cal., Police Department received a telephone call from a federal drug enforcement agent in Hawaii. The agent informed Coleman that he had seized a package containing marijuana which was to have been delivered to the Federal Express Office in Santa Ana and which was addressed to J.R. Daza at 805 West Stevens Avenue in that city. The agent arranged to send the package to Coleman instead. Coleman then was to take the package to the Federal Express office and arrest the person who arrived to claim it.

Coleman received the package on October 29, verified its contents, and took it to the Senior Operations Manager at the Federal Express office. At about 10:30 a.m. on October 30, a man, who identified himself as Jamie Daza, arrived to claim the package. He accepted it and drove to his apartment on West Stevens. He carried the package into the apartment.

At 11:45 a.m., officers observed Daza leave the apartment and drop the box and paper that had contained the marijuana into a trash bin. Coleman at that point left the scene to get a search warrant. About 12:05 p.m., the officers saw Richard St. George leave the apartment carrying a blue knapsack which appeared to be half full. The officers stopped him as he was driving off, searched the knapsack, and found 1 ½ pounds of marijuana.

At 12:30 p.m., respondent Charles Steven Acevedo arrived. He entered Daza’s apartment, stayed
for about 10 minutes, and reappeared carrying a brown paper bag that looked full. The officers noticed that the bag was the size of one of the wrapped marijuana packages sent from Hawaii. Acevedo walked to a silver Honda in the parking lot. He placed the bag in the trunk of the car and started to drive away. Fearing the loss of evidence, officers in a marked police car stopped him. They opened the trunk and the bag, and found marijuana.

Respondent was charged in state court with possession of marijuana for sale. He moved to suppress the marijuana found in the car. The motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty but appealed the denial of the suppression motion.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, concluded that the marijuana found in the paper bag in the car’s trunk should have been suppressed.

The Supreme Court of California denied the State’s petition for review. We granted certiorari to reexamine the law applicable to a closed container in an automobile, a subject that has troubled courts and law enforcement officers since it was first considered.

II

Contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the First Congress, and, later, the Second and Fourth Congresses, distinguished between the need for a warrant to search for contraband concealed in “a dwelling house or similar place” and the need for a warrant to search for contraband concealed in a movable vessel. In [1925] this Court established an exception to the warrant requirement for moving vehicles, for it recognized

“a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”

It therefore held that a warrantless search of an automobile, based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of crime in the light of an exigency arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle, did not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.

In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), we held that a warrantless search of an automobile under the Carroll doctrine could include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search was supported by probable cause. The warrantless search of Ross’ car occurred after an informant told the police that he had seen Ross complete a drug transaction using drugs stored in the trunk of his car. The police stopped the car, searched it, and discovered in the trunk a brown paper bag containing drugs. We decided that the search of Ross’ car was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: “The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower—and no broader—than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.” Thus, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” In Ross, therefore, we clarified the scope of the Carroll doctrine.
as properly including a “probing search” of compartments and containers within the automobile so long as the search is supported by probable cause.

In addition to this clarification, Ross distinguished the Carroll doctrine from the separate rule that governed the search of closed containers. The Court had announced this separate rule, unique to luggage and other closed packages, bags, and containers, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable cause to believe that a 200-pound double-locked footlocker contained marijuana. The agents tracked the locker as the defendants removed it from a train and carried it through the station to a waiting car. As soon as the defendants lifted the locker into the trunk of the car, the agents arrested them, seized the locker, and searched it. In this Court, the United States did not contend that the locker’s brief contact with the automobile’s trunk sufficed to make the Carroll doctrine applicable. Rather, the United States urged that the search of movable luggage could be considered analogous to the search of an automobile.

The Court rejected this argument because, it reasoned, a person expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than he does in his automobile. Moreover, it concluded that as “may often not be the case when automobiles are seized,” secure storage facilities are usually available when the police seize luggage.

In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court extended Chadwick’s rule to apply to a suitcase actually being transported in the trunk of a car. In Sanders, the police had probable cause to believe a suitcase contained marijuana. They watched as the defendant placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and was driven away. The police pursued the taxi for several blocks, stopped it, found the suitcase in the trunk, and searched it. The Sanders majority stressed the heightened privacy expectation in personal luggage and concluded that the presence of luggage in an automobile did not diminish the owner’s expectation of privacy in his personal items.

In Ross, the Court endeavored to distinguish between Carroll, which governed the Ross automobile search, and Chadwick, which governed the Sanders automobile search. It held that the Carroll doctrine covered searches of automobiles when the police had probable cause to search an entire vehicle, but that the Chadwick doctrine governed searches of luggage when the officers had probable cause to search only a container within the vehicle. Thus, in a Ross situation, the police could conduct a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment without obtaining a warrant, whereas in a Sanders situation, the police had to obtain a warrant before they searched.

III

The facts in this case closely resemble the facts in Ross. In Ross, the police had probable cause to believe that drugs were stored in the trunk of a particular car. Here, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the police had probable cause to believe that respondent was carrying marijuana in a bag in his car’s trunk. Furthermore, for what it is worth, in Ross, as here, the drugs in the trunk were contained in a brown paper bag.
We now must decide the question deferred in Ross: whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car. We conclude that it does not.

IV

Dissenters in Ross asked why the suitcase in Sanders was “more private, less difficult for police to seize and store, or in any other relevant respect more properly subject to the warrant requirement, than a container that police discover in a probable-cause search of an entire automobile?” We now agree that a container found after a general search of the automobile and a container found in a car after a limited search for the container are equally easy for the police to store and for the suspect to hide or destroy. In fact, we see no principled distinction in terms of either the privacy expectation or the exigent circumstances between the paper bag found by the police in Ross and the paper bag found by the police here. Furthermore, by attempting to distinguish between a container for which the police are specifically searching and a container which they come across in a car, we have provided only minimal protection for privacy and have impeded effective law enforcement.

The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable cause to search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched may enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve privacy interests. We noted this in Ross in the context of a search of an entire vehicle. Recognizing that under Carroll, the “entire vehicle itself ... could be searched without a warrant,” we concluded that “prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests.” At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be less than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of certainty that the vehicle contains drugs in a bag or simply contains drugs. If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are actually searching the entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.

We cannot see the benefit of a rule that requires law enforcement officers to conduct a more intrusive search in order to justify a less intrusive one.

To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects privacy, its protection is minimal. Law enforcement officers may seize a container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant. “Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases.”

Finally, the search of a paper bag intrudes far less on individual privacy than does the incursion sanctioned long ago in Carroll. In that case, prohibition agents slashed the upholstery of the automobile. This Court nonetheless found their search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If destroying the interior of an automobile is not unreasonable, we cannot conclude that looking inside a closed container is. In light of the minimal protection to privacy afforded by the Chadwick-Sanders rule, and our serious doubt whether that rule substantially serves privacy interests, we now hold that the Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle.
V

The Chadwick-Sanders rule not only has failed to protect privacy but also has confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law enforcement.

Although we have recognized firmly that the doctrine of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the comparatively rare occasion when it has bred confusion or been a derelict or led to anomalous results. We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.

VI

The interpretation of the Carroll doctrine set forth in Ross now applies to all searches of containers found in an automobile. In other words, the police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause.

“Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” We reaffirm that principle. In the case before us, the police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the automobile's trunk contained marijuana. That probable cause now allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn on such coincidences. We therefore interpret Carroll as providing one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.

The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

It is “‘a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”

Relying on arguments that conservative judges have repeatedly rejected in past cases, the Court today—despite its disclaimer to the contrary—enlarges the scope of the automobile exception to this “cardinal principle,” which undergirded our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Our decisions have always acknowledged that the warrant requirement imposes a burden on law enforcement. And our cases have not questioned that trained professionals normally make reliable assessments of the existence of probable cause to conduct a search. We have repeatedly held, however, that these factors are outweighed by the individual interest in privacy that is protected by advance judicial approval. The Fourth Amendment dictates that the privacy interest is paramount, no matter how marginal the risk of error might be if the legality of warrantless searches were judged only after the fact.

In its opinion today, the Court recognizes that the police did not have probable cause to search respondent’s vehicle and that a search of anything but the paper bag that respondent had carried from Daza’s apartment and placed in the trunk of his car would have been unconstitutional. Moreover, as I read the opinion, the Court assumes that the police could not have made a warrantless inspection of the bag before it was placed in the car. Finally, the Court also does not question the fact that, under our prior cases, it would have been lawful for the police to seize the container and detain it (and respondent) until they obtained a search warrant. Thus, all of the relevant facts that governed our decisions in Chadwick and Sanders are present here whereas the relevant fact that justified the vehicle search in Ross is not present.

The Court does not attempt to identify any exigent circumstances that would justify its refusal to apply the general rule against warrantless searches.

It is too early to know how much freedom America has lost today. The magnitude of the loss is, however, not nearly as significant as the Court’s willingness to inflict it without even a colorable basis for its rejection of prior law.

I respectfully dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

Imagine that police suspect a person of committing vehicular homicide. The issue is whether the suspect’s actions before a fatal crash qualify as criminal conduct or are instead merely tortious (or perhaps not even blameworthy). Does the automobile exception allow police to search the car’s internal computer without a warrant? See State v. Mobley, 834 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 2019). The Mobley Court described the data searched by police in a Georgia case.

The record shows that an ACM, also known as an “event data recorder” or “electronic control module,” is an onboard electronic data recording device that is designed to preserve certain data about the operation of a vehicle in the moments preceding certain occurrences, including any event that results in the deployment of airbags. Although the precise data preserved varies from vehicle to vehicle, the data retrieved from the Charger in this case included the speed of the vehicle, the status of the brakes, the status of the brake switch, the time from maximum deceleration to impact, the time from impact to airbag deployment, the speed of the engine, the throttle position, the number of crankshaft revolutions per minute, the status of the driver’s seatbelt, and a diagnostic indicator about the functioning of the ACM.
What arguments best support applying the automobile exception to these data sources? What arguments best support not applying the exception?

The issue remains unsettled, and different courts will likely make different judgments. More background on the issue, see the amicus brief filed in Mobley by the American Civil Liberties Union.

In Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018), the Court decided “whether the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a vehicle parked therein.” For the majority, the question was straightforward. In an opinion joined by six other Justices, Justice Sotomayor wrote: “Because the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself, it did not justify Officer Rhodes’ invasion of the curtilage. Nothing in this Court’s case law suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. Such an expansion would both undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and “untether” the exception “from the justifications underlying” it.” The Court rejected the idea “that the automobile exception is a categorical one that permits the warrantless search of a vehicle anytime, anywhere, including in a home or curtilage.”

Justice Alito dissent sharply, quoting Charles Dickens: “If that is the law, [a character in Oliver Twist] exclaimed, ‘the law is a ass—a idiot.’” Justice Alito noted, “If the motorcycle had been parked at the curb, instead of in the driveway, it is undisputed that Rhodes could have searched it without obtaining a warrant.” He found it bizarre that search became “unreasonable” “[b]ecause, in order to reach the motorcycle, [the officer] had to walk 30 feet or so up the driveway of the house rented by petitioner’s girlfriend, and by doing that, … invaded the home’s ‘curtilage.’”
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Chapter 10

The Warrant Requirement: Exceptions (Part 2)

Warrant Exception: Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest

When police perform a lawful arrest, they are allowed to search the arrestee. The permissible scope of such searches—known as searches incident to lawful arrest ("SILA")—has been the subject of multiple Supreme Court cases. No warrant is required for a SILA.¹

For a search to be justified as a SILA: (1) there must have been an arrest, (2) the arrest must have been “lawful,” and (3) the search must be “incident” to the arrest—that is, close in time and space to the arrest.

Later in the semester, we will study when arrests are permitted. For now, note that because police often need no warrant to arrest a suspect, a SILA can sometimes result from two distinct warrant exceptions. The first allows the underlying arrest, and the second allows the ensuing search.

Supreme Court of the United States

Ted Steven Chimel v. California

Decided June 23, 1969 – 395 U.S. 752

Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises basic questions concerning the permissible scope under the Fourth Amendment of a search incident to a lawful arrest.

The relevant facts are essentially undisputed. Late in the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California, home of the petitioner with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to the petitioner’s wife, and asked if they might come inside. She ushered them into the house, where they waited 10 or 15 minutes until the petitioner returned home from work. When the petitioner entered the house, one of the officers handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to “look around.” The petitioner objected, but was advised that “on the basis of the lawful arrest,” the officers would nonetheless conduct a search. No search warrant had been issued.

¹ This sort of search is sometimes abbreviated “SITA” for “Search Incident To Arrest.” This book uses “SILA” to emphasize that only “lawful” arrests trigger the exception.
Accompanied by the petitioner’s wife, the officers then looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. In some rooms the search was relatively cursory. In the master bedroom and sewing room, however, the officers directed the petitioner’s wife to open drawers and “to physically move contents of the drawers from side to side so that [they] might view any items that would have come from [the] burglary.” After completing the search, they seized numerous items—primarily coins, but also several medals, tokens, and a few other objects. The entire search took between 45 minutes and an hour.

At the petitioner’s subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary, the items taken from his house were admitted into evidence against him, over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. He was convicted, and the judgments of conviction were affirmed by both the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Both courts accepted the petitioner’s contention that the arrest warrant was invalid because the supporting affidavit was set out in conclusory terms, but held that since the arresting officers had procured the warrant “in good faith,” and since in any event they had had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for the petitioner’s arrest, that arrest had been lawful. From this conclusion the appellate courts went on to hold that the search of the petitioner’s home had been justified, despite the absence of a search warrant, on the ground that it had been incident to a valid arrest. We granted certiorari in order to consider the petitioner’s substantial constitutional claims.

Without deciding the question, we proceed on the hypothesis that the California courts were correct in holding that the arrest of the petitioner was valid under the Constitution. This brings us directly to the question whether the warrantless search of the petitioner’s entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest. The decisions of this Court bearing upon that question have been far from consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident.

“The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. ... And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.”
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control”—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The “adherence to judicial processes” mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.

It is argued in the present case that it is “reasonable” to search a man’s house when he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on consideration relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would approach the evaporation point. It is not easy to explain why, for instance, it is less subjectively “reasonable” to search a man’s house when he is arrested on his front lawn—or just down the street—than it is when he happens to be in the house at the time of arrest. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

“To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to say that an ‘unreasonable search’ is forbidden—that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable? The test is the reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and experience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils to which it was a response.”

Thus, although “[t]he recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches” depend upon “the facts and circumstances—the total atmosphere of the case,” those facts and circumstances must be viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles.

No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation, once the search is allowed to go beyond the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items. The only reasoned distinction is one between a search of the person arrested and the area within his reach on the one hand, and more extensive searches on the other.
The general point so forcefully made by Judge Learned Hand remains:

“After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis the power would not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to know that one’s papers are safe only so long as one is not at home.”

Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here went far beyond the petitioner’s person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search was, therefore, “unreasonable” under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the petitioner’s conviction cannot stand.

Reversed.
Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK joins, dissenting.

Few areas of the law have been as subject to shifting constitutional standards over the last 50 years as that of the search “incident to an arrest.” There has been a remarkable instability in this whole area, which has seen at least four major shifts in emphasis. Today’s opinion makes an untimely fifth. In my view, the Court should not now abandon the old rule.

The rule which has prevailed, but for very brief or doubtful periods of aberration, is that a search incident to an arrest may extend to those areas under the control of the defendant and where items subject to constitutional seizure may be found. The justification for this rule must, under the language of the Fourth Amendment, lie in the reasonableness of the rule.

In terms, then, the Court must decide whether a given search is reasonable. The Amendment does not proscribe “warrantless searches” but instead it proscribes “unreasonable searches” and this Court has never held nor does the majority today assert that warrantless searches are necessarily unreasonable.

Applying this reasonableness test to the area of searches incident to arrests, one thing is clear at the outset. Search of an arrested man and of the items within his immediate reach must in almost every case be reasonable. There is always a danger that the suspect will try to escape, seizing concealed weapons with which to overpower and injure the arresting officers, and there is a danger that he may destroy evidence vital to the prosecution. Circumstances in which these justifications would not apply are sufficiently rare that inquiry is not made into searches of this scope, which have been considered reasonable throughout.

The justifications which make such a search reasonable obviously do not apply to the search of areas to which the accused does not have ready physical access. This is not enough, however, to prove such searches unconstitutional. The Court has always held, and does not today deny, that when there is probable cause to search and it is “impracticable” for one reason or another to get a search warrant, then a warrantless search may be reasonable. This is the case whether an arrest was made at the time of the search or not.
This is not to say that a search can be reasonable without regard to the probable cause to believe that seizable items are on the premises. But when there are exigent circumstances, and probable cause, then the search may be made without a warrant, reasonably. An arrest itself may often create an emergency situation making it impracticable to obtain a warrant before embarking on a related search. Again assuming that there is probable cause to search premises at the spot where a suspect is arrested, it seems to me unreasonable to require the police to leave the scene in order to obtain a search warrant when they are already legally there to make a valid arrest, and when there must almost always be a strong possibility that confederates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items for which the police have probable cause to search. This must so often be the case that it seems to me as unreasonable to require a warrant for a search of the premises as to require a warrant for search of the person and his very immediate surroundings.

This case provides a good illustration of my point that it is unreasonable to require police to leave the scene of an arrest in order to obtain a search warrant when they already have probable cause to search and there is a clear danger that the items for which they may reasonably search will be removed before they return with a warrant. Petitioner was arrested in his home after an arrest. There was doubtless probable cause not only to arrest petitioner, but also to search his house. He had obliquely admitted, both to a neighbor and to the owner of the burglarized store, that he had committed the burglary. In light of this, and the fact that the neighbor had seen other admittedly stolen property in petitioner’s house, there was surely probable cause on which a warrant could have issued to search the house for the stolen coins. Moreover, had the police simply arrested petitioner, taken him off to the station house, and later returned with a warrant, it seems very likely that petitioner’s wife, who in view of petitioner’s generally garrulous nature must have known of the robbery, would have removed the coins. For the police to search the house while the evidence they had probable cause to search out and seize was still there cannot be considered unreasonable.

In considering searches incident to arrest, it must be remembered that there will be immediate opportunity to challenge the probable cause for the search in an adversary proceeding. The suspect has been apprised of the search by his very presence at the scene, and having been arrested, he will soon be brought into contact with people who can explain his rights.

An arrested man, by definition conscious of the police interest in him, and provided almost immediately with a lawyer and a judge, is in an excellent position to dispute the reasonableness of his arrest and contemporaneous search in a full adversary proceeding. I would uphold the constitutionality of this search contemporaneous with an arrest since there were probable cause both for the search and for the arrest, exigent circumstances involving the removal or destruction of evidence, and satisfactory opportunity to dispute the issues of probable cause shortly thereafter. In this case, the search was reasonable.

* * *
In the next case, the Court made clear that a search cannot be “incident to a lawful arrest” if no one is arrested.

Supreme Court of the United States

Patrick Knowles v. Iowa

Decided Dec. 8, 1998 – 525 U.S. 113

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding, but issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The question presented is whether such a procedure authorizes the officer, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of the car. We answer this question “no.”

Knowles was stopped in Newton, Iowa, after having been clocked driving 43 miles per hour on a road where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. The police officer issued a citation to Knowles, although under Iowa law he might have arrested him. The officer then conducted a full search of the car, and under the driver’s seat he found a bag of marijuana and a “pot pipe.” Knowles was then arrested and charged with violation of state laws dealing with controlled substances.

Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence so obtained. He argued that the search could not be sustained under the “search incident to arrest” exception because he had not been placed under arrest. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officer conceded that he had neither Knowles’ consent nor probable cause to conduct the search. He relied on Iowa law dealing with such searches.

[Under Iowa law at the time, when an officer was authorized to arrest someone for a traffic offense but instead issued a citation, “the issuance of a citation in lieu of an arrest” did “not affect the officer’s authority to conduct an otherwise lawful search.”]

[The trial court denied the motion to suppress and found Knowles guilty. The Supreme Court of Iowa, sitting en banc, affirmed by a divided vote. [T]he Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search under a bright-line “search incident to citation” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as the arresting officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been a custodial arrest. We granted certiorari and we now reverse.

[W]e noted the two historical rationales for the “search incident to arrest” exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is “both legitimate and weighty.” The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. [A] custodial arrest involves “danger to an officer” because of “the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to
the police station.” We recognized that “[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.” A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and “is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ ... than to a formal arrest.”

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the “minimal” additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver and any passengers, perform a “patdown” of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, conduct a “Terry patdown” of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest.

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.

Iowa nevertheless argues that a “search incident to citation” is justified because a suspect who is subject to a routine traffic stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence related to his identity (e.g., a driver’s license or vehicle registration), or destroy evidence of another, as yet undetected crime. As for the destruction of evidence relating to identity, if a police officer is not satisfied with the identification furnished by the driver, this may be a basis for arresting him rather than merely issuing a citation. As for destroying evidence of other crimes, the possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding offense seems remote.

[T]he authority to conduct a full field search as incident to an arrest [is] a “bright-line rule,” which [is] based on the concern for officer safety and destruction or loss of evidence, but which [does] not depend in every case upon the existence of either concern. Here we are asked to extend that “bright-line rule” to a situation where the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all. We decline to do so. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

After the Court decided Chimel v. California, the proper physical scope of a SILA was defined with reasonable clarity in most contexts. In cases in which suspects were arrested in or near cars, however, there was substantial confusion about the proper scope of ensuing searches. In particular, the Court has repeatedly considered whether police may search a car from which a suspect was removed (or from which the suspect otherwise exited) shortly prior to arrest. In
Arizona v. Gant, the Court considered the continuing vitality of a doctrine set forth in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). (Because the Gant Court describes Belton at length, students need not read Belton to understand the controversy it created.) Students should note that Justice Stevens, who wrote for the Court, could not have assembled a majority without the vote of Justice Scalia, who wrote separately to explain his discontent with how the majority responded to criticism of Belton.

Supreme Court of the United States

Arizona v. Rodney Joseph Gant
Decided April 21, 2009 – 556 U.S. 332

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

After Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), did not justify the search in this case. We agree with that conclusion.

Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee’s “immediate control,” meaning “the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel’s reaching-distance rule determine Belton’s scope. Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. [W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.

I

On August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked on the front door and asked to speak to the owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant’s driver’s license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.

When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet away, called to
Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10–to–12 feet from Gant’s car. Griffith immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him.

Because the other arrestees were secured in the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.

Gant was charged with two offenses—possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia (i.e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search was conducted, Officer Griffith responded: “Because the law says we can do it.”

The trial court rejected the State’s contention that the officers had probable cause to search Gant’s car for contraband when the search began but it denied the motion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited his car, the court held that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3–year term of imprisonment.

After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court’s opinion discussed at length our decision in Belton, which held that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of an arrest of the vehicle’s recent occupant. The court distinguished Belton as a case concerning the permissible scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest and concluded that it did not answer “the threshold question whether the police may conduct a search incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure.” Relying on our earlier decision in Chimel, the court observed that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and evidence preservation. When “the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of an officer,” the court concluded, a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence.” Accordingly, the court held that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable.

The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles. We therefore granted the State’s petition for certiorari.
II

Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are *per se* unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.

In *Chimel*, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.

In *Belton*, we considered *Chimel*’s application to the automobile context. A lone police officer in that case stopped a speeding car in which Belton was one of four occupants. While asking for the driver’s license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed an envelope on the car floor marked “Supergold”—a name he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe the occupants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered them out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them down. Without handcuffing the arrestees, the officer “‘split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway ... so they would not be in physical touching area of each other’” and searched the vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in which he found cocaine.

The New York Court of Appeals found the search unconstitutional, concluding that after the occupants were arrested the vehicle and its contents were “safely within the exclusive custody and control of the police.” The State asked this Court to consider whether the exception recognized in *Chimel* permits an officer to search “a jacket found inside an automobile while the automobile’s four occupants, all under arrest, are standing unsecured around the vehicle.” We granted certiorari because “courts ha[d] found no workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile.”

We held that when an officer lawfully arrests “the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile” and any containers therein. That holding was based in large part on our assumption “that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach.’”

The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in *Belton* as merely delineating “the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile” incident to an arrest. That is, *when* the passenger
compartment is within an arrestee’s reaching distance, *Belton* supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein may be reached. On that view of *Belton*, the state court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable because Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search. It also found that no other exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case.

Gant now urges us to adopt the reading of *Belton* followed by the Arizona Supreme Court.

III

Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court’s reading of *Belton*, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. This reading may be attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent in *Belton*, in which he characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the “fiction ... that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car.” Under the majority’s approach, he argued, “the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car” before conducting the search.

Since we decided *Belton*, Courts of Appeals have given different answers to the question whether a vehicle must be within an arrestee’s reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest, but Justice Brennan’s reading of the Court’s opinion has predominated. As Justice O’Connor observed, “lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of *Chimel*.” Justice SCALIA has similarly noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in “this precise factual scenario ... are legion.” Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under *Belton* “even when ... the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.”

Under this broad reading of *Belton*, a vehicle search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the search. To read *Belton* as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the *Chimel* exception—a result clearly incompatible with our statement in *Belton* that it “in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the *Chimel* case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.” Accordingly, we reject this reading of *Belton* and hold that the *Chimel* rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. But in others ... the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.
Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched Gant’s car. Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license—an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car. Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.

IV

The State does not seriously disagree with the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that Gant could not have accessed his vehicle at the time of the search, but it nevertheless asks us to uphold the search of his vehicle under the broad reading of Belton discussed above. The State argues that Belton searches are reasonable regardless of the possibility of access in a given case because that expansive rule correctly balances law enforcement interests, including the interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his vehicle.

For several reasons, we reject the State’s argument. First, the State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection. It is particularly significant that Belton searches authorize police officers to search not just the passenger compartment but every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space. A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. Indeed, the character of that threat implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.

At the same time as it undervalues these privacy concerns, the State exaggerates the clarity that its reading of Belton provides. Courts that have read Belton expansively are at odds regarding how close in time to the arrest and how proximate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s first contact with the arrestee must be to bring the encounter within Belton’s purview and whether a search is reasonable when it commences or continues after the arrestee has been removed from the scene. The rule has thus generated a great deal of uncertainty, particularly for a rule touted as providing a “bright line.”
Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests. Under our view, Belton and Thornton [v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)] permit an officer to conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand.

These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search. Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.

VI

Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search. Accordingly, the judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.

Justice SCALIA, concurring.

To determine what is an “unreasonable” search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to the historical practices the Framers sought to preserve; if those provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional standards of reasonableness. Since the historical scope of officers’ authority to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain, traditional standards of reasonableness govern. It is abundantly clear that those standards do not justify what I take to be the rule set forth in Belton and Thornton: that arresting officers may always search an arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect themselves from hidden weapons. When an arrest is made in connection with a roadside stop, police virtually always have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their safety—and a means that is virtually always employed: ordering the arrestee away from the vehicle, patting him down in the open, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car.

Law enforcement officers face a risk of being shot whenever they pull a car over. But that risk is at its height at the time of the initial confrontation; and it is not at all reduced by allowing a search of the stopped vehicle after the driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car. I observed in Thornton that the Government had failed to provide a single instance in which a formerly restrained arrestee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own vehicle; Arizona and its amici have not remedied that significant deficiency in the present case.
It must be borne in mind that we are speaking here only of a rule automatically permitting a search when the driver or an occupant is arrested. Where no arrest is made, we have held that officers may search the car if they reasonably believe “the suspect is dangerous and ... may gain immediate control of weapons.” In the no-arrest case, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists, since the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle when the interrogation is completed.

Justice STEVENS acknowledges that an officer-safety rationale cannot justify all vehicle searches incident to arrest, but asserts that that is not the rule Belton and Thornton adopted. Justice STEVENS would therefore retain the application of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), in the car-search context but would apply in the future what he believes our cases held in the past: that officers making a roadside stop may search the vehicle so long as the “arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” I believe that this standard fails to provide the needed guidance to arresting officers and also leaves much room for manipulation, inviting officers to leave the scene unsecured (at least where dangerous suspects are not involved) in order to conduct a vehicle search. In my view we should simply abandon the Belton–Thornton charade of officer safety and overrule those cases. I would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto “reasonable” only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred. Because respondent was arrested for driving without a license (a crime for which no evidence could be expected to be found in the vehicle), I would hold in the present case that the search was unlawful.

Justice ALITO [in dissent] insists that the Court must demand a good reason for abandoning prior precedent. That is true enough, but it seems to me ample reason that the precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in this case unconstitutional) results. We should recognize Belton’s fanciful reliance upon officer safety for what it was: “a return to the broader sort of [evidence-gathering] search incident to arrest that we allowed before Chimel.”

Justice ALITO argues that there is no reason to adopt a rule limiting automobile-arrest searches to those cases where the search’s object is evidence of the crime of arrest. I disagree. This formulation of officers’ authority both preserves the outcomes of our prior cases and tethers the scope and rationale of the doctrine to the triggering event. Belton, by contrast, allowed searches precisely when its exigency-based rationale was least applicable: The fact of the arrest in the automobile context makes searches on exigency grounds less reasonable, not more. I also disagree with Justice ALITO’s conclusory assertion that this standard will be difficult to administer in practice; the ease of its application in this case would suggest otherwise.

No other Justice, however, shares my view that application of Chimel in this context should be entirely abandoned. It seems to me unacceptable for the Court to come forth with a 4–to-1-to–4 opinion that leaves the governing rule uncertain. I am therefore confronted with the choice of either leaving the current understanding of Belton and Thornton in effect, or acceding to what seems to me the artificial narrowing of those cases adopted by Justice STEVENS. The latter, as I have said, does not provide the degree of certainty I think desirable in this field; but the former opens the field to what I think are plainly unconstitutional searches—which is the greater evil. I therefore join the opinion of the Court.
Notes, Comments, and Questions

Consider what is included in the “passenger compartment.” Does it include the trunk? What if the car is a hatchback or station wagon? Are the wheel wells or undercarriage part of the passenger compartment? What other warrant exceptions might apply to trunk searches?

Although some have argued that Gant implicitly overruled Belton, one could argue that the majority instead properly confined Belton to facts similar to those that justified the Belton decision itself. In Belton, a police officer stopped a car for speeding on the New York State Thruway. The Thruway is a system of highways covering hundreds of miles and is among the busiest toll roads in the United States.

The car contained four men (including Belton), and the officer was alone. The officer directed the four men to stand apart from one another so that they could not touch each other. By contrast, in Gant, multiple officers saw Gant park his car in a driveway. Perhaps the facts of Belton—a single officer dealing with multiple suspects on a busy highway—justified a search incident to lawful arrest in a way that the facts of Gant did not. In other words, perhaps police officers and courts had erroneously applied the rule of Belton to inappropriate circumstances, and the Gant Court clarified the Court’s prior holding. Then again, perhaps Belton was written too broadly, and the passage of time allowed the Court to see its own error, which it corrected in Gant. In any event, students would be wise to memorize the rule set forth in Gant, which is easy for bar examiners (and law professors) to test.

In 1973, the Court decided in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, that police may lawfully open a cigarette package found upon an arrestee’s person during a search incident to arrest. Even though the arresting officer had no particular reason to believe that the cigarette package contained contraband or evidence of crime, the Court held the search permissible. The majority concluded that, so long as officers stay within the temporal and geographic constraints imposed in cases such as Chimel, no further quantum of evidence is required to justify a thorough search of the arrestee’s person, clothing, and immediate surroundings, along with inspection of papers and effects found during these searches. Accordingly, other than the probable cause necessary to justify the underlying arrest, no probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion) is required for a SILA.

Although the rule of Robinson may seem relatively clear at first, the case did not resolve the common issue of locked containers seized incident to arrest; nor did it explicitly address the issue of closed (but not locked) containers found near (but not on the person of) the arrestee. In United States v Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (abrogated on grounds unrelated to SILA law), the Court held that opening an arrestee’s luggage ninety minutes after the arrest could not be justified as “incident” to the arrest—the time delay was too great. But the Court did not decide whether a locked (or otherwise closed) container could be opened closer in time to the arrest. Lower courts have split on the question.²

² For opinions reviewing the relevant precedent in some detail and reaching opposite conclusions, see, e.g., People v. Cregan, 10 N.E.3d 1196 (Ill. 2014) (allowing such a search); id. at 1210 (Burke, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority misread Supreme Court precedent).
When the Court decided *Riley v. California* in 2014, it considered facts about a “container” that would have been unimaginable in 1973. Just a few decades ago, no arrestee had in his pocket a mini-computer full of private data, much less one capable of connecting to even more powerful computers with vast repositories of additional private information. Today, most arrestees carry such devices. The question before the Court was whether the rule from *Robinson* allows police to obtain data from a mobile phone found during a search incident to lawful arrest.

Supreme Court of the United States

**David Leon Riley v. California**

Decided June 25, 2014 – 134 S. Ct. 2473

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

[This] case[] raise[s] a common question: whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.

I

A

Petitioner David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired registration tags. In the course of the stop, the officer also learned that Riley’s license had been suspended. The officer impounded Riley’s car, pursuant to department policy, and another officer conducted an inventory search of the car. Riley was arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms when that search turned up two handguns under the car’s hood.

An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He also seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. According to Riley’s uncontradicted assertion, the phone was a “smart phone,” a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity. The officer accessed information on the phone and noticed that some words (presumably in text messages or a contacts list) were preceded by the letters “CK”—a label that, he believed, stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members of the Bloods gang.

At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the contents of the phone. The detective testified that he “went through” Riley’s phone “looking for evidence, because ... gang members will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of themselves with the guns.” Although there was “a lot of stuff” on the phone, particular files that “caught [the detective’s] eye” included videos of young men sparring while someone yelled encouragement using the moniker “Blood.” The police also found photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier.

Riley was ultimately charged, in connection with that earlier shooting, with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder. The State alleged that Riley had committed those crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang, an aggravating factor that carries an enhanced sentence. Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the
police had obtained from his cell phone. He contended that the searches of his phone violated the Fourth Amendment, because they had been performed without a warrant and were not otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. The trial court rejected that argument. At Riley’s trial, police officers testified about the photographs and videos found on the phone, and some of the photographs were admitted into evidence. Riley was convicted on all three counts and received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The court relied on [] California Supreme Court precedent, which held that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of cell phone data incident to an arrest, so long as the cell phone was immediately associated with the arrestee’s person.

The California Supreme Court denied Riley’s petition for review and we granted certiorari.

II

In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.

The [] case[] before us concern[s] the reasonableness of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. In 1914, this Court first acknowledged in dictum “the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.” Since that time, it has been well accepted that such a search constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement. Indeed, the label “exception” is something of a misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.

Although the existence of the exception for such searches has been recognized for a century, its scope has been debated for nearly as long. That debate has focused on the extent to which officers may search property found on or near the arrestee. [The Court then discussed the development of the law in Chimel, Robinson, and Gant.]

III

[We now must] decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy. A smart phone of the sort taken from Riley was unheard of ten years ago; a significant majority of American adults now own such phones. [The] phone[] [is] based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel and Robinson were decided.

Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”
On the government interest side, [the Court held in Robinson] that the two risks identified in Chimel—harm to officers and destruction of evidence—are present in all custodial arrests. There are no comparable risks when the search is of digital data. In addition, any privacy interests retained by an individual after arrest [are] significantly diminished by the fact of the arrest itself. Cell phones, however, place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals. A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search [we have previously] considered.

We therefore hold [] that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a search.

A

In doing so, we do not overlook ... that searches of a person incident to arrest, “while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence,” are reasonable regardless of “the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found.” Rather than requiring [] “case-by-case adjudication” ... we ask instead whether application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to this particular category of effects would “untether the rule from the justifications underlying the [] exception.”

1

Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. Law enforcement officers remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case. Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one.

Perhaps the same might have been said of the cigarette pack seized from Robinson’s pocket. Once an officer gained control of the pack, it was unlikely that Robinson could have accessed the pack’s contents. But unknown physical objects may always pose risks, no matter how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a custodial arrest. The officer in Robinson testified that he could not identify the objects in the cigarette pack but knew they were not cigarettes. Given that, a further search was a reasonable protective measure. No such unknowns exist with respect to digital data.

California suggest[s] that a search of cell phone data might help ensure officer safety in more indirect ways, for example by alerting officers that confederates of the arrestee are headed to the scene. There is undoubtedly a strong government interest in warning officers about such possibilities, but [] California offers [no] evidence to suggest that their concerns are based on actual experience. The proposed consideration would also represent a broadening of Chimel’s concern that an arrestee himself might grab a weapon and use it against an officer “to resist arrest or effect his escape.” And any such threats from outside the arrest scene do not “lurk[ ] in all custodial arrests.” Accordingly, the interest in protecting officer safety does not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement across the board. To the extent dangers to arresting officers may be implicated in a particular way in a particular case, they are better addressed
through consideration of case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as the one for exigent circumstances.

2

California focus[es] primarily on ... preventing the destruction of evidence. Riley concede[s] that officers could have seized and secured [his] cell phone[] to prevent destruction of evidence while seeking a warrant. That is a sensible concession. And once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.

California argue[s] that information on a cell phone may nevertheless be vulnerable to two types of evidence destruction unique to digital data—remote wiping and data encryption. As an initial matter, these broader concerns about the loss of evidence are distinct from Chimel’s focus on a defendant who responds to arrest by trying to conceal or destroy evidence within his reach. With respect to remote wiping, the Government’s primary concern turns on the actions of third parties who are not present at the scene of arrest. And data encryption is even further afield. [That] focuses on the ordinary operation of a phone’s security features, apart from any active attempt by a defendant or his associates to conceal or destroy evidence upon arrest.

We have also been given little reason to believe that either problem is prevalent. Moreover, in situations in which an arrest might trigger a remote-wipe attempt or an officer discovers an unlocked phone, it is not clear that the ability to conduct a warrantless search would make much of a difference. The need to effect the arrest, secure the scene, and tend to other pressing matters means that law enforcement officers may well not be able to turn their attention to a cell phone right away.

In any event, as to remote wiping, law enforcement is not without specific means to address the threat. Remote wiping can be fully prevented by disconnecting a phone from the network. There are at least two simple ways to do this: First, law enforcement officers can turn the phone off or remove its battery. Second, if they are concerned about encryption or other potential problems, they can leave a phone powered on and place it in a [] “Faraday bag.”

To the extent that law enforcement still has specific concerns about the potential loss of evidence in a particular case, there remain more targeted ways to address those concerns. If “the police are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation,” they may be able to rely on exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately.

B

The search incident to arrest exception rests not only on the heightened government interests at stake in a volatile arrest situation, but also on an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being taken into police custody.
The fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does not, [however,] mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely. Not every search “is acceptable solely because a person is in custody.” To the contrary, when “privacy-related concerns are weighty enough” a “search may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.”

The [Government] asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is “materially indistinguishable” from searches [] of physical items. That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together. A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.

1

Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term “cell phone” is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.

One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy. Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so. And if they did, they would have to drag behind them a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant in Chadwick, rather than a container the size of the cigarette package in Robinson.

The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated consequences for privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely be kept on a phone.

Finally, there is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not physical records. Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day. A decade ago police officers searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled across a highly personal item such as a diary. But those discoveries were likely to be few and far between. Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration
to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate. Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the occasional case.

Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively different. An Internet search and browsing history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD. Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.

In 1926, Learned Hand observed (in an opinion later quoted in Chimel) that it is “a totally different thing to search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.” If his pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true. Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.

To further complicate the scope of the privacy interests at stake, the data a user views on many modern cell phones may not in fact be stored on the device itself. Treating a cell phone as a container whose contents may be searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter. But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen. Moreover, the same type of data may be stored locally on the device for one user and in the cloud for another. Officers searching a phone’s data would not typically know whether the information they are viewing was stored locally at the time of the arrest or has been pulled from the cloud. The possibility that a search might extend well beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee is yet another reason that the privacy interests here dwarf those in Robinson.

IV

We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell phones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals. Privacy comes at a cost.

Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest. Our cases have historically recognized that the warrant requirement is “an important working part of our machinery of government,” not merely “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”
Moreover, even though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone. “One well-recognized exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Such exigencies could include the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.

In light of the availability of the exigent circumstances exception, there is no reason to believe that law enforcement officers will not be able to address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that have been suggested: a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the child’s location on his cell phone. The defendants here recognize—indeed, they stress—that such fact-specific threats may justify a warrantless search of cell phone data. The critical point is that, unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.

Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.” The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.

We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I agree that we should not mechanically apply the rule used in the predigital era to the search of a cell phone. Many cell phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly personal, that no person would ever have had on his person in hard-copy form. This calls for a new balancing of law enforcement and privacy interests.

The Court strikes this balance in favor of privacy interests with respect to all cell phones and all information found in them, and this approach leads to anomalies. For example, the Court’s broad holding favors information in digital form over information in hard-copy form. Suppose that two suspects are arrested. Suspect number one has in his pocket a monthly bill for his land-line phone, and the bill lists an incriminating call to a long-distance number. He also has in his a wallet a few snapshots, and one of these is incriminating. Suspect number two has in his pocket a cell phone, the call log of which shows a call to the same incriminating number. In addition, a number of photos are stored in the memory of the cell phone, and one of these is incriminating. Under established law, the police may seize and examine the phone bill and the snapshots in the wallet without obtaining a warrant, but under the Court’s holding today, the information stored in the cell phone is out.
While the Court’s approach leads to anomalies, I do not see a workable alternative. Law enforcement officers need clear rules regarding searches incident to arrest, and it would take many cases and many years for the courts to develop more nuanced rules. And during that time, the nature of the electronic devices that ordinary Americans carry on their persons would continue to change.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

Although the Court considered a different question in *Carpenter v. United States* (Chapter 5)—the issue was whether a “search” occurred at all when police obtained historical mobile phone location data—students likely noticed that the majority opinions in *Carpenter* and *Riley* (both by Chief Justice Roberts) made similar observations about the importance of protecting the privacy of data related to modern telephones. As Justice Alito noted in his *Riley* concurrence, the Court will occasionally reach results that are not satisfying to anyone desiring perfect theoretical coherence in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court must decide the cases before it, and its case-by-case balance of competing interests (such as privacy and crime control) will depend on the facts of individual cases, as well as the march of technological change.

Let’s reconsider Jay-Z’s predicament in “99 Problems.” If an officer arrests Jay-Z for reckless driving after catching him driving 75 in a 55 mph zone, can the officer search the trunk for drugs?

What if instead the officer stops Jay-Z for speeding, looks up the license plate, and sees that Los Angeles County has an outstanding warrant for Jay-Z’s arrest for the crime of marijuana possession. Now can the officer search the trunk?

Two additional points to consider:

When an unarrested third party is near a car, there may be authority for a “sweep” (to quickly search the vehicle for dangerous items third parties could use).

When an unarrested third party is at a house that police wish to search, police likely can secure the house temporarily as they seek a warrant (to prevent mischief by, say, Chimel’s wife). This rule applies only if police have probable cause; otherwise, they cannot obtain a warrant.
Waiving the Warrant Requirement: Consent

As is true of most constitutional rights, the right to be free from warrantless searches can be waived. Police investigations rely every day on such consent. Owners of vehicles and luggage allow officers to search their effects, and occupants of houses allow officers to enter and look around. There is no dispute about the principle that genuine consent serves as a valid substitute for a search warrant. The controversial questions include what is necessary for consent to be valid, who may provide valid consent, and whether certain police tactics render otherwise-valid consent ineffective.

Supreme Court of the United States

Merle R. Schneckloth v. Robert Clyde Bustamonte

Decided May 29, 1973 – 412 U.S. 218

Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is “per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. The constitutional question in the present case concerns the definition of “consent” in this Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment context.

I

The respondent was brought to trial in a California court upon a charge of possessing a check with intent to defraud. He moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through an unconstitutional search and seizure. In response to the motion, the trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing where it was established that the material in question had been acquired by the State under the following circumstances:

While on routine patrol in Sunnyvale, California, at approximately 2:40 in the morning, Police Officer James Rand stopped an automobile when he observed that one headlight and its license plate light were burned out. Six men were in the vehicle. Joe Alcala and the respondent, Robert Bustamonte, were in the front seat with Joe Gonzales, the driver. Three older men were seated in the rear. When, in response to the policeman’s question, Gonzales could not produce a driver’s license, Officer Rand asked if any of the other five had any evidence of identification. Only Alcala produced a license, and he explained that the car was his brother’s. After the six occupants had stepped out of the car at the officer’s request and after two additional policemen had arrived, Officer Rand asked Alcala if he could search the car. Alcala replied, “Sure, go ahead.” Prior to the search no one was threatened with arrest and, according to Officer Rand’s uncontradicted
testimony, it “was all very congenial at this time.” Gonzales testified that Alcala actually helped in the search of the car, by opening the trunk and glove compartment. In Gonzales’ words: “[T]he police officer asked Joe [Alcala], he goes, ‘Does the trunk open?’ And Joe said, ‘Yes.’ He went to the car and got the keys and opened up the trunk.” Wadded up under the left rear seat, the police officers found three checks that had previously been stolen from a car wash.

The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, and the checks in question were admitted in evidence at Bustamonte’s trial. On the basis of this and other evidence he was convicted, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed the conviction. The California Supreme Court denied review.

Thereafter, the respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court. It was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on its prior decisions set aside the District Court’s order. The appellate court reasoned that a consent was a waiver of a person’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the State was under an obligation to demonstrate, not only that the consent had been uncoerced, but that it had been given with an understanding that it could be freely and effectively withheld. Consent could not be found, the court held, solely from the absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent. Since the District Court had not determined that Alcala had known that his consent could have been withheld and that he could have refused to have his vehicle searched, the Court of Appeals vacated the order denying the writ and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require the showing thought necessary by the Court of Appeals.

II

It is important to make it clear at the outset what is not involved in this case. The respondent concedes that a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible. [W]e [have] recognized that a search authorized by consent is wholly valid. And similarly the State concedes that “[w]hen a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”

The precise question in this case, then, is what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a consent was “voluntarily” given.

A

The most extensive judicial exposition of the meaning of “voluntariness” has been developed in those cases in which the Court has had to determine the “voluntariness” of a defendant’s confession for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Those cases yield no talismanic definition of “voluntariness,” mechanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has arisen. “The notion of ‘voluntariness,’” Mr. Justice Frankfurter once wrote, “is itself an amphibian.” It cannot be taken literally to mean a “knowing” choice. “Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements—even those made under brutal treatment—are ‘voluntary’ in the sense of representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if ‘voluntariness’ incorporates notions of ‘but-for’ cause, the question should be whether the
statement would have been made even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtually no statement would be voluntary because very few people give incriminating statements in the absence of official action of some kind.” It is thus evident that neither linguistics nor epistemology will provide a ready definition of the meaning of “voluntariness.”

This Court’s decisions reflect a frank recognition that the Constitution requires the sacrifice of neither security nor liberty. The Due Process Clause does not mandate that the police forgo all questioning, or that they be given carte blanche to extract what they can from a suspect. “The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.”

In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.¹

B

Similar considerations lead us to agree with the courts of California that the question whether a consent to a search was in fact “voluntary” or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. As with police questioning, two competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a “voluntary” consent—the legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.

In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence. In the present case for example, while the police had reason to stop the car for traffic violations, the State does not contend that there was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants. Yet, the search yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a prosecution, and provided some assurance that others, wholly innocent of the crime, were not mistakenly brought to trial. And in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves fruitless, that in itself may convince the police that an arrest with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.

¹ [Footnote by editors] We will consider these factors later in the semester, when studying the Court’s regulation of interrogations pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting “consent” would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.

The approach of the Ninth Circuit finds no support in any of our decisions that have attempted to define the meaning of “voluntariness.” Its ruling, that the State must affirmatively prove that the subject of the search knew that he had a right to refuse consent, would, in practice, create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to be conducted. There might be rare cases where it could be proved from the record that a person in fact affirmatively knew of his right to refuse—such as a case where he announced to the police that if he didn’t sign the consent form, “you [police] are going to get a search warrant;” or a case where by prior experience and training a person had clearly and convincingly demonstrated such knowledge. But more commonly where there was no evidence of any coercion, explicit or implicit, the prosecution would nevertheless be unable to demonstrate that the subject of the search in fact had known of his right to refuse consent.

The very object of the inquiry—the nature of a person’s subjective understanding—underlines the difficulty of the prosecution’s burden under the rule applied by the Court of Appeals in this case. Any defendant who was the subject of a search authorized solely by his consent could effectively frustrate the introduction into evidence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to testify that he in fact knew he could refuse to consent. And the near impossibility of meeting this prosecutorial burden suggests why this Court has never accepted any such litmus-paper test of voluntariness.

One alternative that would go far toward proving that the subject of a search did know he had a right to refuse consent would be to advise him of that right before eliciting his consent. That, however, is a suggestion that has been almost universally repudiated by both federal and state courts, and, we think, rightly so. For it would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning. Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or in a person’s home or office, and under informal and unstructured conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The police may seek to investigate further suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime. These situations are a far cry from the structured atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of his trial rights. And, while surely a closer question, these situations are still immeasurably, far removed from “custodial interrogation” where, in *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) we found that the Constitution required certain now familiar warnings as a prerequisite to police interrogation. Indeed, in language applicable to the typical consent search, we refused to extend the need for warnings.

Consequently, we cannot accept the position of the Court of Appeals in this case that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a “voluntary” consent. Rather it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was voluntary or coerced. It is this careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our prior decisions involving consent searches.
In short, neither this Court's prior cases, nor the traditional definition of “voluntariness” requires proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the *sine qua non* of an effective consent to a search.

C

It is said, however, that a “consent” is a “waiver” of a person’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The argument is that by allowing the police to conduct a search, a person “waives” whatever right he had to prevent the police from searching. It is argued that under the doctrine of *Johnson v. Zerbst*, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), to establish such a “waiver” the State must demonstrate “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”

But these standards were enunciated in *Johnson* in the context of the safeguards of a fair criminal trial. Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection. As Mr. Justice Black once observed for the Court: “‘Waiver’ is a vague term used for a great variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law.” With respect to procedural due process, for example, the Court has acknowledged that waiver is possible, while explicitly leaving open the question whether a “knowing and intelligent” waiver need be shown.

The requirement of a “knowing” and “intelligent” waiver was articulated in a case involving the validity of a defendant’s decision to forego a right constitutionally guaranteed to protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process. *Johnson v. Zerbst* dealt with the denial of counsel in a federal criminal trial.

Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial. Hence, the standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver has most often been applied to test the validity of a waiver of counsel, either at trial, or upon a guilty plea. The guarantees afforded a criminal defendant at trial also protect him at certain stages before the actual trial, and any alleged waiver must meet the strict standard of an intentional relinquishment of a “known” right. But the “trial” guarantees that have been applied to the “pretrial” stage of the criminal process are similarly designed to protect the fairness of the trial itself.

There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a “knowing” and “intelligent” waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects the “security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ....” The Fourth Amendment “is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth.” The guarantees of the Fourth Amendment stand “as a protection of quite different constitutional values—values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone.”

Nor can it even be said that a search, as opposed to an eventual trial, is somehow “unfair” if a person consents to a search. While the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments limit the circumstances under which the police can conduct a search, there is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person’s voluntarily allowing a search. The actual conduct of the search may be precisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant. And, unlike those constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment.

D

Much of what has already been said disposes of the argument that the Court’s decision in the Miranda case requires the conclusion that knowledge of a right to refuse is an indispensable element of a valid consent. The considerations that informed the Court’s holding in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present case. In Miranda the Court found that the techniques of police questioning and the nature of custodial surroundings produce an inherently coercive situation.

In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics—either from the nature of the police questioning or the environment in which it took place. Indeed, since consent searches will normally occur on a person’s own familiar territory, the specter of incommunicado police interrogation in some remote station house is simply inapposite. There is no reason to believe, under circumstances such as are present here, that the response to a policeman’s question is presumptively coerced; and there is, therefore, no reason to reject the traditional test for determining the voluntariness of a person’s response.

It is also argued that the failure to require the Government to establish knowledge as a prerequisite to a valid consent, will relegate the Fourth Amendment to the special province of “the sophisticated, [the] knowledgeable and the privileged.” We cannot agree. The traditional definition of voluntariness we accept today has always taken into account evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and the lack of any effective warnings to a person of his rights; and the voluntariness of any statement taken under those conditions has been carefully scrutinized to determine whether it was in fact voluntarily given.

E

Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such
knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Because the California court followed these principles in affirming the respondent’s conviction, and because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in remanding for an evidentiary hearing required more, its judgment must be reversed.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

I agree with the Court of Appeals that “verbal assent” to a search is not enough, that the fact that consent was given to the search does not imply that the suspect knew that the alternative of a refusal existed. As that court stated:

“[U]nder many circumstances a reasonable person might read an officer’s ‘May I’ as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.”

[W]hether Alcala knew he had the right to refuse, we do not know. All the Court of Appeals did was to remand the case to the District Court for a finding—and if necessary, a hearing on that issue.

I would let the case go forward on that basis. The long, time-consuming contest in this Court might well wash out. At least we could be assured that, if it came back, we would not be rendering an advisory opinion. Had I voted to grant this petition, I would suggest we dismiss it as improvidently granted. But, being in the minority, I am bound by the Rule of Four.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

[T]he search of the vehicle can be justified solely on the ground that the owner’s brother gave his consent—that is, that he waived his Fourth Amendment right “to be secure” against an otherwise “unreasonable” search. The Court holds today that an individual can effectively waive this right even though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions of his privacy would be constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. In my view, the Court’s conclusion is supported neither by “linguistics,” nor by “epistemology,” nor, indeed, by “common sense.” I respectfully dissent.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, dissenting.

I would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made. But today the Court reaches the curious result that one can choose to relinquish a constitutional right—the right to be free of unreasonable searches—without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a police request to search. I cannot agree, and therefore dissent.

I believe that the Court misstates the true issue in this case. That issue is not, as the Court suggests whether the police overbore Alcala’s will in eliciting his consent, but rather, whether a simple statement of assent to search, without more, should be sufficient to permit the police to search and thus act as a relinquishment of Alcala’s constitutional right to exclude the police. This Court has always scrutinized with great care claims that a person has forgone the opportunity to assert constitutional rights. I see no reason to give the claim that a person consented to a search any less rigorous scrutiny. Every case in this Court involving this kind of search has heretofore
spoken of consent as a waiver. Perhaps one skilled in linguistics or epistemology can disregard those comments, but I find them hard to ignore.

The Court assumes that the issue in this case is: what are the standards by which courts are to determine that consent is voluntarily given? It then imports into the law of search and seizure standards developed to decide entirely different questions about coerced confessions.

In contrast, this case deals not with “coercion,” but with “consent,” a subtly different concept to which different standards have been applied in the past. Freedom from coercion is a substantive right, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Consent, however, is a mechanism by which substantive requirements, otherwise applicable, are avoided. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the relevant substantive requirements are that searches be conducted only after evidence justifying them has been submitted to an impartial magistrate for a determination of probable cause. There are, of course, exceptions to these requirements based on a variety of exigent circumstances that make it impractical to invalidate a search simply because the police failed to get a warrant. But none of the exceptions relating to the overriding needs of law enforcement are applicable when a search is justified solely by consent. On the contrary, the needs of law enforcement are significantly more attenuated, for probable cause to search may be lacking but a search permitted if the subject’s consent has been obtained. Thus, consent searches are permitted, not because such an exception to the requirements of probable cause and warrant is essential to proper law enforcement, but because we permit our citizens to choose whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional rights. Our prior decisions simply do not support the view that a meaningful choice has been made solely because no coercion was brought to bear on the subject.

My approach to the case is straightforward and, to me, obviously required by the notion of consent as a relinquishment of Fourth Amendment rights. I am at a loss to understand why consent “cannot be taken literally to mean a ‘knowing’ choice.” In fact, I have difficulty in comprehending how a decision made without knowledge of available alternatives can be treated as a choice at all.

I must conclude with some reluctance that when the Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights. Of course it would be “practical” for the police to ignore the commands of the Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we mean that more criminals will be apprehended, even though the constitutional rights of innocent people also go by the board. But such a practical advantage is achieved only at the cost of permitting the police to disregard the limitations that the Constitution places on their behavior, a cost that a constitutional democracy cannot long absorb.
The Court has affirmed the principles of *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte* repeatedly. The most prominent cases have involved searches aboard public buses.

The Court addressed consent searches on Greyhound buses in *United States v. Drayton*, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). There, the Court held that police officers could board a bus and ask for permission to search the property of passengers, as long as under the totality of the circumstances the officers obtained valid consent. The majority reiterated that officers need not advise passengers of their right to leave or to refuse consent. Previously, in *Florida v. Bostick*, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), the Court held that officers may approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and request their consent to searches, provided “a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” See also *Ohio v. Robinette*, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (rejecting rule created by Ohio judges that required officers at traffic stops to state “At this time you legally are free to go’ or [] words of similar import” before initiating extra questioning or seeking consent to search).

Consider the following scenarios:

A police officer assigned to be a “school resource officer” at a high school confronts a student who has been sent to the principal’s office for disrespectful classroom behavior. The officer says, “You must be on drugs to act so stupid. Let me see what’s in that backpack, and then you can go see the principal.” If the student hands over the backpack, does the officer have valid consent to search it? Why or why not?

A police officer has probable cause to believe that drugs are being stored at a certain house. The officer, without a warrant, knocks on the door. When someone answers, the officer says, “I could get a warrant to search this house for drugs, but I’d rather save myself the trouble. If you let me look around the house and I don’t find anything, I’ll move on to other business. But if you refuse, I’ll be back soon with a warrant, and my partner and I will search this place from top to bottom.” If the person at the door admits the officer inside, does the officer have valid consent to enter and search the house? Why or why not?

Now imagine that two people are present when police request consent to enter a home. One person consents while the other says, “Stay out!” Consent or no consent? Why or why not? The Court addresses this issue in the next case.

*Supreme Court of the United States*

**Georgia v. Scott Fitz Randolph**

Decided March 22, 2006 – 547 U.S. 103

Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence
so obtained. The question here is whether such an evidentiary seizure is likewise lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other, who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent. We hold that, in the circumstances here at issue, a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.

I

Respondent Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, separated in late May 2001, when she left the marital residence in Americus, Georgia, and went to stay with her parents in Canada, taking their son and some belongings. In July, she returned to the Americus house with the child, though the record does not reveal whether her object was reconciliation or retrieval of remaining possessions.

On the morning of July 6, she complained to the police that after a domestic dispute her husband took their son away, and when officers reached the house she told them that her husband was a cocaine user whose habit had caused financial troubles. She mentioned the marital problems and said that she and their son had only recently returned after a stay of several weeks with her parents. Shortly after the police arrived, Scott Randolph returned and explained that he had removed the child to a neighbor’s house out of concern that his wife might take the boy out of the country again; he denied cocaine use, and countered that it was in fact his wife who abused drugs and alcohol.

One of the officers, Sergeant Murray, went with Janet Randolph to reclaim the child, and when they returned she not only renewed her complaints about her husband’s drug use, but also volunteered that there were “‘items of drug evidence’” in the house. Sergeant Murray asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house, which he unequivocally refused.

The sergeant turned to Janet Randolph for consent to search, which she readily gave. She led the officer upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as Scott’s, where the sergeant noticed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue he suspected was cocaine. He then left the house to get an evidence bag from his car and to call the district attorney’s office, which instructed him to stop the search and apply for a warrant. When Sergeant Murray returned to the house, Janet Randolph withdrew her consent. The police took the straw to the police station, along with the Randolphs. After getting a search warrant, they returned to the house and seized further evidence of drug use, on the basis of which Scott Randolph was indicted for possession of cocaine.

He moved to suppress the evidence, as products of a warrantless search of his house unauthorized by his wife’s consent over his express refusal. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Janet Randolph had common authority to consent to the search.

The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed and was itself sustained by the State Supreme Court, principally on the ground that “the consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless search.” The Supreme Court of Georgia acknowledged this Court’s holding in *Matlock*, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) that “the consent of one
who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared” and found *Matlock* distinguishable just because Scott Randolph was not “absent” from the colloquy on which the police relied for consent to make the search. The State Supreme Court stressed that the officers in *Matlock* had not been “faced with the physical presence of joint occupants, with one consenting to the search and the other objecting.” It held that an individual who chooses to live with another assumes a risk no greater than “an inability to control access to the premises during [his] absence,” and does not contemplate that his objection to a request to search commonly shared premises, if made, will be overlooked.

We granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on whether one occupant may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to permit the search. We now affirm.

II

To the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable *per se*, one “jealously and carefully drawn” exception recognizes the validity of searches with the voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority. That person might be the householder against whom evidence is sought or a fellow occupant who shares common authority over property, when the suspect is absent, and the exception for consent extends even to entries and searches with the permission of a co-occupant whom the police reasonably, but erroneously, believe to possess shared authority as an occupant. None of our co-occupant consent-to-search cases, however, has presented the further fact of a second occupant physically present and refusing permission to search, and later moving to suppress evidence so obtained. The significance of such a refusal turns on the underpinnings of the co-occupant consent rule, as recognized since *Matlock*.

A

The defendant in that case was arrested in the yard of a house where he lived with a Mrs. Graff and several of her relatives, and was detained in a squad car parked nearby. When the police went to the door, Mrs. Graff admitted them and consented to a search of the house. In resolving the defendant’s objection to use of the evidence taken in the warrantless search, we said that “the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”

The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its rules. *Matlock* accordingly not only holds that a solitary co-inhabitant may sometimes consent to a search of shared premises, but stands for the proposition that the reasonableness of such a search is in significant part a function of commonly held understanding about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.
Matlock’s example of common understanding is readily apparent. When someone comes to the door of a domestic dwelling with a baby at her hip, as Mrs. Graff did, she shows that she belongs there, and that fact standing alone is enough to tell a law enforcement officer or any other visitor that if she occupies the place along with others, she probably lives there subject to the assumption tenants usually make about their common authority when they share quarters. They understand that any one of them may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may nevertheless be admitted in his absence by another. As Matlock put it, shared tenancy is understood to include an “assumption of risk,” on which police officers are entitled to rely, and although some group living together might make an exceptional arrangement that no one could admit a guest without the agreement of all, the chance of such an eccentric scheme is too remote to expect visitors to investigate a particular household’s rules before accepting an invitation to come in. So, Matlock relied on what was usual and placed no burden on the police to eliminate the possibility of atypical arrangements, in the absence of reason to doubt that the regular scheme was in place.

It is also easy to imagine different facts on which, if known, no common authority could sensibly be suspected. A person on the scene who identifies himself, say, as a landlord or a hotel manager calls up no customary understanding of authority to admit guests without the consent of the current occupant. A tenant in the ordinary course does not take rented premises subject to any formal or informal agreement that the landlord may let visitors into the dwelling, and a hotel guest customarily has no reason to expect the manager to allow anyone but his own employees into his room. In these circumstances, neither state-law property rights, nor common contractual arrangements, nor any other source points to a common understanding of authority to admit third parties generally without the consent of a person occupying the premises. And when it comes to searching through bureau drawers, there will be instances in which even a person clearly belonging on premises as an occupant may lack any perceived authority to consent; “a child of eight might well be considered to have the power to consent to the police crossing the threshold into that part of the house where any caller, such as a pollster or salesman, might well be admitted,” but no one would reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom.

To begin with, it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.” Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions.
Unless the people living together fall within some recognized hierarchy, like a household of parent and child or barracks housing military personnel of different grades, there is no societal understanding of superior and inferior, a fact reflected in a standard formulation of domestic property law, that “[e]ach cotenant ... has the right to use and enjoy the entire property as if he or she were the sole owner, limited only by the same right in the other cotenants.” [T]here is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsiders. 

D

Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all. Accordingly, in the balancing of competing individual and governmental interests entailed by the bar to unreasonable searches, the cooperative occupant’s invitation adds nothing to the government’s side to counter the force of an objecting individual’s claim to security against the government’s intrusion into his dwelling place.

E

There are two loose ends, the first being the explanation given in Matlock for the constitutional sufficiency of a co-tenant’s consent to enter and search: it “rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right ....” If Matlock’s co-tenant is giving permission “in his own right,” how can his “own right” be eliminated by another tenant’s objection? The answer appears in the very footnote from which the quoted statement is taken: the “right” to admit the police to which Matlock refers is not an enduring and enforceable ownership right as understood by the private law of property, but is instead the authority recognized by customary social usage as having a substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances. Thus, to ask whether the consenting tenant has the right to admit the police when a physically present fellow tenant objects is not to question whether some property right may be divested by the mere objection of another. It is, rather, the question whether customary social understanding accords the consenting tenant authority powerful enough to prevail over the co-tenant’s objection. The Matlock Court did not purport to answer this question.

The second loose end is the significance of Matlock and Rodriguez after today’s decision.² Although the Matlock defendant was not present with the opportunity to object, he was in a squad car not far away; the Rodriguez defendant was actually asleep in the apartment, and the police might have roused him with a knock on the door before they entered with only the consent of an apparent co-tenant. If those cases are not to be undercut by today’s holding, we have to admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in

² [Footnote by editors] The Court’s decision in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), is discussed briefly in the notes following this case.
fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.

This is the line we draw, and we think the formalism is justified. So long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it. For the very reason that Rodriguez held it would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent, we think it would needlessly limit the capacity of the police to respond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field if we were to hold that reasonableness required the police to take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had already received. There is no ready reason to believe that efforts to invite a refusal would make a difference in many cases, whereas every co-tenant consent case would turn into a test about the adequacy of the police’s efforts to consult with a potential objector. Better to accept the formalism of distinguishing Matlock from this case than to impose a requirement, time consuming in the field and in the courtroom, with no apparent systemic justification. The pragmatic decision to accept the simplicity of this line is, moreover, supported by the substantial number of instances in which suspects who are asked for permission to search actually consent, albeit imprudently, a fact that undercuts any argument that the police should try to locate a suspected inhabitant because his denial of consent would be a foregone conclusion.

III

This case invites a straightforward application of the rule that a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant. Scott Randolph’s refusal is clear, and nothing in the record justifies the search on grounds independent of Janet Randolph’s consent. The State does not argue that she gave any indication to the police of a need for protection inside the house that might have justified entry into the portion of the premises where the police found the powdery straw (which, if lawfully seized, could have been used when attempting to establish probable cause for the warrant issued later). Nor does the State claim that the entry and search should be upheld under the rubric of exigent circumstances, owing to some apprehension by the police officers that Scott Randolph would destroy evidence of drug use before any warrant could be obtained.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is therefore affirmed.

Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice SCALIA joins, dissenting.

The Court creates constitutional law by surmising what is typical when a social guest encounters an entirely atypical situation. The rule the majority fashions does not implement the high office of the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, but instead provides protection on a random and happenstance basis, protecting, for example, a co-occupant who happens to be at the front door when the other occupant consents to a search, but not one napping or watching television in the
next room. And the cost of affording such random protection is great, as demonstrated by the recurring cases in which abused spouses seek to authorize police entry into a home they share with a nonconsenting abuser.

The correct approach to the question presented is clearly mapped out in our precedents: The Fourth Amendment protects privacy. If an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information or those papers or places with the government. And just as an individual who has shared illegal plans or incriminating documents with another cannot interpose an objection when that other person turns the information over to the government, just because the individual happens to be present at the time, so too someone who shares a place with another cannot interpose an objection when that person decides to grant access to the police, simply because the objecting individual happens to be present.

A warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it. Co-occupants have “assumed the risk that one of their number might permit [a] common area to be searched.” Just as Mrs. Randolph could walk upstairs, come down, and turn her husband’s cocaine straw over to the police, she can consent to police entry and search of what is, after all, her home, too.

* * *

As the *Randolph* majority noted, police may rely on the “consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common.” In other words, warrantless entry is valid—that is, reasonable—“when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do so.” *Illinois v. Rodriguez*, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (emphasis added).

In *Randolph*, the Court decided that when one occupant consents to a search and another occupant concurrently refuses consent, the refusal gets priority. A clever student might ask, what happens if the occupant who refuses consent somehow disappears from the scene? If he takes a short walk, for example, or is rushed to the hospital after suffering a heart attack, does his refusal keep working?

Supreme Court of the United States

**Walter Fernandez v. California**

Decided Feb. 25, 2014 – 571 U.S. 292

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Our cases firmly establish that police officers may search jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents. In *Georgia v. Randolph* we recognized a narrow exception to this rule, holding that the consent of one occupant is insufficient when another occupant is present and
objects to the search. In this case, we consider whether *Randolph* applies if the objecting occupant is absent when another occupant consents. Our opinion in *Randolph* took great pains to emphasize that its holding was limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is physically present. We therefore refuse to extend *Randolph* to the very different situation in this case, where consent was provided by an abused woman well after her male partner had been removed from the apartment they shared.

I

A

The events involved in this case occurred in Los Angeles in October 2009. After observing Abel Lopez cash a check, petitioner Walter Fernandez approached Lopez and asked about the neighborhood in which he lived. When Lopez responded that he was from Mexico, Fernandez laughed and told Lopez that he was in territory ruled by the “D.F.S.,” i.e., the “Drifters” gang. Petitioner then pulled out a knife and pointed it at Lopez’ chest. Lopez raised his hand in self-defense, and petitioner cut him on the wrist.

Lopez ran from the scene and called 911 for help, but petitioner whistled, and four men emerged from a nearby apartment building and attacked Lopez. After knocking him to the ground, they hit and kicked him and took his cell phone and his wallet, which contained $400 in cash.

A police dispatch reported the incident and mentioned the possibility of gang involvement, and two Los Angeles police officers, Detective Clark and Officer Cirrito, drove to an alley frequented by members of the Drifters. A man who appeared scared walked by the officers and said: “[T]he guy is in the apartment.” The officers then observed a man run through the alley and into the building to which the man was pointing. A minute or two later, the officers heard sounds of screaming and fighting coming from that building.

After backup arrived, the officers knocked on the door of the apartment unit from which the screams had been heard. Roxanne Rojas answered the door. She was holding a baby and appeared to be crying. Her face was red, and she had a large bump on her nose. The officers also saw blood on her shirt and hand from what appeared to be a fresh injury. Rojas told the police that she had been in a fight. Officer Cirrito asked if anyone else was in the apartment, and Rojas said that her 4–year–old son was the only other person present.

After Officer Cirrito asked Rojas to step out of the apartment so that he could conduct a protective sweep, petitioner appeared at the door wearing only boxer shorts. Apparently agitated, petitioner stepped forward and said, “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my rights.” Suspecting that petitioner had assaulted Rojas, the officers removed him from the apartment and then placed him under arrest. Lopez identified petitioner as his initial attacker, and petitioner was taken to the police station for booking.
Approximately one hour after petitioner’s arrest, Detective Clark returned to the apartment and informed Rojas that petitioner had been arrested. Detective Clark requested and received both oral and written consent from Rojas to search the premises. In the apartment, the police found Drifters gang paraphernalia, a butterfly knife, clothing worn by the robbery suspect, and ammunition. Rojas’ young son also showed the officers where petitioner had hidden a sawed-off shotgun.

B

Petitioner was charged with robbery, infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or child’s parent, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a short-barreled shotgun, and felony possession of ammunition.

Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress the evidence found in the apartment, but after a hearing, the court denied the motion. Petitioner then pleaded nolo contendere to the firearms and ammunition charges. On the remaining counts—for robbery and infliction of corporal injury—he went to trial and was found guilty by a jury. The court sentenced him to 14 years of imprisonment.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Because Randolph did not overturn our prior decisions recognizing that an occupant may give effective consent to search a shared residence, the court agreed with the majority of the federal circuits that an objecting occupant’s physical presence is “indispensable to the decision in Randolph.” And because petitioner was not present when Rojas consented, the court held that petitioner’s suppression motion had been properly denied.

The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review, and we granted certiorari.

II

A

“Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies” and are “a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.” It would be unreasonable—indeed, absurd—to require police officers to obtain a warrant when the sole owner or occupant of a house or apartment voluntarily consents to a search. The owner of a home has a right to allow others to enter and examine the premises, and there is no reason why the owner should not be permitted to extend this same privilege to police officers if that is the owner’s choice. Where the owner believes that he or she is under suspicion, the owner may want the police to search the premises so that their suspicions are dispelled. This may be particularly important where the owner has a strong interest in the apprehension of the perpetrator of a crime and believes that the suspicions of the police are deflecting the course of their investigation. An owner may want the police to search even where they lack probable cause, and if a warrant were always required, this could not be done. And even where the police could establish probable cause, requiring a warrant despite the owner’s consent would needlessly inconvenience everyone involved—not only the officers and the magistrate but also the occupant of the premises, who would generally either be compelled or would feel a need to stay until the search was completed.
B

While consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search, we recognized a narrow exception to this rule in Georgia v. Randolph. The Court reiterated the proposition that a person who shares a residence with others assumes the risk that “any one of them may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may nevertheless be admitted in his absence by another.” But the Court held that “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search [of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” The Court’s opinion went to great lengths to make clear that its holding was limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present.

III

In this case, petitioner was not present when Rojas consented, but petitioner still contends that Randolph is controlling. He advances two main arguments. First, he claims that his absence should not matter since he was absent only because the police had taken him away. Second, he maintains that it was sufficient that he objected to the search while he was still present. Such an objection, he says, should remain in effect until the objecting party “no longer wishes to keep the police out of his home.” Neither of these arguments is sound.

We first consider the argument that the presence of the objecting occupant is not necessary when the police are responsible for his absence. In Randolph, the Court suggested in dictum that consent by one occupant might not be sufficient if “there is evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection.” We do not believe the statement should be read to suggest that improper motive may invalidate objectively justified removal. Hence, it does not govern here.

This brings us to petitioner’s second argument, viz., that his objection, made at the threshold of the premises that the police wanted to search, remained effective until he changed his mind and withdrew his objection. This argument is inconsistent with Randolph’s reasoning in at least two important ways. First, the argument cannot be squared with the “widely shared social expectations” or “customary social usage” upon which the Randolph holding was based. It seems obvious that the calculus of this hypothetical caller would likely be quite different if the objecting tenant was not standing at the door. When the objecting occupant is standing at the threshold saying “stay out,” a friend or visitor invited to enter by another occupant can expect at best an uncomfortable scene and at worst violence if he or she tries to brush past the objector. But when the objector is not on the scene (and especially when it is known that the objector will not return during the course of the visit), the friend or visitor is much more likely to accept the invitation to enter. Thus, petitioner’s argument is inconsistent with Randolph’s reasoning.

Second, petitioner’s argument would create the very sort of practical complications that Randolph sought to avoid. The Randolph Court recognized that it was adopting a “formalis[tic]” rule, but it did so in the interests of “simple clarity” and administrability.
The rule that petitioner would have us adopt would produce a plethora of practical problems. For one thing, there is the question of duration. Petitioner argues that an objection, once made, should last until it is withdrawn by the objector, but such a rule would be unreasonable. Suppose that a husband and wife owned a house as joint tenants and that the husband, after objecting to a search of the house, was convicted and sentenced to a 15-year prison term. Under petitioner’s proposed rule, the wife would be unable to consent to a search of the house 10 years after the date on which her husband objected. We refuse to stretch *Randolph* to such strange lengths.

Nor are we persuaded to hold that an objection lasts for a “reasonable” time. “[I]t is certainly unusual for this Court to set forth precise time limits governing police action” and what interval of time would be reasonable in this context? A week? A month? A year? Ten years?

Petitioner’s rule would also require the police and ultimately the courts to determine whether, after the passage of time, an objector still had “common authority” over the premises, and this would often be a tricky question. Suppose that an incarcerated objector and a consenting co-occupant were joint tenants on a lease. If the objector, after incarceration, stopped paying rent, would he still have “common authority,” and would his objection retain its force? Would it be enough that his name remained on the lease? Would the result be different if the objecting and consenting lessees had an oral month-to-month tenancy?

Another problem concerns the procedure needed to register a continuing objection. Would it be necessary for an occupant to object while police officers are at the door? If presence at the time of consent is not needed, would an occupant have to be present at the premises when the objection was made? Could an objection be made pre-emptively? Could a person like Scott Randolph, suspecting that his estranged wife might invite the police to view his drug stash and paraphernalia, register an objection in advance? Could this be done by posting a sign in front of the house? Could a standing objection be registered by serving notice on the chief of police?

Finally, there is the question of the particular law enforcement officers who would be bound by an objection. Would this set include just the officers who were present when the objection was made? Would it also apply to other officers working on the same investigation? Would it extend to officers who were unaware of the objection? How about officers assigned to different but arguably related cases? Would it be limited by law enforcement agency?

If *Randolph* is taken at its word—that it applies only when the objector is standing in the door saying “stay out” when officers propose to make a consent search—all of these problems disappear.

Putting the exception the Court adopted in *Randolph* to one side, the lawful occupant of a house or apartment should have the right to invite the police to enter the dwelling and conduct a search. Any other rule would trample on the rights of the occupant who is willing to consent. Such an occupant may want the police to search in order to dispel “suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a criminal.” And an occupant may want the police to conduct a thorough search so that any dangerous contraband can be found and removed. In this case, for example, the search resulted in the discovery and removal of a sawed-off shotgun to which Rojas’ 4-year-old son had access.
Denying someone in Rojas’ position the right to allow the police to enter her home would also show disrespect for her independence. Having beaten Rojas, petitioner would bar her from controlling access to her own home until such time as he chose to relent. The Fourth Amendment does not give him that power.

The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is affirmed.

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting.

This case calls for a straightforward application of Randolph. The police officers in Randolph were confronted with a scenario closely resembling the situation presented here. After Walter Fernandez, while physically present at his home, rebuffed the officers’ request to come in, the police removed him from the premises and then arrested him, albeit with cause to believe he had assaulted his cohabitant, Roxanne Rojas. At the time of the arrest, Rojas said nothing to contradict Fernandez’ refusal. About an hour later, however, and with no attempt to obtain a search warrant, the police returned to the apartment and prevailed upon Rojas to sign a consent form authorizing search of the premises.

In this case, the police could readily have obtained a warrant to search the shared residence. The Court does not dispute this, but instead disparages the warrant requirement as inconvenient, burdensome, entailing delay “[e]ven with modern technological advances.”

Although the police have probable cause and could obtain a warrant with dispatch, if they can gain the consent of someone other than the suspect, why should the law insist on the formality of a warrant? Because the Framers saw the neutral magistrate as an essential part of the criminal process shielding all of us, good or bad, saint or sinner, from unchecked police activity.

I would honor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and hold that Fernandez’ objection to the search did not become null upon his arrest and removal from the scene. “There is every reason to conclude that securing a warrant was entirely feasible in this case, and no reason to contract the Fourth Amendment’s dominion.”

Notes, Comments, and Questions

Justice Souter, who wrote for the majority in Randolph, retired before Fernandez was decided. In addition, Justice Kennedy, who voted with the Randolph majority, supported the Fernandez majority in its limitation of the holding of Randolph to its unusual facts. Justice Breyer, who concurred with the Court’s judgement in Randolph but did not endorse all of the majority’s reasoning, also joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Fernandez. In short, while Randolph remains good law, its reasoning may not have support from a current majority of the Court, and its holding is unlikely to be applied to new fact patterns.

Beyond the somewhat esoteric questions presented by Randolph and Fernandez, the broader issue of consent inspires intense disagreements. In particular, dissenting Justices question whether people can really “terminate encounters” with police officers as easily as majority opinions seems to suggest, and they argue that refusing consent is not always practical (or even
possible), particularly among portions of the populations already uneasy with police. Observers note that gender, among other factors, affects whether one has the confidence to deny consent. See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 51 (2009) (reporting on random survey of Boston residents concerning sidewalks and buses, finding that “women and young people feel less free to leave than other groups”).

On the other hand, robust cooperation with police is essential to the prevention and detection of crime. If police needed a warrant every time they searched a car, bag, or house, investigations would be slowed considerably. This reality encourages Justices to avoid placing high hurdles in the path of officers who seek consent from members of the public.

The Authority of Co-Occupants and Co-Owners to Consent to Searches

Students, generally familiar with shared housing, frequently ask about the scope of authority possessed by a co-occupant to consent to searches of shared living quarters. In particular, when two or more students share a common living room and kitchen yet have individual bedrooms, can one resident of a shared apartment allow police to search the entire premises? The answer is that residents may authorize searches of areas over which they have control, whether sole control or shared control. Accordingly, in the apartment described above, a resident could permit police to search the living room, the kitchen, and her own personal bedroom, but she would not have authority to authorize searches of someone else’s bedroom.

The same principle applies to items that are shared or are lent by an owner to another person. Someone permitted to use and carry a backpack—whether the sole owner, a co-owner, or a borrower—may authorize police to search the bag.

Recall that police can rely on apparent authority—a search is reasonable as long as officers reasonably believe they receive valid consent. Nonetheless, officers should be careful when entering shared premises with consent to learn what areas are controlled by the consenting resident.
WARRANT EXCEPTION: EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The Court has grouped a handful of recurring situations under the umbrella term “exigent circumstances.” This exception allows police to conduct searches without warrants as long as officers have probable cause to believe that one of the approved kinds of unusual situations—that is, exigent circumstances—exists. For all the categories of exigent circumstances, the Court has decided that seeking a warrant would be impossible, or at least impractical. The key categories are: (1) hot pursuit of a fleeing criminal suspect, (2) protection of public safety from immediate threats, and (3) preservation of evidence (that officers have probable cause to believe is subject to seizure and will be found on the premises) from destruction.

We begin with hot pursuit.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: HOT PURSUIT

Supreme Court of the United States

Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Bennie Joe Hayden

Decided May 29, 1967 – 387 U.S. 294

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We review in this case the validity of the proposition that there is under the Fourth Amendment a “distinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized either under the authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search incident to arrest, and on the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen property, weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be effected, and property the possession of which is a crime.”

A Maryland court sitting without a jury convicted respondent of armed robbery. Items of his clothing, a cap, jacket, and trousers, among other things, were seized during a search of his home, and were admitted in evidence without objection. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, he sought and was denied federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court for Maryland. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that respondent was correct in his contention that the clothing seized was improperly admitted in evidence because the items had “evidentiary value only” and therefore were not lawfully subject to seizure. We granted certiorari. We reverse.
I

About 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber entered the business premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland. He took some $363 and ran. Two cab drivers in the vicinity, attracted by shouts of “Holdup,” followed the man to 2111 Cocoa Lane. One driver notified the company dispatcher by radio that the man was [Black] about 5’ 8” tall, wearing a light cap and dark jacket, and that he had entered the house on Cocoa Lane. The dispatcher relayed the information to police who were proceeding to the scene of the robbery. Within minutes, police arrived at the house in a number of patrol cars. An officer knocked and announced their presence. Mrs. Hayden answered, and the officers told her they believed that a robber had entered the house, and asked to search the house. She offered no objection. 1

The officers spread out through the first and second floors and the cellar in search of the robber. Hayden was found in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep. He was arrested when the officers on the first floor and in the cellar reported that no other man was in the house. Meanwhile an officer was attracted to an adjoining bathroom by the noise of running water, and discovered a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank; another officer who, according to the District Court, “was searching the cellar for a man or the money” found in a washing machine a jacket and trousers of the type the fleeing man was said to have worn. A clip of ammunition for the pistol and a cap were found under the mattress of Hayden’s bed, and ammunition for the shotgun was found in a bureau drawer in Hayden’s room. All these items of evidence were introduced against respondent at his trial.

II

We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search for him without warrant was invalid. Under the circumstances of this case, “the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” The police were informed that an armed robbery had taken place, and that the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa Lane less than five minutes before they reached it. They acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape.

[T]he seizures occurred prior to or immediately contemporaneous with Hayden’s arrest, as part of an effort to find a suspected felon, armed, within the house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived. The permissible scope of search must, therefore, at the least, be as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape.

1 [Footnote by editors] Valid consent would have justified entry even absent exigent circumstances. During post-conviction proceedings, the appellate courts decided that because they found exigent circumstances, they did not need to determine whether consent existed. Accordingly, only exigent circumstances was before the Court.
It is argued that, while the weapons, ammunition, and cap may have been seized in the course of a search for weapons, the officer who seized the clothing was searching neither for the suspect nor for weapons when he looked into the washing machine in which he found the clothing. But even if we assume, although we do not decide, that the exigent circumstances in this case made lawful a search without warrant only for the suspect or his weapons, it cannot be said on this record that the officer who found the clothes in the washing machine was not searching for weapons. He testified that he was searching for the man or the money, but his failure to state explicitly that he was searching for weapons, in the absence of a specific question to that effect, can hardly be accorded controlling weight. He knew that the robber was armed and he did not know that some weapons had been found at the time he opened the machine. In these circumstances the inference that he was in fact also looking for weapons is fully justified.

III

We come, then, to the question whether, even though the search was lawful, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the seizure and introduction of the items of clothing violated the Fourth Amendment because they are “mere evidence.” The distinction made by some of our cases between seizure of items of evidential value only and seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband has been criticized by courts and commentators. The Court of Appeals, however, felt “obligated to adhere to it.” We today reject the distinction as based on premises no longer accepted as rules governing the application of the Fourth Amendment.

Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between “mere evidence” and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband. Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband. A magistrate can intervene in both situations, and the requirements of probable cause and specificity can be preserved intact. Moreover, nothing in the nature of property seized as evidence renders it more private than property seized, for example, as an instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed, the distinction is wholly irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the same “papers and effects” may be “mere evidence” in one case and “instrumentality” in another.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

Hot pursuit allows officers to follow a fleeing felon into a house. The Court has explained that “‘hot pursuit’ means some sort of a chase, but it need not be an extended hue and cry ‘in and about (the) public streets.’” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).

After entering a home in hot pursuit, police may look around to protect themselves, find the suspect, find weapons, etc. The Court in Hayden even allows an officer to search a washing machine around the time the suspect was caught elsewhere. Consider the following scenario:
Police have probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor. The suspect flees, and police give chase. If the suspect enters a home, may police follow? Why or why not? See Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011 (2021), in which the Court declined to extend the exception to all fleeing misdemeanor suspects. The Court left open the possibility that some misdemeanants might be covered. The crime at issue in Lange was failing to comply with a police signal.

In addition to its appearance in criminal procedure law, “hot pursuit” is a term of art in international law. A “backgrounder” published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) describes the doctrine as follows: “The doctrine generally pertains to the law of the seas and the ability of one state’s navy to pursue a foreign ship that has violated laws and regulations in its territorial waters (twelve nautical miles from shore), even if the ship flees to the high seas.” Quoting Professor Michael P. Scharf, the CFR document explained further: “It means you are literally and temporally in pursuit and following the tail of a fugitive. … [A state] is allowed to temporarily violate borders to make an apprehension under those circumstances.”

Students interested in further information can review the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which covers hot pursuit in Article 111, along with the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which covers the doctrine in Article 23. Students will notice similarities among the international law doctrine and our domestic criminal procedure rule. Under each, state agents are permitted to briefly enter otherwise prohibited areas for law enforcement purposes. On the other hand, application of “hot pursuit” on land (for example, entering a foreign country to capture or kill a wanted terrorist) is disputed in international law.

In the next case, the Court considers whether a “routine felony arrest” constitutes exigent circumstances and accordingly allows warrantless entry of a home in which police have probable cause to believe the felony suspect will be found. Students should consider that even in the Bronx in 1970—the location and year of the search at issue—the crime rate was not so high that arresting a man suspected of murdering someone two days earlier during an armed robbery had become “routine.” What then made this scenario different from “hot pursuit” and other sorts of exigent circumstances in the eyes of the Justices?

Supreme Court of the United States

Theodore Payton v. New York

Decided April 15, 1980 – 445 U.S. 573

Mr. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

These appeals challenge the constitutionality of New York statutes that authorize police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony arrest.

I

On January 14, 1970, after two days of intensive investigation, New York detectives had assembled evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Theodore Payton had murdered the manager of a gas station two days earlier. At about 7:30 a.m. on January 15, six
officers went to Payton’s apartment in the Bronx, intending to arrest him. They had not obtained a warrant. Although light and music emanated from the apartment, there was no response to their knock on the metal door. They summoned emergency assistance and, about 30 minutes later, used crowbars to break open the door and enter the apartment. No one was there. In plain view, however, was a .30-caliber shell casing that was seized and later admitted into evidence at Payton’s murder trial.

In due course Payton surrendered to the police, was indicted for murder, and moved to suppress the evidence taken from his apartment. The trial judge held that the warrantless and forcible entry was authorized by the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the evidence in plain view was properly seized. He found that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ failure to announce their purpose before entering the apartment as required by the statute. He had no occasion, however, to decide whether those circumstances also would have justified the failure to obtain a warrant, because he concluded that the warrantless entry was adequately supported by the statute without regard to the circumstances. The Appellate Division, First Department, summarily affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Payton.

Before addressing the narrow question presented by these appeals, we put to one side other related problems that are not presented today. Although it is arguable that the warrantless entry to effect Payton’s arrest might have been justified by exigent circumstances, none of the New York courts relied on any such justification. The Court of Appeals majority treated Payton’s case as involving a routine arrest in which there was ample time to obtain a warrant, and we will do the same. Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as “exigent circumstances,” that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search.

Nor do these cases raise any question concerning the authority of the police, without either a search or arrest warrant, to enter a third party’s home to arrest a suspect. The police broke into Payton’s apartment intending to arrest Payton. We also note that it is not argued that the police lacked probable cause to believe that Payton was at home when they entered. Finally, we are dealing with an entry into a home made without the consent of any occupant.

II

It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of “general warrants” were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment. It is perfectly clear that the evil the Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant. Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the Amendment. Almost a century ago the Court stated in resounding terms that the principles reflected in the Amendment “reached farther than the concrete form” of the specific cases that gave it birth, and “apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”

The simple language of the Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property. Our analysis in this case may therefore properly commence with rules that have been well established in Fourth Amendment litigation involving tangible items. As the Court
reiterated just a few years ago, the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” And we have long adhered to the view that the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions of that sort.

It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Yet it is also well settled that objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant. The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. [T]his distinction has equal force when the seizure of a person is involved. [T]he critical point is that any differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and entries to arrest are merely ones of degree rather than kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individual’s home. The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.” That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.

IV

The parties have argued at some length about the practical consequences of a warrant requirement as a precondition to a felony arrest in the home. In the absence of any evidence that effective law enforcement has suffered in those States that already have such a requirement, we are inclined to view such arguments with skepticism. More fundamentally, however, such arguments of policy must give way to a constitutional command that we consider to be unequivocal.

Finally, we note the State’s suggestion that only a search warrant based on probable cause to believe the suspect is at home at a given time can adequately protect the privacy interests at stake, and since such a warrant requirement is manifestly impractical, there need be no warrant of any kind. We find this ingenious argument unpersuasive. It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate’s determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen. If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.

Because no arrest warrant was obtained, the judgments must be reversed and the cases remanded to the New York Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

The Court today holds that absent exigent circumstances officers may never enter a home during the daytime to arrest for a dangerous felony unless they have first obtained a warrant. This hard-and-fast rule, founded on erroneous assumptions concerning the intrusiveness of home arrest entries, finds little or no support in the common law or in the text and history of the Fourth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.

Today’s decision distorts the historical meaning of the Fourth Amendment, by proclaiming for the first time a rigid warrant requirement for all nonexigent home arrest entries. The history of the Fourth Amendment does not support the rule announced today. At the time that Amendment was adopted the constable possessed broad inherent powers to arrest. The limitations on those powers derived, not from a warrant “requirement,” but from the generally ministerial nature of the constable’s office at common law. Far from restricting the constable’s arrest power, the institution of the warrant was used to expand that authority by giving the constable delegated powers of a superior officer such as a justice of the peace. Hence at the time of the Bill of Rights, the warrant functioned as a powerful tool of law enforcement rather than as a protection for the rights of criminal suspects.

In fact, it was the abusive use of the warrant power, rather than any excessive zeal in the discharge of peace officers’ inherent authority, that precipitated the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment grew out of colonial opposition to the infamous general warrants known as writs of assistance, which empowered customs officers to search at will, and to break open receptacles or packages, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be. The writs did not specify where searches could occur and they remained effective throughout the sovereign’s lifetime. In effect, the writs placed complete discretion in the hands of executing officials. Customs searches of this type were beyond the inherent power of common-law officials and were the subject of court suits when performed by colonial customs agents not acting pursuant to a writ.

That the Framers were concerned about warrants, and not about the constable’s inherent power to arrest, is also evident from the text and legislative history of the Fourth Amendment. That provision first reaffirms the basic principle of common law, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....” The Amendment does not here purport to limit or restrict the peace officer’s inherent power to arrest or search, but rather assumes an existing right against actions in excess of that inherent power and ensures that it remain inviolable. [I]t was not generally considered “unreasonable” at common law for officers to break doors in making warrantless felony arrests. The Amendment’s second clause is directed at the actions of officers taken in their ministerial capacity pursuant to writs of assistance and other warrants. In contrast to the first Clause, the second Clause does purport to alter colonial practice: “and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

That the Fourth Amendment was directed towards safeguarding the rights at common law, and restricting the warrant practice which gave officers vast new powers beyond their inherent
authority, is evident from the legislative history of that provision. As originally drafted by James Madison, it was directed only at warrants; so deeply ingrained was the basic common-law premise that it was not even expressed:

“The rights of the people to be secured in their persons[,] their houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.” 1 Annals of Cong. 452 (1789).

In sum, the background, text, and legislative history of the Fourth Amendment demonstrate that the purpose was to restrict the abuses that had developed with respect to warrants; the Amendment preserved common-law rules of arrest. Because it was not considered generally unreasonable at common law for officers to break doors to effect a warrantless felony arrest, I do not believe that the Fourth Amendment was intended to outlaw the types of police conduct at issue in the present cases.

Today’s decision rests, in large measure, on the premise that warrantless arrest entries constitute a particularly severe invasion of personal privacy. I do not dispute that the home is generally a very private area or that the common law displayed a special “reverence ... for the individual’s right of privacy in his house.” However, the Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting people, not places, and no talismanic significance is given to the fact that an arrest occurs in the home rather than elsewhere. It is necessary in each case to assess realistically the actual extent of invasion of constitutionally protected privacy. Further, all arrests involve serious intrusions into an individual’s privacy and dignity. Yet we settled in [United States v.] Watson [423 U.S. 411 (1976)], that the intrusiveness of a public arrest is not enough to mandate the obtaining of a warrant. The inquiry in the present case, therefore, is whether the incremental intrusiveness that results from an arrest’s being made in the dwelling is enough to support an inflexible constitutional rule requiring warrants for such arrests whenever exigent circumstances are not present.

Today’s decision ignores the carefully crafted restrictions on the common-law power of arrest entry and thereby overestimates the dangers inherent in that practice. At common law, absent exigent circumstances, entries to arrest could be made only for felony. Even in cases of felony, the officers were required to announce their presence, demand admission, and be refused entry before they were entitled to break doors. Further, it seems generally accepted that entries could be made only during daylight hours. And, in my view, the officer entering to arrest must have reasonable grounds to believe, not only that the arrestee has committed a crime, but also that the person suspected is present in the house at the time of the entry.

These four restrictions on home arrests—felony, knock and announce, daytime, and stringent probable cause—constitute powerful and complementary protections for the privacy interests associated with the home. The felony requirement guards against abusive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes. The knock-and-announce and daytime requirements protect individuals against the fear, humiliation, and embarrassment of being aroused from their beds in states of partial or complete undress. And these requirements allow the arrestee to surrender at his front door, thereby maintaining his dignity and preventing the officers from entering other rooms of the dwelling.
The stringent probable-cause requirement would help ensure against the possibility that the police would enter when the suspect was not home, and, in searching for him, frighten members of the family or ransack parts of the house, seizing items in plain view. In short, these requirements, taken together, permit an individual suspected of a serious crime to surrender at the front door of his dwelling and thereby avoid most of the humiliation and indignity that the Court seems to believe necessarily accompany a house arrest entry.

While exaggerating the invasion of personal privacy involved in home arrests, the Court fails to account for the danger that its rule will “severely hamper effective law enforcement.” The policeman on his beat must now make subtle discriminations that perplex even judges in their chambers. [P]olice will sometimes delay making an arrest, even after probable cause is established, in order to be sure that they have enough evidence to convict. Then, if they suddenly have to arrest, they run the risk that the subsequent exigency will not excuse their prior failure to obtain a warrant. This problem cannot effectively be cured by obtaining a warrant as soon as probable cause is established because of the chance that the warrant will go stale before the arrest is made.

Further, police officers will often face the difficult task of deciding whether the circumstances are sufficiently exigent to justify their entry to arrest without a warrant. This is a decision that must be made quickly in the most trying of circumstances. If the officers mistakenly decide that the circumstances are exigent, the arrest will be invalid and any evidence seized incident to the arrest or in plain view will be excluded at trial. On the other hand, if the officers mistakenly determine that exigent circumstances are lacking, they may refrain from making the arrest, thus creating the possibility that a dangerous criminal will escape into the community. The police could reduce the likelihood of escape by staking out all possible exits until the circumstances become clearly exigent or a warrant is obtained. But the costs of such a stakeout seem excessive in an era of rising crime and scarce police resources.

The uncertainty inherent in the exigent-circumstances determination burdens the judicial system as well. In the case of searches, exigent circumstances are sufficiently unusual that this Court has determined that the benefits of a warrant outweigh the burdens imposed, including the burdens on the judicial system. In contrast, arrests recurrringly involve exigent circumstances, and this Court has heretofore held that a warrant can be dispensed with without undue sacrifice in Fourth Amendment values. The situation should be no different with respect to arrests in the home. Under today’s decision, whenever the police have made a warrantless home arrest there will be the possibility of “endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like.”

Our cases establish that the ultimate test under the Fourth Amendment is one of “reasonableness.” I cannot join the Court in declaring unreasonable a practice which has been thought entirely reasonable by so many for so long.
Notes, Comments, and Questions

Consider the “routine felony arrest” in other locations. Do the police need a search warrant to enter third party’s home? Suspect’s place of employment? Suspect’s privately-owned business? Suspect’s girlfriend’s home? Suspect’s parent’s home?

Exigent Circumstances: Public Safety

The next category of exigent circumstances includes situations in which police believe public safety is at immediate risk. For example, when operators receive a 911 call reporting an ongoing assault, police need not seek a warrant before heading to the crime scene and, if necessary, entering a home. Firefighters and emergency medical personnel also enter buildings without warrants to provide prompt aid. Similarly, officers who hear screams coming from a house or perceive other evidence of imminent danger may have probable cause that justifies warrantless entry. In these situations, police could not effectively “serve and protect” without an exception to the warrant requirement.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Brigham City, Utah v. Charles W. Stuart**

Decided May 22, 2006 – 547 U.S. 398

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court.

In this case we consider whether police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. We conclude that they may.

I

This case arises out of a melee that occurred in a Brigham City, Utah, home in the early morning hours of July 23, 2000. At about 3 a.m., four police officers responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house, they heard shouting from inside, and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. There, they observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. They entered the backyard, and saw—through a screen door and windows—an altercation taking place in the kitchen of the home. According to the testimony of one of the officers, four adults were attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a juvenile. The juvenile eventually “broke free, swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face.” The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. At this point, an officer opened the screen door and announced the officers’ presence. Amid the tumult, nobody noticed. The officer entered the kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly became aware that the police were on the scene, the altercation ceased.
The officers subsequently arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial court, respondents filed
a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the
warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion, and the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed.

We granted certiorari in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals
concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law
enforcement in an emergency situation.

II

It is a “‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” Nevertheless, because the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness,” the warrant requirement is subject to
certain exceptions. We have held, for example, that law enforcement officers may make a
warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and investigate its cause, to prevent the
imminent destruction of evidence, or to engage in “‘hot pursuit’” of a fleeing suspect. “[W]arrants
are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the
situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are
seriously injured or threatened with such injury. “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency.” Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to
render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent
injury.

Respondents do not take issue with these principles, but instead advance two reasons why the
officers’ entry here was unreasonable. First, they argue that the officers were more interested in
making arrests than quelling violence. They urge us to consider, in assessing the reasonableness
of the entry, whether the officers were “indeed motivated primarily by a desire to save lives and
property.” The Utah Supreme Court also considered the officers’ subjective motivations relevant.

Our cases have repeatedly rejected this approach. An action is “reasonable” under the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, “as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively, justify [the] action.” The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant. It
therefore does not matter here—even if their subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled—
whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them
or to assist the injured and prevent further violence.

As respondents note, we have held in the context of programmatic searches conducted without
individualized suspicion—such as checkpoints to combat drunk driving or drug trafficking—that
“an inquiry into programmatic purpose” is sometimes appropriate. But this inquiry is directed
at ensuring that the purpose behind the program is not “ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control.” It has nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.

Respondents further contend that their conduct was not serious enough to justify the officers’ intrusion into the home. They rely on *Welsh v. Wisconsin*, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), in which we held that “an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.” This contention, too, is misplaced. *Welsh* involved a warrantless entry by officers to arrest a suspect for driving while intoxicated. There, the “only potential emergency” confronting the officers was the need to preserve evidence (i.e., the suspect’s blood-alcohol level)—an exigency that we held insufficient under the circumstances to justify entry into the suspect’s home. Here, the officers were confronted with ongoing violence occurring within the home. *Welsh* did not address such a situation.

We think the officers’ entry here was plainly reasonable under the circumstances. The officers were responding, at 3 o’clock in the morning, to complaints about a loud party. As they approached the house, they could hear from within “an altercation occurring, some kind of a fight.” “It was loud and it was tumultuous.” The officers heard “thumping and crashing” and people yelling “stop, stop” and “get off me.” As the trial court found, “it was obvious that ... knocking on the front door” would have been futile. The noise seemed to be coming from the back of the house; after looking in the front window and seeing nothing, the officers proceeded around back to investigate further. They found two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. From there, they could see that a fracas was taking place inside the kitchen. A juvenile, fists clenched, was being held back by several adults. As the officers watch, he breaks free and strikes one of the adults in the face, sending the adult to the sink spitting blood.

In these circumstances, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment required them to wait until another blow rendered someone “unconscious” or “semi-conscious” or worse before entering. The role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not like a boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-sided.

The manner of the officers’ entry was also reasonable. After witnessing the punch, one of the officers opened the screen door and “yelled in police.” When nobody heard him, he stepped into the kitchen and announced himself again. Only then did the tumult subside. The officer’s announcement of his presence was at least equivalent to a knock on the screen door. Indeed, it was probably the only option that had even a chance of rising above the din. Under these circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule. Furthermore, once the announcement was made, the officers were free to enter; it would serve no purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah, and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

* * *
In *Michigan v. Fisher*, the majority (in a brief unsigned opinion, issued without oral argument), held that the law set forth in cases like *Brigham City* easily justified the warrantless entry at issue. However, while *Brigham City* was decided by a unanimous Court, the facts of *Fisher* inspired two Justices to dissent. Regardless of which opinion one finds more persuasive in *Fisher*, students can use this case to see approximately where different judges will draw the line between exigent circumstances—in which public safety concerns allow warrantless entry—and day-to-day law enforcement scenarios requiring warrants.

**Supreme Court of the United States**

**Michigan v. Jeremy Fisher**


**PER CURIAM.**

Police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance near Allen Road in Brownstown, Michigan. Officer Christopher Goolsby later testified that, as he and his partner approached the area, a couple directed them to a residence where a man was “going crazy.” Upon their arrival, the officers found a household in considerable chaos: a pickup truck in the driveway with its front smashed, damaged fenceposts along the side of the property, and three broken house windows, the glass still on the ground outside. The officers also noticed blood on the hood of the pickup and on clothes inside of it, as well as on one of the doors to the house. (It is disputed whether they noticed this immediately upon reaching the house, but undisputed that they noticed it before the allegedly unconstitutional entry.) Through a window, the officers could see respondent, Jeremy Fisher, inside the house, screaming and throwing things. The back door was locked, and a couch had been placed to block the front door.

The officers knocked, but Fisher refused to answer. They saw that Fisher had a cut on his hand, and they asked him whether he needed medical attention. Fisher ignored these questions and demanded, with accompanying profanity, that the officers go to get a search warrant. Officer Goolsby then pushed the front door partway open and ventured into the house. Through the window of the open door he saw Fisher pointing a long gun at him. Officer Goolsby withdrew.

Fisher was charged under Michigan law with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court concluded that Officer Goolsby violated the Fourth Amendment when he entered Fisher’s house, and granted Fisher’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result—that is, Officer Goolsby’s statement that Fisher pointed a rifle at him. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially remanded for an evidentiary hearing, after which the trial court reinstated its order. The Court of Appeals then affirmed. Because the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals is indeed contrary to our Fourth Amendment case law, particularly *Brigham City v. Stuart*, we grant the State’s petition for certiorari and reverse.

 “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” we have often said, “is ‘reasonableness.’” Therefore, although “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” that presumption can be overcome. For example, “the exigencies of the situation
[may] make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”

*Brigham City* identified one such exigency: “the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Thus, law enforcement officers “may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” This “emergency aid exception” does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. It requires only “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that “a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.”

A straightforward application of the emergency aid exception, as in *Brigham City*, dictates that the officer’s entry was reasonable. Just as in *Brigham City*, the police officers here were responding to a report of a disturbance. Just as in *Brigham City*, when they arrived on the scene they encountered a tumultuous situation in the house—and here they also found signs of a recent injury, perhaps from a car accident, outside. And just as in *Brigham City*, the officers could see violent behavior inside. Although Officer Goolsby and his partner did not see punches thrown, as did the officers in *Brigham City*, they did see Fisher screaming and throwing things. It would be objectively reasonable to believe that Fisher’s projectiles might have a human target (perhaps a spouse or a child), or that Fisher would hurt himself in the course of his rage. In short, we find it as plain here as we did in *Brigham City* that the officer’s entry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, thought the situation “did not rise to a level of emergency justifying the warrantless intrusion into a residence.” Although the Court of Appeals conceded that “there was evidence an injured person was on the premises,” it found it significant that “the mere drops of blood did not signal a likely serious, life-threatening injury.” The court added that the cut Officer Goolsby observed on Fisher’s hand “likely explained the trail of blood” and that Fisher “was very much on his feet and apparently able to see to his own needs.”

Even a casual review of *Brigham City* reveals the flaw in this reasoning. Officers do not need ironclad proof of “a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emergency aid exception. The only injury police could confirm in *Brigham City* was the bloody lip they saw the juvenile inflict upon the adult. Fisher argues that the officers here could not have been motivated by a perceived need to provide medical assistance, since they never summoned emergency medical personnel. This would have no bearing, of course, upon their need to ensure that Fisher was not endangering someone else in the house. Moreover, even if the failure to summon medical personnel conclusively established that Goolsby did not subjectively believe, when he entered the house, that Fisher or someone else was seriously injured (which is doubtful), the test, as we have said, is not what Goolsby believed, but whether there was “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.

It was error for the Michigan Court of Appeals to replace that objective inquiry into appearances with its hindsight determination that there was in fact no emergency. It does not meet the needs of law enforcement or the demands of public safety to require officers to walk away from a situation like the one they encountered here. Only when an apparent threat has become an actual harm can officers rule out innocuous explanations for ominous circumstances. But “[t]he role of
a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties.” It sufficed to invoke the emergency aid exception that it was reasonable to believe that Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that in his rage he was unable to provide, or that Fisher was about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone else. The Michigan Court of Appeals required more than what the Fourth Amendment demands.

The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR joins, dissenting.

On October 31, 2003, Jeremy Fisher pointed a rifle at Officer Christopher Goolsby when Goolsby attempted to force his way into Fisher’s home without a warrant. Fisher was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a dangerous weapon during the commission of a felony. The charges were dismissed after the trial judge granted a motion to suppress evidence of the assault because it was the product of Goolsby’s unlawful entry. In 2005 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred because it had decided the suppression motion without conducting a full evidentiary hearing. On remand, the trial court conducted such a hearing and again granted the motion to suppress.

As a matter of Michigan law it is well settled that police officers may enter a home without a warrant “when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” We have stated the rule in the same way under federal law and have explained that a warrantless entry is justified by the “need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” The State bears the burden of proof on that factual issue and relied entirely on the testimony of Officer Goolsby in its attempt to carry that burden. Since three years had passed, Goolsby was not sure about certain facts—such as whether Fisher had a cut on his hand—but he did remember that Fisher repeatedly swore at the officers and told them to get a warrant, and that Fisher was screaming and throwing things. Goolsby also testified that he saw “mere drops” of blood outside Fisher’s home and that he did not ask whether anyone else was inside. Goolsby did not testify that he had any reason to believe that anyone else was in the house. Thus, the factual question was whether Goolsby had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that [Fisher was] seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.

After hearing the testimony, the trial judge was “even more convinced” that the entry was unlawful. He noted the issue was “whether or not there was a reasonable basis to [enter the house] or whether [Goolsby] was just acting on some possibilities” and evidently found the record supported the latter rather than the former. He found the police decision to leave the scene and not return for several hours—without resolving any potentially dangerous situation and without calling for medical assistance—inconsistent with a reasonable belief that Fisher was in need of immediate aid. In sum, the one judge who heard Officer Goolsby’s testimony was not persuaded that Goolsby had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that entering Fisher’s home was necessary to avoid serious injury.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the State had not met its burden. Perhaps because one judge dissented, the Michigan Supreme Court initially granted an application for leave to appeal. After considering briefs and oral argument, however, the majority of that Court vacated its earlier order because it was “no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.”

Today, without having heard Officer Goolsby’s testimony, this Court decides that the trial judge got it wrong. I am not persuaded that he did, but even if we make that assumption, it is hard to see how the Court is justified in micromanaging the day-to-day business of state tribunals making fact-intensive decisions of this kind. We ought not usurp the role of the factfinder when faced with a close question of the reasonableness of an officer’s actions, particularly in a case tried in a state court. I therefore respectfully dissent.

* * *

In Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021), the Court considered whether after a dangerous (possibly suicidal) man was removed from his home, police could confiscate firearms from the home pursuant to a “community caretaking function.” The Court had held in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973) that the community caretaking function allowed police to search an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm. The Court held that entering the home and seizing the weapons was not justified by the exigent circumstances exception. The Court reasoned that prior caselaw about car searches did not apply to homes, which enjoy greater protection. Then, the Court distinguished cases such as Brigham City and Fisher, in which police perceived immediate dangers and could not sensibly take time to obtain warrants, from the scenario presented. 2 The weapons, sitting in an empty house, did not justify a warrantless search of the home. The concurring opinion of Justice Kavanaugh provides further discussion of what scenarios (such as reasonable fear that an old man has fallen inside his house and needs help) would justify warrantless searches of homes.

Exigent Circumstances: Preserving Evidence from Destruction

Our next category of exigent circumstances includes situations in which police have probable cause to believe (1) that items subject to seizure are in a particular place and (2) that waiting for a warrant would put the evidence at serious risk of destruction. Common scenarios involve suspects who may be about to flush drugs down the toilet, burn documents, or tamper with electronic devices.

Supreme Court of the United States

Kentucky v. Hollis Deshaun King

Decided May 16, 2011 – 563 U.S. 452

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is well established that “exigent circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction

2 In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that nothing in the Court’s decision in Caniglia cast doubt on the prior holdings in Brigham City and Fisher.
of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant. In this case, we consider whether this rule applies when police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances rule does not apply in the case at hand because the police should have foreseen that their conduct would prompt the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence. We reject this interpretation of the exigent circumstances rule. The conduct of the police prior to their entry into the apartment was entirely lawful. They did not violate the Fourth Amendment or threaten to do so. In such a situation, the exigent circumstances rule applies.

I

A

This case concerns the search of an apartment in Lexington, Kentucky. Police officers set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine outside an apartment complex. Undercover Officer Gibbons watched the deal take place from an unmarked car in a nearby parking lot. After the deal occurred, Gibbons radioed uniformed officers to move in on the suspect. He told the officers that the suspect was moving quickly toward the breezeway of an apartment building, and he urged them to “hurry up and get there” before the suspect entered an apartment.

In response to the radio alert, the uniformed officers drove into the nearby parking lot, left their vehicles, and ran to the breezeway. Just as they entered the breezeway, they heard a door shut and detected a very strong odor of burnt marijuana. At the end of the breezeway, the officers saw two apartments, one on the left and one on the right, and they did not know which apartment the suspect had entered. Gibbons had radioed that the suspect was running into the apartment on the right, but the officers did not hear this statement because they had already left their vehicles. Because they smelled marijuana smoke emanating from the apartment on the left, they approached the door of that apartment.

Officer Steven Cobb, one of the uniformed officers who approached the door, testified that the officers banged on the left apartment door “as loud as [they] could” and announced, “This is the police” or “Police, police, police.” Cobb said that “[a]s soon as [the officers] started banging on the door,” they “could hear people inside moving,” and “[i]t sounded as [though] things were being moved inside the apartment.” These noises, Cobb testified, led the officers to believe that drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed.

At that point, the officers announced that they “were going to make entry inside the apartment.” Cobb then kicked in the door, the officers entered the apartment, and they found three people in the front room: respondent Hollis King, respondent’s girlfriend, and a guest who was smoking marijuana. The officers performed a protective sweep of the apartment during which they saw marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. In a subsequent search, they also discovered crack cocaine, cash, and drug paraphernalia.

Police eventually entered the apartment on the right. Inside, they found the suspected drug dealer who was the initial target of their investigation.
In the Fayette County Circuit Court, a grand jury charged respondent with trafficking in marijuana, first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and second-degree persistent felony offender status. Respondent filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search, but the Circuit Court denied the motion. The court sentenced respondent to 11 years' imprisonment. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed.

II

A

Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured. “It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law,'” we have often said, “that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” But we have also recognized that this presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because “[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Accordingly, the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.

One well-recognized exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” This Court has identified several exigencies that may justify a warrantless search of a home. [W]hat is relevant here—the need “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence” has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.

B

Over the years, lower courts have developed an exception to the exigent circumstances rule, the so-called “police-created exigency” doctrine. Under this doctrine, police may not rely on the need to prevent destruction of evidence when that exigency was “created” or “manufactured” by the conduct of the police.

In applying this exception for the “creation” or “manufacturing” of an exigency by the police, courts require something more than mere proof that fear of detection by the police caused the destruction of evidence. An additional showing is obviously needed because, as the Eighth Circuit has recognized, “in some sense the police always create the exigent circumstances.” That is to say, in the vast majority of cases in which evidence is destroyed by persons who are engaged in illegal conduct, the reason for the destruction is fear that the evidence will fall into the hands of law enforcement. Destruction of evidence issues probably occur most frequently in drug cases because drugs may be easily destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing them down a drain. Persons in possession of valuable drugs are unlikely to destroy them unless they fear discovery by the police. Consequently, a rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established exception to the warrant requirement.
Presumably for the purpose of avoiding such a result, the lower courts have held that the police-created exigency doctrine requires more than simple causation, but the lower courts have not agreed on the test to be applied.

III

Despite the welter of tests devised by the lower courts, the answer to the question presented in this case follows directly and clearly from the principle that permits warrantless searches in the first place. As previously noted, warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Therefore, the answer to the question before us is that the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. Where, as here, the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.

Some lower courts have adopted a rule that is similar to the one that we recognize today. But others, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, have imposed additional requirements that are unsound and that we now reject.

**Bad faith.** Some courts, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, ask whether law enforcement officers “deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement.”

This approach is fundamentally inconsistent with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “Our cases have repeatedly rejected” a subjective approach, asking only whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.” “Indeed, we have never held, outside limited contexts such as an “inventory search or administrative inspection ..., that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.”

The reasons for looking to objective factors, rather than subjective intent, are clear. Legal tests based on reasonableness are generally objective, and this Court has long taken the view that “evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.”

**Reasonable foreseeability.** Some courts, again including the Kentucky Supreme Court, hold that police may not rely on an exigency if “it was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances.” Courts applying this test have invalidated warrantless home searches on the ground that it was reasonably foreseeable that police officers, by knocking on the door and announcing their presence, would lead a drug suspect to destroy evidence.

Contrary to this reasoning, however, we have rejected the notion that police may seize evidence without a warrant only when they come across the evidence by happenstance. Adoption of a reasonable foreseeability test would also introduce an unacceptable degree of unpredictability.
For example, whenever law enforcement officers knock on the door of premises occupied by a person who may be involved in the drug trade, there is some possibility that the occupants may possess drugs and may seek to destroy them. Under a reasonable foreseeability test, it would be necessary to quantify the degree of predictability that must be reached before the police-created exigency doctrine comes into play.

A simple example illustrates the difficulties that such an approach would produce. Suppose that the officers in the present case did not smell marijuana smoke and thus knew only that there was a 50% chance that the fleeing suspect had entered the apartment on the left rather than the apartment on the right. Under those circumstances, would it have been reasonably foreseeable that the occupants of the apartment on the left would seek to destroy evidence upon learning that the police were at the door? Or suppose that the officers knew only that the suspect had disappeared into one of the apartments on a floor with 3, 5, 10, or even 20 units? If the police chose a door at random and knocked for the purpose of asking the occupants if they knew a person who fit the description of the suspect, would it have been reasonably foreseeable that the occupants would seek to destroy evidence?

We have noted that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” The reasonable foreseeability test would create unacceptable and unwarranted difficulties for law enforcement officers who must make quick decisions in the field, as well as for judges who would be required to determine after the fact whether the destruction of evidence in response to a knock on the door was reasonably foreseeable based on what the officers knew at the time.

Probable cause and time to secure a warrant. Some courts, in applying the police-created exigency doctrine, fault law enforcement officers if, after acquiring evidence that is sufficient to establish probable cause to search particular premises, the officers do not seek a warrant but instead knock on the door and seek either to speak with an occupant or to obtain consent to search.

This approach unjustifiably interferes with legitimate law enforcement strategies. There are many entirely proper reasons why police may not want to seek a search warrant as soon as the bare minimum of evidence needed to establish probable cause is acquired.

Standard or good investigative tactics. Finally, some lower court cases suggest that law enforcement officers may be found to have created or manufactured an exigency if the court concludes that the course of their investigation was “contrary to standard or good law enforcement practices [or to the policies or practices of their jurisdictions].” This approach fails to provide clear guidance for law enforcement officers and authorizes courts to make judgments on matters that are the province of those who are responsible for federal and state law enforcement agencies.

Respondent argues for a rule that differs from those discussed above, but his rule is also flawed. Respondent contends that law enforcement officers impermissibly create an exigency when they “engage in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is imminent and inevitable.” In respondent’s view, relevant factors include the officers’ tone of voice in
announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their knocks. But the ability of law enforcement officers to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such subtleties.

If respondent’s test were adopted, it would be extremely difficult for police officers to know how loudly they may announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock on a door without running afoul of the police-created exigency rule. And in most cases, it would be nearly impossible for a court to determine whether that threshold had been passed. The Fourth Amendment does not require the nebulous and impractical test that respondent proposes.

For these reasons, we conclude that the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. This holding provides ample protection for the privacy rights that the Amendment protects.

When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak. When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low point,” and the occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security system cannot provide.” And even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time.

Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.

IV

We now apply our interpretation of the police-created exigency doctrine to the facts of this case.

A

We need not decide whether exigent circumstances existed in this case. Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency. The trial court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that there was a real exigency in this case, but the Kentucky Supreme Court expressed doubt on this issue, observing that there was “certainly some question as to whether the sound of persons moving [inside the apartment] was sufficient to establish that evidence was being destroyed.” The Kentucky Supreme Court “assum[ed] for the purpose of argument that exigent circumstances existed,” and it held that the police had impermissibly manufactured the exigency.

We, too, assume for purposes of argument that an exigency existed. We decide only the question on which the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled and on which we granted certiorari: Under what circumstances do police impermissibly create an exigency? Any question about whether an exigency actually existed is better addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand.
In this case, we see no evidence that the officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment. Officer Cobb testified without contradiction that the officers “banged on the door as loud as [they] could” and announced either “Police, police, police’” or “This is the police.” This conduct was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and we are aware of no other evidence that might show that the officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so (for example, by announcing that they would break down the door if the occupants did not open the door voluntarily).

Like the court below, we assume for purposes of argument that an exigency existed. Because the officers in this case did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency, we hold that the exigency justified the warrantless search of the apartment.

The judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice GINSBURG, dissenting.

The Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases. In lieu of presenting their evidence to a neutral magistrate, police officers may now knock, listen, then break the door down, nevermind that they had ample time to obtain a warrant. I dissent from the Court’s reduction of the Fourth Amendment’s force.

This case involves a principal exception to the warrant requirement, the exception applicable in “exigent circumstances.” “[C]arefully delineated,” the exception should govern only in genuine emergency situations. Circumstances qualify as “exigent” when there is an imminent risk of death or serious injury, or danger that evidence will be immediately destroyed, or that a suspect will escape. The question presented: May police, who could pause to gain the approval of a neutral magistrate, dispense with the need to get a warrant by themselves creating exigent circumstances? I would answer no, as did the Kentucky Supreme Court. The urgency must exist, I would rule, when the police come on the scene, not subsequent to their arrival, prompted by their own conduct.

That heavy burden has not been carried here. There was little risk that drug-related evidence would have been destroyed had the police delayed the search pending a magistrate’s authorization. As the Court recognizes, “[p]ersons in possession of valuable drugs are unlikely to destroy them unless they fear discovery by the police.” Nothing in the record shows that, prior to the knock at the apartment door, the occupants were apprehensive about police proximity.
In no quarter does the Fourth Amendment apply with greater force than in our homes, our most private space which, for centuries, has been regarded as “entitled to special protection.” Home intrusions, the Court has said, are indeed “the chief evil against which ... the Fourth Amendment is directed.” “[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are [therefore] presumptively unreasonable.” How “secure” do our homes remain if police, armed with no warrant, can pound on doors at will and, on hearing sounds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search for evidence of unlawful activity?

As above noted, to justify the police activity in this case, Kentucky invoked the once-guarded exception for emergencies “in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant ... threaten[s] ‘the destruction of evidence.’” To fit within this exception, “police action literally must be [taken] ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime.”

The existence of a genuine emergency depends not only on the state of necessity at the time of the warrantless search; it depends, first and foremost, on “actions taken by the police preceding the warrantless search.” “[W]asting a clear opportunity to obtain a warrant,” therefore, “disentitles the officer from relying on subsequent exigent circumstances.”

Under an appropriately reined-in “emergency” or “exigent circumstances” exception, the result in this case should not be in doubt. The target of the investigation’s entry into the building, and the smell of marijuana seeping under the apartment door into the hallway, the Kentucky Supreme Court rightly determined, gave the police “probable cause ... sufficient ... to obtain a warrant to search the ... apartment.” As that court observed, nothing made it impracticable for the police to post officers on the premises while proceeding to obtain a warrant authorizing their entry.

I [] would not allow an expedient knock to override the warrant requirement. Instead, I would accord that core requirement of the Fourth Amendment full respect. When possible, “a warrant must generally be secured,” the Court acknowledges. There is every reason to conclude that securing a warrant was entirely feasible in this case, and no reason to contract the Fourth Amendment’s dominion.

* * *

In our next chapter, we will review limits to the exigent circumstances exception, including one case, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), in which the prosecution unsuccessfully raised three different exigent circumstances theories—hot pursuit, safety, and preservation of evidence. We will also examine, more generally, the issue presented by cases in which police desire evidence of the amount of alcohol in a suspect’s blood.
Exigent Circumstance: Drunk Driving

Questions concerning the scope of the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement have arisen repeatedly in the context of drunk driving cases. These cases commonly involve a special kind of evidence—alcohol in the blood of a driver—at risk of being destroyed by the body’s metabolism.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Missouri v. Tyler G. McNeely**

Decided April 17, 2013 – 569 U.S. 141

Justice SOTOMAYOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A, II–B, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice SCALIA, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice KAGAN join.

In *Schmerber v. California*, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), this Court upheld a warrantless blood test of an individual arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol because the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence.” The question presented here is whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a *per se* exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. We conclude that it does not, and we hold, consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.

I

While on highway patrol at approximately 2:08 a.m., a Missouri police officer stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline. The officer noticed several signs that McNeely was intoxicated, including McNeely’s bloodshot eyes, his slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. McNeely acknowledged to the officer that he had consumed “a couple of beers” at a bar and he appeared unsteady on his feet when he exited the truck. After McNeely performed poorly on a battery of field-sobriety tests and declined to use a portable breath-test device to measure his blood alcohol concentration (BAC), the officer placed him under arrest.

The officer began to transport McNeely to the station house. But when McNeely indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer changed course and took McNeely to a nearby hospital for blood testing. The officer did not attempt to secure a warrant. Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer asked McNeely whether he would consent to a blood test. Reading from a standard implied consent form, the officer explained to McNeely that under state
law refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to the immediate revocation of his driver’s license for one year and could be used against him in a future prosecution. McNeely nonetheless refused. The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample, and the sample was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m. Subsequent laboratory testing measured McNeely’s BAC at 0.154 percent, which was well above the legal limit of 0.08 percent.

McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). He moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing in relevant part that, under the circumstances, taking his blood for chemical testing without first obtaining a search warrant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court agreed. It concluded that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because, apart from the fact that “[a]s in all cases involving intoxication, [McNeely’s] blood alcohol was being metabolized by his liver,” there were no circumstances suggesting the officer faced an emergency in which he could not practically obtain a warrant. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated an intention to reverse but transferred the case directly to the Missouri Supreme Court.

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. We granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on the question whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving investigations. We now affirm.

II

A

[T]he warrant requirement is subject to exceptions. “One well-recognized exception,” and the one at issue in this case, “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search, including law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home, engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, or enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause. As is relevant here, we have also recognized that in some circumstances law enforcement officers may conduct a search without a warrant to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. While these contexts do not necessarily involve equivalent dangers, in each a warrantless search is potentially reasonable because “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.”

To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances. We apply this “finely tuned approach” to Fourth Amendment reasonableness in this context because the police action at issue lacks “the traditional justification that ... a warrant ... provides.” Absent that established justification, “the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry” demands that we evaluate each case of alleged exigency based “on its own facts and circumstances.”

Our decision in Schmerber applied this totality of the circumstances approach. In that case, the petitioner had suffered injuries in an automobile accident and was taken to the hospital. While he was there receiving treatment, a police officer arrested the petitioner for driving while under
the influence of alcohol and ordered a blood test over his objection. After explaining that the warrant requirement applied generally to searches that intrude into the human body, we concluded that the warrantless blood test “in the present case” was nonetheless permissible because the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’”

In support of that conclusion, we observed that evidence could have been lost because “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system.” We added that “[p]articularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.” “Given these special facts,” we found that it was appropriate for the police to act without a warrant. We further held that the blood test at issue was a reasonable way to recover the evidence because it was highly effective, “involve[d] virtually no risk, trauma, or pain,” and was conducted in a reasonable fashion “by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical practices.” And in conclusion, we noted that our judgment that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation was strictly based “on the facts of the present record.”

Thus, our analysis in Schmerber fits comfortably within our case law applying the exigent circumstances exception. In finding the warrantless blood test reasonable in Schmerber, we considered all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case and carefully based our holding on those specific facts.

B

The State properly recognizes that the reasonableness of a warrantless search under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. But the State nevertheless seeks a per se rule for blood testing in drunk-driving cases. The State contends that whenever an officer has probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent circumstances will necessarily exist because BAC evidence is inherently evanescent. As a result, the State claims that so long as the officer has probable cause and the blood test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is categorically reasonable for law enforcement to obtain the blood sample without a warrant.

It is true that as a result of the human body’s natural metabolic processes, the alcohol level in a person’s blood begins to dissipate once the alcohol is fully absorbed and continues to decline until the alcohol is eliminated. This fact was essential to our holding in Schmerber, as we recognized that, under the circumstances, further delay in order to secure a warrant after the time spent investigating the scene of the accident and transporting the injured suspect to the hospital to receive treatment would have threatened the destruction of evidence.

But it does not follow that we should depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State and its amici. In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. We do not doubt that some circumstances will make obtaining a
warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test. That, however, is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in Schmerber, not to accept the “considerable overgeneralization” that a per se rule would reflect.

The context of blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are truly confronted with a “now or never” situation. In contrast to, for example, circumstances in which the suspect has control over easily disposable evidence, BAC evidence from a drunk-driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and relatively predictable manner. Moreover, because a police officer must typically transport a drunk-driving suspect to a medical facility and obtain the assistance of someone with appropriate medical training before conducting a blood test, some delay between the time of the arrest or accident and the time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether police officers are required to obtain a warrant. This reality undermines the force of the State’s contention that we should recognize a categorical exception to the warrant requirement because BAC evidence “is actively being destroyed with every minute that passes.” Consider, for example, a situation in which the warrant process will not significantly increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because an officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is being transported to a medical facility by another officer. In such a circumstance, there would be no plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.

The State’s proposed per se rule also fails to account for advances in the 47 years since Schmerber was decided that allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence offered to establish probable cause is simple. We by no means claim that telecommunications innovations have, will, or should eliminate all delay from the warrant-application process. But technological developments that enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so without undermining the neutral magistrate judge’s essential role as a check on police discretion, are relevant to an assessment of exigency. That is particularly so in this context, where BAC evidence is lost gradually and relatively predictably.

Of course, there are important countervailing concerns. While experts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the sample was taken to determine the BAC at the time of the alleged offense, longer intervals may raise questions about the accuracy of the calculation. For that reason, exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application process. But adopting the State’s per se approach would improperly ignore the current and future technological developments in warrant procedures, and might well diminish the incentive for jurisdictions “to pursue progressive approaches to warrant acquisition that preserve the protections afforded by the warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law enforcement.”

In short, while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber, it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.
The remaining arguments advanced in support of a *per se* exigency rule are unpersuasive. The State and several of its *amici*, including the United States, express concern that a case-by-case approach to exigency will not provide adequate guidance to law enforcement officers deciding whether to conduct a blood test of a drunk-driving suspect without a warrant. While the desire for a bright-line rule is understandable, the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context where significant privacy interests are at stake. Moreover, a case-by-case approach is hardly unique within our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Numerous police actions are judged based on fact-intensive, totality of the circumstances analyses rather than according to categorical rules, including in situations that are more likely to require police officers to make difficult split-second judgments.

Next, the State and the United States contend that the privacy interest implicated by blood draws of drunk-driving suspects is relatively minimal. That is so, they claim, both because motorists have a diminished expectation of privacy and because our cases have repeatedly indicated that blood testing is commonplace in society and typically involves “virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”

But the fact that people are “accorded less privacy in ... automobiles because of the compelling governmental need for regulation,” does not diminish a motorist’s privacy interest in preventing an agent of the government from piercing his skin. As to the nature of a blood test conducted in a medical setting by trained personnel, it is concededly less intrusive than other bodily invasions we have found unreasonable. For that reason, we have held that medically drawn blood tests are reasonable in appropriate circumstances. We have never retreated, however, from our recognition that any compelled intrusion into the human body implicates significant, constitutionally protected privacy interests.

Finally, the State and its *amici* point to the compelling governmental interest in combating drunk driving and contend that prompt BAC testing, including through blood testing, is vital to pursuit of that interest. They argue that is particularly so because, in addition to laws that make it illegal to operate a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that make it *per se* unlawful to operate a motor vehicle with a BAC of over 0.08 percent. “No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.” Certainly we do not. While some progress has been made, drunk driving continues to exact a terrible toll on our society.

But the general importance of the government’s interest in this area does not justify departing from the warrant requirement without showing exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particular case. To the extent that the State and its *amici* contend that applying the traditional Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to determine whether an exigency justified a warrantless search will undermine the governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses, we are not convinced.
States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense. Such laws impose significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist’s driver’s license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.

IV

The State argued before this Court that the fact that alcohol is naturally metabolized by the human body creates an exigent circumstance in every case. The State did not argue that there were exigent circumstances in this particular case because a warrant could not have been obtained within a reasonable amount of time. In his testimony before the trial court, the arresting officer did not identify any other factors that would suggest he faced an emergency or unusual delay in securing a warrant. He testified that he made no effort to obtain a search warrant before conducting the blood draw even though he was “sure” a prosecuting attorney was on call and even though he had no reason to believe that a magistrate judge would have been unavailable. The officer also acknowledged that he had obtained search warrants before taking blood samples in the past without difficulty. He explained that he elected to forgo a warrant application in this case only because he believed it was not legally necessary to obtain a warrant. Based on this testimony, the trial court concluded that there was no exigency and specifically found that, although the arrest took place in the middle of the night, “a prosecutor was readily available to apply for a search warrant and a judge was readily available to issue a warrant.”

The Missouri Supreme Court in turn affirmed that judgment, holding first that the dissipation of alcohol did not establish a per se exigency, and second that the State could not otherwise satisfy its burden of establishing exigent circumstances. In petitioning for certiorari to this Court, the State challenged only the first holding; it did not separately contend that the warrantless blood test was reasonable regardless of whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in a suspect’s blood categorically justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement.

Here and in its own courts the State based its case on an insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect.

Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred to this case as “unquestionably a routine DWI case,” the fact that a particular drunk-driving stop is “routine” in the sense that it does not involve “special facts,” such as the need for the police to attend to a car accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious way and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. The relevant factors in determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in the case.
Because this case was argued on the broad proposition that drunk-driving cases present a *per se* exigency, the arguments and the record do not provide the Court with an adequate analytic framework for a detailed discussion of all the relevant factors that can be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of acting without a warrant. It suffices to say that the metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream and the ensuing loss of evidence are among the factors that must be considered in deciding whether a warrant is required. No doubt, given the large number of arrests for this offense in different jurisdictions nationwide, cases will arise when anticipated delays in obtaining a warrant will justify a blood test without judicial authorization, for in every case the law must be concerned that evidence is being destroyed. But that inquiry ought not to be pursued here where the question is not properly before this Court. Having rejected the sole argument presented to us challenging the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision, we affirm its judgment.

We hold that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.

The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed.

Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice BREYER and Justice ALITO join, concurring in part and dissenting in part

[Chief Justice Roberts would have provided more robust guidance to law enforcement about precisely when warrantless nonconsensual blood draws are allowed. He wrote:

“A police officer reading this Court’s opinion would have no idea—no idea—what the Fourth Amendment requires of him, once he decides to obtain a blood sample from a drunk driving suspect who has refused a breathalyzer test. I have no quarrel with the Court’s ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach as a general matter; that is what our cases require. But the circumstances in drunk driving cases are often typical, and the Court should be able to offer guidance on how police should handle cases like the one before us.”

“In my view, the proper rule is straightforward. Our cases establish that there is an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. That exception applies when there is a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of important evidence, and there is no time to obtain a warrant. The natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes not only the imminent but ongoing destruction of critical evidence. That would qualify as an exigent circumstance, except that there may be time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn. If there is, an officer must seek a warrant. If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not, the exigent circumstances exception applies by its terms, and the blood may be drawn without a warrant.”1]

1 [Footnote by editors] Part II-C of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, which responds to the arguments raised by Chief Justice Roberts and is not reprinted here, had the support of only four justices. Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the result, wrote separately to argue that “this case does not call for the Court to consider in detail the issue discussed in Part II-C and the separate opinion by” Roberts.
Justice THOMAS, dissenting.

[Justice Thomas argued, “Because the body’s natural metabolization of alcohol inevitably destroys evidence of the crime, it constitutes an exigent circumstance. As a result, I would hold that a warrantless blood draw does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” He noted that all parties agreed about the “rapid destruction of evidence” that “occurs in every situation where police have probable cause to arrest a drunk driver.” He offered an evocative hypothetical:

“Officers are watching a warehouse and observe a worker carrying bundles from the warehouse to a large bonfire and throwing them into the blaze. The officers have probable cause to believe the bundles contain marijuana. Because there is only one person carrying the bundles, the officers believe it will take hours to completely destroy the drugs. During that time the officers likely could obtain a warrant. But it is clear that the officers need not sit idly by and watch the destruction of evidence while they wait for a warrant.”]

* * *

The McNeely Court noted that to help enforce laws against drunk driving, states have enacted laws requiring drivers to submit to blood-alcohol tests in certain situations. Failure to submit to the test can lead to revocation of a driver’s license even if the driver is never proven in court to have driven under the influence. In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court considered a particularly punitive state law that—had it survived constitutional scrutiny—could have undermined the Court’s holding in McNeely.

Supreme Court of the United States

Danny Birchfield v. North Dakota

Decided June 23, 2016 – 136 S. Ct. 2160

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Drunk drivers take a grisly toll on the Nation’s roads, claiming thousands of lives, injuring many more victims, and inflicting billions of dollars in property damage every year. To fight this problem, all States have laws that prohibit motorists from driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) that exceeds a specified level. But determining whether a driver’s BAC is over the legal limit requires a test, and many drivers stopped on suspicion of drunk driving would not submit to testing if given the option. So every State also has long had what are termed “implied consent laws.” These laws impose penalties on motorists who refuse to undergo testing when there is sufficient reason to believe they are violating the State’s drunk-driving laws.

In the past, the typical penalty for noncompliance was suspension or revocation of the motorist’s license. The cases now before us involve laws that go beyond that and make it a crime for a motorist to refuse to be tested after being lawfully arrested for driving while impaired. The question presented is whether such laws violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.
Because the cooperation of the test subject is necessary when a breath test is administered and highly preferable when a blood sample is taken, the enactment of laws defining intoxication based on BAC made it necessary for States to find a way of securing such cooperation. So-called “implied consent” laws were enacted to achieve this result. They provided that cooperation with BAC testing was a condition of the privilege of driving on state roads and that the privilege would be rescinded if a suspected drunk driver refused to honor that condition. The first such law was enacted by New York in 1953, and many other States followed suit not long thereafter. In 1962, the Uniform Vehicle Code also included such a provision. Today, “all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.” Suspension or revocation of the motorist’s driver’s license remains the standard legal consequence of refusal. In addition, evidence of the motorist’s refusal is admitted as evidence of likely intoxication in a drunk-driving prosecution.

In recent decades, the States and the Federal Government have toughened drunk-driving laws, and those efforts have corresponded to a dramatic decrease in alcohol-related fatalities. As of the early 1980’s, the number of annual fatalities averaged 25,000; by 2014, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the number had fallen to below 10,000. One legal change has been further lowering the BAC standard from 0.10% to 0.08%. In addition, many States now impose increased penalties for recidivists and for drivers with a BAC level that exceeds a higher threshold. In North Dakota, for example, the standard penalty for first-time drunk-driving offenders is license suspension and a fine. But an offender with a BAC of 0.16% or higher must spend at least two days in jail. In addition, the State imposes increased mandatory minimum sentences for drunk-driving recidivists.

Many other States have taken a similar approach, but this new structure threatened to undermine the effectiveness of implied consent laws. If the penalty for driving with a greatly elevated BAC or for repeat violations exceeds the penalty for refusing to submit to testing, motorists who fear conviction for the more severely punished offenses have an incentive to reject testing. And in some States, the refusal rate is high. On average, over one-fifth of all drivers asked to submit to BAC testing in 2011 refused to do so. In North Dakota, the refusal rate for 2011 was a representative 21%.

To combat the problem of test refusal, some States have begun to enact laws making it a crime to refuse to undergo testing. North Dakota adopted a similar law, in 2013, after a pair of drunk-driving accidents claimed the lives of an entire young family and another family’s 5- and 9-year-old boys. The Federal Government also encourages this approach as a means for overcoming the incentive that drunk drivers have to refuse a test.
II

Petitioner Danny Birchfield accidentally drove his car off a North Dakota highway on October 10, 2013. A state trooper arrived and watched as Birchfield unsuccessfully tried to drive back out of the ditch in which his car was stuck. The trooper approached, caught a strong whiff of alcohol, and saw that Birchfield’s eyes were bloodshot and watery. Birchfield spoke in slurred speech and struggled to stay steady on his feet. At the trooper’s request, Birchfield agreed to take several field sobriety tests and performed poorly on each. He had trouble reciting sections of the alphabet and counting backwards in compliance with the trooper’s directions.

Believing that Birchfield was intoxicated, the trooper informed him of his obligation under state law to agree to a BAC test. Birchfield consented to a roadside breath test. The device used for this sort of test often differs from the machines used for breath tests administered in a police station and is intended to provide a preliminary assessment of the driver’s BAC. Because the reliability of these preliminary or screening breath tests varies, many jurisdictions do not permit their numerical results to be admitted in a drunk-driving trial as evidence of a driver’s BAC. In North Dakota, results from this type of test are “used only for determining whether or not a further test shall be given.” In Birchfield’s case, the screening test estimated that his BAC was 0.254%, more than three times the legal limit of 0.08%.

The state trooper arrested Birchfield for driving while impaired, gave the usual Miranda warnings, again advised him of his obligation under North Dakota law to undergo BAC testing, and informed him, as state law requires that refusing to take the test would expose him to criminal penalties. In addition to mandatory addiction treatment, sentences range from a mandatory fine of $500 (for first-time offenders) to fines of at least $2,000 and imprisonment of at least one year and one day (for serial offenders). These criminal penalties apply to blood, breath, and urine test refusals alike.

Although faced with the prospect of prosecution under this law, Birchfield refused to let his blood be drawn. Just three months before, Birchfield had received a citation for driving under the influence, and he ultimately pleaded guilty to that offense. This time he also pleaded guilty—to a misdemeanor violation of the refusal statute—but his plea was a conditional one: while Birchfield admitted refusing the blood test, he argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited criminalizing his refusal to submit to the test. The State District Court rejected this argument and imposed a sentence that accounted for his prior conviction. The sentence included 30 days in jail (20 of which were suspended and 10 of which had already been served), 1 year of unsupervised probation, $1,750 in fine and fees, and mandatory participation in a sobriety program and in a substance abuse evaluation.

On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The court found support for the test refusal statute in this Court’s McNeely plurality opinion, which had spoken favorably about “acceptable ‘legal tools’ with ‘significant consequences’ for refusing to submit to testing.”

We granted certiorari in order to decide whether motorists lawfully arrested for drunk driving may be convicted of a crime or otherwise penalized for refusing to take a warrantless test measuring the alcohol in their bloodstream.
III

[S]uccess for [] petitioner[] depends on the proposition that the criminal law ordinarily may not compel a motorist to submit to the taking of a blood sample or to a breath test unless a warrant authorizing such testing is issued by a magistrate. If, on the other hand, such warrantless searches comport with the Fourth Amendment, it follows that a State may criminalize the refusal to comply with a demand to submit to the required testing, just as a State may make it a crime for a person to obstruct the execution of a valid search warrant. And by the same token, if such warrantless searches are constitutional, there is no obstacle under federal law to the admission of the results that they yield in either a criminal prosecution or a civil or administrative proceeding. We therefore begin by considering whether the searches demanded in these cases were consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

IV

The [Fourth] Amendment [] prohibits “unreasonable searches,” and our cases establish that the taking of a blood sample or the administration of a breath test is a search. The question, then, is whether the warrantless searches at issue here were reasonable. “[T]he text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained.” But “this Court has inferred that a warrant must [usually] be secured.” This usual requirement, however, is subject to a number of exceptions.

We have previously had occasion to examine whether one such exception—for “exigent circumstances”—applies in drunk-driving investigations. In Schmerber v. California, we held that drunk driving may present such an exigency. More recently, though, we have held that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always constitute an exigency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample. While emphasizing that the exigent-circumstances exception must be applied on a case-by-case basis, the [Missouri v.] McNeely Court noted that other exceptions to the warrant requirement “apply categorically” rather than in a “case-specific” fashion. One of these, as the McNeely opinion recognized, is the long-established rule that a warrantless search may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest. But the Court pointedly did not address any potential justification for warrantless testing of drunk-driving suspects except for the exception “at issue in th[e] case,” namely, the exception for exigent circumstances.

In the [] case[] now before us, the driver[] w[as] [] told that [he was] required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest for drunk driving. We therefore consider how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood tests incident to such arrests.

V

Blood and breath tests to measure blood alcohol concentration are not as new as searches of cell phones, but here, as in Riley v. California, the founding era does not provide any definitive guidance as to whether they should be allowed incident to arrest. Lacking such guidance, we engage in the same mode of analysis as in Riley: we examine “the degree to which [they] intrud[e] upon an individual’s privacy and ... the degree to which [they are] needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” We begin by considering the impact of breath and blood tests on individual privacy interests, and we will discuss each type of test in turn.
Years ago we said that breath tests do not “implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.” That remains so today. First, the physical intrusion is almost negligible. Breath tests “do not require piercing the skin” and entail “a minimum of inconvenience.” The effort is no more demanding than blowing up a party balloon.

In prior cases, we have upheld warrantless searches involving physical intrusions that were at least as significant as that entailed in the administration of a breath test. Just recently we described the process of collecting a DNA sample by rubbing a swab on the inside of a person’s cheek as a “negligible” intrusion. We have also upheld scraping underneath a suspect’s fingernails to find evidence of a crime, calling that a “very limited intrusion.” A breath test is no more intrusive than either of these procedures.

Second, breath tests are capable of revealing only one bit of information, the amount of alcohol in the subject’s breath. In this respect, they contrast sharply with the sample of cells collected by the swab in Maryland v. King [569 U.S. 435 (2013)]. Although the DNA obtained under the law at issue in that case could lawfully be used only for identification purposes, the process put into the possession of law enforcement authorities a sample from which a wealth of additional, highly personal information could potentially be obtained. A breath test, by contrast, results in a BAC reading on a machine, nothing more. No sample of anything is left in the possession of the police.

Finally, participation in a breath test is not an experience that is likely to cause any great enhancement in the embarrassment that is inherent in any arrest. The act of blowing into a straw is not inherently embarrassing, nor are evidentiary breath tests administered in a manner that causes embarrassment. Again, such tests are normally administered in private at a police station, in a patrol car, or in a mobile testing facility, out of public view. Moreover, once placed under arrest, the individual’s expectation of privacy is necessarily diminished. For all these reasons, “[a] breath test does not “implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.”

Blood tests are a different matter. They “require piercing the skin” and extract a part of the subject’s body. And while humans exhale air from their lungs many times per minute, humans do not continually shed blood. It is true, of course, that people voluntarily submit to the taking of blood samples as part of a physical examination, and the process involves little pain or risk. Nevertheless, for many, the process is not one they relish. It is significantly more intrusive than blowing into a tube. Perhaps that is why many States’ implied consent laws specifically prescribe that breath tests be administered in the usual drunk-driving case instead of blood tests or give motorists a measure of choice over which test to take.

In addition, a blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands of law enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC reading. Even if the law enforcement agency is precluded from testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person tested.
Having assessed the impact of breath and blood testing on privacy interests, we now look to the States’ asserted need to obtain BAC readings for persons arrested for drunk driving.

The States and the Federal Government have a “paramount interest ... in preserving the safety of ... public highways.” Although the number of deaths and injuries caused by motor vehicle accidents has declined over the years, the statistics are still staggering.

Alcohol consumption is a leading cause of traffic fatalities and injuries. During the past decade, annual fatalities in drunk-driving accidents ranged from 13,582 deaths in 2005 to 9,865 deaths in 2011. The most recent data report a total of 9,967 such fatalities in 2014—on average, one death every 53 minutes. Our cases have long recognized the “carnage” and “slaughter” caused by drunk drivers.

To deter potential drunk drivers and thereby reduce alcohol-related injuries, the States and the Federal Government have taken the series of steps that we recounted earlier. The law[] at issue in the present cases—which make it a crime to refuse to submit to a BAC test—are designed to provide an incentive to cooperate in such cases, and we conclude that they serve a very important function.

Petitioners[] contend[] that the States and the Federal Government could combat drunk driving in other ways that do not have the same impact on personal privacy. [His] argument[] [] is unconvincing.

The chief argument on this score is that an officer making an arrest for drunk driving should not be allowed to administer a BAC test unless the officer procures a search warrant or could not do so in time to obtain usable test results.

This argument contravenes our decisions holding that the legality of a search incident to arrest must be judged on the basis of categorical rules.

Petitioners next suggest[] that requiring a warrant for BAC testing in every case in which a motorist is arrested for drunk driving would not impose any great burden on the police or the courts. But of course the same argument could be made about searching through objects found on the arrestee’s possession, which our cases permit even in the absence of a warrant. What about the cigarette package in [United States v.] Robinson? What if a motorist arrested for drunk driving has a flask in his pocket? What if a motorist arrested for driving while under the influence of marijuana has what appears to be a marijuana cigarette on his person? What about an unmarked bottle of pills?

If a search warrant were required for every search incident to arrest that does not involve exigent circumstances, the courts would be swamped. And even if we arbitrarily singled out BAC tests incident to arrest for this special treatment, the impact on the courts would be considerable. The number of arrests every year for driving under the influence is enormous—more than 1.1 million in 2014. Particularly in sparsely populated areas, it would be no small task for courts to field a large new influx of warrant applications that could come on any day of the year and at any hour. In many jurisdictions, judicial officers have the authority to issue warrants only within their own districts, and in rural areas, some districts may have only a small number of judicial officers.
North Dakota, for instance, has only 51 state district judges spread across eight judicial districts. Those judges are assisted by 31 magistrates, and there are no magistrates in 20 of the State’s 53 counties. At any given location in the State, then, relatively few state officials have authority to issue search warrants. Yet the State, with a population of roughly 740,000, sees nearly 7,000 drunk-driving arrests each year. With a small number of judicial officers authorized to issue warrants in some parts of the State, the burden of fielding BAC warrant applications 24 hours per day, 365 days of the year would not be the light burden that petitioner[] suggest[s].

In light of this burden and our prior search-incident-to-arrest precedents, petitioner[] would at a minimum have to show some special need for warrants for BAC testing. It is therefore appropriate to consider the benefits that such applications would provide. Search warrants protect privacy in two main ways. First, they ensure that a search is not carried out unless a neutral magistrate makes an independent determination that there is probable cause to believe that evidence will be found. Second, if the magistrate finds probable cause, the warrant limits the intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the search—that is, the area that can be searched and the items that can be sought.

How well would these functions be performed by the warrant applications that petitioners propose? In order to persuade a magistrate that there is probable cause for a search warrant, the officer would typically recite the same facts that led the officer to find that there was probable cause for arrest, namely, that there is probable cause to believe that a BAC test will reveal that the motorist’s blood alcohol level is over the limit. [T]he facts that establish probable cause are largely the same from one drunk-driving stop to the next and consist largely of the officer’s own characterization of his or her observations—for example, that there was a strong odor of alcohol, that the motorist wobbled when attempting to stand, that the motorist paused when reciting the alphabet or counting backwards, and so on. A magistrate would be in a poor position to challenge such characterizations.

As for the second function served by search warrants—delineating the scope of a search—the warrants in question here would not serve that function at all. In every case the scope of the warrant would simply be a BAC test of the arrestee. For these reasons, requiring the police to obtain a warrant in every case would impose a substantial burden but no commensurate benefit.

Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. The impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great.

We reach a different conclusion with respect to blood tests. Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Respondents have offered no satisfactory justification for demanding the more intrusive alternative without a warrant.
Neither respondents nor their amici dispute the effectiveness of breath tests in measuring BAC. Breath tests have been in common use for many years. Their results are admissible in court and are widely credited by juries, and respondents do not dispute their accuracy or utility. What, then, is the justification for warrantless blood tests?

One advantage of blood tests is their ability to detect not just alcohol but also other substances that can impair a driver’s ability to operate a car safely. A breath test cannot do this, but police have other measures at their disposal when they have reason to believe that a motorist may be under the influence of some other substance (for example, if a breath test indicates that a clearly impaired motorist has little if any alcohol in his blood). Nothing prevents the police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when there is sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or from relying on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement when there is not.

A blood test also requires less driver participation than a breath test. In order for a technician to take a blood sample, all that is needed is for the subject to remain still, either voluntarily or by being immobilized. Thus, it is possible to extract a blood sample from a subject who forcibly resists, but many States reasonably prefer not to take this step. North Dakota, for example, tells us that it generally opposes this practice because of the risk of dangerous altercations between police officers and arrestees in rural areas where the arresting officer may not have backup. Under current North Dakota law, only in cases involving an accident that results in death or serious injury may blood be taken from arrestees who resist.

It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath test, may be administered to a person who is unconscious (perhaps as a result of a crash) or who is unable to do what is needed to take a breath test due to profound intoxication or injuries. But we have no reason to believe that such situations are common in drunk-driving arrests, and when they arise, the police may apply for a warrant if need be.

A breath test may also be ineffective if an arrestee deliberately attempts to prevent an accurate reading by failing to blow into the tube for the requisite length of time or with the necessary force. But courts have held that such conduct qualifies as a refusal to undergo testing and it may be prosecuted as such. And again, a warrant for a blood test may be sought.

Because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. As in all cases involving reasonable searches incident to arrest, a warrant is not needed in this situation.

VI

Having concluded that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify the warrantless taking of a blood sample, we must address respondents’ alternative argument that such tests are justified based on the driver’s legally implied consent to submit to them. It is well established that a search is reasonable when the subject consents, and that sometimes consent to a search need not be express but may be fairly inferred from context. Our prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and
evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply. Petitioner[] do[es] not question
the constitutionality of those laws, and nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them.

It is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also
to impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test. There must be a limit to the
consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to
drive on public roads.

Respondents and their amici all but concede this point. North Dakota emphasizes that its law
makes refusal a misdemeanor and suggests that laws punishing refusal more severely would
present a different issue. Borrowing from our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States
suggests that motorists could be deemed to have consented to only those conditions that are
“reasonable” in that they have a “nexus” to the privilege of driving and entail penalties that are
proportional to severity of the violation. But in the Fourth Amendment setting, this standard
does not differ in substance from the one that we apply, since reasonableness is always the
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis. And applying this standard, we conclude that
motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing
a criminal offense.

VII

Our remaining task is to apply our legal conclusions to the [] case[] before us.

Petitioner Birchfield was criminally prosecuted for refusing a warrantless blood draw, and
therefore the search he refused cannot be justified as a search incident to his arrest or on the
basis of implied consent. There is no indication in the record or briefing that a breath test would
have failed to satisfy the State’s interests in acquiring evidence to enforce its drunk-driving laws
against Birchfield. And North Dakota has not presented any case-specific information to suggest
that the exigent circumstances exception would have justified a warrantless search. Unable to
see any other basis on which to justify a warrantless test of Birchfield’s blood, we conclude that
Birchfield was threatened with an unlawful search and that the judgment affirming his
conviction must be reversed.

We accordingly reverse the judgment of the North Dakota Supreme Court and remand the case
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice THOMAS, concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part.

The compromise the Court reaches today is not a good one. By deciding that some (but not all)
warrantless tests revealing the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of an arrested driver are
constitutional, the Court contorts the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement. The far simpler answer to the question presented is the one
rejected in Missouri v. McNeely. Here, the tests revealing the BAC of a driver suspected of
driving drunk are constitutional under the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.
Today’s decision chips away at a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Until recently, we have admonished that “[a] police officer’s determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.” Under our precedents, a search incident to lawful arrest “require[d] no additional justification.” Not until the recent decision in Riley v. California, did the Court begin to retreat from this categorical approach because it feared that the search at issue, the “search of the information on a cell phone,” bore “little resemblance to the type of brief physical search” contemplated by this Court’s past search-incident-to-arrest decisions. I joined Riley, however, because the Court resisted the temptation to permit searches of some kinds of cellphone data and not others and instead asked more generally whether that entire “category of effects” was searchable without a warrant.

Today’s decision begins where Riley left off. The Court purports to apply Robinson but further departs from its categorical approach by holding that warrantless breath tests to prevent the destruction of BAC evidence are constitutional searches incident to arrest, but warrantless blood tests are not. That hairsplitting makes little sense. Either the search-incident-to-arrest exception permits bodily searches to prevent the destruction of BAC evidence, or it does not.

The Court justifies its result—an arbitrary line in the sand between blood and breath tests—by balancing the invasiveness of the particular type of search against the government’s reasons for the search. Such case-by-case balancing is bad for the People, who “through ratification, have already weighed the policy tradeoffs that constitutional rights entail.” It is also bad for law enforcement officers, who depend on predictable rules to do their job, as Members of this Court have exhorted in the past.

Today’s application of the search-incident-to-arrest exception is bound to cause confusion in the lower courts. The Court’s choice to allow some (but not all) BAC searches is undeniably appealing, for it both reins in the pernicious problem of drunk driving and also purports to preserve some Fourth Amendment protections. But that compromise has little support under this Court’s existing precedents.

The better (and far simpler) way to resolve these cases is by applying the per se rule that I proposed in McNeely. Under that approach, both warrantless breath and blood tests are constitutional because “the natural metabolization of [BAC] creates an exigency once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk. It naturally follows that police may conduct a search in these circumstances.”

Today’s decision rejects McNeely’s arbitrary distinction between the destruction of evidence generally and the destruction of BAC evidence. But only for searches incident to arrest. The Court declares that such a distinction “between an arrestee’s active destruction of evidence and the loss of evidence due to a natural process makes little sense.” I agree. But it also “makes little sense” for the Court to reject McNeely’s arbitrary distinction only for searches incident to arrest and
not also for exigent-circumstances searches when both are justified by identical concerns about the destruction of the same evidence. McNeely’s distinction is no less arbitrary for searches justified by exigent circumstances than those justified by search incident to arrest.

The Court was wrong in McNeely, and today’s compromise is perhaps an inevitable consequence of that error. Both searches contemplated by the state laws at issue in these cases would be constitutional under the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. I respectfully concur in the judgment in part and dissent in part.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

The Court in Birchfield holds implied blood-draw consent laws that result in criminal prosecution unconstitutional. What result if the implied consent law results in an administrative (rather than criminal) penalty? For example, suppose a state’s implied consent law requires drivers arrested for drunk driving to consent to a breathalyzer, blood draw, saliva or urine analysis or have their license administratively revoked for one year. See, e.g., 577.020, RSMo (2016).

In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct 2525 (2019), the Court issued a plurality opinion affirming the legality of a warrantless blood draw conducted by police after a suspect became unconscious. The plurality opinion—approved by four Justices—stated that when a driver is unconscious and cannot submit to a breath test, police may perform a blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The opinion relied upon Schmerber v. California, Missouri v. McNeely, and Birchfield. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, would have held that the natural metabolism of alcohol by the human body always creates a per se exigency “once police have probable cause to believe the driver is drunk.” Four Justices dissented, in two separate opinions.

Like the preceding cases, Welsh v. Wisconsin involves police investigation of drunk driving and an argument about whether the exigent circumstances exception justifies certain police activity. The key difference here is that instead of seeking to take a suspect’s blood, the police in Welsh sought to enter his home to arrest him. In addition, this case illustrates the far more relaxed attitude toward drunk driving that was common among judges and legislators in the 1980s.

Supreme Court of the United States

Edward G. Welsh v. Wisconsin

Decided May 15, 1984 – 466 U.S. 740

Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), held that, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. But the Court in that case explicitly refused “to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as ‘exigent circumstances,’ that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search.” Certiorari was granted in this case to decide at least one aspect of the unresolved question: whether, and if so under what
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless night entry of a person’s home in order to arrest him for a nonjailable traffic offense.

I

A

Shortly before 9 o’clock on the rainy night of April 24, 1978, a lone witness, Randy Jablonic, observed a car being driven erratically. After changing speeds and veering from side to side, the car eventually swerved off the road and came to a stop in an open field. No damage to any person or property occurred. Concerned about the driver and fearing that the car would get back on the highway, Jablonic drove his truck up behind the car so as to block it from returning to the road. Another passerby also stopped at the scene, and Jablonic asked her to call the police. Before the police arrived, however, the driver of the car emerged from his vehicle, approached Jablonic’s truck, and asked Jablonic for a ride home. Jablonic instead suggested that they wait for assistance in removing or repairing the car. Ignoring Jablonic’s suggestion, the driver walked away from the scene.

A few minutes later, the police arrived and questioned Jablonic. He told one officer what he had seen, specifically noting that the driver was either very inebriated or very sick. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration of the abandoned car and learned that it was registered to the petitioner, Edward G. Welsh. In addition, the officer noted that the petitioner’s residence was a short distance from the scene, and therefore easily within walking distance.

Without securing any type of warrant, the police proceeded to the petitioner’s home, arriving about 9 p.m. When the petitioner’s stepdaughter answered the door, the police gained entry into the house. Proceeding upstairs to the petitioner’s bedroom, they found him lying naked in bed. At this point, the petitioner was placed under arrest for driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The petitioner was taken to the police station, where he refused to submit to a breath-analysis test.

B

As a result of these events, the petitioner was subjected to two separate but related proceedings: one concerning his refusal to submit to a breath test and the other involving the alleged code violation for driving while intoxicated. Under the Wisconsin Vehicle Code in effect in April 1978, one arrested for driving while intoxicated [] could be requested by a law enforcement officer to provide breath, blood, or urine samples for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol. If such a request was made, the arrestee was required to submit to the appropriate testing or risk a revocation of operating privileges ... for 60 days.

2 [Footnote 1 by the Court] The state trial court never decided whether there was consent to the entry because it deemed decision of that issue unnecessary in light of its finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. For purposes of this decision, therefore, we assume that there was no valid consent to enter the petitioner’s home.
The State filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for driving while intoxicated. The petitioner responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying on his contention that the underlying arrest was invalid. After receiving evidence at a hearing on this motion in July 1980, the trial court concluded that the criminal complaint would not be dismissed because the existence of both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. The appellate court concluded that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in turn reversed the Court of Appeals. Because of the important Fourth Amendment implications of the decision below, we granted certiorari.

II

The Court decided in Payton v. New York that warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. At the same time, the Court declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception. Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are “few in number and carefully delineated” and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Indeed, the Court has recognized only a few such emergency conditions.

Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. When the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.

We conclude that the common-sense approach utilized by most lower courts is required by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and hold that an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed.

Application of this principle to the facts of the present case is relatively straightforward. The petitioner was arrested in the privacy of his own bedroom for a noncriminal, traffic offense. The State attempts to justify the arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and on the need to preserve evidence of the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level. On the facts of this case, however, the claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate
or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime. Moreover, because the petitioner had already arrived home, and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there was little remaining threat to the public safety. Hence, the only potential emergency claimed by the State was the need to ascertain the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level.

Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would support a finding of this exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient. The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. This is the best indication of the State’s interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. Given this expression of the State’s interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. To allow a warrantless home entry on these facts would be to approve unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will not sanction.

III

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a warrantless, nighttime entry into the petitioner’s home to arrest him for a civil traffic offense. Such an arrest, however, is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner’s arrest was therefore invalid, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice BLACKMUN, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion but add a personal observation.

I yield to no one in my profound personal concern about the unwillingness of our national consciousness to face up to—and to do something about—the continuing slaughter upon our Nation’s highways, a good percentage of which is due to drivers who are drunk or semi-incapacitated because of alcohol or drug ingestion. I have spoken in these Reports to this point before. And it is amazing to me that one of our great States—one which, by its highway signs, proclaims to be diligent and emphatic in its prosecution of the drunken driver—still classifies driving while intoxicated as a civil violation that allows only a money forfeiture of not more than $300 so long as it is a first offense. The State, like the indulgent parent, hesitates to discipline the spoiled child very much, even though the child is engaging in an act that is dangerous to others who are law abiding and helpless in the face of the child’s act. Our personal convenience still weighs heavily in the balance, and the highway deaths and injuries continue. But if Wisconsin and other States choose by legislation thus to regulate their penalty structure, there is, unfortunately, nothing in the United States Constitution that says they may not do so.
Notes, Comments, and Questions

In 1984, the Court prohibited police from entering a house to arrest an apparently intoxicated man who had recently driven his car off the road and stumbled home. In 2016, the Court allowed states to demand—under threat of criminal prosecution—that motorists arrested for drunk driving submit to breath tests. The home entry was “unreasonable,” and demanding the breath test is “reasonable.”

Perhaps the results can be explained by Fourth Amendment doctrine that has remained constant since 1791. Students might also consider, however, that the decisions could result in part on changing attitudes toward drunk driving. What was a noncriminal violation in Wisconsin in the 1980s is now punished far more severely across the nation. The position articulated by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Welsh, in which he chastised Wisconsin for its lax treatment of drunken drivers, has won widespread appeal among lawmakers, both those on the bench and those in legislatures. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, founded in 1980 after the founder’s daughter was killed in a crash involving a drunk driver, won important legislative victories beginning in 1984, when Congress acted to force states to raise their drinking ages to 21 years.³

Warrant Exception: Ports of Entry

When persons and items enter the United States from abroad, agents of the executive enjoy expansive authority to conduct searches and seizures without a warrant. The Court has repeatedly chosen to provide relatively little judicial oversight of the executive’s use of that authority, especially when compared to oversight of common domestic policing.

We begin with the Court’s approval of routine searches at the California-Mexico border. No quantum of evidence (or suspicion) is needed.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Manuel Flores-Montano

Decided March 30, 2004 – 541 U.S. 149

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court.

Customs officials seized 37 kilograms—a little more than 81 pounds—of marijuana from respondent Manuel Flores-Montano’s gas tank at the international border. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on an earlier decision by a divided panel of that court, held that the Fourth Amendment forbade the fuel tank search absent reasonable suspicion. We hold that the search in question did not require reasonable suspicion.

Respondent, driving a 1987 Ford Taurus station wagon, attempted to enter the United States at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in southern California. A customs inspector conducted an inspection of the station wagon, and requested respondent to leave the vehicle. The vehicle was then taken to a secondary inspection station.

At the secondary station, a second customs inspector inspected the gas tank by tapping it, and noted that the tank sounded solid. Subsequently, the inspector requested a mechanic under contract with Customs to come to the border station to remove the tank. Within 20 to 30 minutes, the mechanic arrived. He raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and unscrewed the bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of the vehicle, and then disconnected some hoses and electrical connections. After the gas tank was removed, the inspector hammered off bondo (a putty-like hardening substance that is used to seal openings) from the top of the gas tank. The inspector opened an access plate underneath the bondo and found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks. The process took 15 to 25 minutes.
A grand jury indicted respondent on one count of unlawfully importing marijuana and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Relying on [Ninth Circuit precedent], the Court of Appeals held, *inter alia*, that removal of a gas tank requires reasonable suspicion in order to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

We granted certiorari and now reverse.

In [*United States v. Molina-Tarazon*, 279 F.3d 709] the Court of Appeals decided a case presenting similar facts to the one at bar. It asked “whether [the removal and dismantling of the defendant’s fuel tank] is a ‘routine’ border search for which no suspicion whatsoever is required.” The Court of Appeals stated that “[i]n order to conduct a search that goes beyond the routine, an inspector must have reasonable suspicion,” and the “critical factor” in determining whether a search is “routine” is the “degree of intrusiveness.”

The Court of Appeals seized on language from our opinion in [*United States v. Montoya de Hernandez*, 473 U.S. 531 (1985)], in which we used the word “routine” as a descriptive term in discussing border searches. The Court of Appeals took the term “routine,” fashioned a new balancing test, and extended it to searches of vehicles. But the reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing tests to determine what is a “routine” search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more “intrusive” search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehicles.

The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. Time and again, we have stated that “searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.” Congress, since the beginning of our Government, “has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.” It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.

That interest in protecting the borders is illustrated in this case by the evidence that smugglers frequently attempt to penetrate our borders with contraband secreted in their automobiles’ fuel tank. Over the past 5 ½ fiscal years, there have been 18,788 vehicle drug seizures at the southern California ports of entry. Of those 18,788, gas tank drug seizures have accounted for 4,619 of the vehicle drug seizures, or approximately 25%. In addition, instances of persons smuggled in and around gas tank compartments are discovered at the ports of entry of San Ysidro and Otay Mesa at a rate averaging 1 approximately every 10 days.
Respondent asserts two main arguments with respect to his Fourth Amendment interests. First, he urges that he has a privacy interest in his fuel tank, and that the suspicionless disassembly of his tank is an invasion of his privacy. But on many occasions, we have noted that the expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior. We have long recognized that automobiles seeking entry into this country may be searched. It is difficult to imagine how the search of a gas tank, which should be solely a repository for fuel, could be more of an invasion of privacy than the search of the automobile’s passenger compartment.

Second, respondent argues that the Fourth Amendment “protects property as well as privacy” and that the disassembly and reassembly of his gas tank is a significant deprivation of his property interest because it may damage the vehicle. He does not, and on the record cannot, truly contend that the procedure of removal, disassembly, and reassembly of the fuel tank in this case or any other has resulted in serious damage to, or destruction of, the property. According to the Government, for example, in fiscal year 2003, 348 gas tank searches conducted along the southern border were negative (i.e., no contraband was found), the gas tanks were reassembled, and the vehicles continued their entry into the United States without incident.

Respondent cites not a single accident involving the vehicle or motorist in the many thousands of gas tank disassemblies that have occurred at the border. A gas tank search involves a brief procedure that can be reversed without damaging the safety or operation of the vehicle. If damage to a vehicle were to occur, the motorist might be entitled to recovery. While the interference with a motorist’s possessory interest is not insignificant when the Government removes, disassembles, and reassembles his gas tank, it nevertheless is justified by the Government’s paramount interest in protecting the border.

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Government’s authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank. While it may be true that some searches of property are so destructive as to require a different result, this was not one of them. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice BREYER, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion in full. I also note that Customs keeps track of the border searches its agents conduct, including the reasons for the searches. This administrative process should help minimize concerns that gas tank searches might be undertaken in an abusive manner.

*   *   *

Chapter 14 — Page 297
In addition to permitting extensive suspicionless searches and seizures at international borders, the Court has permitted similar searches and seizures at checkpoints some distance from the border. The fixed checkpoint at issue in the next case was 66 miles north of the United States-Mexico border.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Amado Martinez-Fuerte

Decided July 6, 1976 — 428 U.S. 543

Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens. Defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Mexico, and [ ] sought the exclusion of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Fourth Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. We hold today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a judicial warrant.

I

A

The respondents are defendants in three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made on three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal. Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is 66 road miles north of the Mexican border.

The “point” agent visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress without any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a relatively small number of cases the “point” agent will conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their occupants are asked about their citizenship and immigration status. The Government informs us that at San Clemente the average length of an investigation in the secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. A direction to stop in the secondary inspection area could be based on something suspicious about a particular car passing through the checkpoint, but the Government concedes that none of the three stops at issue was based on any articulable suspicion. During the period when these stops were made, the checkpoint was operating under a magistrate’s “warrant of inspection,” which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a routine-stop operation at the San Clemente location.

We turn now to the particulars of the stops and the procedural history of the case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two female passengers. The women were illegal Mexican aliens who had entered the United States at the
San Ysidro port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte produced documents showing him to be a lawful resident alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the country unlawfully. He was charged, *inter alia*, with two counts of illegally transporting aliens. He moved before trial to suppress all evidence stemming from the stop on the ground that the operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury trial.

Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction. The Court of Appeals held, with one judge dissenting, that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte’s conviction. We reverse and remand.

II

Before turning to the constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.

It has been national policy for many years to limit immigration into the United States. Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico poses formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. The United States shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the border area is uninhabited desert or thinly populated arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals to enter the United States without detection. It also is possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain in the country unlawfully. Once within the country, the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers who transport them in private vehicles.

The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland traffic-checking operations in an effort to minimize illegal immigration. Permanent checkpoints are maintained at or near intersections of important roads leading away from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis designed to avoid circumvention by smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occasionally are established in other strategic locations. Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the checkpoint system.

We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints, the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a number of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to assure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the confluence of two or more significant roads leading away from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a stretch of highway compatible with safe operation, and (v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which “border passes” are valid.¹

¹ [Footnote by editors] “Border passes,” also known as “border crossing cards,” allow bearers entry into parts of the United States near the border for brief periods—less than 72 hours—and do not allow bearers to work.
III

The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals. In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual, a process evident in our previous cases dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.

In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, [413 U.S. 266 (1973)], the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized that important law enforcement interests were at stake but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that a search could be conducted without consent only if there was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given area. We held in United States v. Ortiz, [422 U.S. 891 (1975)], that the same limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a permanent checkpoint.

In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, [422 U.S. 873 (1975)], however, we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve a different balance of public and private interests and appropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional safeguards. The question was under what circumstances a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area of the border for brief inquiry into their residence status. We found that the interference with Fourth Amendment interests involved in such a stop was “modest,” while the inquiry served significant law enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving-patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and may be undertaken if the stopping officer is “aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that a vehicle contains illegal aliens.

IV

It is agreed that checkpoint stops are “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants contend primarily that the routine stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of reasonable suspicion. [W]e turn first to whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests at stake.

A

Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border. We note here only the substantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a practice which the Government identifies as the most important of the traffic-checking operations. These checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who
succumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily traveled, slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols.

A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.

B

While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a limited extent on motorists’ right to “free passage without interruption,” and arguably on their right to personal security. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which “[a]ll that is required of the vehicle’s occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States.”

Neither the vehicle nor its occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can be seen without a search. This objective intrusion the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion—the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers—is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted:

“[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”

In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis in this context also must take into account the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic. We concluded there that random roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they “would subject the residents of ... [border] areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. ... [They] could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road ....” There also was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers in the field.

Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not
chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.

The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small percentage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection area, thereby “stigmatizing” those diverted and reducing the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motorists. We think defendants overstate the consequences. Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening or offensive because of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective referrals rather than questioning the occupants of every car tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring public.

C

The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.

[Here,] we deal neither with searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. As we have noted earlier, one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence. And the reasonableness of the procedures followed in making these checkpoint stops makes the resulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal. On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate and in the public interest, and the need for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by the records in the cases before us. Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at issue may be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints.

We further believe that it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation. As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.²

² [Footnote 17 by the Court] Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area during the eight days surrounding the arrests involved in [Martinez-Fuerte’s case], roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Thus, to the extent that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this checkpoint, that reliance clearly is relevant.
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. We have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or probable cause to search. And our holding today is limited to the type of stops described in this opinion. “[A]ny further detention ... must be based on consent or probable cause.” None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers exceeded these limitations. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the conviction of Martinez-Fuerte.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Today’s decision is the ninth this Term marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Consistent with this purpose to debilitate Fourth Amendment protections, the Court’s decision today virtually empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement by holding that law enforcement officials manning fixed checkpoint stations who make standardless seizures of persons do not violate the Amendment. I dissent.

We are told today [] that motorists without number may be individually stopped, questioned, visually inspected, and then further detained without even a showing of articulable suspicion, let alone the heretofore constitutional minimum of reasonable suspicion, a result that permits search and seizure to rest upon “nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.” This defacement of Fourth Amendment protections is arrived at by a balancing process that overwhelms the individual’s protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure. But that method is only a convenient cover for condoning arbitrary official conduct.

[T]he Court, without explanation, also ignores one major source of vexation. In abandoning any requirement of a minimum of reasonable suspicion, or even articulable suspicion, the Court in every practical sense renders meaningless, as applied to checkpoint stops, the Brignoni-Ponce holding that “standing alone [Mexican appearance] does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.” Since the objective is almost entirely the Mexican illegally in the country, checkpoint officials, uninhibited by any objective standards and therefore free to stop any or all motorists without explanation or excuse, wholly on whim, will perforce target motorists of Mexican appearance. The process will then inescapably discriminate against citizens of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason than that they unavoidably possess the same “suspicious” physical and grooming characteristics of illegal Mexican aliens.

to the law enforcement need to be served. [W]e have noted that “[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor ...,” although we held that apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop. Different considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border.
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after today’s decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent far more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists. To be singled out for referral and to be detained and interrogated must be upsetting to any motorist. One wonders what actual experience supports my Brethren’s conclusion that referrals “should not be frightening or offensive because of their public and relatively routine nature.” In point of fact, referrals viewed in context, are not relatively routine; thousands are otherwise permitted to pass. But for the arbitrarily selected motorists who must suffer the delay and humiliation of detention and interrogation, the experience can obviously be upsetting. And that experience is particularly vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively referred, knowing that the officers’ target is the Mexican alien. That deep resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair discrimination is not difficult to foresee.³

In short, if a balancing process is required, the balance should be struck to require that Border Patrol officers act upon at least reasonable suspicion in making checkpoint stops. In any event, even if a different balance were struck, the Court cannot, without ignoring the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness, justify wholly unguided seizures by officials manning the checkpoints.

The cornerstone of this society, indeed of any free society, is orderly procedure. The Constitution, as originally adopted, was therefore, in great measure, a procedural document. For the same reasons the drafters of the Bill of Rights largely placed their faith in procedural limitations on government action. The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable enforces this fundamental understanding in erecting its buffer against the arbitrary treatment of citizens by government. But to permit, as the Court does today, police discretion to supplant the objectivity of reason and, thereby, expediency to reign in the place of order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safeguards and threaten erosion of the cornerstone of our system of a government, for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us, “[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.”

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### Notes, Comments, and Questions

A police officer is 66 miles from the Canadian border. There is no checkpoint. The officer spots a car and is suspicious that it contains Canadians who are not legally in the United States. How much evidence must the officer have to stop the car to conduct a brief investigation of its occupants?

³ [Footnote 4 in the opinion] Though today’s decision would clearly permit detentions to be based solely on Mexican ancestry, the Court takes comfort in what appears to be the Border Patrol practice of not relying on Mexican ancestry standing alone in referring motorists for secondary detentions. Good faith on the part of law enforcement officials, however, has never sufficed in this tribunal to substitute as a safeguard for personal freedoms or to remit our duty to effectuate constitutional guarantees. ... Even if good faith is assumed, the affront to the dignity of American citizens of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully within the country is in no way diminished. The fact still remains that people of Mexican ancestry are targeted for examination at checkpoints and that the burden of checkpoint intrusions will lie heaviest on them.
What is your authority for your answer to the previous question? If you do not have authority to which you can refer, review the Court’s opinion in Martinez-Fuerte. In that opinion, which mostly concerned fixed checkpoints, the Court referred to prior law concerning roving patrols.

Opening another person’s mail without permission is normally a serious invasion of privacy, and police normally must obtain a search warrant before opening a suspect’s mail. A great deal of mail, however, is sent to the United States from abroad and accordingly crosses an international border. Here the Court considers whether agents may open such mail at will.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Charles W. Ramsey

Decided June 6, 1977 – 431 U.S. 606

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Customs officials, acting with “reasonable cause to suspect” a violation of customs laws, opened for inspection incoming international letter-class mail without first obtaining a search warrant. A divided Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held contrary to every other Court of Appeals which has considered the matter, that the Fourth Amendment forbade the opening of such mail without probable cause and a search warrant. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to resolve this Circuit conflict. We now reverse.

I

Charles W. Ramsey and James W. Kelly jointly commenced a heroin-by-mail enterprise in the Washington, D.C., area. The process involved their procuring of heroin, which was mailed in letters from Bangkok, Thailand, and sent to various locations in the District of Columbia area for collection. Two of their suppliers, Sylvia Bailey and William Ward, who were located in West Germany, were engaged in international narcotics trafficking during the latter part of 1973 and the early part of 1974. West German agents, pursuant to court-authorized electronic surveillance, intercepted several trans-Atlantic conversations between Bailey and Ramsey during which their narcotics operation was discussed. By late January 1974, Bailey and Ward had gone to Thailand. Thai officials, alerted to their presence by West German authorities, placed them under surveillance. Ward was observed mailing letter-sized envelopes in six different mail boxes; five of these envelopes were recovered; and one of the addresses in Washington, D.C., was later linked to respondents. Bailey and Ward were arrested by Thai officials on February 2, 1974; among the items seized were eleven heroin-filed envelopes addressed to the Washington, D.C., area, and later connected with respondents.

Two days after this arrest of Bailey and Ward, Inspector George Kallnischkies, a United States customs officer in New York City, without any knowledge of the foregoing events, inspecting a sack of incoming international mail from Thailand, spotted eight envelopes that were bulky and which he believed might contain merchandise. The envelopes, all of which appeared to him to have been typed on the same typewriter, were addressed to four different locations in the Washington, D.C., area. Inspector Kallnischkies, based on the fact that the letters were from Thailand, a known source of narcotics, and were “rather bulky,” suspected that the envelopes
might contain merchandise or contraband rather than correspondence. He took the letters to an examining area in the post office, and felt one of the letters: “felt like there was something in there, in the envelope. It was not just plain paper that the envelope is supposed to contain.” He weighed one of the envelopes, and found it weighed 42 grams, some three to six times the normal weight of an airmail letter. Inspector Kallnischkies then opened that envelope:

“In there I saw some cardboard and between the cardboard, if I recall, there was a plastic bag containing a white powdered substance, which, based on experience, I knew from Thailand would be heroin. I went ahead and removed a sample. Gave it a field test, a Marquis Reagent field test, and I had a positive reaction for heroin.” He proceeded to open the other seven envelopes which “in a lot of ways were identical”; examination revealed that at least the contents were in fact identical: each contained heroin.

Ramsey and Kelly were indicted, along with Bailey and Ward, in a 17-count indictment. Respondents moved to suppress the heroin. The District Court denied the motions, and after a bench trial on the stipulated record, respondents were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for what is in effect a term of 10 to 30 years. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the convictions, holding that the “border search exception to the warrant requirement” applicable to persons, baggage, and mailed packages did not apply to the routine opening of international letter mail, and held that the Constitution requires that “before international letter mail is opened, a showing of probable cause be made to and a warrant secured from a neutral magistrate.”

II

Congress and the applicable postal regulations authorized the actions undertaken in this case. [Title 19 U.S.C. § 482] authorizes customs officials to inspect, under the circumstances therein stated, incoming international mail. The “reasonable cause to suspect” test adopted by the statute is, we think, a practical test which imposes a less stringent requirement than that of “probable cause” imposed by the Fourth Amendment as a requirement for the issuance of warrants. Inspector Kallnischkies, at the time he opened the letters, knew that they were from Thailand, were bulky, were many times the weight of a normal airmail letter, and “felt like there was something in there.” Under these circumstances, we have no doubt that he had reasonable “cause to suspect” that there was merchandise or contraband in the envelopes. The search, therefore, was plainly authorized by the statute.

Since the search in this case was authorized by statute, we are left simply with the question of whether the search, nevertheless violated the Constitution. Specifically, we need not decide whether Congress conceived the statute as a necessary precondition to the validity of the search or whether it was viewed, instead, as a limitation on otherwise existing authority of the Executive. Having acted pursuant to, and within the scope of, a congressional Act, Inspector Kallnischkies’ searches were permissible unless they violated the Constitution.
III

A

That searches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. This interpretation, that border searches were not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment and were “reasonable” within the meaning of that Amendment, has been faithfully adhered to by this Court. [We have] recognized the distinction between searches within this country, requiring probable cause, and border searches:

“It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country ... have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be “reasonable” by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless “reasonable” has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself. We reaffirm it now.

B

The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country. It is clear that there is nothing in the rationale behind the border-search exception which suggests that the mode of entry will be critical. It was conceded at oral argument that customs officials could search, without probable cause and without a warrant, envelopes carried by an entering traveler, whether in his luggage or on his person. Surely no different constitutional standard should apply simply because the envelopes were mailed not carried. The critical fact is that the envelopes cross the border and enter this country, not that that are brought in by one mode of transportation rather than another. It is their entry into this country from without it that makes a resulting search “reasonable.”
We therefore conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not interdict the actions taken by Inspector Kallnischkies in opening and searching the eight envelopes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed.

Mr. Justice STEVENS, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

The decisive question in this case is whether Congress has granted customs officials the authority to open and inspect personal letters entering the United States from abroad without the knowledge or consent of the sender or the addressee, and without probable cause to believe the mail contains contraband or dutiable merchandise.

If the Government is allowed to exercise the power it claims, the door will be open to the wholesale, secret examination of all incoming international letter mail. No notice would be necessary either before or after the search. Until Congress has made an unambiguous policy decision that such an unprecedented intrusion upon a vital method of personal communication is in the Nation’s interest, this Court should not address the serious constitutional question it decides today. For it is settled that “when action taken by an inferior governmental agency was accomplished by procedures which raise serious constitutional questions, an initial inquiry will be made to determine whether or not ‘the President or Congress, within their respective constitutional powers, specifically has decided that the imposed procedures are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use.’”

Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

* * *

In the next case, the Court considers the treatment of a woman who flew to the United States from abroad and was suspected of smuggling drugs. Her unpleasant ordeal further illustrates the broad authority and discretion given to agents at the border.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez

Decided July 1, 1985 – 473 U.S. 531

Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez was detained by customs officials upon her arrival at the Los Angeles Airport on a flight from Bogota, Colombia. She was found to be smuggling 88 cocaine-filled balloons in her alimentary canal, and was convicted after a bench trial of various federal narcotics offenses. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed her convictions, holding that her detention violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the customs inspectors did not have a “clear indication” of alimentary canal smuggling at the time she was detained. Because of a
conflict in the decisions of the Courts of Appeals on this question and the importance of its resolution to the enforcement of customs laws, we granted certiorari. We now reverse.

Respondent arrived at Los Angeles International Airport shortly after midnight, March 5, 1983, on Avianca Flight 080, a direct 10-hour flight from Bogota, Colombia. Her visa was in order so she was passed through Immigration and proceeded to the customs desk. At the customs desk she encountered Customs Inspector Talamantes, who reviewed her documents and noticed from her passport that she had made at least eight recent trips to either Miami or Los Angeles. Talamantes referred respondent to a secondary customs desk for further questioning. At this desk Talamantes and another inspector asked respondent general questions concerning herself and the purpose of her trip. Respondent revealed that she spoke no English and had no family or friends in the United States. She explained in Spanish that she had come to the United States to purchase goods for her husband’s store in Bogota. The customs inspectors recognized Bogota as a “source city” for narcotics. Respondent possessed $5,000 in cash, mostly $50 bills, but had no billfold. She indicated to the inspectors that she had no appointments with merchandise vendors, but planned to ride around Los Angeles in taxicabs visiting retail stores such as J.C. Penney and K-Mart in order to buy goods for her husband’s store with the $5,000.

Respondent admitted that she had no hotel reservations, but stated that she planned to stay at a Holiday Inn. Respondent could not recall how her airline ticket was purchased. When the inspectors opened respondent’s one small valise they found about four changes of “cold weather” clothing. Respondent had no shoes other than the high-heeled pair she was wearing. Although respondent possessed no checks, waybills, credit cards, or letters of credit, she did produce a Colombian business card and a number of old receipts, waybills, and fabric swatches displayed in a photo album.

At this point Talamantes and the other inspector suspected that respondent was a “balloon swallow,” one who attempts to smuggle narcotics into this country hidden in her alimentary canal. Over the years Inspector Talamantes had apprehended dozens of alimentary canal smugglers arriving on Avianca Flight 080.

The inspectors requested a female customs inspector to take respondent to a private area and conduct a patdown and strip search. During the search the female inspector felt respondent’s abdomen area and noticed a firm fullness, as if respondent were wearing a girdle. The search revealed no contraband, but the inspector noticed that respondent was wearing two pairs of elastic underpants with a paper towel lining the crotch area.

When respondent returned to the customs area and the female inspector reported her discoveries, the inspector in charge told respondent that he suspected she was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. Respondent agreed to the inspector's request that she be x-rayed at a hospital but in answer to the inspector’s query stated that she was pregnant. She agreed to a pregnancy test before the x ray. Respondent withdrew the consent for an x ray when she learned that she would have to be handcuffed en route to the hospital. The inspector then gave respondent the option of returning to Colombia on the next available flight, agreeing to an x ray, or remaining in detention until she produced a monitored bowel movement that would confirm or rebut the inspectors’ suspicions. Respondent chose the first option and was placed in a customs office under observation. She was told that if she went to the toilet she would have to
use a wastebasket in the women’s restroom, in order that female customs inspectors could inspect her stool for balloons or capsules carrying narcotics. The inspectors refused respondent’s request to place a telephone call.

Respondent sat in the customs office, under observation, for the remainder of the night. During the night customs officials attempted to place respondent on a Mexican airline that was flying to Bogota via Mexico City in the morning. The airline refused to transport respondent because she lacked a Mexican visa necessary to land in Mexico City. Respondent was not permitted to leave, and was informed that she would be detained until she agreed to an x ray or her bowels moved. She remained detained in the customs office under observation, for most of the time curled up in a chair leaning to one side. She refused all offers of food and drink, and refused to use the toilet facilities. The Court of Appeals noted that she exhibited symptoms of discomfort consistent with “heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of nature.”

At the shift change at 4 o’clock the next afternoon, almost 16 hours after her flight had landed, respondent still had not defecated or urinated or partaken of food or drink. At that time customs officials sought a court order authorizing a pregnancy test, an x ray, and a rectal examination. The Federal Magistrate issued an order just before midnight that evening, which authorized a rectal examination and involuntary x ray, provided that the physician in charge considered respondent’s claim of pregnancy. Respondent was taken to a hospital and given a pregnancy test, which later turned out to be negative. Before the results of the pregnancy test were known, a physician conducted a rectal examination and removed from respondent’s rectum a balloon containing a foreign substance. Respondent was then placed formally under arrest. By 4:10 a.m. respondent had passed 6 similar balloons; over the next four days she passed 88 balloons containing a total of 528 grams of 80% pure cocaine hydrochloride.

After a suppression hearing the District Court admitted the cocaine in evidence against respondent. She was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and unlawful importation of cocaine.

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed respondent’s convictions. The court noted that customs inspectors had a “justifiably high level of official skepticism” about respondent’s good motives, but the inspectors decided to let nature take its course rather than seek an immediate magistrate’s warrant for an x ray. Such a magistrate’s warrant required a “clear indication” or “plain suggestion” that the traveler was an alimentary canal smuggler under previous decisions of the Court of Appeals. The court applied this required level of suspicion to respondent’s case. The court questioned the “humanity” of the inspectors’ decision to hold respondent until her bowels moved, knowing that she would suffer “many hours of humiliating discomfort” if she chose not to submit to the x-ray examination. The court concluded that under a “clear indication” standard “the evidence available to the customs officers when they decided to hold [respondent] for continued observation was insufficient to support the 16-hour detention.”
The Government contends that the customs inspectors reasonably suspected that respondent was an alimentary canal smuggler, and this suspicion was sufficient to justify the detention. In support of the judgment below respondent argues, *inter alia*, that reasonable suspicion would not support respondent’s detention, and in any event the inspectors did not reasonably suspect that respondent was carrying narcotics internally.

The Fourth Amendment commands that searches and seizures be reasonable. What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself. The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by “balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”

Here the seizure of respondent took place at the international border. Since the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.

Consistently, therefore, with Congress’ power to protect the Nation by stopping and examining persons entering this country, the Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than in the interior. Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant, and first-class mail may be opened without a warrant on less than probable cause. Automotive travelers may be stopped at fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop is based largely on ethnicity, and boats on inland waters with ready access to the sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion whatever.

[There is] longstanding concern for the protection of the integrity of the border. This concern is, if anything, heightened by the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics, and in particular by the increasing utilization of alimentary canal smuggling. This desperate practice appears to be a relatively recent addition to the smugglers’ repertoire of deceptive practices, and it also appears to be exceedingly difficult to detect. Congress had recognized these difficulties. Customs agents may “stop, search, and examine” any “vehicle, beast or person” upon which an officer suspects there is contraband or “merchandise which is subject to duty.”

Balanced against the sovereign’s interests at the border are the Fourth Amendment rights of respondent. Having presented herself at the border for admission, and having subjected herself to the criminal enforcement powers of the Federal Government, respondent was entitled to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. But not only is the expectation of privacy less at the border than in the interior, the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the Government at the border.

We have not previously decided what level of suspicion would justify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than a routine border search. We hold that the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its
inception if customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.

The “reasonable suspicion” standard has been applied in a number of contexts and effects a needed balance between private and public interests when law enforcement officials must make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause. It thus fits well into the situations involving alimentary canal smuggling at the border: this type of smuggling gives no external signs and inspectors will rarely possess probable cause to arrest or search, yet governmental interests in stopping smuggling at the border are high indeed. Under this standard officials at the border must have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person” of alimentary canal smuggling.

The facts, and their rational inferences, known to customs inspectors in this case clearly supported a reasonable suspicion that respondent was an alimentary canal smuggler. We need not belabor the facts, including respondent’s implausible story, that supported this suspicion. The trained customs inspectors had encountered many alimentary canal smugglers and certainly had more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’” that respondent was smuggling narcotics in her alimentary canal. The inspectors’ suspicion was a “‘common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people,’—including government officials, are entitled to rely.”

The final issue in this case is whether the detention of respondent was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it initially. In this regard we have cautioned that courts should not indulge in “unrealistic second-guessing,” and we have noted that “creative judge[s], engaged in post hoc evaluations of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished.” But “[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, in itself, render the search unreasonable.” Authorities must be allowed “to graduate their response to the demands of any particular situation.” Here, respondent was detained incommunicado for almost 16 hours before inspectors sought a warrant; the warrant then took a number of hours to procure, through no apparent fault of the inspectors. This length of time undoubtedly exceeds any other detention we have approved under reasonable suspicion. But we have also consistently rejected hard-and-fast time limits. Instead, “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.”

The rudimentary knowledge of the human body which judges possess in common with the rest of humankind tells us that alimentary canal smuggling cannot be detected in the amount of time in which other illegal activity may be investigated through brief Terry-type stops. It presents few, if any external signs; a quick frisk will not do, nor will even a strip search. In the case of respondent the inspectors had available, as an alternative to simply awaiting her bowel movement, an x ray. They offered her the alternative of submitting herself to that procedure. But when she refused that alternative, the customs inspectors were left with only two practical alternatives: detain her for such time as necessary to confirm their suspicions, a detention which would last much longer than the typical Terry stop, or turn her loose into the interior carrying the reasonably suspected contraband drugs.
The inspectors in this case followed this former procedure. They no doubt expected that respondent, having recently disembarked from a 10-hour direct flight with a full and stiff abdomen, would produce a bowel movement without extended delay. But her visible efforts to resist the call of nature, which the court below labeled “heroic,” disappointed this expectation and in turn caused her humiliation and discomfort. Our prior cases have refused to charge police with delays in investigatory detention attributable to the suspect’s evasive actions, and that principle applies here as well. Respondent alone was responsible for much of the duration and discomfort of the seizure.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the detention in this case was not unreasonably long. It occurred at the international border, where the Fourth Amendment balance of interests leans heavily to the Government. At the border, customs officials have more than merely an investigative law enforcement role. They are also charged, along with immigration officials, with protecting this Nation from entrants who may bring anything harmful into this country, whether that be communicable diseases, narcotics, or explosives. In this regard the detention of a suspected alimentary canal smuggler at the border is analogous to the detention of a suspected tuberculosis carrier at the border: both are detained until their bodily processes dispel the suspicion that they will introduce a harmful agent into this country.

Respondent’s detention was long, uncomfortable, indeed, humiliating; but both its length and its discomfort resulted solely from the method by which she chose to smuggle illicit drugs into this country. “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Here, by analogy, in the presence of articulable suspicion of smuggling in her alimentary canal, the customs officers were not required by the Fourth Amendment to pass respondent and her 88 cocaine-filled balloons into the interior. Her detention for the period of time necessary to either verify or dispel the suspicion was not unreasonable. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

We confront a “disgusting and saddening episode” at our Nation’s border. Shortly after midnight on March 5, 1983, the respondent Rosa Elvira Montoya De Hernandez was detained by customs officers because she fit the profile of an “alimentary canal smuggler.” This profile did not of course give the officers probable cause to believe that De Hernandez was smuggling drugs into the country, but at most a “reasonable suspicion” that she might be engaged in such an attempt. After a thorough strip search failed to uncover any contraband, De Hernandez agreed to go to a local hospital for an abdominal x ray to resolve the matter. When the officers approached with handcuffs at the ready to lead her away, however, “she crossed her arms by her chest and began stepping backwards shaking her head negatively,” protesting: “You are not going to put those on me. That is an insult to my character.”

Stymied in their efforts, the officers decided on an alternative course: they would simply lock De Hernandez away in an adjacent manifest room “until her peristaltic functions produced a monitored bowel movement.” The officers explained to De Hernandez that she could not leave
until she had excreted by squatting over a wastebasket pursuant to the watchful eyes of two attending matrons. De Hernandez responded: “I will not submit to your degradation and I’d rather die.” She was locked away with the matrons.

De Hernandez remained locked up in the room for almost 24 hours. Three shifts of matrons came and went during this time. The room had no bed or couch on which she could lie, but only hard chairs and a table. The matrons told her that if she wished to sleep she could lie down on the hard, uncarpeted floor. De Hernandez instead “sat in her chair clutching her purse,” “occasionally putting her head down on the table to nap.” Most of the time she simply wept and pleaded “to go home.” She repeatedly begged for permission “to call my husband and tell him what you are doing to me.” Permission was denied. Sobbing, she insisted that she had to “make a phone call home so that she could talk to her children and to let them know that everything was all right.” Permission again was denied. In fact, the matrons considered it highly “unusual” that “each time someone entered the search room, she would take out two small pictures of her children and show them to the person.” De Hernandez also demanded that her attorney be contacted. Once again, permission was denied. As far as the outside world knew, Rosa de Hernandez had simply vanished. And although she already had been stripped and searched and probed, the customs officers decided about halfway through her ordeal to repeat that process—“to ensure the safety of the surveilling officers. The result was again negative.”

After almost 24 hours had passed, someone finally had the presence of mind to consult a Magistrate and to obtain a court order for an x ray and a body-cavity search. De Hernandez, “very agitated,” was handcuffed and led away to the hospital. A rectal examination disclosed the presence of a cocaine-filled balloon. At approximately 3:15 on the morning of March 6, almost 27 hours after her initial detention, De Hernandez was formally placed under arrest and advised of her Miranda rights. Over the course of the next four days she excreted a total of 88 balloons.

The issue [] is simply this: Does the Fourth Amendment permit an international traveler, citizen or alien, to be subjected to the sort of treatment that occurred in this case without the sanction of a judicial officer and based on nothing more than the “reasonable suspicion” of low-ranking investigative officers that something might be amiss? The Court today concludes that the Fourth Amendment grants such sweeping and unmonitored authority to customs officials. It reasons that “[t]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by ‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” The Court goes on to assert that the “balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border,” and that searches and seizures in these circumstances may therefore be conducted without probable cause or a warrant. Thus a traveler at the Nation’s border may be detained for criminal investigation merely if the authorities “reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband.” There are no “hard-and-fast time limits” for such investigative detentions, because “‘common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.’” Applying this “reasonableness” test to the instant case, the Court concludes that the “[r]espondent alone was responsible for much of the duration and discomfort of the seizure.”

I dissent. Indefinite involuntary incommunicado detentions “for investigation” are the hallmark of a police state, not a free society. In my opinion, Government officials may no more confine a person at the border under such circumstances for purposes of criminal investigation than they
may within the interior of the country. The nature and duration of the detention here may well have been tolerable for spoiled meat or diseased animals, but not for human beings held on simple suspicion of criminal activity. I believe such indefinite detentions can be “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment only with the approval of a magistrate. I also believe that such approval can be given only upon a showing of probable cause.

At some point further investigation involves such severe intrusions on the values the Fourth Amendment protects that more stringent safeguards are required. For example, the length and nature of a detention may, at least when conducted for criminal-investigative purposes, ripen into something approximating a full-scale custodial arrest—indeed, the arrestee, unlike the detainee in cases such as this, is at least given such basic rights as a telephone call, warnings, a bed, a prompt hearing before the nearest federal magistrate, an appointed attorney, and consideration of bail. In addition, border detentions may involve the use of such highly intrusive investigative techniques as body-cavity searches, x-ray searches, and stomach-pumping.

I believe that detentions and searches falling into these more intrusive categories are presumptively “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if authorized by a judicial officer. We have, to be sure, held that executive officials need not obtain prior judicial authorization where exigent circumstances would make such authorization impractical and counterproductive. In so holding, however, we have reaffirmed the general rule that “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.” And even where a person has permissibly been taken into custody without a warrant, we have held that a prompt probable-cause determination by a detached magistrate is a constitutional “prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”

There is no persuasive reason not to apply these principles to lengthy and intrusive criminal-investigative detentions occurring at the Nation’s border. To be sure, the Court today invokes precedent stating that neither probable cause nor a warrant ever have been required for border searches. If this is the law as a general matter, I believe it is time that we reexamine its foundations.

Something has gone fundamentally awry in our constitutional jurisprudence when a neutral and detached magistrate’s authorization is required before the authorities may inspect “the plumbing, heating, ventilation, gas, and electrical systems” in a person’s home, investigate the back rooms of his workplace, or poke through the charred remains of his gutted garage, but not before they may hold him in indefinite involuntary isolation at the Nation’s border to investigate whether he might be engaged in criminal wrongdoing. No less than those who conduct administrative searches, those charged with investigative duties at the border “should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks,” because “unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy.” And unlike administrative searches, which typically involve “relatively limited invasion[s]” of individual privacy interests, many border searches carry grave potential for “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” The conditions of De Hernandez’ detention in this case—indefinite confinement in a squalid back room cut off from the outside world, the absence of basic amenities that would have been provided to even the vilest of hardened criminals, repeated strip searches—in many ways surpassed the conditions of a full
custodial arrest. Although the Court previously has declined to require a warrant for border searches involving “minor interference with privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning,” surely there is no parallel between such “minor” intrusions and the extreme invasion of personal privacy and dignity that occurs in detentions and searches such as that before us today.

The Court argues [] that the length and “discomfort” of De Hernandez’ detention “resulted solely from the method by which she chose to smuggle illicit drugs into this country,” and it speculates that only her “heroic” efforts prevented the detention from being brief and to the point. Although we now know that De Hernandez was indeed guilty of smuggling drugs internally, such post hoc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that we “prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.” At the time the authorities simply had, at most, a reasonable suspicion that De Hernandez might be engaged in such smuggling. Neither the law of the land nor the law of nature supports the notion that petty government officials can require people to excrete on command; indeed, the Court relies elsewhere on “[t]he rudimentary knowledge of the human body” in sanctioning the “much longer than ... typical” duration of detentions such as this. And, with all respect to the Court, it is not “unrealistic second-guessing,“ to predict that an innocent traveler, locked away in incommunicado detention in unfamiliar surroundings in a foreign land, might well be so frightened and exhausted as to be unable so to “cooperate” with the authorities.

The Court further appears to believe that such investigative practices are “reasonable,” however, on the premise that a traveler’s “expectation of privacy [is] less at the border than in the interior.” This may well be so with respect to routine border inspections, but I do not imagine that decent and law-abiding international travelers have yet reached the point where they “expect” to be thrown into locked rooms and ordered to excrete into wastebaskets, held incommunicado until they cooperate, or led away in handcuffs to the nearest hospital for exposure to various medical procedures—all on nothing more than the “reasonable” suspicions of low-ranking enforcement agents. In fact, many people from around the world travel to our borders precisely to escape such unchecked executive investigatory discretion. What a curious first lesson in American liberty awaits them on their arrival.

In my opinion, allowing the Government to hold someone in indefinite, involuntary, incommunicado isolation without probable cause and a judicial warrant violates our constitutional charter whether the purpose is to extract ransom or to investigate suspected criminal activity. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment permits an exception for such actions at the Nation’s border. It is tempting, of course, to look the other way in a case that so graphically illustrates the “veritable national crisis” caused by narcotics trafficking. But if there is one enduring lesson in the long struggle to balance individual rights against society’s need to defend itself against lawlessness, it is that “[i]t is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.”

I dissent.
Students should be aware of three ongoing controversies related to border enforcement: (1) the existence and significance of an “extended border” and areas known as the “functional equivalent” of the border, (2) the treatment of electronic devices crossing the border, and (3) the treatment of persons crossing the border seeking asylum or otherwise fleeing persecution and poverty.

**The Functional Border and Extended Border**

International airports and the land immediately surrounding those airports are treated as the “functional equivalent” of the border. Accordingly, a traveler flying from England to St. Louis could be subjected to the same searches permissible at the border itself.

More controversially, federal officials have argued that they possess search and seizure authority within 100 miles of international borders in an area known as the “extended border.” See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.1. If all authority granted to law enforcement at the physical border exists throughout the extended border, then people in New York City, Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, Seattle, Washington, D.C., and all of Florida could be subjected to suspicionless searches of their persons and effects at will. Civil libertarian organizations have accordingly decried the concept of the extended border, calling it an unlawful “Constitution-Free Zone.”

The map below illustrates the ACLU’s take on the extended border:

![Map of the United States with highlighted Constitution-Free Zone](image)

It is not clear precisely what authority federal officials claim to possess in the extended border—official guidance documents differ, and actual practice can diverge from such documents—nor is there robust judicial guidance. In an era of increasingly-vigorous immigration enforcement, this issue is attracting more attention.
Electronic Devices at or Near the Border

Referring to Supreme Court cases granting border officials wide discretion to search persons and effects entering and leaving the United States, federal officials have claimed to have authority to inspect electronic devices at the border. Privacy advocates have argued that searches conducted under this purported authority violate the Fourth Amendment.

Although some caselaw exists on this question, see, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that reasonable suspicion is necessary to search electronic devices at border in certain cases); Alasaad v. McAleenan, 1:17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019) (applying rule to larger class of searches); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) (allowing suspicionless searches), the law is not clear. Further litigation is ongoing.

In response to the risk of searches (which could expose lawful information such as trade secrets, personal correspondence, and embarrassing literature to inspection), some international travelers have begun wiping data from their computers and other devices before entering the United States; they can then download data from the cloud after clearing immigration and customs.

Treatment of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Other Migrants

The treatment of border crossers has received significant news coverage recently. In particular, the question of how the United States may treat migrants who claim to be fleeing persecution—especially migrants entering the United States with children—has inspired intense debate. For example, U.S. Senator Kamala Harris visited the Otay Mesa Detention Facility in June 2018 and called the treatment of detainees “a crime against humanity that is being committed by the United States government.” As one might expect, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Department of Homeland Security officials have disagreed and have defended current practices as lawful exercises of the executive’s authority to enforce laws at the border. Immigration law and refugee policy are beyond the scope of this course. Students might nonetheless consider whether the Court’s decisions on how the Fourth Amendment restricts (or does not restrict) executive discretion with respect to searches and seizures at the border shed light on what other border enforcement tactics are and are not (and should be or should not be) lawful.

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4 Otay Mesa was the port of entry through which Manuel Flores-Montano’s gas tank entered the United States.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Chapter 15

The Warrant Requirement: Exceptions (Part 7)

Warrant Exception: Checkpoints

In this chapter, we consider two situations in which the Court has authorized warrantless searches: (1) checkpoints, generally aimed at protecting the public from intoxicated drivers, and (2) “protective sweeps” that police may conduct in association with an arrest. Note that sweeps are distinct from searches incident to lawful arrest and are governed by different rules.

We begin with vehicle checkpoints. Checkpoints involve stopping cars randomly—or otherwise selecting cars to stop without any specific reason to believe that the drivers are intoxicated or otherwise breaking the law or transporting items subject to seizure. Accordingly, vehicle checkpoints can be permissible only if the Court allows police seizures of persons and property without even reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause. The question is whether such seizures are “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

Supreme Court of the United States

Michigan State Police v. Rick Sitz

Decided June 14, 1990 – 496 U.S. 444

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case poses the question whether a State’s use of highway sobriety checkpoints violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not and therefore reverse the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Petitioners, the Michigan Department of State Police and its director, established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program in early 1986. The director appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee comprising representatives of the State Police force, local police forces, state prosecutors, and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. Pursuant to its charge, the advisory committee created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity.

Under the guidelines, checkpoints would be set up at selected sites along state roads. All vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. In cases where a checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a location out of the traffic flow where an officer would check the motorist’s driver’s license and car registration and, if warranted, conduct further sobriety tests. Should the field tests and the officer’s observations suggest that the driver was intoxicated, an arrest would be made. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately.
The first—and to date the only—sobriety checkpoint operated under the program was conducted in Saginaw County with the assistance of the Saginaw County Sheriff’s Department. During the 75-minute duration of the checkpoint’s operation, 126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint. The average delay for each vehicle was approximately 25 seconds. Two drivers were detained for field sobriety testing, and one of the two was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver who drove through without stopping was pulled over by an officer in an observation vehicle and arrested for driving under the influence.

On the day before the operation of the Saginaw County checkpoint, respondents filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wayne County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints. Each of the respondents “is a licensed driver in the State of Michigan ... who regularly travels throughout the State in his automobile.” During pretrial proceedings, petitioners agreed to delay further implementation of the checkpoint program pending the outcome of this litigation.

After the trial, at which the court heard extensive testimony concerning, inter alia, the “effectiveness” of highway sobriety checkpoint programs, the court ruled that the Michigan program violated the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the holding. After the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioners’ application for leave to appeal, we granted certiorari.

Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. The question thus becomes whether such seizures are “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

It is important to recognize what our inquiry is not about. No allegations are before us of unreasonable treatment of any person after an actual detention at a particular checkpoint. As pursued in the lower courts, the instant action challenges only the use of sobriety checkpoints generally. We address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers. Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard.

No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are legion. The anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical. “Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage.”

Conversely, the weight bearing on the other scale—the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints—is slight. We reached a similar conclusion as to the intrusion on motorists subjected to a brief stop at a highway checkpoint for detecting illegal aliens. We see virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types of checkpoints, which to the average motorist would seem identical save for the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus, accurately gauged the
“objective” intrusion, measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation, as minimal.

With respect to what it perceived to be the “subjective” intrusion on motorists, however, the Court of Appeals found such intrusion substantial. The court first affirmed the trial court’s finding that the guidelines governing checkpoint operation minimize the discretion of the officers on the scene. But the court also agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the checkpoints have the potential to generate fear and surprise in motorists. This was so because the record failed to demonstrate that approaching motorists would be aware of their option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the checkpoints. On that basis, the court deemed the subjective intrusion from the checkpoints unreasonable.

We believe the Michigan courts misread our cases concerning the degree of “subjective intrusion” and the potential for generating fear and surprise. The “fear and surprise” to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop. This was made clear in Martinez-Fuerte.

Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle. The intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.

In sum, the balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program. We therefore hold that it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Today, the Court rejects a Fourth Amendment challenge to a sobriety checkpoint policy in which police stop all cars and inspect all drivers for signs of intoxication without any individualized suspicion that a specific driver is intoxicated. The Court does so by balancing “the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped.” [T]he Court misapplies that test by undervaluing the nature of the intrusion and exaggerating the law enforcement need to use the roadblocks to prevent drunken driving.

I do not dispute the immense social cost caused by drunken drivers, nor do I slight the government’s efforts to prevent such tragic losses. Indeed, I would hazard a guess that today’s opinion will be received favorably by a majority of our society, who would willingly suffer the minimal intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint stop in order to prevent drunken driving. But consensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis.
“The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some ‘balancing test’ than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only where the ‘reasonable’ requirements of the probable-cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials—perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens—may be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between the individual and society depends on the recognition of ‘the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’”

In the face of the “momentary evil” of drunken driving, the Court today abdicates its role as the protector of that fundamental right. I respectfully dissent.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join as to Parts I and II, dissenting.

A sobriety checkpoint is usually operated at night at an unannounced location. Surprise is crucial to its method. The test operation conducted by the Michigan State Police and the Saginaw County Sheriff’s Department began shortly after midnight and lasted until about 1 a.m. During that period, the 19 officers participating in the operation made two arrests and stopped and questioned 124 other unsuspecting and innocent drivers. It is, of course, not known how many arrests would have been made during that period if those officers had been engaged in normal patrol activities. However, the findings of the trial court, based on an extensive record and affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, indicate that the net effect of sobriety checkpoints on traffic safety is infinitesimal and possibly negative.

Indeed, the record in this case makes clear that a decision holding these suspicionless seizures unconstitutional would not impede the law enforcement community’s remarkable progress in reducing the death toll on our highways. Because the Michigan program was patterned after an older program in Maryland, the trial judge gave special attention to that State’s experience. Over a period of several years, Maryland operated 125 checkpoints; of the 41,000 motorists passing through those checkpoints, only 143 persons (0.3%) were arrested. The number of man-hours devoted to these operations is not in the record, but it seems inconceivable that a higher arrest rate could not have been achieved by more conventional means. Yet, even if the 143 checkpoint arrests were assumed to involve a net increase in the number of drunken driving arrests per year, the figure would still be insignificant by comparison to the 71,000 such arrests made by Michigan State Police without checkpoints in 1984 alone.

Any relationship between sobriety checkpoints and an actual reduction in highway fatalities is even less substantial than the minimal impact on arrest rates. In light of these considerations, it seems evident that the Court today misapplies the balancing test. The Court overvalues the law enforcement interest in using sobriety checkpoints, undervalues the citizen’s interest in freedom from random, unannounced investigatory seizures, and mistakenly assumes that there is “virtually no difference” between a routine stop at a permanent, fixed checkpoint and a surprise stop at a sobriety checkpoint.
This is a case that is driven by nothing more than symbolic state action—an insufficient justification for an otherwise unreasonable program of random seizures. Unfortunately, the Court is transfixed by the wrong symbol—the illusory prospect of punishing countless intoxicated motorists—when it should keep its eyes on the road plainly marked by the Constitution.

I respectfully dissent.

* * *

In the next case, the Court considered whether the holding of Michigan v. Sitz allows police to conduct random (suspicionless) stops of vehicles to check whether they contain illegal drugs. While a checkpoint for “drugged” drivers would almost surely have been permissible for the same reasons that the Court permitted drunk driving checkpoints, the question of a checkpoint for contraband or other evidence of crime proved more controversial.

Supreme Court of the United States

City of Indianapolis v. James Edmond

Decided Nov. 28, 2000 – 531 U.S. 32

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, we held that brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants were constitutional. We now consider the constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.

I

In August 1998, the city of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints on Indianapolis roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The city conducted six such roadblocks between August and November that year, stopping 1,161 vehicles and arresting 104 motorists. Fifty-five arrests were for drug-related crimes, while 49 were for offenses unrelated to drugs. The overall “hit rate” of the program was thus approximately nine percent.

The parties stipulated to the facts concerning the operation of the checkpoints by the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) for purposes of the preliminary injunction proceedings instituted below. At each checkpoint location, the police stop a predetermined number of vehicles. Approximately 30 officers are stationed at the checkpoint. Pursuant to written directives issued by the chief of police, at least one officer approaches the vehicle, advises the driver that he or she is being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint, and asks the driver to produce a license and registration. The officer also looks for signs of impairment and conducts an open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside. A narcotics-detection dog walks around the outside of each stopped vehicle.
The directives instruct the officers that they may conduct a search only by consent or based on the appropriate quantum of particularized suspicion. The officers must conduct each stop in the same manner until particularized suspicion develops, and the officers have no discretion to stop any vehicle out of sequence. The city agreed in the stipulation to operate the checkpoints in such a way as to ensure that the total duration of each stop, absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause, would be five minutes or less.

Respondents James Edmond and Joell Palmer were each stopped at a narcotics checkpoint in late September 1998. Respondents then filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the class of all motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped in the future at the Indianapolis drug checkpoints. Respondents claimed that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. Respondents requested declaratory and injunctive relief for the class, as well as damages and attorney’s fees for themselves.

Respondents then moved for a preliminary injunction. Although respondents alleged that the officers who stopped them did not follow the written directives, they agreed to the stipulation concerning the operation of the checkpoints for purposes of the preliminary injunction proceedings. The parties also stipulated to certification of the plaintiff class. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana agreed to class certification and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints contravened the Fourth Amendment. The panel denied rehearing. We granted certiorari and now affirm.

II

The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. While such suspicion is not an “irreducible” component of reasonableness, we have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply. We have [] upheld brief, suspicionless seizures of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road. In addition we [have] suggested that a similar type of roadblock with the purpose of verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be permissible. In none of these cases, however, did we indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.

III

It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search. Just as in Place,1 an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics.

1 [Citation by editors] United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (assigned for Chapter 5).
Like the dog sniff in *Place*, a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is “much less intrusive than a typical search.” Rather, what principally distinguishes these checkpoints from those we have previously approved is their primary purpose.

As petitioners concede, the Indianapolis checkpoint program unquestionably has the primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics. In their stipulation of facts, the parties repeatedly refer to the checkpoints as “drug checkpoints” and describe them as “being operated by the City of Indianapolis in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs in Indianapolis.” In addition, the first document attached to the parties’ stipulation is entitled “DRUG CHECKPOINT CONTACT OFFICER DIRECTIVES BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE.” These directives instruct officers to “[a]dvise the citizen that they are being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint.” The second document attached to the stipulation is entitled “1998 Drug Road Blocks” and contains a statistical breakdown of information relating to the checkpoints conducted. Further, according to Sergeant DePew, the checkpoints are identified with lighted signs reading, “‘NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT ____ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K–9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP.’” Finally, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that the primary purpose of the roadblocks is the interdiction of narcotics.

We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. Each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment.

Petitioners propose several ways in which the narcotics-detection purpose of the instant checkpoint program may instead resemble the primary purposes of the checkpoints in *Sitz* and *Martinez-Fuerte*. Petitioners state that the checkpoints in those cases had the same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of committing crimes. Securing the border and apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities, and law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit of these goals. If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.

Petitioners also emphasize the severe and intractable nature of the drug problem as justification for the checkpoint program. There is no doubt that traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude. The law enforcement problems that the drug trade creates likewise remain daunting and complex, particularly in light of the myriad forms of spin-off crime that it spawns. The same can be said of various other illegal activities, if only to a lesser degree. But the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose. Rather, in determining whether individualized suspicion is required, we must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their
connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue. We are particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.

Nor can the narcotics-interdiction purpose of the checkpoints be rationalized in terms of a highway safety concern similar to that present in *Sitz*. The detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense serves broadly the safety of the community, and our streets would no doubt be safer but for the scourge of illegal drugs. Only with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is society confronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint in *Sitz* was designed to eliminate.

The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoints is in the end to advance “the general interest in crime control.” We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.

Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control. For example, as the Court of Appeals noted, the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route. The exigencies created by these scenarios are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.

Petitioners argue that the Indianapolis checkpoint program is justified by its lawful secondary purposes of keeping impaired motorists off the road and verifying licenses and registrations. If this were the case, however, law enforcement authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or sobriety check. For this reason, we examine the available evidence to determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint program. While we recognize the challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry, courts routinely engage in this enterprise in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive governmental conduct from that which is lawful. As a result, a program driven by an impermissible purpose may be proscribed while a program impelled by licit purposes is permitted, even though the challenged conduct may be outwardly similar. While reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is predominantly an objective inquiry, our special needs and administrative search cases demonstrate that purpose is often relevant when suspicionless intrusions pursuant to a general scheme are at issue.

It goes without saying that our holding today does nothing to alter the constitutional status of the sobriety and border checkpoints that we approved in *Sitz* and *Martinez-Fuerte*. The constitutionality of such checkpoint programs still depends on a balancing of the competing interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program. When law enforcement authorities pursue
primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.

Our holding also does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute. Nor does our opinion speak to other intrusions aimed primarily at purposes beyond the general interest in crime control. Our holding also does not impair the ability of police officers to act appropriately upon information that they properly learn during a checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary purpose, even where such action may result in the arrest of a motorist for an offense unrelated to that purpose. Finally, we caution that the purpose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene.

Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, affirmed.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, and with whom Justice SCALIA joins as to Part I, dissenting.

The State’s use of a drug-sniffing dog, according to the Court’s holding, annuls what is otherwise plainly constitutional under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: brief, standardized, discretionless, roadblock seizures of automobiles, seizures which effectively serve a weighty state interest with only minimal intrusion on the privacy of their occupants. Because these seizures serve the State’s accepted and significant interests of preventing drunken driving and checking for driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations, and because there is nothing in the record to indicate that the addition of the dog sniff lengthens these otherwise legitimate seizures, I dissent.

As it is nowhere to be found in the Court’s opinion, I begin with blackletter roadblock seizure law. “The principal protection of Fourth Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop.” Roadblock seizures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment if they are “carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.” Specifically, the constitutionality of a seizure turns upon “a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.”

We first applied these principles in Martinez-Fuerte, which approved highway checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens. In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, we upheld the State’s use of a highway sobriety checkpoint after applying the framework set out in Martinez-Fuerte. This case follows naturally from Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. Petitioners acknowledge that the “primary purpose” of these roadblocks is to interdict illegal drugs, but this fact should not be controlling. Even accepting the Court’s conclusion that the checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were not primarily related to criminal law enforcement, the question whether a law enforcement purpose could support a roadblock seizure is not presented in this case. The District Court found that another “purpose of the checkpoints is to check driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations,” and the written directives state that the police officers are to “[I]look for signs of impairment.” The use of roadblocks to look for signs of impairment was validated by Sitz, and the use of
roadblocks to check for driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations was expressly recognized in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). That the roadblocks serve these legitimate state interests cannot be seriously disputed, as the 49 people arrested for offenses unrelated to drugs can attest. And it would be speculative to conclude—given the District Court’s findings, the written directives, and the actual arrests—that petitioners would not have operated these roadblocks but for the State’s interest in interdicting drugs.

Because of the valid reasons for conducting these roadblock seizures, it is constitutionally irrelevant that petitioners also hoped to interdict drugs. Once the constitutional requirements for a particular seizure are satisfied, the subjective expectations of those responsible for it, be it police officers or members of a city council, are irrelevant. It is the objective effect of the State’s actions on the privacy of the individual that animates the Fourth Amendment. Because the objective intrusion of a valid seizure does not turn upon anyone’s subjective thoughts, neither should our constitutional analysis.

With these checkpoints serving two important state interests, the remaining prongs of the balancing test are easily met. The seizure is objectively reasonable as it lasts, on average, two to three minutes and does not involve a search. The subjective intrusion is likewise limited as the checkpoints are clearly marked and operated by uniformed officers who are directed to stop every vehicle in the same manner. The only difference between this case and Sitz is the presence of the dog. We have already held, however, that a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics dog is not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not require physical intrusion of the object being sniffed and it does not expose anything other than the contraband items. And there is nothing in the record to indicate that the dog sniff lengthens the stop. Finally, the checkpoints’ success rate—49 arrests for offenses unrelated to drugs—only confirms the State’s legitimate interests in preventing drunken driving and ensuring the proper licensing of drivers and registration of their vehicles.

These stops effectively serve the State’s legitimate interests; they are executed in a regularized and neutral manner; and they only minimally intrude upon the privacy of the motorists. They should therefore be constitutional.

*   *   *

In the next case, the Court considered a police checkpoint designed to find witnesses of a recent crime—a hit-and-run crash. Like Indianapolis v. Edmond, and unlike Michigan v. Sitz, the case involved stopping vehicles without any purpose of protecting the public from immediate hazards presented by their drivers. However, unlike Edmond, police did not hope to find evidence of wrongdoing by the drivers; instead, they hoped to learn whether the drivers had seen wrongdoing by someone else.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.

This Fourth Amendment case focuses upon a highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run accident. We hold that the police stops were reasonable, hence, constitutional.

I

The relevant background is as follows: On Saturday, August 23, 1997, just after midnight, an unknown motorist traveling eastbound on a highway in Lombard, Illinois, struck and killed a 70-year-old bicyclist. The motorist drove off without identifying himself. About one week later at about the same time of night and at about the same place, local police set up a highway checkpoint designed to obtain more information about the accident from the motoring public.

Police cars with flashing lights partially blocked the eastbound lanes of the highway. The blockage forced traffic to slow down, leading to lines of up to 15 cars in each lane. As each vehicle drew up to the checkpoint, an officer would stop it for 10 to 15 seconds, ask the occupants whether they had seen anything happen there the previous weekend, and hand each driver a flyer. The flyer said “ALERT ... FATAL HIT & RUN ACCIDENT” and requested “ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING THE VEHICLE AND DRIVER INVOLVED IN THIS ACCIDENT WHICH KILLED A 70 YEAR OLD BICYCLIST.”

Robert Lidster, the respondent, drove a minivan toward the checkpoint. As he approached the checkpoint, his van swerved, nearly hitting one of the officers. The officer smelled alcohol on Lidster’s breath. He directed Lidster to a side street where another officer administered a sobriety test and then arrested Lidster. Lidster was tried and convicted in Illinois state court of driving under the influence of alcohol.

Lidster challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and conviction on the ground that the government had obtained much of the relevant evidence through use of a checkpoint stop that violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court rejected that challenge. But an Illinois appellate court reached the opposite conclusion. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court.

We granted certiorari. We now reverse the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination.

II

The Illinois Supreme Court basically held that our decision in Edmond governs the outcome of this case. We do not agree. Edmond involved a checkpoint at which police stopped vehicles to look for evidence of drug crimes committed by occupants of those vehicles.

The checkpoint stop here differs significantly from that in Edmond. The stop’s primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a
crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals.

*Edmond*'s language, as well as its context, makes clear that the constitutionality of this latter, information-seeking kind of stop was not then before the Court. Neither do we believe, *Edmond* aside, that the Fourth Amendment would have us apply an *Edmond*-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to brief, information-seeking highway stops of the kind now before us. For one thing, the fact that such stops normally lack individualized suspicion cannot by itself determine the constitutional outcome. As in *Edmond*, the stop here at issue involves a motorist. The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist’s car as his castle. And special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without individualized suspicion. Moreover, unlike *Edmond*, the context here (seeking information from the public) is one in which, by definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play. Like certain other forms of police activity, say, crowd control or public safety, an information-seeking stop is not the kind of event that involves suspicion, or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.

For another thing, information-seeking highway stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive. The stops are likely brief. The police are not likely to ask questions designed to elicit self-incriminating information. And citizens will often react positively when police simply ask for their help as “responsible citizen[s]” to “give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.”

Further, the law ordinarily permits police to seek the voluntary cooperation of members of the public in the investigation of a crime. “[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen.” That, in part, is because voluntary requests play a vital role in police investigatory work.

The importance of soliciting the public’s assistance is offset to some degree by the need to stop a motorist to obtain that help—a need less likely present where a pedestrian, not a motorist, is involved. The difference is significant in light of our determinations that such an involuntary stop amounts to a “seizure” in Fourth Amendment terms. That difference, however, is not important enough to justify an *Edmond*-type rule here. After all, as we have said, the motorist stop will likely be brief. Any accompanying traffic delay should prove no more onerous than many that typically accompany normal traffic congestion. And the resulting voluntary questioning of a motorist is as likely to prove important for police investigation as is the questioning of a pedestrian. Given these considerations, it would seem anomalous were the law (1) ordinarily to allow police freely to seek the voluntary cooperation of pedestrians but (2) ordinarily to forbid police to seek similar voluntary cooperation from motorists.
Finally, we do not believe that an *Edmond*-type rule is needed to prevent an unreasonable proliferation of police checkpoints. Practical considerations—namely, limited police resources and community hostility to related traffic tieups—seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation. And, of course, the Fourth Amendment’s normal insistence that the stop be reasonable in context will still provide an important legal limitation on police use of this kind of information-seeking checkpoint.

These considerations, taken together, convince us that an *Edmond*-type presumptive rule of unconstitutionality does not apply here. That does not mean the stop is automatically, or even presumptively, constitutional. It simply means that we must judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances. And as this Court said in *Brown v. Texas*, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), in judging reasonableness, we look to “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.”

III

We now consider the reasonableness of the checkpoint stop before us in light of the factors just mentioned, an issue that, in our view, has been fully argued here. We hold that the stop was constitutional.

The relevant public concern was grave. Police were investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death. No one denies the police’s need to obtain more information at that time. And the stop’s objective was to help find the perpetrator of a specific and known crime, not of unknown crimes of a general sort.

The stop advanced this grave public concern to a significant degree. The police appropriately tailored their checkpoint stops to fit important criminal investigatory needs. The stops took place about one week after the hit-and-run accident, on the same highway near the location of the accident, and at about the same time of night. And police used the stops to obtain information from drivers, some of whom might well have been in the vicinity of the crime at the time it occurred.

Most importantly, the stops interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. Viewed objectively, each stop required only a brief wait in line—a very few minutes at most. Contact with the police lasted only a few seconds. Police contact consisted simply of a request for information and the distribution of a flyer. Viewed subjectively, the contact provided little reason for anxiety or alarm. The police stopped all vehicles systematically. And there is no allegation here that the police acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner while questioning motorists during stops.

For these reasons we conclude that the checkpoint stop was constitutional.

The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is [r]eversed.
The Court made clear in *Indianapolis v. Edmond* that police may not establish checkpoints to investigate whether drivers are transporting illegal drugs. Consider a department that responds as follows:

Police post signs with text like “Drug Checkpoint Ahead” on public highways. Then, after observing drivers who promptly exit the highway after passing the sign, officers investigate the drivers for drug activity. Lawful? Why or why not?

See, e.g., *United States v. Williams*, 359 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that because “there was no checkpoint,” *Edmond* did not apply); *United States v. Neff*, 681 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that the fake-checkpoint ruse was lawful but that “standing alone,” a driver’s choice to exit after seeing the sign “is insufficient to justify even a brief investigatory detention of a vehicle”); compare *State v. Mack*, 66 S.W.3d 706 (Mo. 2002) (finding that “it is reasonable to conclude that drivers with drugs would ‘take the bait’ and exit” and holding that stop was reasonable in part because “the checkpoint was set up in an isolated and sparsely populated area offering no services to motorists and was conducted on an evening that would otherwise have little traffic”); with id. at 710 (Stith, J., dissenting) (arguing that seizure was unreasonable under *Edmond*).

If a driver exiting the highway immediately after passing a “drug checkpoint ahead” sign is not sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to justify a vehicle stop (as the Tenth Circuit held), what else should be necessary to justify the stop? In other words, what else must an officer observe after the car exits?


**Warrant Exception: Protective Sweeps**

Our final case for this chapter concerns “protective sweeps,” which police may conduct along with an arrest to protect themselves and others from potential attackers who may be lying in wait. Students should carefully note how the protective sweeps doctrine differs from that regulating searches incident to lawful arrests.
Supreme Court of the United States

Maryland v. Jerome Edward Buie

Decided Feb. 28, 1990 – 494 U.S. 325

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

A “protective sweep” is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding. In this case we must decide what level of justification is required by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments before police officers, while effecting the arrest of a suspect in his home pursuant to an arrest warrant, may conduct a warrantless protective sweep of all or part of the premises. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a running suit seized in plain view during such a protective sweep should have been suppressed at respondent’s armed robbery trial because the officer who conducted the sweep did not have probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed. We conclude that the Fourth Amendment would permit the protective sweep undertaken here if the searching officer “possess[e] a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed]’ the officer in believing” that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others. We accordingly vacate the judgment below and remand for application of this standard.

I

On February 3, 1986, two men committed an armed robbery of a Godfather’s Pizza restaurant in Prince George’s County, Maryland. One of the robbers was wearing a red running suit. That same day, Prince George’s County police obtained arrest warrants for respondent Jerome Edward Buie and his suspected accomplice in the robbery, Lloyd Allen. Buie’s house was placed under police surveillance.

On February 5, the police executed the arrest warrant for Buie. They first had a police department secretary telephone Buie’s house to verify that he was home. The secretary spoke to a female first, then to Buie himself. Six or seven officers proceeded to Buie’s house. Once inside, the officers fanned out through the first and second floors. Corporal James Rozar announced that he would “freeze” the basement so that no one could come up and surprise the officers. With his service revolver drawn, Rozar twice shouted into the basement, ordering anyone down there to come out. When a voice asked who was calling, Rozar announced three times: “this is the police, show me your hands.” Eventually, a pair of hands appeared around the bottom of the stairwell and Buie emerged from the basement. He was arrested, searched, and handcuffed by Rozar. Thereafter, Detective Joseph Frolich entered the basement “in case there was someone else” down there. He noticed a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack of clothing and seized it.

The trial court denied Buie’s motion to suppress the running suit, stating in part: “The man comes out from a basement, the police don’t know how many other people are down there. He is charged with a serious offense.” The State introduced the running suit into evidence at Buie’s
trial. A jury convicted Buie of robbery with a deadly weapon and using a handgun in the commission of a felony.

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. The court stated that Detective Frolich did not go into the basement to search for evidence, but to look for the suspected accomplice or anyone else who might pose a threat to the officers on the scene.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed by a 4-to-3 vote. The court acknowledged that “when the intrusion is slight, as in the case of a brief stop and frisk on a public street, and the public interest in prevention of crime is substantial, reasonable articulable suspicion may be enough to pass constitutional muster.” The court, however, stated that when the sanctity of the home is involved, the exceptions to the warrant requirement are few, and held: “[T]o justify a protective sweep of a home, the government must show that there is probable cause to believe that “a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger” exists.” The court went on to find that the State had not satisfied that probable-cause requirement.

II

It is not disputed that until the point of Buie’s arrest the police had the right, based on the authority of the arrest warrant, to search anywhere in the house that Buie might have been found, including the basement. “If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law.” There is also no dispute that if Detective Frolich’s entry into the basement was lawful, the seizure of the red running suit, which was in plain view and which the officer had probable cause to believe was evidence of a crime, was also lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The issue in this case is what level of justification the Fourth Amendment required before Detective Frolich could legally enter the basement to see if someone else was there.

Petitioner, the State of Maryland, argues that, under a general reasonableness balancing test, police should be permitted to conduct a protective sweep whenever they make an in-home arrest for a violent crime.

III

It goes without saying that the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures. Our cases show that in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Under this test, a search of the house or office is generally not reasonable without a warrant issued on probable cause. There are other contexts, however, where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required.

Possessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe Buie was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere in the house in which Buie might be found. Once he was found, however, the search for him was over, and there was no longer that particular justification for entering any rooms that had not yet been searched.
That Buie had an expectation of privacy in those remaining areas of his house, however, does not mean such rooms were immune from entry. In the instant case, there is an interest of the officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an attack. The risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter. A protective sweep, in contrast, occurs as an adjunct to the serious step of taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. Moreover, unlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s “turf.” An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings.

We agree with the State, as did the court below, that a warrant was not required. We also hold that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. This is no more and no less than was required in Terry and Long, and as in those cases, we think this balance is the proper one.²

We should emphasize that such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.

IV

The type of search we authorize today is far removed from the “top-to-bottom” search involved in Chimel; moreover, it is decidedly not “automati[c],” but may be conducted only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

V

We conclude that by requiring a protective sweep to be justified by probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied an unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard. The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. We therefore vacate

² [Footnote by editors] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) concern searches permitted under the “stop-and-frisk” doctrine, which we will cover later in the course.
the judgment below and remand this case to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, concurring.

Today the Court holds that reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, is necessary to support a protective sweep while an arrest is in progress. I agree with that holding and with the Court’s opinion, but I believe it is important to emphasize that the standard applies only to protective sweeps. Officers conducting such a sweep must have a reasonable basis for believing that their search will reduce the danger of harm to themselves or of violent interference with their mission; in short, the search must be protective.

In this case, to justify Officer Frolich’s entry into the basement, it is the State’s burden to demonstrate that the officers had a reasonable basis for believing not only that someone in the basement might attack them or otherwise try to interfere with the arrest, but also that it would be safer to go down the stairs instead of simply guarding them from above until respondent had been removed from the house. The fact that respondent offered no resistance when he emerged from the basement is somewhat inconsistent with the hypothesis that the danger of an attack by a hidden confederate persisted after the arrest. Moreover, Officer Rozar testified that he was not worried about any possible danger when he arrested Buie.

Indeed, were the officers concerned about safety, one would expect them to do what Officer Rozar did before the arrest: guard the basement door to prevent surprise attacks. As the Court indicates, Officer Frolich might, at the time of the arrest, reasonably have “look[ed] in” the already open basement door to ensure that no accomplice had followed Buie to the stairwell. But Officer Frolich did not merely “look in” the basement; he entered it. That strategy is sensible if one wishes to search the basement. It is a surprising choice for an officer, worried about safety, who need not risk entering the stairwell at all.

The State may thus face a formidable task on remand. However, the Maryland courts are better equipped than are we to review the record.

Justice KENNEDY, concurring.

The Court adopts the prudent course of explaining the general rule and permitting the state court to apply it in the first instance. The concurrence by JUSTICE STEVENS, however, makes the gratuitous observation that the State has a formidable task on remand. My view is quite to the contrary. Based on my present understanding of the record, I should think the officers’ conduct here was in full accord with standard police safety procedure, and that the officers would have been remiss if they had not taken these precautions. This comment is necessary, lest by acquiescence the impression be left that JUSTICE STEVENS’ views can be interpreted as authoritative guidance for application of our ruling to the facts of the case.
Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

While the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s privacy interests in a variety of settings, “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” The Court discounts the nature of the intrusion because it believes that the scope of the intrusion is limited. The Court explains that a protective sweep’s scope is “narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding” and confined in duration to a period “no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” But these spatial and temporal restrictions are not particularly limiting. A protective sweep would bring within police purview virtually all personal possessions within the house not hidden from view in a small enclosed space. Police officers searching for potential ambushers might enter every room including basements and attics; open up closets, lockers, chests, wardrobes, and cars; and peer under beds and behind furniture. The officers will view letters, documents, and personal effects that are on tables or desks or are visible inside open drawers; books, records, tapes, and pictures on shelves; and clothing, medicines, toiletries and other paraphernalia not carefully stored in dresser drawers or bathroom cupboards. While perhaps not a “full-blown” or “top-to-bottom” search, a protective sweep is much closer to it than to a “limited patdown for weapons” or a “frisk’ of an automobile.”

In light of the special sanctity of a private residence and the highly intrusive nature of a protective sweep, I firmly believe that police officers must have probable cause to fear that their personal safety is threatened by a hidden confederate of an arrestee before they may sweep through the entire home. Given the state-court determination that the officers searching Buie’s home lacked probable cause to perceive such a danger and therefore were not lawfully present in the basement, I would affirm the state court’s decision to suppress the incriminating evidence. I respectfully dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

When comparing lawful “protective sweeps” with searches incident to lawful arrest, students should note (1) the physical scope of a protective sweep will often extend beyond the area in which a SILA is permissible, (2) because sweeps are permitted only to protect against dangers to those present during the arrest, police may search only areas in which an officer may reasonably suspect a person could be found, and (3) the searches must be “cursory inspections” of those spaces.

An open question related to prospective sweeps concerns whether police may conduct them upon entering a house with consent—or in other contexts unrelated to arrests.³ Federal courts have reached divergent results.

Imagine police are investigating a brutal murder of a gang member and suspect that a rival gang is responsible. They obtain consent to enter the home of a witness in a “high-crime” neighborhood. May they “sweep” the house upon entry? Why or why not?

³ The authors thank Rachel Mitchell, who raised this issue while enrolled in Criminal Procedure at the University of Missouri School of Law during fall of 2018.
Consider a slightly modified version of the problem presented above. Here, police are investigating an allegation of insider trading that violates federal securities law. They obtain consent to enter the home of a witness in an exclusive gated community. May they “sweep” the house upon entry? Why or why not?

For courts permitting sweeps absent arrests, see, e.g., United States v. Fadual, 16 F. Supp. 3d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that “under certain circumstances, law enforcement officers may engage in a protective sweep where they gained entry through consent in the first instance” but that the sweep at issue was not lawful); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2005) (allowing sweeps made by the police pursuant to “lawful process, such as an order permitting or directing the officer to enter for the purpose of protecting a third party”); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2004) (allowing sweep of mobile home entered by police with consent). For courts holding sweeps unlawful absent an arrest, see, e.g., United States v. Torres-Castro, 470 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Following Buie, we held that such ‘protective sweeps’ are only permitted incident to an arrest.”); United States v. Waldner, 425 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining the invitation to “extend Buie further”); United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding search cannot be justified as protective sweep because when it occurred suspect “was not under arrest”).
Warrant Exception: Searches of Students & Public Employees

Although law enforcement officers conduct the bulk of the searches and seizures covered in this book, other government agents also perform searches and seizures outside the context of normal policing. In this chapter, we consider searches of public school students and public employees.

In public schools, teachers and other school officials must conduct searches to promote safety and to foster an environment conducive to education. Yet students do not forfeit all rights at school, and some searches of students and their effects are unreasonable. (Note that because the Fourth Amendment regulates only state actors, private school students are not protected against “unreasonable” school searches, unless the government is somehow involved.)

Supreme Court of the United States

**New Jersey v. T.L.O.**

Decided Jan. 15, 1985 — 469 U.S. 325

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public school authorities. Our consideration of the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, however, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we here address only the questions of the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by public school officials and the application of that standard to the facts of this case.

I

On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, N.J., discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T.L.O., who at that time was a 14-year-old high school freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to the Principal’s office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick, T.L.O.’s companion admitted that she had violated the rule. T.L.O., however, denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all.

Mr. Choplick asked T.L.O. to come into his private office and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse and held before T.L.O. as he accused her of having lied to him. As he reached into the purse for the
cigarettes, Mr. Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school students was closely associated with the use of marihuana. Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing.

Mr. Choplick notified T.L.O.’s mother and the police, and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At the request of the police, T.L.O.’s mother took her daughter to police headquarters, where T.L.O. confessed that she had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, the State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County. Contending that Mr. Choplick’s search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse as well as her confession, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. Although the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried out by school officials, ... the court concluded that the search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one. The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr. Choplick’s well-founded suspicion that T.L.O. had violated the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view, and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search to determine the nature and extent of T.L.O.’s drug-related activities. Having denied the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981, found T.L.O. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982, sentenced her to a year’s probation.

On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a divided Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation. T.L.O. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in T.L.O.’s purse.

We granted the State of New Jersey’s petition for certiorari. Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order reargument on that question. Having heard argument on the legality of the search of T.L.O.’s purse, we are satisfied that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

II

In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the question whether that Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials. We hold that it does.
It is now beyond dispute that “the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers.” Equally indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students against encroachment by public school officials.

These two propositions—that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the actions of public school officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment—might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public school officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them.

This Court has never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed upon “governmental action”—that is, “upon the activities of sovereign authority.” Accordingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, and even firemen entering privately owned premises to battle a fire, are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Because the individual’s interest in privacy and personal security “suffers whether the government’s motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,” it would be “anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”

Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment.

Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials subject to the commands of the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students. More generally, the Court has recognized that “the concept of parental delegation” as a source of school authority is not entirely “consonant with compulsory education laws.” Today’s public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
III

To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches. Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place. The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires “balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.

We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy. We have also recognized that searches of closed items of personal luggage are intrusions on protected privacy interests, for “the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view.” A search of a child’s person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.

Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise “illegitimate.” To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that society is “prepared to recognize as legitimate.” The State of New Jersey has argued that because of the pervasive supervision to which children in the schools are necessarily subject, a child has virtually no legitimate expectation of privacy in articles of personal property “unnecessarily” carried into a school. This argument has two factual premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility of expectations of privacy with the maintenance of a sound educational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of the child in bringing any items of personal property into the school. Both premises are severely flawed.

Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy. We have recently recognized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their cells, but it goes almost without saying that “[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration.” We are not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Nor does the State’s suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring personal property into the schools seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum must bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries. Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to carry with them articles of property needed in connection with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short, schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.
Against the child’s interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. Even in schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. “Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.” Accordingly, we have recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student–teacher relationship.

How, then, should we strike the balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place? It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,” we hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.

The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search—even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant—must be based upon “probable cause” to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. However, “probable cause” is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although “both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, ... in certain limited circumstances neither is required.” Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonable,” do not rise to the level of probable cause. Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.

We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider “whether the ... action was justified at its inception[;]” second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.” Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.

This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.

IV

There remains the question of the legality of the search in this case. Our review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.

The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved two separate searches, with the first—the search for cigarettes—providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to suspect that T.L.O. possessed marihuana had the first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search for cigarettes that we first turn our attention.

The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreasonable. First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because the contents of T.L.O.’s purse would therefore have “no direct bearing on the infraction” of which she was accused (smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there was no reason to search her purse. Second, even assuming that a search of T.L.O.’s purse might under some circumstances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against T.L.O., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, according to the court, Mr. Choplick had “a good hunch.”

Both these conclusions are implausible. T.L.O. had been accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not smoke at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these circumstances, T.L.O.’s possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her or to her response to those charges. T.L.O.’s possession of cigarettes, once it was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes would not prove that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at all. But it
is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The relevance of T.L.O.’s possession of cigarettes to the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary “nexus” between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute “mere evidence” of a violation.

Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes with her; and if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find them. Mr. Choplick’s suspicion that there were cigarettes in the purse was not an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”; rather, it was the sort of “common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior” upon which “practical people”—including government officials—are entitled to rely. Of course, even if the teacher’s report were true, T.L.O. might not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing a cigarette with another student. But the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: “sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment ....” Because the hypothesis that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher’s accusation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined T.L.O.’s purse to see if it contained cigarettes.

Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick’s decision to open T.L.O.’s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes was located. The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed the pack of cigarettes. Although T.L.O. does not dispute the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick’s belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters that implicated T.L.O. in drug dealing. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.’s purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type commonly used to store marihuana, a small quantity of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of “people who owe me money” as well as two letters, the inference that T.L.O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect.
Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T.L.O. was reasonable, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to exclude that evidence from T.L.O.’s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is [r]eversed.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I fully agree with Part II of the Court’s opinion. Teachers, like all other government officials, must conform their conduct to the Fourth Amendment’s protections of personal privacy and personal security. [T]his principle is of particular importance when applied to schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect constitutional protections.

I do not, however, otherwise join the Court’s opinion. Today’s decision sanctions school officials to conduct full-scale searches on a “reasonableness” standard whose only definite content is that it is not the same test as the “probable cause” standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported neither by precedent nor even by a fair application of the “balancing test” it proclaims in this very opinion.

I emphatically disagree with the Court’s decision to cast aside the constitutional probable-cause standard when assessing the constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. The Court’s decision jettisons the probable-cause standard—the only standard that finds support in the text of the Fourth Amendment—on the basis of its Rohrschach-like “balancing test.” Use of such a “balancing test” to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis. This innovation finds support neither in precedent nor policy and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of our citizens. Moreover, even if this Court’s historic understanding of the Fourth Amendment were mistaken and a balancing test of some kind were appropriate, any such test that gave adequate weight to the privacy and security interests protected by the Fourth Amendment would not reach the preordained result the Court’s conclusory analysis reaches today. Therefore, because I believe that the balancing test used by the Court today is flawed both in its inception and in its execution, I respectfully dissent.

In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a succession of Fourth Amendment opinions in which “balancing tests” have been applied to resolve various questions concerning the proper scope of official searches. The Court has begun to apply a “balancing test” to determine whether a particular category of searches intrudes upon expectations of privacy that merit Fourth Amendment protection. It applies a “balancing test” to determine whether a warrant is necessary to conduct a search. In today’s opinion, it employs a “balancing test” to determine what standard should govern the constitutionality of a given category of searches.
All of these “balancing tests” amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely a convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot agree on a genuine rationale can conceal its differences. And it may be that the real force underlying today’s decision is the belief that the Court purports to reject—the belief that the unique role served by the schools justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment on their behalf. If so, the methodology of today’s decision may turn out to have as little influence in future cases as will its result, and the Court’s departure from traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine will be confined to the schools.

On my view, the presence of the word “unreasonable” in the text of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good. Full-scale searches unaccompanied by probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. I do not pretend that our traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine automatically answers all of the difficult legal questions that occasionally arise. I do contend, however, that this Court has an obligation to provide some coherent framework to resolve such questions on the basis of more than a conclusory recitation of the results of a “balancing test.” The Fourth Amendment itself supplies that framework and, because the Court today fails to heed its message, I must respectfully dissent.

* * *

In 2009, the Court applied the rule of New Jersey v. T.L.O. to a substantially more unpleasant set of facts.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Safford Unified School District #1 v. April Redding**

Decided June 25, 2009 – 557 U.S. 364

Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue here is whether a 13–year–old student’s Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school. Because there were no reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, we hold that the search did violate the Constitution.

I

The events immediately prior to the search in question began in 13–year–old Savana Redding’s math class at Safford Middle School one October day in 2003. The assistant principal of the school, Kerry Wilson, came into the room and asked Savana to go to his office. There, he showed her a day planner, unzipped and open flat on his desk, in which there were several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette. Wilson asked Savana whether the planner was hers; she said it was, but that a few days before she had lent it to her friend, Marissa Glines. Savana stated that none of the items in the planner belonged to her.
Wilson then showed Savana four white prescription-strength ibuprofen 400-mg pills, and one over-the-counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, all used for pain and inflammation but banned under school rules without advance permission. He asked Savana if she knew anything about the pills. Savana answered that she did not. Wilson then told Savana that he had received a report that she was giving these pills to fellow students; Savana denied it and agreed to let Wilson search her belongings. Helen Romero, an administrative assistant, came into the office, and together with Wilson they searched Savana’s backpack, finding nothing.

At that point, Wilson instructed Romero to take Savana to the school nurse’s office to search her clothes for pills. Romero and the nurse, Peggy Schwallier, asked Savana to remove her jacket, socks, and shoes, leaving her in stretch pants and a T-shirt (both without pockets), which she was then asked to remove. Finally, Savana was told to pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree. No pills were found.

Savana’s mother filed suit against Safford Unified School District # 1, Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier for conducting a strip search in violation of Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights. The individuals (hereinafter petitioners) moved for summary judgment, raising a defense of qualified immunity. The District Court for the District of Arizona granted the motion on the ground that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A closely divided Circuit sitting en banc, however, reversed. We granted certiorari and now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

II

The Fourth Amendment “right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures” generally requires a law enforcement officer to have probable cause for conducting a search.

In T.L.O., we recognized that the school setting “requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search” and held that for searches by school officials “a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause.” We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator’s search of a student and have held that a school search “will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”

Perhaps the best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component of probable cause for a law enforcement officer’s evidence search is that it raise a “fair probability” or a “substantial chance” of discovering evidence of criminal activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.
In this case, the school’s policies strictly prohibit the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school grounds, including “[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which permission to use in school has been granted pursuant to Board policy.” A week before Savana was searched, another student, Jordan Romero (no relation of the school’s administrative assistant), told the principal and Assistant Principal Wilson that “certain students were bringing drugs and weapons on campus,” and that he had been sick after taking some pills that “he got from a classmate.” On the morning of October 8, the same boy handed Wilson a white pill that he said Marissa Glines had given him. He told Wilson that students were planning to take the pills at lunch.

Wilson learned from Peggy Schwallier, the school nurse, that the pill was Ibuprofen 400 mg, available only by prescription. Wilson then called Marissa out of class. Outside the classroom, Marissa’s teacher handed Wilson the day planner, found within Marissa’s reach, containing various contraband items. Wilson escorted Marissa back to his office.

In the presence of Helen Romero, Wilson requested Marissa to turn out her pockets and open her wallet. Marissa produced a blue pill, several white ones, and a razor blade. Wilson asked where the blue pill came from, and Marissa answered, “I guess it slipped in when she gave me the IBU 400s.” When Wilson asked whom she meant, Marissa replied, “Savana Redding.” Wilson then enquired about the day planner and its contents; Marissa denied knowing anything about them. Wilson did not ask Marissa any followup questions to determine whether there was any likelihood that Savana presently had pills: neither asking when Marissa received the pills from Savana nor where Savana might be hiding them.

Schwallier did not immediately recognize the blue pill, but information provided through a poison control hotline indicated that the pill was a 200-mg dose of an anti-inflammatory drug, generically called naproxen, available over the counter. At Wilson’s direction, Marissa was then subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by Romero and Schwallier, as Savana was later on. The search revealed no additional pills.

It was at this juncture that Wilson called Savana into his office and showed her the day planner. Their conversation established that Savana and Marissa were on friendly terms: while she denied knowledge of the contraband, Savana admitted that the day planner was hers and that she had lent it to Marissa. Wilson had other reports of their friendship from staff members, who had identified Savana and Marissa as part of an unusually rowdy group at the school’s opening dance in August, during which alcohol and cigarettes were found in the girls’ bathroom. Wilson had reason to connect the girls with this contraband, for Wilson knew that Jordan Romero had told the principal that before the dance, he had been at a party at Savana’s house where alcohol was served. Marissa’s statement that the pills came from Savana was thus sufficiently plausible to warrant suspicion that Savana was involved in pill distribution.
This suspicion of Wilson’s was enough to justify a search of Savana’s backpack and outer clothing. If a student is reasonably suspected of giving out contraband pills, she is reasonably suspected of carrying them on her person and in the carryall that has become an item of student uniform in most places today. If Wilson’s reasonable suspicion of pill distribution were not understood to support searches of outer clothes and backpack, it would not justify any search worth making. And the look into Savana’s bag, in her presence and in the relative privacy of Wilson’s office, was not excessively intrusive, any more than Romero’s subsequent search of her outer clothing.

B

Here it is that the parties part company, with Savana’s claim that extending the search at Wilson’s behest to the point of making her pull out her underwear was constitutionally unreasonable. The exact label for this final step in the intrusion is not important, though strip search is a fair way to speak of it. Romero and Schwallier directed Savana to remove her clothes down to her underwear, and then “pull out” her bra and the elastic band on her underpants. Although Romero and Schwallier stated that they did not see anything when Savana followed their instructions, we would not define strip search and its Fourth Amendment consequences in a way that would guarantee litigation about who was looking and how much was seen. The very fact of Savana’s pulling her underwear away from her body in the presence of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy support the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings.

Savana’s subjective expectation of privacy against such a search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating. The reasonableness of her expectation (required by the Fourth Amendment standard) is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure. The common reaction of these adolescents simply registers the obviously different meaning of a search exposing the body from the experience of nakedness or near undress in other school circumstances. Changing for gym is getting ready for play; exposing for a search is responding to an accusation reserved for suspected wrongdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that a number of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and have banned them no matter what the facts may be.

The indignity of the search does not, of course, outlaw it, but it does implicate the rule of reasonableness as stated in T.L.O., that “the search as actually conducted [be] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” The scope will be permissible, that is, when it is “not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”

Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion. Wilson knew beforehand that the pills were prescription-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxen, common pain relievers equivalent to two Advil, or one Aleve. He must have been aware of the nature and limited threat of the specific drugs he was searching for, and while just about anything can be taken in quantities that will do real harm, Wilson had no reason to suspect that
large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or that individual students were receiving great numbers of pills.

Nor could Wilson have suspected that Savana was hiding common painkillers in her underwear. Petitioners suggest, as a truth universally acknowledged, that “students ... hid[e] contraband in or under their clothing” and cite a smattering of cases of students with contraband in their underwear. But when the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a search down to the body of an adolescent requires some justification in suspected facts, general background possibilities fall short; a reasonable search that extensive calls for suspicion that it will pay off. But nondangerous school contraband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no evidence in the record of any general practice among Safford Middle School students of hiding that sort of thing in underwear; neither Jordan nor Marissa suggested to Wilson that Savana was doing that, and the preceding search of Marissa that Wilson ordered yielded nothing. Wilson never even determined when Marissa had received the pills from Savana; if it had been a few days before, that would weigh heavily against any reasonable conclusion that Savana presently had the pills on her person, much less in her underwear.

In sum, what was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana was any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, and any reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear. We think that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable.

We do mean, though, to make it clear that the T.L.O. concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.

[The Court found qualified immunity warranted for Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier because “the cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law.” The case was remanded for resolution of the question of liability for the school district.]

Justice THOMAS, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

By declaring the search unreasonable in this case, the majority has “surrender[ed] control of the American public school system to public school students” by invalidating school policies that treat all drugs equally and by second-guessing swift disciplinary decisions made by school officials. The Court’s interference in these matters of great concern to teachers, parents, and
students illustrates why the most constitutionally sound approach to the question of applying the Fourth Amendment in local public schools would in fact be the complete restoration of the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis.

“[I]n the early years of public schooling,” courts applied the doctrine of in loco parentis to transfer to teachers the authority of a parent to “command obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits.” So empowered, schoolteachers and administrators had almost complete discretion to establish and enforce the rules they believed were necessary to maintain control over their classrooms. The perils of judicial policymaking inherent in applying Fourth Amendment protections to public schools counsel in favor of a return to the understanding that existed in this Nation’s first public schools, which gave teachers discretion to craft the rules needed to carry out the disciplinary responsibilities delegated to them by parents.

If the common-law view that parents delegate to teachers their authority to discipline and maintain order were to be applied in this case, the search of Redding would stand. There can be no doubt that a parent would have had the authority to conduct the search at issue in this case. Parents have “immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment” when it comes to searches of a child or that child’s belongings.

Restoring the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis would not, however, leave public schools entirely free to impose any rule they choose. “If parents do not like the rules imposed by those schools, they can seek redress in school boards or legislatures; they can send their children to private schools or home school them; or they can simply move.” Indeed, parents and local government officials have proved themselves quite capable of challenging overly harsh school rules or the enforcement of sensible rules in insensible ways.

In the end, the task of implementing and amending public school policies is beyond this Court’s function. Parents, teachers, school administrators, local politicians, and state officials are all better suited than judges to determine the appropriate limits on searches conducted by school officials. Preservation of order, discipline, and safety in public schools is simply not the domain of the Constitution. And, common sense is not a judicial monopoly or a Constitutional imperative.

Only then will teachers again be able to “govern the[ir] pupils, quicken the slothful, spur the indolent, restrain the impetuous, and control the stubborn” by making “rules, giv[ing] commands, and punish[ing] disobedience” without interference from judges. By deciding that it is better equipped to decide what behavior should be permitted in schools, the Court has undercut student safety and undermined the authority of school administrators and local officials. Even more troubling, it has done so in a case in which the underlying response by school administrators was reasonable and justified. I cannot join this regrettable decision. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the Court’s determination that this search violated the Fourth Amendment.
April Redding sued the Safford Unified school district on behalf of her daughter, Savana. During the oral argument, some of the Justices asked questions that betrayed their lack of knowledge about modern middle school life. Justice Scalia, for example, inquired about some of the items classified as contraband at Savana’s school. He said learning that a “black marker pencil” was contraband “astounded” him. Told by counsel that students use such markers “for sniffing,” Justice Scalia replied, “Oh, is that what they do? … They sniff them? … Really?”

Justice Breyer, after trying to pin down the facts concerning how Savana was searched—and after suggesting that underwear might be a sensible place to hide pills—reminisced on his own school days.

“In my experience when I was 8 or 10 or 12 years old, you know, we did take our clothes off once a day, we changed for gym, okay?”

He continued, “And in my experience, too, people did sometimes stick things in my underwear.”

The audience burst into laughter, and he clarified: “Or not my underwear. Whatever. … I was the one who did it? I don’t know.”

Dahlia Lithwick, who covered the case for Slate, predicted as follows after the oral argument:

“When constitutional historians sit down someday to compile the definitive Supreme Court Concordance of Not Getting It, the entry directly next to Lilly Ledbetter (‘Court fails utterly to understand realities of gender pay discrimination’) will be Savana Redding (‘Court compares strip searches of 13-year-old girls to American Pie-style locker-room hijinks’). After today’s argument, it’s plain the court will overturn a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion finding a school’s decision to strip-search a 13-year-old girl unconstitutional. That the school in question was looking for a prescription pill with the mind-altering force of a pair of Advil—and couldn’t be bothered to call the child’s mother first—hardly matters.”

Having read the Court’s opinion, we know that Lithwick’s prediction was not correct. Justice Breyer, he of the hijinks memories, joined an eight-Justice majority finding that the school’s behavior violated the Fourth Amendment. Although there was broad consensus for finding a violation, a smaller majority of Justices denied Savana money damages, holding that the school officials were protected by “qualified immunity,” a doctrine discussed in Chapter 35.

Based on the standards set forth in T.L.O. and Redding, consider these potential actions by a school district:

May a school search the mobile phone of a student who was caught texting in class? Does it matter if the teachers search only to see who else was texting with the student or instead search the photos and other data on the phone? See Amy Vorenberg, Indecent Exposure: Do Warrantless Searches of a Student’s Cell Phone Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 17 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 62 (2012).
What about random locker searches aimed at finding drugs? What about requiring students to use clear backpacks or to walk through metal detectors when entering the school building?

We now turn to searches of public employees. Supervisors of public employees have a duty to monitor the work of subordinates for the public interest. Beyond reducing waste, fraud, and abuse, supervisors have the day-to-day responsibility of managing staff so that offices accomplish their goals. It remains unclear what privacy rights public employees maintain at work.

In the context of a public employee whose electronic communications were searched by supervisors, the Court in 2010 avoided resolving important questions about public employee privacy. The Court found the searches at issue “reasonable,” in part, because the employee’s behavior was egregious and the response of the employer unsurprising. Students should note what issues are not decided by the Court, in addition to noting the holdings.

Supreme Court of the United States

**City of Ontario, California v. Jeff Quon**

Decided June 17, 2010 – *560 U.S. 746*

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the assertion by a government employer of the right, in circumstances to be described, to read text messages sent and received on a pager the employer owned and issued to an employee. The employee contends that the privacy of the messages is protected by the ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures” found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though the case touches issues of farreaching significance, the Court concludes it can be resolved by settled principles determining when a search is reasonable.

I

A

The City of Ontario (City) is a political subdivision of the State of California. The case arose out of incidents in 2001 and 2002 when respondent Jeff Quon was employed by the Ontario Police Department (OPD). He was a police sergeant and member of OPD’s Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team. The City, OPD, and OPD’s Chief, Lloyd Scharf, are petitioners here. As will be discussed, two respondents share the last name Quon. In this opinion “Quon” refers to Jeff Quon, for the relevant events mainly revolve around him.

In October 2001, the City acquired 20 alphanumeric pagers capable of sending and receiving text messages. Arch Wireless Operating Company provided wireless service for the pagers. Under the City’s service contract with Arch Wireless, each pager was allotted a limited number of characters sent or received each month. Usage in excess of that amount would result in an additional fee. The City issued pagers to Quon and other SWAT Team members in order to help the SWAT Team mobilize and respond to emergency situations.
Before acquiring the pagers, the City announced a “Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy” (Computer Policy) that applied to all employees. Among other provisions, it specified that the City “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” In March 2000, Quon signed a statement acknowledging that he had read and understood the Computer Policy.

The Computer Policy did not apply, on its face, to text messaging. Text messages share similarities with e-mails, but the two differ in an important way. In this case, for instance, an e-mail sent on a City computer was transmitted through the City’s own data servers, but a text message sent on one of the City’s pagers was transmitted using wireless radio frequencies from an individual pager to a receiving station owned by Arch Wireless. It was routed through Arch Wireless’ computer network, where it remained until the recipient’s pager or cellular telephone was ready to receive the message, at which point Arch Wireless transmitted the message from the transmitting station nearest to the recipient. After delivery, Arch Wireless retained a copy on its computer servers. The message did not pass through computers owned by the City.

Although the Computer Policy did not cover text messages by its explicit terms, the City made clear to employees, including Quon, that the City would treat text messages the same way as it treated e-mails. At an April 18, 2002, staff meeting at which Quon was present, Lieutenant Steven Duke, the OPD officer responsible for the City’s contract with Arch Wireless, told officers that messages sent on the pagers “are considered e-mail messages. This means that [text] messages would fall under the City’s policy as public information and [would be] eligible for auditing.” Duke’s comments were put in writing in a memorandum sent on April 29, 2002, by Chief Scharf to Quon and other City personnel.

Within the first or second billing cycle after the pagers were distributed, Quon exceeded his monthly text message character allotment. Duke told Quon about the overage, and reminded him that messages sent on the pagers were “considered e-mail and could be audited.” Duke said, however, that “it was not his intent to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if the overage [was] due to work related transmissions.” Duke suggested that Quon could reimburse the City for the overage fee rather than have Duke audit the messages. Quon wrote a check to the City for the overage. Duke offered the same arrangement to other employees who incurred overage fees.

Over the next few months, Quon exceeded his character limit three or four times. Each time he reimbursed the City. Quon and another officer again incurred overage fees for their pager usage in August 2002. At a meeting in October, Duke told Scharf that he had become “tired of being a bill collector.” Scharf decided to determine whether the existing character limit was too low—that is, whether officers such as Quon were having to pay fees for sending work-related messages—or if the overages were for personal messages. Scharf told Duke to request transcripts of text messages sent in August and September by Quon and the other employee who had exceeded the character allowance.

At Duke’s request, an administrative assistant employed by OPD contacted Arch Wireless. After verifying that the City was the subscriber on the accounts, Arch Wireless provided the desired transcripts. Duke reviewed the transcripts and discovered that many of the messages sent and received on Quon’s pager were not work related, and some were sexually explicit. Duke reported
his findings to Scharf, who, along with Quon’s immediate supervisor, reviewed the transcripts himself. After his review, Scharf referred the matter to OPD’s internal affairs division for an investigation into whether Quon was violating OPD rules by pursuing personal matters while on duty.

The officer in charge of the internal affairs review was Sergeant Patrick McMahon. Before conducting a review, McMahon used Quon’s work schedule to redact the transcripts in order to eliminate any messages Quon sent while off duty. He then reviewed the content of the messages Quon sent during work hours. McMahon’s report noted that Quon sent or received 456 messages during work hours in the month of August 2002, of which no more than 57 were work related; he sent as many as 80 messages during a single day at work; and on an average workday, Quon sent or received 28 messages, of which only 3 were related to police business. The report concluded that Quon had violated OPD rules. Quon was allegedly disciplined.

B

Quon filed suit against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Among the allegations in the complaint was that petitioners violated respondent[’s] Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining and reviewing the transcript of Jeff Quon’s pager messages.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court denied petitioners’ motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims. The jury concluded that Scharf ordered the audit to determine the efficacy of the character limits. The District Court accordingly held that petitioners did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It entered judgment in their favor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The panel agreed with the District Court that Jeff Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages but disagreed with the District Court about whether the search was reasonable. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc.

This Court granted the petition for certiorari filed by the City, OPD, and Chief Scharf challenging the Court of Appeals’ holding that they violated the Fourth Amendment.

II

It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment’s protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal investigations. “The Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government,” without regard to whether the government actor is investigating crime or performing another function. The Fourth Amendment applies as well when the Government acts in its capacity as an employer.

The Court discussed this principle in O'Connor [v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)]. All Members of the Court agreed with the general principle that “[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.” A majority
of the Court further agreed that “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable for government employers.

The O’Connor Court did disagree on the proper analytical framework for Fourth Amendment claims against government employers. A four-Justice plurality concluded that the correct analysis has two steps. First, because “some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable,” a court must consider “[t]he operational realities of the workplace” in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. On this view, “the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.” Next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation “for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.”

Justice SCALIA, concurring in the judgment, outlined a different approach. His opinion would have dispensed with an inquiry into “operational realities” and would conclude “that the offices of government employees ... are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.” But he would also have held “that government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context—do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”

Later, in the Von Raab decision, [Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)], the Court explained that “operational realities” could diminish an employee’s privacy expectations, and that this diminution could be taken into consideration when assessing the reasonableness of a workplace search. In the two decades since O’Connor, however, the threshold test for determining the scope of an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights has not been clarified further. Here, though they disagree on whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, both petitioners and respondents start from the premise that the O’Connor plurality controls. It is not necessary to resolve whether that premise is correct. The case can be decided by determining that the search was reasonable even assuming Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The two O’Connor approaches—the plurality’s and Justice SCALIA’s—therefore lead to the same result here.

III

A

Before turning to the reasonableness of the search, it is instructive to note the parties’ disagreement over whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear. In Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth. It is not so clear that courts at present are on so sure a ground. Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises
that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication devices.

Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior. As one amici brief notes, many employers expect or at least tolerate personal use of such equipment by employees because it often increases worker efficiency. Another amicus points out that the law is beginning to respond to these developments, as some States have recently passed statutes requiring employers to notify employees when monitoring their electronic communications. At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will evolve.

[T]he Court [will] have difficulty predicting how employees’ privacy expectations will be shaped by those changes or the degree to which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as reasonable. Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their own. And employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.

A broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted. It is preferable to dispose of this case on narrower grounds. For present purposes we assume several propositions arguendo: First, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to him by the City; second, petitioners’ review of the transcript constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and third, the principles applicable to a government employer’s search of an employee’s physical office apply with at least the same force when the employer intrudes on the employee’s privacy in the electronic sphere.

B

Even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, petitioners did not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining and reviewing the transcripts. Although as a general matter, warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” there are “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to that general rule. The Court has held that the “special needs” of the workplace justify one such exception.

Under the approach of the O’Connor plurality, when conducted for a “noninvestigatory, work-related purpos[e]” or for the “investigatio[n] of work-related misconduct,” a government employer’s warrantless search is reasonable if it is “justified at its inception” and if “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of” the circumstances giving rise to the search. The search here satisfied the standard of the O’Connor plurality and was reasonable under that approach.
The search was justified at its inception because there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search [was] necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose.” As a jury found, Chief Scharf ordered the search in order to determine whether the character limit on the City’s contract with Arch Wireless was sufficient to meet the City’s needs. This was, as the Ninth Circuit noted, a “legitimate work-related rationale.” The City and OPD had a legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not being forced to pay out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or on the other hand that the City was not paying for extensive personal communications.

As for the scope of the search, reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether Quon’s overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal use. The review was also not “excessively intrusive.” Although Quon had gone over his monthly allotment a number of times, OPD requested transcripts for only the months of August and September 2002. While it may have been reasonable as well for OPD to review transcripts of all the months in which Quon exceeded his allowance, it was certainly reasonable for OPD to review messages for just two months in order to obtain a large enough sample to decide whether the character limits were efficacious. And it is worth noting that during his internal affairs investigation, McMahon redacted all messages Quon sent while off duty, a measure which reduced the intrusiveness of any further review of the transcripts.

Furthermore, and again on the assumption that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his messages, the extent of an expectation is relevant to assessing whether the search was too intrusive. Even if he could assume some level of privacy would inhere in his messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages were in all circumstances immune from scrutiny. Quon was told that his messages were subject to auditing. As a law enforcement officer, he would or should have known that his actions were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that this might entail an analysis of his on-the-job communications. Under the circumstances, a reasonable employee would be aware that sound management principles might require the audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used. Given that the City issued the pagers to Quon and other SWAT Team members in order to help them more quickly respond to crises—and given that Quon had received no assurances of privacy—Quon could have anticipated that it might be necessary for the City to audit pager messages to assess the SWAT Team’s performance in particular emergency situations.

From OPD’s perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy expectation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life. OPD’s audit of messages on Quon’s employer-provided pager was not nearly as intrusive as a search of his personal e-mail account or pager, or a wiretap on his home phone line, would have been. That the search did reveal intimate details of Quon’s life does not make it unreasonable, for under the circumstances a reasonable employer would not expect that such a review would intrude on such matters. The search was permissible in its scope.

The Court of Appeals erred in finding the search unreasonable. It pointed to a “host of simple ways to verify the efficacy of the 25,000 character limit ... without intruding on [respondents’] Fourth Amendment rights.” The panel suggested that Scharf “could have warned Quon that for the month of September he was forbidden from using his pager for personal communications,
and that the contents of all his messages would be reviewed to ensure the pager was used only for work-related purposes during that time frame. Alternatively, if [OPD] wanted to review past usage, it could have asked Quon to count the characters himself, or asked him to redact personal messages and grant permission to [OPD] to review the redacted transcript.”

This approach was inconsistent with controlling precedents. This Court has “repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” That rationale “could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers,” because “judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the government might have been accomplished.” The analytic errors of the Court of Appeals in this case illustrate the necessity of this principle. Even assuming there were ways that OPD could have performed the search that would have been less intrusive, it does not follow that the search as conducted was unreasonable.

Because the search was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable under the approach of the O’Connor plurality. For these same reasons—that the employer had a legitimate reason for the search, and that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of that justification—the Court also concludes that the search would be “regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context” and would satisfy the approach of Justice SCALIA’s concurrence. The search was reasonable, and the Court of Appeals erred by holding to the contrary. Petitioners did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

* * *

A recurring Fourth Amendment question for public employees and public school students is the permissibility of drug testing by employers and school officials. We consider that issue in our next chapter.
In this chapter, we continue our discussion of searches of public school students and public employees. First, we review when the Court has allowed for public employers and public schools to require that employees and students submit to drug tests. Then, we consider the question of when public hospitals may conduct drug tests of patients without consent.

**Drug Testing of Public Employees**

The next case concerns a government regulation providing for the drug testing of certain railroad employees after certain accidents.

*Samuel K. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association*

Decided March 21, 1989 – 489 U.S. 602

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety.” Finding that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees poses a serious threat to safety, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has promulgated regulations that mandate blood and urine tests of employees who are involved in certain train accidents. The FRA also has adopted regulations that do not require, but do authorize, railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules. The question presented by this case is whether these regulations violate the Fourth Amendment.

I

The regulations prohibit covered employees from using or possessing alcohol or any controlled substance. The regulations further prohibit those employees from reporting for covered service while under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol, while having a blood alcohol concentration of .04 or more, or while under the influence of, or impaired by, any controlled substance. To the extent pertinent here, two subparts of the regulations relate to testing. Subpart C, which is entitled “Post-Accident Toxicological Testing,” is mandatory. It provides that railroads “shall take all practicable steps to assure that all covered employees of the railroad directly involved ... provide blood and urine samples for toxicological testing by FRA” upon the occurrence of certain specified events. Toxicological testing is required following a “major train accident,” which is defined as any train accident that involves (i) a fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. The railroad has the further duty of collecting blood and urine samples for
testing after an “impact accident,” which is defined as a collision that results in a reportable injury, or in damage to railroad property of $50,000 or more. Finally, the railroad is also obligated to test after “[a]ny train incident that involves a fatality to any on-duty railroad employee.”

After occurrence of an event which activates its duty to test, the railroad must transport all crew members and other covered employees directly involved in the accident or incident to an independent medical facility, where both blood and urine samples must be obtained from each employee. After the samples have been collected, the railroad is required to ship them by prepaid air freight to the FRA laboratory for analysis. The FRA proposes to place primary reliance on analysis of blood samples, as blood is “the only available body fluid ... that can provide a clear indication not only of the presence of alcohol and drugs but also their current impairment effects.” Urine samples are also necessary, however, because drug traces remain in the urine longer than in blood, and in some cases it will not be possible to transport employees to a medical facility before the time it takes for certain drugs to be eliminated from the bloodstream. In those instances, a “positive urine test, taken with specific information on the pattern of elimination for the particular drug and other information on the behavior of the employee and the circumstances of the accident, may be crucial to the determination of” the cause of an accident.

The regulations require that the FRA notify employees of the results of the tests and afford them an opportunity to respond in writing before preparation of any final investigative report. Employees who refuse to provide required blood or urine samples may not perform covered service for nine months, but they are entitled to a hearing concerning their refusal to take the test.

Subpart D of the regulations, which is entitled “Authorization to Test for Cause,” is permissive. It authorizes railroads to require covered employees to submit to breath or urine tests in certain circumstances not addressed by Subpart C. Breath or urine tests, or both, may be ordered (1) after a reportable accident or incident, where a supervisor has a “reasonable suspicion” that an employee’s acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or severity of the accident or incident; or (2) in the event of certain specific rule violations, including noncompliance with a signal and excessive speeding. A railroad also may require breath tests where a supervisor has a “reasonable suspicion” that an employee is under the influence of alcohol, based upon specific, personal observations concerning the appearance, behavior, speech, or body odors of the employee. Where impairment is suspected, a railroad, in addition, may require urine tests, but only if two supervisors make the appropriate determination and where the supervisors suspect impairment due to a substance other than alcohol, at least one of those supervisors must have received specialized training in detecting the signs of drug intoxication.

Subpart D further provides that whenever the results of either breath or urine tests are intended for use in a disciplinary proceeding, the employee must be given the opportunity to provide a blood sample for analysis at an independent medical facility. If an employee declines to give a blood sample, the railroad may presume impairment, absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, from a positive showing of controlled substance residues in the urine. The railroad must, however, provide detailed notice of this presumption to its employees, and advise them of their right to provide a contemporaneous blood sample. As in the case of samples procured under
Subpart C, the regulations set forth procedures for the collection of samples, and require that samples “be analyzed by a method that is reliable within known tolerances.”

Respondents brought the instant suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to enjoin the FRA’s regulations on various statutory and constitutional grounds. In a ruling from the bench, the District Court granted summary judgment in petitioners’ favor. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. We granted the federal parties’ petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the regulations invalidated by the Court of Appeals violate the Fourth Amendment. We now reverse.

II

[The Court first determined that the drug testing regulation could be challenged under the Fourth Amendment even though the tests at issue were conducted by private railroads. The Court also found that the tests amounted to “searches.”]

III

A

[T]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. What is reasonable, of course, “depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”

We have recognized exceptions to [the warrant requirement] “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’” When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context.

The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a government office, school, or prison, “likewise presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” It is undisputed that [] covered employees are engaged in safety-sensitive tasks. The FRA so found, and respondents conceded the point at oral argument.

The FRA has prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather “to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.” This governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the traveling public and of the employees themselves plainly justifies prohibiting covered employees from using alcohol or drugs on duty, or while subject to being called for duty. This interest also “require[s] and justif[ies] the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed.” The question that remains, then, is whether the Government’s need to monitor
compliance with these restrictions justifies the privacy intrusions at issue absent a warrant or individualized suspicion.

B

Both the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in the regulations that authorize them, and doubtless are well known to covered employees. Indeed, in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.

We have recognized, moreover, that the government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is at its strongest when, as here, “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.” As the FRA recognized, alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate, and blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as possible.

The Government’s need to rely on private railroads to set the testing process in motion also indicates that insistence on a warrant requirement would impede the achievement of the Government’s objective. Railroad supervisors are not in the business of investigating violations of the criminal laws or enforcing administrative codes, and otherwise have little occasion to become familiar with the intricacies of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “Impressing unwieldy warrant procedures ... upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.”

In sum, imposing a warrant requirement in the present context would add little to the assurances of certainty and regularity already afforded by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and in many cases frustrating, the objectives of the Government’s testing program. We do not believe that a warrant is essential to render the intrusions here at issue reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Our cases indicate that even a search that may be performed without a warrant must be based, as a general matter, on probable cause to believe that the person to be searched has violated the law. When the balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable cause, we have usually required “some quantum of individualized suspicion” before concluding that a search is reasonable. We made it clear, however, that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. We believe this is true of the intrusions in question here.

By and large, intrusions on privacy under the FRA regulations are limited. The breath tests authorized by Subpart D of the regulations are even less intrusive than the blood tests prescribed by Subpart C. Unlike blood tests, breath tests do not require piercing the skin and may be
conducted safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconvenience or embarrassment. Like the blood-testing procedures mandated by Subpart C, which can be used only to ascertain the presence of alcohol or controlled substances in the bloodstream, breath tests reveal no other facts in which the employee has a substantial privacy interest. In all the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the administration of a breath test implicates significant privacy concerns.

A more difficult question is presented by urine tests. Like breath tests, urine tests are not invasive of the body and, under the regulations, may not be used as an occasion for inquiring into private facts unrelated to alcohol or drug use. We recognize, however, that the procedures for collecting the necessary samples, which require employees to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy, raise concerns not implicated by blood or breath tests. While we would not characterize these additional privacy concerns as minimal in most contexts, we note that the regulations endeavor to reduce the intrusiveness of the collection process. The regulations do not require that samples be furnished under the direct observation of a monitor, despite the desirability of such a procedure to ensure the integrity of the sample. The sample is also collected in a medical environment, by personnel unrelated to the railroad employer, and is thus not unlike similar procedures encountered often in the context of a regular physical examination.

More importantly, the expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees. We do not suggest, of course, that the interest in bodily security enjoyed by those employed in a regulated industry must always be considered minimal. Here, however, the covered employees have long been a principal focus of regulatory concern. As the dissenting judge below noted: “The reason is obvious. An idle locomotive, sitting in the roundhouse, is harmless. It becomes lethal when operated negligently by persons who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” We conclude, therefore, that the testing procedures contemplated by Subparts C and D pose only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees.

By contrast, the Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion is compelling. Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities, employees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others. An impaired employee, the FRA found, will seldom display any outward “signs detectable by the lay person or, in many cases, even the physician.” Indeed, while respondents posit that impaired employees might be detected without alcohol or drug testing, the premise of respondents’ lawsuit is that even the occurrence of a major calamity will not give rise to a suspicion of impairment with respect to any particular employee.

While no procedure can identify all impaired employees with ease and perfect accuracy, the FRA regulations supply an effective means of deterring employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alcohol in the first place. By ensuring that employees in safety-sensitive positions know they will be tested upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the timing of which no employee can predict with certainty, the regulations significantly increase
the deterrent effect of the administrative penalties associated with the prohibited conduct, concomitantly increasing the likelihood that employees will forgo using drugs or alcohol while subject to being called for duty.

The testing procedures contemplated by Subpart C also help railroads obtain invaluable information about the causes of major accidents and to take appropriate measures to safeguard the general public. Positive test results would point toward drug or alcohol impairment on the part of members of the crew as a possible cause of an accident, and may help to establish whether a particular accident, otherwise not drug related, was made worse by the inability of impaired employees to respond appropriately. Negative test results would likewise furnish invaluable clues, for eliminating drug impairment as a potential cause or contributing factor would help establish the significance of equipment failure, inadequate training, or other potential causes, and suggest a more thorough examination of these alternatives. Tests performed following the rule violations specified in Subpart D likewise can provide valuable information respecting the causes of those transgressions, which the FRA found to involve “the potential for a serious train accident or grave personal injury, or both.”

A requirement of particularized suspicion of drug or alcohol use would seriously impede an employer’s ability to obtain this information, despite its obvious importance. Experience confirms the FRA’s judgment that the scene of a serious rail accident is chaotic. Investigators who arrive at the scene shortly after a major accident has occurred may find it difficult to determine which members of a train crew contributed to its occurrence. Obtaining evidence that might give rise to the suspicion that a particular employee is impaired, a difficult endeavor in the best of circumstances, is most impracticable in the aftermath of a serious accident. While events following the rule violations that activate the testing authority of Subpart D may be less chaotic, objective indicia of impairment are absent in these instances as well. Indeed, any attempt to gather evidence relating to the possible impairment of particular employees likely would result in the loss or deterioration of the evidence furnished by the tests. It would be unrealistic, and inimical to the Government’s goal of ensuring safety in rail transportation, to require a showing of individualized suspicion in these circumstances.

We conclude that the compelling Government interests served by the FRA’s regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee. In view of our conclusion that, on the present record, the toxicological testing contemplated by the regulations is not an undue infringement on the justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees, the Government’s compelling interests outweigh privacy concerns.

IV

The possession of unlawful drugs is a criminal offense that the Government may punish, but it is a separate and far more dangerous wrong to perform certain sensitive tasks while under the influence of those substances. Performing those tasks while impaired by alcohol is, of course, equally dangerous, though consumption of alcohol is legal in most other contexts. The Government may take all necessary and reasonable regulatory steps to prevent or deter that hazardous conduct, and since the gravamen of the evil is performing certain functions while
concealing the substance in the body, it may be necessary, as in the case before us, to examine the body or its fluids to accomplish the regulatory purpose. The necessity to perform that regulatory function with respect to railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks, and the reasonableness of the system for doing so, have been established in this case.

In light of the limited discretion exercised by the railroad employers under the regulations, the surpassing safety interests served by toxicological tests in this context, and the diminished expectation of privacy that attaches to information pertaining to the fitness of covered employees, we believe that it is reasonable to conduct such tests in the absence of a warrant or reasonable suspicion that any particular employee may be impaired. We hold that the alcohol and drug tests contemplated by Subparts C and D of the FRA’s regulations are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

The issue in this case is not whether declaring a war on illegal drugs is good public policy. The importance of ridding our society of such drugs is, by now, apparent to all. Rather, the issue here is whether the Government’s deployment in that war of a particularly Draconian weapon—the compulsory collection and chemical testing of railroad workers’ blood and urine—comports with the Fourth Amendment. Precisely because the need for action against the drug scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great. History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. [W]hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.

In permitting the Government to force entire railroad crews to submit to invasive blood and urine tests, even when it lacks any evidence of drug or alcohol use or other wrongdoing, the majority today joins those shortsighted courts which have allowed basic constitutional rights to fall prey to momentary emergencies. The majority purports to limit its decision to postaccident testing of workers in “safety-sensitive” jobs. But the damage done to the Fourth Amendment is not so easily cabined. The majority’s acceptance of dragnet blood and urine testing ensures that the first, and worst, casualty of the war on drugs will be the precious liberties of our citizens. I therefore dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

On the same day as Skinner, the Court decided National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), another case about drug testing public employees. A U.S. Customs Service program required drug testing of employees who sought promotion to jobs involving seizing illegal drugs or which required employees to carry firearms or handle classified materials. Again, the Court found the collection of urine samples to be a “search.” Again, the Court upheld the policy, holding that it was “reasonable” for the government to mandate the tests because of its “compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment.” Comparing the practice to hypothetical searches
of workers at “the United States Mint ... when they leave the workplace every day,” the Court concluded that the “operational realities” of the Customs Service justified the testing.

By contrast, in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), the Court struck down a Georgia law requiring that candidates for certain state offices submit to drug tests. The state stressed “the incompatibility of unlawful drug use with holding high state office” and argued that “the use of illegal drugs draws into question an official’s judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence and trust in elected officials.” The Court was not persuaded, concluding, “[n]othing in the record hints that the hazards respondents broadly describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia’s polity.” The Court noted that political candidates “are subject to relentless scrutiny—by their peers, the public, and the press.” The Justices stated that the suspicionless searches needed to track lower-profile employees—like those approved in Skinner and Von Raab—were not necessary for voters to vet candidates for election.

Drug Testing of Public School Students

The Court has repeatedly applied the reasoning of Skinner and Von Raab to public school policies that mandate the drug testing of certain students.

Supreme Court of the United States

Vernonia School District 47J v. Wayne Acton

Decided June 26, 1995 – 515 U.S. 646

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Student Athlete Drug Policy adopted by School District 47J in the town of Vernonia, Oregon, authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of students who participate in the District’s school athletics programs. We granted certiorari to decide whether this violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

I

A

Petitioner Vernonia School District 47J (District) operates one high school and three grade schools in the logging community of Vernonia, Oregon. As elsewhere in small-town America, school sports play a prominent role in the town’s life, and student athletes are admired in their schools and in the community.

Drugs had not been a major problem in Vernonia schools. In the mid-to-late 1980’s, however, teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use. Students began to speak out about their attraction to the drug culture, and to boast that there was nothing the school could do about it. Along with more drugs came more disciplinary problems. Between 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number
reported in the early 1980’s, and several students were suspended. Students became increasingly rude during class; outbursts of profane language became common.

Not only were student athletes included among the drug users but, as the District Court found, athletes were the leaders of the drug culture. This caused the District’s administrators particular concern, since drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. The high school football and wrestling coach witnessed a severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, and various omissions of safety procedures and misexecutions by football players, all attributable in his belief to the effects of drug use.

Initially, the District responded to the drug problem by offering special classes, speakers, and presentations designed to deter drug use. It even brought in a specially trained dog to detect drugs, but the drug problem persisted. At that point, District officials began considering a drug-testing program. They held a parent “input night” to discuss the proposed Student Athlete Drug Policy (Policy), and the parents in attendance gave their unanimous approval. The school board approved the Policy for implementation in the fall of 1989. Its expressed purpose is to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs.

B

The Policy applies to all students participating in interscholastic athletics. Students wishing to play sports must sign a form consenting to the testing and must obtain the written consent of their parents. Athletes are tested at the beginning of the season for their sport. In addition, once each week of the season the names of the athletes are placed in a “pool” from which a student, with the supervision of two adults, blindly draws the names of 10% of the athletes for random testing. Those selected are notified and tested that same day, if possible.

The student to be tested completes a specimen control form which bears an assigned number. Prescription medications that the student is taking must be identified by providing a copy of the prescription or a doctor’s authorization. The student then enters an empty locker room accompanied by an adult monitor of the same sex. Each boy selected produces a sample at a urinal, remaining fully clothed with his back to the monitor, who stands approximately 12 to 15 feet behind the student. Monitors may (though do not always) watch the student while he produces the sample, and they listen for normal sounds of urination. Girls produce samples in an enclosed bathroom stall, so that they can be heard but not observed. After the sample is produced, it is given to the monitor, who checks it for temperature and tampering and then transfers it to a vial.

The samples are sent to an independent laboratory, which routinely tests them for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana. Other drugs, such as LSD, may be screened at the request of the District, but the identity of a particular student does not determine which drugs will be tested. The laboratory’s procedures are 99.94% accurate. The District follows strict procedures regarding the chain of custody and access to test results. The laboratory does not know the identity of the students whose samples it tests. It is authorized to mail written test reports only to the superintendent and to provide test results to District personnel by telephone only after the requesting official recites a code confirming his authority. Only the
superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and athletic directors have access to test results, and the results are not kept for more than one year.

If a sample tests positive, a second test is administered as soon as possible to confirm the result. If the second test is negative, no further action is taken. If the second test is positive, the athlete’s parents are notified, and the school principal convenes a meeting with the student and his parents, at which the student is given the option of (1) participating for six weeks in an assistance program that includes weekly urinalysis, or (2) suffering suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current season and the next athletic season. The student is then retested prior to the start of the next athletic season for which he or she is eligible. The Policy states that a second offense results in automatic imposition of option (2); a third offense in suspension for the remainder of the current season and the next two athletic seasons.

C

In the fall of 1991, respondent James Acton, then a seventh grader, signed up to play football at one of the District’s grade schools. He was denied participation, however, because he and his parents refused to sign the testing consent forms. The Actons filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. After a bench trial, the District Court entered an order denying the claims on the merits and dismissing the action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Policy violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted certiorari.

II

As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is “reasonableness.” Whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant [supported by probable cause]. A search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional, we have said, “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”

III

The first factor to be considered is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search here at issue intrudes. Central, in our view, to the present case is the fact that the subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster.
Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the “reasonableness” inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children. For their own good and that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required to submit to various physical examinations, and to be vaccinated against various diseases.

Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes. School sports are not for the bashful. They require “suiting up” before each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford. The locker rooms in Vernonia are typical: No individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even all the toilet stalls have doors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted, there is “an element of ‘communal undress’ inherent in athletic participation.”

There is an additional respect in which school athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy. By choosing to “go out for the team,” they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally. In Vernonia’s public schools, they must submit to a preseason physical exam (James testified that his included the giving of a urine sample), they must acquire adequate insurance coverage or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average, and comply with any “rules of conduct, dress, training hours and related matters as may be established for each sport by the head coach and athletic director with the principal’s approval.” Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a “closely regulated industry,” students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.

IV

Having considered the scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue here, we turn next to the character of the intrusion that is complained of. We recognized in *Skinner* that collecting the samples for urinalysis intrudes upon “an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy.” We noted, however, that the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored. Under the District’s Policy, male students produce samples at a urinal along a wall. They remain fully clothed and are only observed from behind, if at all. Female students produce samples in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside listening only for sounds of tampering. These conditions are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and especially schoolchildren use daily. Under such conditions, the privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in our view negligible.

The other privacy-invasive aspect of urinalysis is, of course, the information it discloses concerning the state of the subject’s body, and the materials he has ingested. In this regard it is significant that the tests at issue here look only for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Moreover, the drugs for which the samples are screened are standard, and do not vary according to the identity of the student. And finally, the results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to
know; and they are not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function.

V

Finally, we turn to consider the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy of this means for meeting it. [T]he District Court held that because the District’s program also called for drug testing in the absence of individualized suspicion, the District “must demonstrate a ‘compelling need’ for the program.” The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with this view. It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase “compelling state interest,” in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest that appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy. Whether that relatively high degree of government concern is necessary in this case or not, we think it is met.

That the nature of the concern is important—indeed, perhaps compelling—can hardly be doubted. School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe. “Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound”; “children grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly poor.” And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted. In the present case, moreover, the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that this evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon children for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility of care and direction. Finally, it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high. Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened by the District’s Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes. Amphetamines produce an “artificially induced heart rate increase, [p]eripheral vasoconstriction, [b]lood pressure increase, and [m]asking of the normal fatigue response,” making them a “very dangerous drug when used during exercise of any type.” Marijuana causes “[i]rrregular blood pressure responses during changes in body position,” “[r]eduction in the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood,” and “[i]nhibition of the normal sweating responses resulting in increased body temperature.” Cocaine produces “[v]asoconstriction[,] [e]levated blood pressure,” and “[p]ossible coronary artery spasms and myocardial infarction.”

As for the immediacy of the District’s concerns: We are not inclined to question—indeed, we could not possibly find clearly erroneous—the District Court’s conclusion that “a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion,” that “[d]isciplinary actions had reached ‘epidemic proportions,’” and that “the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student’s misperceptions about the drug culture.” That is an immediate crisis of greater proportions than existed in
Skinner, where we upheld the Government’s drug-testing program based on findings of drug use by railroad employees nationwide, without proof that a problem existed on the particular railroads whose employees were subject to the test. And of much greater proportions than existed in Von Raab, where there was no documented history of drug use by any customs officials.

As to the efficacy of this means for addressing the problem: It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the “role model” effect of athletes’ drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs. Respondents argue that a “less intrusive means to the same end” was available, namely, “drug testing on suspicion of drug use.” We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the “least intrusive” search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Respondents’ alternative entails substantial difficulties—if it is indeed practicable at all. It may be impracticable, for one thing, simply because the parents who are willing to accept random drug testing for athletes are not willing to accept accusatory drug testing for all students, which transforms the process into a badge of shame. Respondents’ proposal brings the risk that teachers will impose testing arbitrarily upon troublesome but not drug-likely students. It generates the expense of defending lawsuits that charge such arbitrary imposition, or that simply demand greater process before accusatory drug testing is imposed. And not least of all, it adds to the ever-expanding diversionary duties of schoolteachers the new function of spotting and bringing to account drug abuse, a task for which they are ill prepared, and which is not readily compatible with their vocation. In many respects, we think, testing based on “suspicion” of drug use would not be better, but worse.

VI

Taking into account all the factors we have considered above—the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search—we conclude Vernonia’s Policy is reasonable and hence constitutional.

We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts. The most significant element in this case is the first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care. Just as when the government conducts a search in its capacity as employer (a warrantless search of an absent employee’s desk to obtain an urgently needed file, for example), the relevant question is whether that intrusion upon privacy is one that a reasonable employer might engage in; so also when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. Given the findings of need made by the District Court, we conclude that in the present case it is.
We may note that the primary guardians of Vernonia’s schoolchildren appear to agree. The record shows no objection to this districtwide program by any parents other than the couple before us here—even though, as we have described, a public meeting was held to obtain parents’ views. We find insufficient basis to contradict the judgment of Vernonia’s parents, its school board, and the District Court, as to what was reasonably in the interest of these children under the circumstances.

We vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice O’CONNOR, with whom Justice STEVENS and Justice SOUTER join, dissenting.

The population of our Nation’s public schools, grades 7 through 12, numbers around 18 million. By the reasoning of today’s decision, the millions of these students who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bodily search.

In justifying this result, the Court dispenses with a requirement of individualized suspicion on considered policy grounds. First, it explains that precisely because every student athlete is being tested, there is no concern that school officials might act arbitrarily in choosing whom to test. Second, a broad-based search regime, the Court reasons, dilutes the accusatory nature of the search. In making these policy arguments, of course, the Court sidesteps powerful, countervailing privacy concerns. Blanket searches, because they can involve “thousands or millions” of searches, “pose a greater threat to liberty” than do suspicion-based ones, which “affec[t] one person at a time.” Searches based on individualized suspicion also afford potential targets considerable control over whether they will, in fact, be searched because a person can avoid such a search by not acting in an objectively suspicious way. And given that the surest way to avoid acting suspiciously is to avoid the underlying wrongdoing, the costs of such a regime, one would think, are minimal.

But whether a blanket search is “better” than a regime based on individualized suspicion is not a debate in which we should engage. In my view, it is not open to judges or government officials to decide on policy grounds which is better and which is worse. For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have allowed exceptions in recent years only where it has been clear that a suspicion-based regime would be ineffectual. Because that is not the case here, I dissent.

*   *   *

Seven years after deciding Vernonia, the Court considered a public school drug testing program that went beyond athletes and included participants in activities such as the debate team, band, and Future Farmers of America. While the district policy stated that students involved in any extracurricular activity could be tested, the record reflected that in practice testing was limited to participants in “competitive extracurricular activities.”
Supreme Court of the United States

Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Lindsay Earls

Decided June 27, 2002 – 536 U.S. 822

[In Earls, the Court applied the principles of Vernonia and upheld a suspicionless drug testing policy that required all students who participated in “competitive extracurricular activities”—a term with broad definition—to submit to drug testing. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the five-Justice majority found no meaningful difference between the policies challenged in Earls and in Vernonia in the character of intrusion (based on a similar urine collection method) or the nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns (based on the national drug problem and the factual findings about local conditions).

With respect to the students’ privacy interest, the Court was untroubled by the application of Vernonia to a broader category of student activities. The Court noted that required physicals and communal undress common to athletes were not essential to its finding of a negligible privacy interest in Vernonia, and it concluded the interest remained negligible in Earls because the students “who participate[d] in competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject[ed] themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes.” The Court’s analysis of the efficacy of the Policy’s approach broadened Vernonia’s holding:

“Finally, we find that testing students who participate in extracurricular activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the School District’s legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use. While in Vernonia there might have been a closer fit between the testing of athletes and the trial court’s finding that the drug problem was “fueled by the ‘role model’ effect of athletes’ drug use,” such a finding was not essential to the holding. Vernonia did not require the school to test the group of students most likely to use drugs, but rather considered the constitutionality of the program in the context of the public school’s custodial responsibilities. Evaluating the Policy in this context, we conclude that the drug testing of Tecumseh students who participate in extracurricular activities effectively serves the School District’s interest in protecting the safety and health of its students.”

Four Justices sharply disagreed with the result:]

Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice STEVENS, JUSTICE O’CONNOR, and Justice SOUTER join, dissenting.

The particular testing program upheld today is not reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse: Petitioners’ policy targets for testing a student population least likely to be at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging effects. I therefore dissent.

Vernonia cannot be read to endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize the life and health of those who use them. Had the Vernonia Court agreed that public school attendance, in and of itself, permitted
the State to test each student’s blood or urine for drugs, the opinion in *Vernonia* could have saved many words.

Enrollment in a public school, and election to participate in school activities beyond the bare minimum that the curriculum requires, are indeed factors relevant to reasonableness, but they do not on their own justify intrusive, suspicionless searches. *Vernonia*, accordingly, did not rest upon these factors; instead, the Court performed what today’s majority aptly describes as a “fact-specific balancing.” Balancing of that order, applied to the facts now before the Court, should yield a result other than the one the Court announces today.

At the margins, of course, no policy of *random* drug testing is perfectly tailored to the harms it seeks to address. The School District cites the dangers faced by members of the band, who must “perform extremely precise routines with heavy equipment and instruments in close proximity to other students,” and by Future Farmers of America, who “are required to individually control and restrain animals as large as 1500 pounds.” Notwithstanding nightmarish images of out-of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding tubas disturbing the peace and quiet of Tecumseh, the great majority of students the School District seeks to test in truth are engaged in activities that are not safety sensitive to an unusual degree. There is a difference between imperfect tailoring and no tailoring at all.

The Vernonia district, in sum, had two good reasons for testing athletes: Sports team members faced special health risks and they “were the leaders of the drug culture.” No similar reason, and no other tenable justification, explains Tecumseh’s decision to target for testing all participants in every competitive extracurricular activity.

Nationwide, students who participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less likely to develop substance abuse problems than are their less-involved peers. Even if students might be deterred from drug use in order to preserve their extracurricular eligibility, it is at least as likely that other students might forgo their extracurricular involvement in order to avoid detection of their drug use. Tecumseh’s policy thus falls short doubly if deterrence is its aim: It invades the privacy of students who need deterrence least, and risks steering students at greatest risk for substance abuse away from extracurricular involvement that potentially may palliate drug problems.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

Since the Court decided *Vernonia* and *Earls*, public schools have continued to explore how much of the student population can be subjected to mandatory drug testing. Although courts have not yet approved a policy mandating the testing of all students at a public school, school districts have been largely successful in requiring testing of broad portions of the student population.
Consider these examples:

Some schools have required students to submit to drug testing if they wish to park on school grounds. See, e.g., Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000). Lawful? Why or why not?

A public technical college adopted a policy requiring that all students at the college submit to drug tests. See Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Lawful? Why or why not? What if the policy applied only to students in certain academic programs?

In the case of the technical college, the Eighth Circuit upheld mandatory drug testing of students enrolled in “safety-sensitive programs.” Dissenting judges would have allowed testing of all students because there was no reason “to assume that [the college’s] students pursuing an education in its non-safety-sensitive programs are not likewise fully impacted by the same illicit drug-abuse crisis” that justified the testing of students in safety-sensitive programs. Other courts could reach different results in similar cases.


**Drug Testing of Public Hospital Patients**

In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court considered a public hospital’s practice of testing patient urine for drugs to learn whether pregnant women were using cocaine. It applied the reasoning of the public employee and public school student drug test cases to the program.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Crystal M. Ferguson v. City of Charleston**

Decided March 21, 2001 – 532 U.S. 67

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we must decide whether a state hospital’s performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. More narrowly, the question is whether the interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine can justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant.
In the fall of 1988, staff members at the public hospital operated in the city of Charleston by the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) became concerned about an apparent increase in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal treatment. In response to this perceived increase, as of April 1989, MUSC began to order drug screens to be performed on urine samples from maternity patients who were suspected of using cocaine. If a patient tested positive, she was then referred by MUSC staff to the county substance abuse commission for counseling and treatment. However, despite the referrals, the incidence of cocaine use among the patients at MUSC did not appear to change.

Some four months later, Nurse Shirley Brown, the case manager for the MUSC obstetrics department, heard a news broadcast reporting that the police in Greenville, South Carolina, were arresting pregnant users of cocaine on the theory that such use harmed the fetus and was therefore child abuse. Nurse Brown discussed the story with MUSC’s general counsel, Joseph C. Good, Jr., who then contacted Charleston Solicitor Charles Condon in order to offer MUSC’s cooperation in prosecuting mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth.

After receiving Good’s letter, Solicitor Condon took the first steps in developing the policy at issue in this case. He organized the initial meetings, decided who would participate, and issued the invitations, in which he described his plan to prosecute women who tested positive for cocaine while pregnant. The task force that Condon formed included representatives of MUSC, the police, the County Substance Abuse Commission and the Department of Social Services. Their deliberations led to MUSC’s adoption of a 12-page document entitled “POLICY M-7,” dealing with the subject of “Management of Drug Abuse During Pregnancy.”

The first three pages of Policy M-7 set forth the procedure to be followed by the hospital staff to “identify/assist pregnant patients suspected of drug abuse.” The first section, entitled the “Identification of Drug Abusers,” provided that a patient should be tested for cocaine through a urine drug screen if she met one or more of nine criteria. It also stated that a chain of custody should be followed when obtaining and testing urine samples, presumably to make sure that the results could be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. The policy also provided for education and referral to a substance abuse clinic for patients who tested positive. Most important, it added the threat of law enforcement intervention that “provided the necessary ‘leverage’ to make the [p]olicy effective.” That threat was, as respondents candidly acknowledge, essential to the program’s success in getting women into treatment and keeping them there.

The threat of law enforcement involvement was set forth in two protocols, the first dealing with the identification of drug use during pregnancy, and the second with identification of drug use

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1 [Footnote 1 by the Court] As several witnesses testified at trial, the problem of “crack babies” was widely perceived in the late 1980’s as a national epidemic, prompting considerable concern both in the medical community and among the general populace.

2 [Footnote by editors] In a footnote here, the Court listed the nine criteria, which included “No prenatal care,” “Previously known drug or alcohol abuse,” and “Unexplained congenital anomalies.”
after labor. Under the latter protocol, the police were to be notified without delay and the patient promptly arrested. Under the former, after the initial positive drug test, the police were to be notified (and the patient arrested) only if the patient tested positive for cocaine a second time or if she missed an appointment with a substance abuse counselor. In 1990, however, the policy was modified at the behest of the solicitor’s office to give the patient who tested positive during labor, like the patient who tested positive during a prenatal care visit, an opportunity to avoid arrest by consenting to substance abuse treatment.

The last six pages of the policy contained forms for the patients to sign, as well as procedures for the police to follow when a patient was arrested. The policy also prescribed in detail the precise offenses with which a woman could be charged, depending on the stage of her pregnancy. If the pregnancy was 27 weeks or less, the patient was to be charged with simple possession. If it was 28 weeks or more, she was to be charged with possession and distribution to a person under the age of 18—in this case, the fetus. If she delivered “while testing positive for illegal drugs,” she was also to be charged with unlawful neglect of a child. Under the policy, the police were instructed to interrogate the arrestee in order “to ascertain the identity of the subject who provided illegal drugs to the suspect.” Other than the provisions describing the substance abuse treatment to be offered to women who tested positive, the policy made no mention of any change in the prenatal care of such patients, nor did it prescribe any special treatment for the newborns.

II

Petitioners are 10 women who received obstetrical care at MUSC and who were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. Four of them were arrested during the initial implementation of the policy; they were not offered the opportunity to receive drug treatment as an alternative to arrest. The others were arrested after the policy was modified in 1990; they either failed to comply with the terms of the drug treatment program or tested positive for a second time. Respondents include the city of Charleston, law enforcement officials who helped develop and enforce the policy, and representatives of MUSC.

Petitioners’ complaint challenged the validity of the policy. The jury found for respondents. Petitioners appealed [and] the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari to review the appellate court’s holding on the “special needs” issue. We conclude that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a decision on the consent issue.

III

Because MUSC is a state hospital, the members of its staff are government actors, subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the urine tests conducted by those staff members were indisputably searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals concluded that any of the nine criteria used to identify

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3 [Footnote by editors] The “special needs” doctrine has been invoked to permit searches “in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” One example is public school searches. Another is the search of the home of someone on probation, which is covered in our next chapter.
the women to be searched provided either probable cause to believe that they were using cocaine, or even the basis for a reasonable suspicion of such use. Furthermore, given the posture in which the case comes to us, we must assume for purposes of our decision that the tests were performed without the informed consent of the patients.

Because the hospital seeks to justify its authority to conduct drug tests and to turn the results over to law enforcement agents without the knowledge or consent of the patients, this case differs from the four previous cases in which we have considered whether comparable drug tests “fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”

In each of those cases, we employed a balancing test that weighed the intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy against the “special needs” that supported the program. As an initial matter, we note that the invasion of privacy in this case is far more substantial than in those cases. In the previous four cases, there was no misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results, and there were protections against the dissemination of the results to third parties. The use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to participate in an extracurricular activity, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy than the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties. The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent. In none of our prior cases was there any intrusion upon that kind of expectation.

The critical difference between those four drug-testing cases and this one, however, lies in the nature of the “special need” asserted as justification for the warrantless searches. In each of those earlier cases, the “special need” that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement. In this case, however, the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment. This fact distinguishes this case from circumstances in which physicians or psychologists, in the course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the patient herself, come across information that under rules of law or ethics is subject to reporting requirements, which no one has challenged here.

Respondents argue in essence that their ultimate purpose—namely, protecting the health of both mother and child—is a beneficent one. [A] review of the M-7 policy plainly reveals that the purpose actually served by the MUSC searches “is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.”

In looking to the programmatic purpose, we consider all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant primary purpose. In this case, as Judge Blake put it in her dissent below, “it ... is clear from the record that an initial and continuing focus of the policy was on the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers....” Tellingly, the document codifying the policy incorporates the police’s operational guidelines. It devotes its attention to the chain of custody, the range of possible criminal charges, and the logistics of police notification and arrests. Nowhere, however, does the document discuss different courses of medical treatment for either
mother or infant, aside from treatment for the mother’s addiction. Moreover, throughout the development and application of the policy, the Charleston prosecutors and police were extensively involved in the day-to-day administration of the policy.

While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal. The threat of law enforcement may ultimately have been intended as a means to an end, but the direct and primary purpose of MUSC’s policy was to ensure the use of those means. In our opinion, this distinction is critical. Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective, under respondents’ view, virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose. Such an approach is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Given the primary purpose of the Charleston program, which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment, and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy, this case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category of “special needs.”

The fact that positive test results were turned over to the police does not merely provide a basis for distinguishing our prior cases applying the “special needs” balancing approach to the determination of drug use. It also provides an affirmative reason for enforcing the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a duty to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.

As respondents have repeatedly insisted, their motive was benign rather than punitive. Such a motive, however, cannot justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive involvement of law enforcement with the development and application of the MUSC policy. The stark and unique fact that characterizes this case is that Policy M-7 was designed to obtain evidence of criminal conduct by the tested patients that would be turned over to the police and that could be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions. While respondents are correct that drug abuse both was and is a serious problem, “the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.” The Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily applies to such a policy.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia attacked the majority opinion on multiple fronts. First, he disputed whether any Fourth Amendment “search” had occurred, arguing that eliminated urine is abandoned and should be treated like the garbage at issue in California v. Greenwood (Chapter 3). Second, he argued that patients consented to
the collection of urine by hospital officials. Finally he argued that even if somehow the hospital’s collection of urine were a search to which patients did not consent, the “special-needs doctrine” would easily justify the drug testing to “protect both mother and unborn child.”]

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

Although no one today would recommend use of crack cocaine by pregnant women, it turns out that much of the science behind the so-called “crack baby” epidemic has been debunked. Predictions like that of “a bio-underclass, a generation of physically damaged cocaine babies whose biological inferiority is stamped at birth”—from a 1989 column in the *Washington Post*—or a flood of 4 million kids whose “neurological, emotional and learning problems will severely test teachers and schools”—from a 1990 article in the *New York Times*—appear alarmist in hindsight. See Vann R. Newkirk II, “What the ‘Crack Baby’ Panic Reveals about the Opioid Epidemic,” Atlantic (July 16, 2017) (noting the greater empathy extended to pregnant women using opiates than was shown to crack-addicted mothers). Legal scholars noted that in the late 1980s, a trend emerged wherein prosecutors used laws previously used to punish abuse of children after birth—such as involuntary manslaughter and delivery of drugs to a minor—to prosecute pregnant drug users. *See, e.g.*, Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Comment, “Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory,” 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 505 (1990).

Had *Ferguson v. City of Charleston* been decided in 1991 instead of 2001, the Court might well have reached a different result. The concerns raised by Justice Scalia in his dissent—the need to “protect both mother and unborn child”—echo comments of pundits and of policy makers from the height of the crack-baby scare.

In our next chapter, we consider our final selection of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Chapter 18

The Warrant Requirement: Exceptions (Part 10)

In this chapter, we conclude our review of exceptions to the warrant requirement. In particular, we will examine: (1) searches of persons in jails, (2) searches of persons on probation and parole, (3) inventory searches, (4) administrative searches, and (5) DNA tests of arrested persons.

Warrant Exception: Searches of Persons in Jails and Prisons

To maintain order and safety in jails and prisons, correctional officers must conduct searches of inmates and their effects. The next case explores the limits of this authority, as well as whether the offense for which someone is jailed affects what searches are reasonable.

Supreme Court of the United States

Albert W. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington

Decided April 2, 2012 — 566 U.S. 318

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV.¹

I

In 1998, seven years before the incidents at issue, petitioner Albert Florence was arrested after fleeing from police officers in Essex County, New Jersey. He was charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to two lesser offenses and was sentenced to pay a fine in monthly installments. In 2003, after he fell behind on his payments and failed to appear at an enforcement hearing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He paid the outstanding balance less than a week later; but, for some unexplained reason, the warrant remained in a statewide computer database.

Two years later, in Burlington County, New Jersey, petitioner and his wife were stopped in their automobile by a state trooper. Based on the outstanding warrant in the computer system, the officer arrested petitioner and took him to the Burlington County Detention Center. He was held there for six days and then was transferred to the Essex County Correctional Facility. It is not the arrest or confinement but the search process at each jail that gives rise to the claims before the Court.

Burlington County jail procedures required every arrestee to shower with a delousing agent. Officers would check arrestees for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as they disrobed. Petitioner claims he was also instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. (It is not clear whether this last step was part of the normal

¹ [Footnote by editors] Only three Justices joined Justice Kennedy in Part IV; that Part did not command a majority of votes. For the remainder of his opinion, four Justices joined Justice Kennedy, providing a majority.
practice.) Petitioner shared a cell with at least one other person and interacted with other inmates following his admission to the jail.

When petitioner was transferred [to the Essex County facility], all arriving detainees passed through a metal detector and waited in a group holding cell for a more thorough search. When they left the holding cell, they were instructed to remove their clothing while an officer looked for body markings, wounds, and contraband. Apparently without touching the detainees, an officer looked at their ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings. This policy applied regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or the detainee’s behavior, demeanor, or criminal history. Petitioner alleges he was required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the process. After a mandatory shower, during which his clothes were inspected, petitioner was admitted to the facility. He was released the next day, when the charges against him were dismissed.

Petitioner sued the governmental entities that operated the jails, one of the wardens, and certain other defendants. Seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, petitioner maintained that persons arrested for a minor offense could not be required to remove their clothing and expose the most private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part of the intake process. The District Court certified a class of individuals who were charged with a nonindictable offense under New Jersey law, processed at either the Burlington County or Essex County jail, and directed to strip naked even though an officer had not articulated any reasonable suspicion they were concealing contraband.

After discovery, the court granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on the unlawful search claim. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. This Court granted certiorari.

II

The difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by the courts. Jails (in the stricter sense of the term, excluding prison facilities) admit more than 13 million inmates a year. The largest facilities process hundreds of people every day; smaller jails may be crowded on weekend nights, after a large police operation, or because of detainees arriving from other jurisdictions. Maintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face. The Court has confirmed the importance of deference to correctional officials and explained that a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”

The Court has [] recognized that deterring the possession of contraband depends in part on the ability to conduct searches without predictable exceptions. [C]orrectional officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities. The task of determining whether a policy is reasonably related to legitimate security interests is “peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials.”
In many jails officials seek to improve security by requiring some kind of strip search of everyone who is to be detained. Persons arrested for minor offenses may be among the detainees processed at these facilities.

III

The question here is whether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the more invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. The Court has held that deference must be given to the officials in charge of the jail unless there is “substantial evidence” demonstrating their response to the situation is exaggerated. Petitioner has not met this standard, and the record provides full justifications for the procedures used.

A

Correctional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process. The admission of inmates creates numerous risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee population, and for a new detainee himself or herself. The danger of introducing lice or contagious infections, for example, is well documented. The Federal Bureau of Prisons recommends that staff screen new detainees for these conditions. Persons just arrested may have wounds or other injuries requiring immediate medical attention. It may be difficult to identify and treat these problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual inspection.

Jails and prisons also face grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang members who go through the intake process. “Gang rivalries spawn a climate of tension, violence, and coercion.” The groups recruit new members by force, engage in assaults against staff, and give other inmates a reason to arm themselves. Fights among feuding gangs can be deadly, and the officers who must maintain order are put in harm’s way. These considerations provide a reasonable basis to justify a visual inspection for certain tattoos and other signs of gang affiliation as part of the intake process. The identification and isolation of gang members before they are admitted protects everyone in the facility.

Detecting contraband concealed by new detainees, furthermore, is a most serious responsibility. Weapons, drugs, and alcohol all disrupt the safe operation of a jail. Correctional officers have had to confront arrestees concealing knives, scissors, razor blades, glass shards, and other prohibited items on their person, including in their body cavities. They have also found crack, heroin, and marijuana. The use of drugs can embolden inmates in aggression toward officers or each other; and, even apart from their use, the trade in these substances can lead to violent confrontations.

Contraband creates additional problems because scarce items, including currency, have value in a jail’s culture and underground economy. Correctional officials inform us “[t]he competition ... for such goods begets violence, extortion, and disorder.” They “orchestrate thefts, commit assaults, and approach inmates in packs to take the contraband from the weak.” This puts the entire facility, including detainees being held for a brief term for a minor offense, at risk. Gangs do coerce inmates who have access to the outside world, such as people serving their time on the
weekends, to sneak things into the jail. These inmates, who might be thought to pose the least risk, have been caught smuggling prohibited items into jail.

It is not surprising that correctional officials have sought to perform thorough searches at intake for disease, gang affiliation, and contraband. Jails are often crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous places. There is a substantial interest in preventing any new inmate, either of his own will or as a result of coercion, from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is admitted to the general population.

B

Petitioner acknowledges that correctional officials must be allowed to conduct an effective search during the intake process and that this will require at least some detainees to lift their genitals or cough in a squatting position. These procedures are designed to uncover contraband that can go undetected by a patdown, metal detector, and other less invasive searches. Petitioner maintains there is little benefit to conducting these more invasive steps on a new detainee who has not been arrested for a serious crime or for any offense involving a weapon or drugs. In his view these detainees should be exempt from this process unless they give officers a particular reason to suspect them of hiding contraband. It is reasonable, however, for correctional officials to conclude this standard would be unworkable.

Experience shows that people arrested for minor offenses have tried to smuggle prohibited items into jail, sometimes by using their rectal cavities or genitals for the concealment. They may have some of the same incentives as a serious criminal to hide contraband. A detainee might risk carrying cash, cigarettes, or a penknife to survive in jail. Others may make a quick decision to hide unlawful substances to avoid getting in more trouble at the time of their arrest.

Even if people arrested for a minor offense do not themselves wish to introduce contraband into a jail, they may be coerced into doing so by others. This could happen any time detainees are held in the same area, including in a van on the way to the station or in the holding cell of the jail. If, for example, a person arrested and detained for unpaid traffic citations is not subject to the same search as others, this will be well known to other detainees with jail experience. A hardened criminal or gang member can, in just a few minutes, approach the person and coerce him into hiding the fruits of a crime, a weapon, or some other contraband. As an expert in this case explained, “the interaction and mingling between misdemeanants and felons will only increase the amount of contraband in the facility if the jail can only conduct admission searches on felons.” Exempting people arrested for minor offenses from a standard search protocol thus may put them at greater risk and result in more contraband being brought into the detention facility. This is a substantial reason not to mandate the exception petitioner seeks as a matter of constitutional law.

It also may be difficult, as a practical matter, to classify inmates by their current and prior offenses before the intake search. Jails can be even more dangerous than prisons because officials there know so little about the people they admit at the outset. An arrestee may be carrying a false ID or lie about his identity. The officers who conduct an initial search often do not have access to criminal history records.
IV

This case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees. Petitioner's *amicus* raises concerns about instances of officers engaging in intentional humiliation and other abusive practices. There also may be legitimate concerns about the invasiveness of searches that involve the touching of detainees. These issues are not implicated on the facts of this case, however, and it is unnecessary to consider them here.

V

Even assuming all the facts in favor of petitioner, the search procedures at the Burlington County Detention Center and the Essex County Correctional Facility struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require adoption of the framework of rules petitioner proposes.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is affirmed.

Justice ALITO, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court but emphasize the limits of today’s holding. It is important to note [] that the Court does not hold that it is *always* reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population. Most of those arrested for minor offenses are not dangerous, and most are released from custody prior to or at the time of their initial appearance before a magistrate. In some cases, the charges are dropped. In others, arrestees are released either on their own recognizance or on minimal bail. In the end, few are sentenced to incarceration. For these persons, admission to the general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation of a strip search, may not be reasonable, particularly if an alternative procedure is feasible. For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and possibly even some local jails appear to segregate temporary detainees who are minor offenders from the general population.

The Court does not address whether it is always reasonable, without regard to the offense or the reason for detention, to strip search an arrestee before the arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by a judicial officer. The lead opinion explicitly reserves judgment on that question. In light of that limitation, I join the opinion of the Court in full.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.

The petition for certiorari asks us to decide “[w]hether the Fourth Amendment permits a ... suspicionless strip search of every individual arrested for any minor offense.....” This question is phrased more broadly than what is at issue. The case is limited to strip searches of those arrestees entering a jail’s general population. And the kind of strip search in question involves more than undressing and taking a shower (even if guards monitor the shower area for threatened disorder). Rather, the searches here involve close observation of the private areas of a person’s
body and for that reason constitute a far more serious invasion of that person’s privacy.

In my view, such a search of an individual arrested for a minor offense that does not involve drugs or violence—say a traffic offense, a regulatory offense, an essentially civil matter, or any other such misdemeanor—is an “unreasonable searc[h]” forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual possesses drugs or other contraband. And I dissent from the Court’s contrary determination.

A strip search that involves a stranger peering without consent at a naked individual, and in particular at the most private portions of that person’s body, is a serious invasion of privacy. Even when carried out in a respectful manner, and even absent any physical touching, such searches are inherently harmful, humiliating, and degrading. And the harm to privacy interests would seem particularly acute where the person searched may well have no expectation of being subject to such a search, say, because she had simply received a traffic ticket for failing to buckle a seatbelt, because he had not previously paid a civil fine, or because she had been arrested for a minor trespass.

I doubt that we seriously disagree about the nature of the strip search or about the serious affront to human dignity and to individual privacy that it presents. The basic question before us is whether such a search is nonetheless justified when an individual arrested for a minor offense is involuntarily placed in the general jail or prison population.

The majority, like the respondents, argues that strip searches are needed (1) to detect injuries or diseases, such as lice, that might spread in confinement, (2) to identify gang tattoos, which might reflect a need for special housing to avoid violence, and (3) to detect contraband, including drugs, guns, knives, and even pens or chewing gum, which might prove harmful or dangerous in prison.

Nonetheless, the “particular” invasion of interests must be “reasonably related” to the justifying “penological interest” and the need must not be “exaggerated.” It is at this point that I must part company with the majority. I have found no convincing reason indicating that, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, involuntary strip searches of those arrested for minor offenses are necessary in order to further the penal interests mentioned. And there are strong reasons to believe they are not justified.

The lack of justification is fairly obvious with respect to the first two penological interests advanced. The searches already employed at Essex and Burlington include: (a) pat-frisking all inmates; (b) making inmates go through metal detectors (including the Body Orifice Screening System (BOSS) chair used at Essex County Correctional Facility that identifies metal hidden within the body); (c) making inmates shower and use particular delousing agents or bathing supplies; and (d) searching inmates’ clothing. In addition, petitioner concedes that detainees could be lawfully subject to being viewed in their undergarments by jail officers or during showering (for security purposes). No one here has offered any reason, example, or empirical evidence suggesting the inadequacy of such practices for detecting injuries, diseases, or tattoos. In particular, there is no connection between the genital lift and the “squat and cough” that Florence was allegedly subjected to and health or gang concerns.
The lack of justification for such a strip search is less obvious but no less real in respect to the third interest, namely that of detecting contraband. The information demonstrating the lack of justification is of three kinds. First, there are empirically based conclusions reached in specific cases. The New York Federal District Court conducted a study of 23,000 persons admitted to the Orange County correctional facility between 1999 and 2003. These 23,000 persons underwent a strip search of the kind described. Of these 23,000 persons, the court wrote, “the County encountered three incidents of drugs recovered from an inmate’s anal cavity and two incidents of drugs falling from an inmate’s underwear during the course of a strip search.” The court added that in four of these five instances there may have been “reasonable suspicion” to search, leaving only one instance in 23,000 in which the strip search policy “arguably” detected additional contraband.

Second, there is the plethora of recommendations of professional bodies, such as correctional associations, that have studied and thoughtfully considered the matter. The American Correctional Association (ACA)—an association that informs our view of “what is obtainable and what is acceptable in corrections philosophy”—has promulgated a standard that forbids suspicionless strip searches. And it has done so after consultation with the American Jail Association, National Sheriff’s Association, National Institute of Corrections of the Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Prisons. Moreover, many correctional facilities apply a reasonable suspicion standard before strip searching inmates entering the general jail population, including the U.S. Marshals Service, the Immigration and Customs Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Third, there is general experience in areas where the law has forbidden here-relevant suspicionless searches. Laws in at least 10 States prohibit suspicionless strip searches. At the same time at least seven Courts of Appeals have considered the question and have required reasonable suspicion that an arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband before a strip search of one arrested for a minor offense can take place. Respondents have not presented convincing grounds to believe that administration of these legal standards has increased the smuggling of contraband into prison. The majority is left with the word of prison officials in support of its contrary proposition. And though that word is important, it cannot be sufficient.

For the reasons set forth, I cannot find justification for the strip search policy at issue here—a policy that would subject those arrested for minor offenses to serious invasions of their personal privacy. I consequently dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

The Court in Florence did not conclude that the challenged jail policy was in keeping with best correctional practices. Indeed, organizations of officials who run jails and prisons recommend against the kind of strip searches at issue in the case, and the Court was fully aware of this opposition. Why then did the Court find against Florence?
The dissenting Justices mention the Body Orifice Screening System (BOSS) chair, which allows jail officials to search inmates for hidden contraband without the sort of invasive physical contact complained of by Florence. More information about these scanners is available at the XECU Corporation website: https://bodyorificescanner.com/

Compare how the Court treats searches in jail with those of public school students. Unsurprisingly, the Court is more receptive to privacy claims from school children than from jail inmates. Yet in both contexts, the Court tends to defer to public officials.

Warrant Exception: Searches of Probationers and Parolees

Although persons on probation and parole are not subjected to the sort of control and scrutiny experienced by jail and prison inmates, probationers and parolees must submit to searches that would be “unreasonable” if required of other persons.

Because probationers and parolees by definition have been convicted of crimes, they are often known to police and may be suspected of ongoing criminal activity. In United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the Court considered the search of a probationer’s house. When Mark Knights was convicted of a drug crime, his probation order included what is sometimes described as a “search condition.” The order stated that he would: “[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.”

Soon afterward, police investigating a series of arsons suspected Knights and a partner of involvement in the crimes, and an officer searched Knights’s apartment. Evidence found during the search would have helped prosecutors convict him of federal crimes, and he challenged the searches as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court suppressed the evidence “on the ground that the search was for ‘investigatory’ rather than ‘probationary’ purposes,” and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the searches were reasonable. The Court noted that “nothing in the condition of probation suggests that it was confined to searches bearing upon probationary status and nothing more.”

Previously, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the Court had upheld the search of a probationer under a state law allowing “any probation officer to search a probationer’s home without a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as long as there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe the presence of contraband.” Knights argued that searches of probationers are allowed only if, as in Griffin, they are “special needs” searches conducted to verify whether the probationer is obeying conditions of probation, such as abstaining from drug use. The Knights Court disagreed, holding that the search condition reduced Knights’s reasonable expectation of privacy. That reduction, combined with the reasonable suspicion police had of his involvement in the arsons under investigation, justified the search of his residence. The Court explicitly declined to decide whether his acceptance of the search condition was a form of “consent” that would have made the search lawful under the holdings of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Chapter 11), and similar cases.

Then, in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), the Court approved the suspicionless search of a parolee on the street. The case concerned a “California law provid[ing] that every prisoner
eligible for release on state parole ‘shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.’” Upon seeing Donald Samson on the street, an officer searched him “based solely on petitioner’s status as a parolee,” and the search revealed methamphetamine. Samson challenged the search as unreasonable, and the Court disagreed. Relying on *Knights*, the Court again declined to consider whether the “consent” exception to the warrant requirement applied. The Court held instead that the search of parolees is reasonable because (1) awareness of the state law authorizing such searches lowers a parolee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) the state has substantial interest in monitoring convicted criminals released on parole because they “are more likely to commit future criminal offenses” than the general population.

In a dissent joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, Justice Stevens argued that “neither *Knights* nor *Griffin* supports a regime of suspicionless searches, conducted pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion untethered by any procedural safeguards, by law enforcement personnel who have no special interest in the welfare of the parolee or probationer.”

Although the Court has not formally relied upon the “consent” exception when approving searches of probationers (with reasonable suspicion) and parolees (with no individualized suspicion at all), it is hard to ignore the Court’s reliance on the searched person’s knowledge of and acceptance of the search conditions. Probation and parole are alternatives to imprisonment, and convicted defendants generally prefer probation to incarceration, just as inmates generally prefer parole to continued confinement. The Court’s opinions in *Knights* and *Samson* seem based, in part, on the idea that someone who is unhappy with the state’s parole or probation system can choose not to participate. The dissenters in *Samson* attacked this theory and rejected the state’s argument that participation is a form of consent. They wrote that a convict “has no ‘choice’ concerning the search condition” and argued that equating acquiescence with consent “is sophistry.”

For a handful of lower court cases examining searches of parolees and probationers, see: https://casetext.com/analysis/search-and-seizure-probationer-parolee-pretrial-release

Note that there is a circuit split about whether an officer may (consistent with the Fourth Amendment) search a probationer’s home without a warrant even without a search condition. See https://legal-forum.uchicago.edu/publication/fourth-amendment-rights-probationers-lack-explicit-probation-conditions-and-warrantless

**Warrant Exception: Inventory Searches**

When police impound an illegally parked car, they may tow it to a government parking lot. Similarly, police may tow the car of a driver who is arrested for a traffic violation. These are just two of the many ways in which government agents can lawfully take possession of property. Another common scenario arises when police store the effects of a person who is jailed, keeping them until the person is released. The Court has held that government officials may search property that comes into their possession in circumstances such as these, as long as they follow proper procedures.
Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We review the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, holding that local police violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, when they conducted a routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal parking ordinances.

(1)

Local ordinances prohibit parking in certain areas of downtown Vermillion, S.D., between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. During the early morning hours of December 10, 1973, a Vermillion police officer observed respondent’s unoccupied vehicle illegally parked in the restricted zone. At approximately 3 a.m., the officer issued an overtime parking ticket and placed it on the car’s windshield. The citation warned: “Vehicles in violation of any parking ordinance may be towed from the area.”

At approximately 10 o’clock on the same morning, another officer issued a second ticket for an overtime parking violation. These circumstances were routinely reported to police headquarters, and after the vehicle was inspected, the car was towed to the city impound lot.

From outside the car at the impound lot, a police officer observed a watch on the dashboard and other items of personal property located on the back seat and back floorboard. At the officer’s direction, the car door was then unlocked and, using a standard inventory form pursuant to standard police procedures, the officer inventoried the contents of the car, including the contents of the glove compartment which was unlocked. There he found marihuana contained in a plastic bag. All items, including the contraband, were removed to the police department for safekeeping. During the late afternoon of December 10, respondent appeared at the police department to claim his property. The marihuana was retained by police.

Respondent was subsequently arrested on charges of possession of marihuana. His motion to suppress the evidence yielded by the inventory search was denied; he was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to a fine of $100 and 14 days’ incarceration in the county jail. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the conviction. We granted certiorari and we reverse.

(2)

This Court has traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in relation to the Fourth Amendment. Although automobiles are “effects” and thus within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not.

[The expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office. In discharging their varied responsibilities for ensuring the public safety, law enforcement officials are necessarily brought into frequent contact with...
automobiles. Most of this contact is distinctly noncriminal in nature. Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.

In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called “community caretaking functions,” automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. Vehicle accidents present one such occasion. To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities. Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.

When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from potential danger. The practice has been viewed as essential to respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. In addition, police frequently attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and thereafter abandoned.

In applying the reasonableness standard adopted by the Framers, this Court has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents. [Our prior holdings] point the way to the correct resolution of this case.

The Vermillion police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking search of a lawfully impounded automobile. The inventory was conducted only after the car had been impounded for multiple parking violations. The owner, having left his car illegally parked for an extended period, and thus subject to impoundment, was not present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings. The inventory itself was prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside the car. [T]here is no suggestion [] that this standard procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.

On this record we conclude that in following standard police procedures, prevailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of the police was not “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the South Dakota Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
In *Illinois v. Lafayette*, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), the Court applied *Opperman* to a police search of the “purse-type shoulder bag” of “an arrested person [who] arrive[d] at a police station.” Because the search could not be deemed “incident” to the arrest, the Court considered “whether, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police stationhouse incident to booking and jailing the suspect.” The Court found the question fairly straightforward and resolved it as follows:

“At the stationhouse, it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed. A range of governmental interests support an inventory process. It is not unheard of for persons employed in police activities to steal property taken from arrested persons; similarly, arrested persons have been known to make false claims regarding what was taken from their possession at the stationhouse. A standardized procedure for making a list or inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the stationhouse not only deters false claims but also inhibits theft or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested person. Arrested persons have also been known to injure themselves—or others—with belts, knives, drugs or other items on their person while being detained. Dangerous instrumentalities—such as razor blades, bombs, or weapons—can be concealed in innocent-looking articles taken from the arrestee’s possession. The bare recital of these mundane realities justifies reasonable measures by police to limit these risks—either while the items are in police possession or at the time they are returned to the arrestee upon his release.”

Because the Court found such searches to be reasonable regardless of whether officials feared any particular bag possessed by an arrestee, the Court held that neither probable cause or any other form of individualized suspicion was needed for inventory searches of an arrestee’s belongings prior to incarceration, “in accordance with established inventory procedures.”

By contrast, in *Florida v. Wells*, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court found that because the highway patrol lacked “standardized criteria” or an “established routine” with respect to opening closed containers while inventorying a car, officers violated the Fourth Amendment when opening a locked suitcase found in the trunk of an impounded car. The Court said such criteria were needed because of “the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” In sum, departments have wide latitude to set inventory policies and to search cars, bags, and other items pursuant to such policies. But without a preexisting policy, searches lose the presumption of reasonableness.

A former student of your authors once told a story about *Gant* drawn from the student’s experience as a police officer.² He began by describing how police reacted to the Court’s decision in *Gant*.

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² The authors thank Clinton Sinclair for permission to include his story in this book.
“Post-Gant, law enforcement agencies scurried to train officers on search of automobiles incident to lawful arrest. A tool once frequently and heavily relied on, [SILA] was no longer an option for officers looking to get into vehicles without the availability of the automobile exception outlined in Carroll. This was particularly frustrating on pretext stops where officers would arrest local drug dealers and criminals for driver's license violations or other mundane crimes to get into vehicles where evidence of the more serious, and sometimes violent, crimes were concealed.”

Police adjusted their tactics: “The response was shoring up vehicle tow, impound, and inventory policies.” In other words, because police could not search nearly as many cars incident to arrest, police increased the number of cars they decided to tow after arrests.

Here is where the story gets exciting: “In 2010, Officers ... stopped a vehicle after complaints of careless and imprudent driving. The driver, 20, did not have a driver’s license. Officer attempts to contact the vehicle owner to remove it from the side of the road were unsuccessful. Pursuant to department policy, officers contacted a tow truck and conducted an inventory search where they located the owner of the vehicle, mother of the driver, dead in the trunk.”

As the student summed up, “Sometimes there IS a body in the trunk.”

Warrant Exception: Administrative Searches

Our next warrant exception concerns “administrative searches,” which involve government functions largely (if not entirely) unknown when the Fourth Amendment was ratified. For example, fire code and housing code inspections are important to the safety of densely populated cities. On the other hand, some might question whether inspectors should be allowed to search their homes without a warrant, perhaps even without probable cause.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Roland Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco**


Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing. Appellant properly raised and had considered by the California courts the federal constitutional questions he now presents to this Court.

Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this prohibition proceeding, we shall set forth the parties’ factual allegations. On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city’s Housing Code. The building’s manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using
the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building’s occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant.

The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney’s office. When appellant failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was required by law to permit an inspection under § 503 of the Housing Code.

Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of § 507 of the Code. Appellant was arrested on December 2 and released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, appellant filed this petition for a writ of prohibition.

Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that § 503 is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted under § 507 for refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by § 503. The District Court of Appeal held that § 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it “is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.” We reverse.

I

Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.

In Frank v. State of Maryland, [359 U.S. 360 (1959),] this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance. Although Frank can arguably be distinguished from this case on its facts, the Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal so interpreted Frank in this case, and that ruling is the core of appellant’s challenge here. We proceed to a re-examination of the factors which persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. For this reason alone, *Frank* differed from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment cases which have been considered by this Court. But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely “peripheral.” It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. [A]s this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.

[W]e hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in *Frank v. State of Maryland* and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs under consideration, however, these conclusions must be the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The *Frank* majority gave recognition to the unique character of these inspection programs by refusing to require search warrants; to reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the question whether some other accommodation between public need and individual rights is essential.

II

The Fourth Amendment provides that, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment cases, appellant argues not only that code enforcement inspection programs must be circumscribed by a warrant procedure, but also that warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code being enforced. We disagree.

In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, “probable cause” is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety. In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable—and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection—the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.

There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures. It is here that the probable cause debate is focused, for the agency’s decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each particular building.
“Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of ‘probable cause’ to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of warrant. The test of ‘probable cause’ required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought.”

III

Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations.

IV

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant’s consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that under these circumstances a writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California law.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

What are the differences between the general warrant proposed in Camera and the disfavored general warrant? What other types of searches might fall under the “inspection” umbrella?

Consider a city zoning law that restricts who may live in a certain residence on the basis of family status. For example, the city code might state that no more than three unrelated persons may live in a house zoned for “single-family” occupancy. In such a house, an adult could live with her four children, but four unrelated roommates could not share the house (even though the four roommates would constitute one fewer total person than the alternative group of occupants). In a neighborhood near a university campus, students might occasionally rent houses (with two or three names on a lease) and use them in a way that violates the code (for example, six students living together). If a neighborhood busybody—concerned with a perceived threat to property

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values or simply interested in policing how neighbors behave—calls city officials with vague reports of overoccupancy, may a judge issue a warrant allowing city officials to inspect every house in the neighborhood to see who lives there and whether they are related to one another? May such warrants issue every year—allowing searches of houses in “single-family” neighborhoods near campus—even if no one complains?

In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), decided the same day as Camara, the Court held that the rule of Camara applied to commercial warehouses. “As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.”

Two decades later, however, the Court was less protective of a business owner’s right to avoid warrantless administrative searches. In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Court considered a different kind of business premises—a junkyard. After stating (somewhat implausibly) that the junkyard was a “closely regulated industry,” the Court held that proprietors of such businesses have lowered expectations of privacy. That finding, combined with the state interest in supervising such industries (in this case, to combat car theft by preventing stolen parts from being bought and sold at junkyards), made the warrantless search reasonable. Students should note that the Burger Court went even further than the Court’s decision in Camara. In Camara, the Court required inspectors to obtain a warrant, which if suspiciously similar to the detested “general warrants” of old was at least issued by a judge. In Burger, the Court held that New York’s statute allowing for the inspection of junkyards was a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”

In a dissent joined in full by Justice Marshall and in part by Justice O’Connor, Justice Brennan argued that “Burger’s vehicle-dismantling business is not closely regulated (unless most New York City businesses are).” Objecting to the Court’s acceptance of the New York statute in lieu of a warrant, he argued that “the Court also perceives careful guidance and control of police discretion in a statute that is patently insufficient to eliminate the need for a warrant.” Accordingly, he concluded that the decision “renders virtually meaningless the general rule that a warrant is required for administrative searches of commercial property.”

The Court revisited administrative searches in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015), deciding by a 5-4 vote that certain regulations of Los Angeles hotels violated the Fourth Amendment. In particular, the city required “hotel operators to record and keep specific information about their guests on the premises for a 90-day period” and to make the records “available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police Department for inspection ... at a time and in a manner that minimizes any interference with the operation of the business.” Refusal to make the records available was a crime. Hotel operators brought a facial challenge to the regulation and prevailed.

The majority noted that it did not strike down the provisions of the regulation requiring that the records be kept, nor did it prevent officers from viewing the records by consent or by obtaining a proper administrative warrant (or with some other exception to the warrant requirement). Instead, the Court struck down only the provision forcing hotel owners to show the records on demand to any officer without a warrant, on pain of criminal prosecution—without even the
opportunity for a precompliance judicial review. The Court rejected the city’s argument that the regulation was valid under prior precedents related to “closely regulated industries.” Perhaps retreating a bit from the broad definition of such industries in *Burger*, the *Patel* Court stated, “Over the past 45 years, the Court has identified only four industries that ‘have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ... could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise.’” Those industries are “liquor sales,” “firearms dealing,” “mining,” and—of course—“running an automobile junkyard.”

In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote: “[T]he Court today concludes that Los Angeles’s ordinance is ‘unreasonable’ inasmuch as it permits police to flip through a guest register to ensure it is being filled out without first providing an opportunity for the motel operator to seek judicial review. Because I believe that such a limited inspection of a guest register is eminently reasonable under the circumstances presented, I dissent.” He noted “that the motel operators who conspire with drug dealers and procurers may demand precompliance judicial review simply as a pretext to buy time for making fraudulent entries in their guest registers.”

Justice Alito dissented as well, joined by Justice Thomas. Objecting in particular to the Court’s finding that the regulation was *facially* invalid—as opposed to invalid in limited cases—he presented five examples of circumstances in which he believed it would be reasonable for the city to enforce the law as written. Here is one:

“Example Two. A murderer has kidnapped a woman with the intent to rape and kill her and there is reason to believe he is holed up in a certain motel. The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard accounts for exigent circumstances. When the police arrive, the motel operator folds her arms and says the register is locked in a safe. Invoking [the challenged regulation], the police order the operator to turn over the register. She refuses. The Fourth Amendment does not protect her from arrest.”

* * *

**DNA Tests of Arreestees**

We conclude with a case challenging a Maryland policy under which police collected DNA from arrestees as part of “routine booking procedure.”

> Supreme Court of the United States  
> **Maryland v. Alonzo Jay King**  
> Decided June 3, 2013 – 569 U.S. 435

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 2003 a man concealing his face and armed with a gun broke into a woman’s home in Salisbury, Maryland. He raped her. The police were unable to identify or apprehend the assailant based on any detailed description or other evidence they then had, but they did obtain from the victim a sample of the perpetrator’s DNA.
In 2009 Alonzo King was arrested in Wicomico County, Maryland, and charged with first- and second-degree assault for menacing a group of people with a shotgun. As part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses, his DNA sample was taken by applying a cotton swab or filter paper—known as a buccal swab—to the inside of his cheeks. The DNA was found to match the DNA taken from the Salisbury rape victim. King was tried and convicted for the rape. Additional DNA samples were taken from him and used in the rape trial, but there seems to be no doubt that it was the DNA from the cheek sample taken at the time he was booked in 2009 that led to his first having been linked to the rape and charged with its commission.

On July 13, 2009, King’s DNA record was uploaded to the Maryland DNA database, and three weeks later, on August 4, 2009, his DNA profile was matched to the DNA sample collected in the unsolved 2003 rape case. Once the DNA was matched to King, detectives presented the forensic evidence to a grand jury, which indicted him for the rape. Detectives obtained a search warrant and took a second sample of DNA from King, which again matched the evidence from the rape. He moved to suppress the DNA match on the grounds that Maryland’s DNA collection law violated the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit Court Judge upheld the statute as constitutional. King pleaded not guilty to the rape charges but was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on review of King’s rape conviction, ruled that the DNA taken when King was booked for the 2009 charge was an unlawful seizure because obtaining and using the cheek swab was an unreasonable search of the person. It set the rape conviction aside. This Court granted certiorari and now reverses the judgment of the Maryland court.

II

A

The Act authorizes Maryland law enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from “an individual who is charged with ... a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of violence; or ... burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.” Maryland law defines a crime of violence to include murder, rape, first-degree assault, kidnaping, arson, sexual assault, and a variety of other serious crimes. Once taken, a DNA sample may not be processed or placed in a database before the individual is arraigned (unless the individual consents). It is at this point that a judicial officer ensures that there is probable cause to detain the arrestee on a qualifying serious offense. If “all qualifying criminal charges are determined to be unsupported by probable cause ... the DNA sample shall be immediately destroyed.” DNA samples are also destroyed if “a criminal action begun against the individual ... does not result in a conviction,” “the conviction is finally reversed or vacated and no new trial is permitted,” or “the individual is granted an unconditional pardon.”

The Act also limits the information added to a DNA database and how it may be used. Specifically, “[o]nly DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.” No purpose other than identification is permissible: “A person may not willfully test a DNA sample for information that does not relate to the identification of individuals as specified in this subtitle.” Tests for familial matches are also prohibited. The officers involved in taking and analyzing respondent’s DNA sample complied with the Act in all respects.
Respondent’s DNA was collected in this case using a common procedure known as a “buccal swab.” “Buccal cell collection involves wiping a small piece of filter paper or a cotton swab similar to a Q-tip against the inside cheek of an individual’s mouth to collect some skin cells.” The procedure is quick and painless. The swab touches inside an arrestee’s mouth, but it requires no “surgical intrusio[n] beneath the skin,” and it poses no “threat” to the health or safety” of arrestees.

B

Respondent’s identification as the rapist resulted in part through the operation of a national project to standardize collection and storage of DNA profiles. Authorized by Congress and supervised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) connects DNA laboratories at the local, state, and national level. All 50 States require the collection of DNA from felony convicts, and respondent does not dispute the validity of that practice. Twenty-eight States and the Federal Government have adopted laws similar to the Maryland Act authorizing the collection of DNA from some or all arrestees. At issue is a standard, expanding technology already in widespread use throughout the Nation.

III

It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search. Virtually any “intrusio[n] into the human body” will work an invasion of “‘cherished personal security’ that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.” The fact than an intrusion is negligible is of central relevance to determining reasonableness, although it is still a search as the law defines that term.

To say that the Fourth Amendment applies here is the beginning point, not the end of the analysis. “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.” “As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’” In giving content to the inquiry whether an intrusion is reasonable, the Court has preferred “some quantum of individualized suspicion ... [as] a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.”

The Maryland DNA Collection Act provides that, in order to obtain a DNA sample, all arrestees charged with serious crimes must furnish the sample on a buccal swab applied, as noted, to the inside of the cheeks. The arrestee is already in valid police custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause. The DNA collection is not subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective might be “colored by their primary involvement in ‘the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” “[T]here are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.” Here, the search effected by the buccal swab of respondent falls within the category of cases this Court has analyzed by reference to the proposition that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.”
Even if a warrant is not required, a search is not beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution. Urgent government interests are not a license for indiscriminate police behavior. To say that no warrant is required is merely to acknowledge that “rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.” This application of “traditional standards of reasonableness” requires a court to weigh “the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” against “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy.” An assessment of reasonableness to determine the lawfulness of requiring this class of arrestees to provide a DNA sample is central to the instant case.

IV

A

The legitimate government interest served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act is one that is well established: the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody. It is beyond dispute that “probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” Also uncontested is the “right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.” When probable cause exists to remove an individual from the normal channels of society and hold him in legal custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving those interests.

First, “[i]n every criminal case, it is known and must be known who has been arrested and who is being tried.” An individual’s identity is more than just his name or Social Security number, and the government’s interest in identification goes beyond ensuring that the proper name is typed on the indictment. Identity has never been considered limited to the name on the arrestee’s birth certificate. An “arrestee may be carrying a false ID or lie about his identity,” and “criminal history records ... can be inaccurate or incomplete.”

A suspect’s criminal history is a critical part of his identity that officers should know when processing him for detention. Police already seek this crucial identifying information. They use routine and accepted means as varied as comparing the suspect’s booking photograph to sketch artists’ depictions of persons of interest, showing his mugshot to potential witnesses, and of course making a computerized comparison of the arrestee’s fingerprints against electronic databases of known criminals and unsolved crimes. In this respect the only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.

The task of identification necessarily entails searching public and police records based on the identifying information provided by the arrestee to see what is already known about him. A DNA profile is useful to the police because it gives them a form of identification to search the records already in their valid possession. In this respect the use of DNA for identification is no different than matching an arrestee’s face to a wanted poster of a previously unidentified suspect; or
matching tattoos to known gang symbols to reveal a criminal affiliation; or matching the
arrestee’s fingerprints to those recovered from a crime scene. Finding occurrences of the
arrestee’s CODIS profile in outstanding cases is consistent with this common practice. It uses a
different form of identification than a name or fingerprint, but its function is the same.

Second, law enforcement officers bear a responsibility for ensuring that the custody of an
arrestee does not create inordinate “risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee population,
and for a new detainee.” DNA identification can provide untainted information to those charged
with detaining suspects and detaining the property of any felon. For these purposes officers must
know the type of person whom they are detaining, and DNA allows them to make critical choices
about how to proceed.

Third, looking forward to future stages of criminal prosecution, “the Government has a
substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for trials.” Fourth,
an arrestee’s past conduct is essential to an assessment of the danger he poses to the public, and
this will inform a court’s determination whether the individual should be released on bail.
Knowing that the defendant is wanted for a previous violent crime based on DNA identification
is especially probative of the court’s consideration of “the danger of the defendant to the alleged
victim, another person, or the community.”

Present capabilities make it possible to complete a DNA identification that provides information
essential to determining whether a detained suspect can be released pending trial. The facts of
this case are illustrative. Though the record is not clear, if some thought were being given to
releasing the respondent on bail on the gun charge, a release that would take weeks or months
in any event, when the DNA report linked him to the prior rape, it would be relevant to the
conditions of his release. The same would be true with a supplemental fingerprint report.

Finally, in the interests of justice, the identification of an arrestee as the perpetrator of some
heinous crime may have the salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the
same offense. “[P]rompt [DNA] testing ... would speed up apprehension of criminals before they
commit additional crimes, and prevent the grotesque detention of ... innocent people.”

Because proper processing of arrestees is so important and has consequences for every stage of
the criminal process, the Court has recognized that the “governmental interests underlying a
station-house search of the arrestee’s person and possessions may in some circumstances be
even greater than those supporting a search immediately following arrest.”


B

DNA identification represents an important advance in the techniques used by law enforcement
to serve legitimate police concerns for as long as there have been arrests. Law enforcement
agencies routinely have used scientific advancements in their standard procedures for the
identification of arrestees. “Police had been using photography to capture the faces of criminals
almost since its invention.” By the time that it had become “the daily practice of the police officers
and detectives of crime to use photographic pictures for the discovery and identification of
criminals,” the courts likewise had come to the conclusion that “it would be [a] matter of regret
to have its use unduly restricted upon any fanciful theory or constitutional privilege.”
Beginning in 1887, some police adopted more exacting means to identify arrestees, using the system of precise physical measurements pioneered by the French anthropologist Alphonse Bertillon. Bertillon identification consisted of 10 measurements of the arrestee’s body, along with a “scientific analysis of the features of the face and an exact anatomical localization of the various scars, marks, &c., of the body.” As in the present case, the point of taking this information about each arrestee was not limited to verifying that the proper name was on the indictment. These procedures were used to “facilitate the recapture of escaped prisoners,” to aid “the investigation of their past records and personal history,” and “to preserve the means of identification for ... future supervision after discharge.”

Perhaps the most direct historical analogue to the DNA technology used to identify respondent is the familiar practice of fingerprinting arrestees. From the advent of this technique, courts had no trouble determining that fingerprinting was a natural part of “the administrative steps incident to arrest.” By the middle of the 20th century, it was considered “elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing and fingerprinting as part of routine identification processes.”

DNA identification is an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting in many ways, so much so that to insist on fingerprints as the norm would make little sense to either the forensic expert or a layperson. The additional intrusion upon the arrestee’s privacy beyond that associated with fingerprinting is not significant, and DNA is a markedly more accurate form of identifying arrestees. A suspect who has changed his facial features to evade photographic identification or even one who has undertaken the more arduous task of altering his fingerprints cannot escape the revealing power of his DNA.

In sum, there can be little reason to question “the legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an absolute certainty the identity of the person arrested, in knowing whether he is wanted elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in the event he flees prosecution.” To that end, courts have confirmed that the Fourth Amendment allows police to take certain routine “administrative steps incident to arrest—i.e., ... book[ing], photograph[ing], and fingerprint[ing].” DNA identification of arrestees, of the type approved by the Maryland statute here at issue, is “no more than an extension of methods of identification long used in dealing with persons under arrest.” In the balance of reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment, therefore, the Court must give great weight both to the significant government interest at stake in the identification of arrestees and to the unmatched potential of DNA identification to serve that interest.

V

A

By comparison to this substantial government interest and the unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is a minimal one.

The reasonableness of any search must be considered in the context of the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy. The expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police custody
“necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.” A search of the detainee’s person when he is booked into custody may “involve a relatively extensive exploration,” including “requir[ing] at least some detainees to lift their genitals or cough in a squatting position.”

In this critical respect, the search here at issue differs from the sort of programmatic searches of either the public at large or a particular class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens that the Court has previously labeled as “special needs” searches. Once an individual has been arrested on probable cause for a dangerous offense that may require detention before trial [], his or her expectations of privacy and freedom from police scrutiny are reduced. DNA identification like that at issue here thus does not require consideration of any unique needs that would be required to justify searching the average citizen.

The reasonableness inquiry here considers two other circumstances in which the Court has held that particularized suspicion is not categorically required: “diminished expectations of privacy [and] minimal intrusions.” This is not to suggest that any search is acceptable solely because a person is in custody. Some searches, such as invasive surgery or a search of the arrestee’s home, involve either greater intrusions or higher expectations of privacy than are present in this case. A brief intrusion of an arrestee’s person is subject to the Fourth Amendment, but a swab of this nature does not increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents of arrest.

B

In addition the processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci did not intrude on respondent’s privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification unconstitutional. In light of the scientific and statutory safeguards, once respondent’s DNA was lawfully collected the STR analysis of respondent’s DNA pursuant to CODIS procedures did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy that would render the DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.

In light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s expectations of privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks. By contrast, that same context of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his charges but also so that the criminal justice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial custody. Upon these considerations the Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed.
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting.

The Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence. That prohibition is categorical and without exception; it lies at the very heart of the Fourth Amendment. Whenever this Court has allowed a suspicionless search, it has insisted upon a justifying motive apart from the investigation of crime.

It is obvious that no such noninvestigative motive exists in this case. The Court’s assertion that DNA is being taken, not to solve crimes, but to identify those in the State’s custody, taxes the credulity of the credulous. The Court elaborates at length the ways that the search here served the special purpose of “identifying” King. But that seems to me quite wrong—unless what one means by “identifying” someone is “searching for evidence that he has committed crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.”

If anything was “identified” at the moment that the DNA database returned a match, it was not King—his identity was already known. (The docket for the original criminal charges lists his full name, his race, his sex, his height, his weight, his date of birth, and his address.) Rather, what the August 4 match “identified” was the previously-taken sample from the earlier crime. That sample was genuinely mysterious to Maryland. King was not identified by his association with the sample; rather, the sample was identified by its association with King. The Court effectively destroys its own “identification” theory when it acknowledges that the object of this search was “to see what [was] already known about [King].” No minimally competent speaker of English would say, upon noticing a known arrestee’s similarity “to a wanted poster of a previously unidentified suspect,” that the arrestee had thereby been identified. It was the previously unidentified suspect who had been identified—just as, here, it was the previously unidentified rapist.

That taking DNA samples from arrestees has nothing to do with identifying them is confirmed not just by actual practice (which the Court ignores) but by the enabling statute itself (which the Court also ignores). The Maryland Act at issue has a section helpfully entitled “Purpose of collecting and testing DNA samples.” (One would expect such a section to play a somewhat larger role in the Court’s analysis of the Act’s purpose—which is to say, at least some role.) That provision lists five purposes for which DNA samples may be tested. By this point, it will not surprise the reader to learn that the Court’s imagined purpose is not among them.

So, to review: DNA testing does not even begin until after arraignment and bail decisions are already made. The samples sit in storage for months, and take weeks to test. When they are tested, they are checked against the Unsolved Crimes Collection—rather than the Convict and Arrestee Collection, which could be used to identify them. The Act forbids the Court’s purpose (identification), but prescribes as its purpose what our suspicionless-search cases forbid (“official investigation into a crime”). Against all of that, it is safe to say that if the Court’s identification theory is not wrong, there is no such thing as error.

I therefore dissent, and hope that today’s incursion upon the Fourth Amendment [] will some day be repudiated.
The dissent points out that the police did not really use the DNA to identify King; they used it to identify the source of sample obtained elsewhere; that is, they used the DNA test of King to match him to the pre-existing sample. In recent years, police have used DNA evidence to create profiles and search for family matches in ancestry DNA databases. What outcome under the Fourth Amendment?

Imagine a small community where two children are murdered. Police believe they have a serial killer and obtain a confession for one of the murders from a local boy with developmental disabilities. DNA evidence proves the two victims had the same killer, but the evidence also exonerates the boy. The police want to obtain DNA samples from every male resident in the small town to find the murderer. What outcome under the Fourth Amendment? What if the police convince the entire male population to consent to giving DNA evidence; one man has a friend give DNA evidence on his behalf. Then later the friend comes forward to confess the subterfuge. Analyze whether the police can require a DNA test from the man who sent the friend in his place. (Note: This question is based on a real case from England, in which Colin Pitchfork was eventually proven to have murdered two victims: Lynda Mann and Dawn Ashworth.)

This marks the end of our review of exceptions to the warrant requirement, as well as of searches more generally. While questions about unlawful searches will arise again during the semester—for example, when we consider what remedies are appropriate for different kinds of constitutional violations—we are now ready to shift our view to seizures and arrests, to which we will devote our next few chapters.

After that, the remainder of the course materials will focus on rights enumerated in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, with the regulation of interrogations receiving particular attention.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Chapter 19

Seizures and Arrests

In this chapter, we consider the Court’s definition of “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes. The common meaning of “seizure”—to take possession of a thing or person by force or by legal process—provides some insight to the term’s meaning in constitutional law. But as is true for other terms of art, such as “search,” the dictionary definition is not identical to the doctrinal meaning. We also consider when police may conduct arrests.

What Is a Seizure?

Just as something cannot be an “unreasonable search” without being a “search,” something cannot be an “unreasonable seizure” without being a “seizure.” Arrests are easily deemed “seizures” of the persons arrested. A variety of less invasive police tactics, however, have required more subtle analysis.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Sylvia L. Mendenhall

Decided May 27, 1980 – 446 U.S. 544

Mr. Justice STEWART announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Mr. Justice REHNQUIST joined.

The respondent was brought to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on a charge of possessing heroin with intent to distribute it. She moved to suppress the introduction at trial of the heroin as evidence against her on the ground that it had been acquired from her through an unconstitutional search and seizure by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The District Court denied the respondent’s motion, and she was convicted after a trial upon stipulated facts. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted certiorari.

I

At the hearing in the trial court on the respondent’s motion to suppress, it was established how the heroin she was charged with possessing had been obtained from her. The respondent arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on a commercial airline flight from Los Angeles early in the morning on February 10, 1976. As she disembarked from the airplane, she was observed by two agents of the DEA, who were present at the airport for the purpose of detecting unlawful traffic in narcotics. After observing the respondent’s conduct, which appeared to the agents to be characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics, the agents approached her as she was walking through the concourse, identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her

1 [Footnote ** by the Court] THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, and Mr. Justice POWELL also join all but Part II-A of this opinion.
identification and airline ticket. The respondent produced her driver’s license, which was in the name of Sylvia Mendenhall, and, in answer to a question of one of the agents, stated that she resided at the address appearing on the license. The airline ticket was issued in the name of “Annette Ford.” When asked why the ticket bore a name different from her own, the respondent stated that she “just felt like using that name.” In response to a further question, the respondent indicated that she had been in California only two days. Agent Anderson then specifically identified himself as a federal narcotics agent and, according to his testimony, the respondent “became quite shaken, extremely nervous. She had a hard time speaking.”

After returning the airline ticket and driver’s license to her, Agent Anderson asked the respondent if she would accompany him to the airport DEA office for further questions. She did so, although the record does not indicate a verbal response to the request. The office, which was located up one flight of stairs about 50 feet from where the respondent had first been approached, consisted of a reception area adjoined by three other rooms. At the office the agent asked the respondent if she would allow a search of her person and handbag and told her that she had the right to decline the search if she desired. She responded: “Go ahead.” She then handed Agent Anderson her purse, which contained a receipt for an airline ticket that had been issued to “F. Bush” three days earlier for a flight from Pittsburgh through Chicago to Los Angeles. The agent asked whether this was the ticket that she had used for her flight to California, and the respondent stated that it was.

A female police officer then arrived to conduct the search of the respondent’s person. She asked the agents if the respondent had consented to be searched. The agents said that she had, and the respondent followed the policewoman into a private room. There the policewoman again asked the respondent if she consented to the search, and the respondent replied that she did. The policewoman explained that the search would require that the respondent remove her clothing. The respondent stated that she had a plane to catch and was assured by the policewoman that if she were carrying no narcotics, there would be no problem. The respondent then began to disrobe without further comment. As the respondent removed her clothing, she took from her undergarments two small packages, one of which appeared to contain heroin, and handed both to the policewoman. The agents then arrested the respondent for possessing heroin.

II

Here the Government concedes that its agents had neither a warrant nor probable cause to believe that the respondent was carrying narcotics when the agents conducted a search of the respondent’s person. It is the Government’s position, however, that the search was conducted pursuant to the respondent’s consent, and thus was excepted from the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause. Evidently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the respondent’s apparent consent to the search was in fact not voluntarily given and was in any event the product of earlier official conduct violative of the Fourth Amendment. We must first consider, therefore, whether such conduct occurred, either on the concourse or in the DEA office at the airport.
[I]f the respondent was “seized” when the DEA agents approached her on the concourse and asked questions of her, the agents’ conduct in doing so was constitutional only if they reasonably suspected the respondent of wrongdoing. But “[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”

We conclude that a person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.

On the facts of this case, no “seizure” of the respondent occurred. The events took place in the public concourse. The agents wore no uniforms and displayed no weapons. They did not summon the respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as federal agents. They requested, but did not demand to see the respondent’s identification and ticket. Such conduct without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest. The respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions. Nor was it enough to establish a seizure that the person asking the questions was a law enforcement official. In short, nothing in the record suggests that the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way, and for that reason we conclude that the agents’ initial approach to her was not a seizure.

Our conclusion that no seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having been so informed. We also reject the argument that the only inference to be drawn from the fact that the respondent acted in a manner so contrary to her self-interest is that she was compelled to answer the agents’ questions. It may happen that a person makes statements to law enforcement officials that he later regrets, but the issue in such cases is not whether the statement was self-protective, but rather whether it was made voluntarily.

Although we have concluded that the initial encounter between the DEA agents and the respondent on the concourse at the Detroit Airport did not constitute an unlawful seizure, it is

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2 [Footnote by editors] Only Justices Stewart and Rehnquist signed on to Part II-A of the opinion.
still arguable that the respondent’s Fourth Amendment protections were violated when she went from the concourse to the DEA office. Such a violation might in turn infect the subsequent search of the respondent’s person.

The question whether the respondent’s consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances and is a matter which the Government has the burden of proving. The respondent herself did not testify at the hearing. The Government’s evidence showed that the respondent was not told that she had to go to the office, but was simply asked if she would accompany the officers. There were neither threats nor any show of force. The respondent had been questioned only briefly, and her ticket and identification were returned to her before she was asked to accompany the officers.

On the other hand, it is argued that the incident would reasonably have appeared coercive to the respondent, who was 22 years old and had not been graduated from high school. It is additionally suggested that the respondent, a female and [Black], may have felt unusually threatened by the officers, who were white males. While these factors were not irrelevant, neither were they decisive, and the totality of the evidence in this case was plainly adequate to support the District Court’s finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the DEA office.

III

We conclude that the District Court’s determination that the respondent consented to the search of her person “freely and voluntarily” was sustained by the evidence and that the Court of Appeals was, therefore, in error in setting it aside. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.

[In a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell wrote that the Court should not decide whether the agents “seized” Mendenhall because the courts below had not considered it. Further, he argued that if the encounter did constitute a seizure, it was justified because the circumstances provided “reasonable suspicion.”]

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice MARSHALL, and Mr. Justice STEVENS join, dissenting.

The Court today concludes that agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) acted lawfully in stopping a traveler changing planes in an airport terminal and escorting her to a DEA office for a strip-search of her person. This result is particularly curious because a majority of the Members of the Court refuse to reject the conclusion that Ms. Mendenhall was “seized,” while a separate majority decline to hold that there were reasonable grounds to justify a seizure. Mr. Justice STEWART concludes that the DEA agents acted lawfully, regardless of whether there were any reasonable grounds for suspecting Ms. Mendenhall of criminal activity, because he finds that Ms. Mendenhall was not “seized” by the DEA agents, even though throughout the proceedings below the Government never questioned the fact that a seizure had occurred necessitating a showing of antecedent reasonable suspicion. Mr. Justice POWELL’s opinion concludes that even though Ms. Mendenhall may have been “seized,” the seizure was lawful.
because her behavior while changing planes in the airport provided reasonable suspicion that she was engaging in criminal activity. The Court then concludes, based on the absence of evidence that Ms. Mendenhall resisted her detention, that she voluntarily consented to being taken to the DEA office, even though she in fact had no choice in the matter. This conclusion is inconsistent with our recognition that consent cannot be presumed from a showing of acquiescence to authority.

Whatever doubt there may be concerning whether Ms. Mendenhall’s Fourth Amendment interests were implicated during the initial stages of her confrontation with the DEA agents, she undoubtedly was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the agents escorted her from the public area of the terminal to the DEA office for questioning and a strip-search of her person. [T]he nature of the intrusion to which Ms. Mendenhall was subjected when she was escorted by DEA agents to their office and detained there for questioning and a strip-search was so great that it “was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.” Although Ms. Mendenhall was not told that she was under arrest, she in fact was not free to refuse to go to the DEA office and was not told that she was. Furthermore, once inside the office, Ms. Mendenhall would not have been permitted to leave without submitting to a strip-search.\footnote{In two footnotes hanging from this paragraph, the dissent quoted from testimony indicating that, according to the officers, Mendenhall “was not free to leave” when officers asked her to accompany them to the office and to submit to a search of her person. In other words, had she tried to leave, officers would have detained her.}

The Court recognizes that the Government has the burden of proving that Ms. Mendenhall consented to accompany the officers, but it nevertheless holds that the “totality of evidence was plainly adequate” to support a finding of consent. On the record before us, the Court’s conclusion can only be based on the notion that consent can be assumed from the absence of proof that a suspect resisted police authority.

Since the defendant was not present to testify at the suppression hearing, we can only speculate about her state of mind as her encounter with the DEA agents progressed from surveillance, to detention, to questioning, to seclusion in a private office, to the female officer’s command to remove her clothing. Nevertheless, it is unbelievable that this sequence of events involved no invasion of a citizen’s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. The rule of law requires a different conclusion.
Notes, Comments, and Questions

The Court in *Mendenhall* stated that a person is seized if “a reasonable person [in his situation] would have believed that he was not free to leave.” As a result, lawyers and others have recommended that if someone is approached by police and wishes either to avoid or to end the encounter, a useful tactic is to ask, “Am I free to leave?” If the answer is “yes,” then the person may leave without further discussion. If the answer is “no,” then the person should stay—a reasonable person in the situation would not feel free to go. A person told “no” can later challenge the interaction as an unlawful seizure. At a minimum the encounter should be considered a “seizure;” the debate will be about its legality. (An equivalent tactic is to ask, “Am I being detained?” An answer of “no” indicates permission to leave. “Yes” indicates a seizure.)

Consider the following scenario:

Police approach a suspect (who had recently parked his car) and ask to speak to him. The suspect agrees. The officer asks for identification, and the suspect produces a driver’s license. Before returning the license, the officer asks for and receives permission to search the suspect’s vehicle. Is that search the product of valid consent given by a suspect who had not been “seized” during the encounter? Or, instead, did the officer detain the suspect by retaining his driver’s license, thereby creating a situation in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave? See *United States v. De La Rosa*, 922 F.2d 675, 678 (11th Cir. 1991); *id.* at 680–81 (Clark, J., dissenting on this question).

Now imagine a slightly different scenario: Police lawfully stop a car and ask the driver for his license, which is provided. Before returning the license, officers ask for permission to search the car. Is this scenario different from the prior one in any material way? See *United States v. Thompson*, 712 F.2d 1356, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 1983).

The next case concerns a young suspect especially interested in avoiding an encounter with police. The question is whether police efforts to stop him qualified as a “seizure.”

**Supreme Court of the United States**

**California v. Hodari D.**

Decided April 23, 1991 – 499 U.S. 621

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Late one evening in April 1988, Officers Brian McColgin and Jerry Pertoso were on patrol in a high-crime area of Oakland, California. They were dressed in street clothes but wearing jackets with “Police” embossed on both front and back. Their unmarked car proceeded west on Foothill Boulevard, and turned south onto 63rd Avenue. As they rounded the corner, they saw four or five youths huddled around a small red car parked at the curb. When the youths saw the officers’ car approaching they apparently panicked, and took flight. The respondent here, Hodari D., and

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4 The authors thank former student Christopher Thompson for bringing this case to our attention.
one companion ran west through an alley; the others fled south. The red car also headed south, at a high rate of speed.

The officers were suspicious and gave chase. McColgin remained in the car and continued south on 63rd Avenue; Pertoso left the car, ran back north along 63rd, then west on Foothill Boulevard, and turned south on 62nd Avenue. Hodari, meanwhile, emerged from the alley onto 62nd and ran north. Looking behind as he ran, he did not turn and see Pertoso until the officer was almost upon him, whereupon he tossed away what appeared to be a small rock. A moment later, Pertoso tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and radioed for assistance. Hodari was found to be carrying $130 in cash and a pager; and the rock he had discarded was found to be crack cocaine.

In the juvenile proceeding brought against him, Hodari moved to suppress the evidence relating to the cocaine. The court denied the motion without opinion. The California Court of Appeal reversed. The California Supreme Court denied the State’s application for review. We granted certiorari.

As this case comes to us, the only issue presented is whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If so, respondent argues, the drugs were the fruit of that seizure and the evidence concerning them was properly excluded. If not, the drugs were abandoned by Hodari and lawfully recovered by the police, and the evidence should have been admitted.

We have long understood that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable ... seizures” includes seizure of the person. From the time of the founding to the present, the word “seizure” has meant a “taking possession.” For most purposes at common law, the word connoted not merely grasping, or applying physical force to, the animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it within physical control. A ship still fleeing, even though under attack, would not be considered to have been seized as a war prize. To constitute an arrest, however—the quintessential “seizure of the person” under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—the mere grasping or application of physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was sufficient.

To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical force, despite the arrestee’s escape, is not to say that for Fourth Amendment purposes there is a continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity. If, for example, Pertoso had laid his hands upon Hodari to arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and had then cast away the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say that that disclosure had been made during the course of an arrest. The present case, however, is even one step further removed. It does not involve the application of any physical force; Hodari was untouched by Officer Pertoso at the time he discarded the cocaine. His defense

5 [Footnote 1 by the Court] California conceded below that Officer Pertoso did not have the “reasonable suspicion” required to justify stopping Hodari. That it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs 28:1 (“The wicked flee when no man pursueth”). We do not decide that point here, but rely entirely upon the State’s concession.

6 [Footnote by editors] The Court reaffirmed this principle in Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. ___ (2020), holding that when police shoot a motorist with intent to restrain, the physical force involved in the shooting counts as a “seizure” even if the motorist escapes.
relies instead upon the proposition that a seizure occurs “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Hodari contends (and we accept as true for purposes of this decision) that Pertoso’s pursuit qualified as a “show of authority” calling upon Hodari to halt. The narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.

The language of the Fourth Amendment, of course, cannot sustain respondent’s contention. The word “seizure” readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful. It does not remotely apply, however, to the prospect of a policeman yelling “Stop, in the name of the law!” at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure. Nor can the result respondent wishes to achieve be produced—indirectly, as it were—by suggesting that Pertoso’s uncomplied-with show of authority was a common-law arrest, and then appealing to the principle that all common-law arrests are seizures. An arrest requires either physical force or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.

We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter, to stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of arrest, as respondent urges. Street pursuits always place the public at some risk, and compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encouraged. Only a few of those orders, we must presume, will be without adequate basis, and since the addressee has no ready means of identifying the deficient ones it almost invariably is the responsible course to comply. Unlawful orders will not be deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed. Since policemen do not command “Stop!” expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping to be outrun, it fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine, successful seizures.

In sum, assuming that Pertoso’s pursuit in the present case constituted a “show of authority” enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled. The cocaine abandoned while he was running was in this case not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion to exclude evidence of it was properly denied. We reverse the decision of the California Court of Appeal, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

The Court’s narrow construction of the word “seizure” represents a significant, and in my view, unfortunate, departure from prior case law construing the Fourth Amendment. [T]he Court now adopts a definition of “seizure” that is unfaithful to a long line of Fourth Amendment cases. Even if the Court were defining seizure for the first time, which it is not, the definition that it chooses today is profoundly unwise. In its decision, the Court assumes, without acknowledging, that a police officer may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not implicate the Fourth Amendment—as long as he misses his target.

Because the facts of this case are somewhat unusual, it is appropriate to note that the same issue would arise if the show of force took the form of a command to “freeze,” a warning shot, or the sound of sirens accompanied by a patrol car’s flashing lights. In any of these situations, there
may be a significant time interval between the initiation of the officer’s show of force and the complete submission by the citizen. At least on the facts of this case, the Court concludes that the timing of the seizure is governed by the citizen’s reaction, rather than by the officer’s conduct. One consequence of this conclusion is that the point at which the interaction between citizen and police officer becomes a seizure occurs, not when a reasonable citizen believes he or she is no longer free to go, but, rather, only after the officer exercises control over the citizen.

It is too early to know the consequences of the Court’s holding. If carried to its logical conclusion, it will encourage unlawful displays of force that will frighten countless innocent citizens into surrendering whatever privacy rights they may still have.

I respectfully dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

Justice Scalia noted in a footnote that “California conceded below” that police did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Hodari and, citing Scripture, stated that the Court would not decide whether a stop would have been lawful. The dissent found the majority’s musings on the question annoying:

“The Court’s gratuitous quotation from Proverbs 28:1 mistakenly assumes that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden approach of strangers. We have previously considered, and rejected, this ivory-towered analysis of the real world for it fails to describe the experience of many residents, particularly if they are members of a minority. See generally Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214 (1983). It has long been ‘a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’ Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896).”

We will reconsider the legal significance of flight from police when reading cases in which the Court confronted the merits.

The Court in Hodari D. decided that an attempted seizure by police—ordering “stop” at a suspect who ignores the command and runs—is not a “seizure” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Court did not, however, decide how state law might regulate such police action. In New York, state courts have rejected the reasoning of Hodari D. when interpreting the state constitution. See People v. Martinez, 606 N.E.2d 951 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Hill, 150 A.D.3d 627, 634 & n.4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2017) (“In contrast [to New York law], the United States Supreme Court rejected mere police pursuit as constituting a seizure in California v. Hodari D.”). Students need not investigate the idiosyncrasies of New York search and seizure law, much less of all the states. Instead, New York’s rejection of Hodari D. is noted as an example of a larger principle: Under our federal system, states may not offer less protection than the Court declares to be provided by the federal constitution. But states may, if they wish, offer more protection. The Court’s decisions about federal constitutional law thereby
provide a floor—not a ceiling—for the protection of individual liberties. Would-be reformers of the law may find greater success in the state courts and state legislatures than in the filing of petitions for certiorari.

**Arrests**

In previous chapters, we have seen that police are often allowed to conduct warrantless arrests as long as they have probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. The leading Supreme Court case affirming this principle is *United States v. Watson*, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).

The *Watson* Court summarized the facts as follows:

“The relevant events began on August 17, 1972, when an informant, one Khoury, telephoned a postal inspector informing him that respondent Watson was in possession of a stolen credit card and had asked Khoury to cooperate in using the card to their mutual advantage. On five to 10 previous occasions Khoury had provided the inspector with reliable information on postal inspection matters, some involving Watson. Later that day Khoury delivered the card to the inspector. On learning that Watson had agreed to furnish additional cards, the inspector asked Khoury to arrange to meet with Watson. Khoury did so, a meeting being scheduled for August 22. Watson canceled that engagement, but at noon on August 23, Khoury met with Watson at a restaurant designated by the latter. Khoury had been instructed that if Watson had additional stolen credit cards, Khoury was to give a designated signal. The signal was given, the officers closed in, and Watson was forthwith arrested.”

After his arrest, Watson consented to a search of his car that revealed incriminating evidence. He later moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that his consent was obtained after an unlawful arrest. The Court considered the arrest as follows:

“Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ view, Watson’s arrest was not invalid because executed without a warrant. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) expressly empowers the Board of Governors of the Postal Service to authorize Postal Service officers and employees ‘performing duties related to the inspection of postal matters’ to ‘make arrests without warrant for felonies cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony.’ [T]he inspector and his subordinates, in arresting Watson, were acting strictly in accordance with the governing statute and regulations. The effect of the judgment of the Court of Appeals was to invalidate the statute as applied in this case and as applied to all the situations where a court fails to find exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest. We reverse that judgment.”

“Section 3061 represents a judgment by Congress that it is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant provided they have probable cause to do so. This was not an isolated or quixotic judgment of the legislative branch. Other federal law enforcement officers have been expressly authorized by statute for many years to make felony arrests on probable cause but without a warrant. This is true of United States marshals, and of agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, and the Customs Service.”

“[T]here is nothing in the Court’s prior cases indicating that under the Fourth Amendment a
warrant is required to make a valid arrest for a felony. Indeed, the relevant prior decisions are uniformly to the contrary.”

“The cases construing the Fourth Amendment [] reflect the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”

In a concurrence, Justice Powell noted the “anomaly” created by decisions requiring warrants for searches absent exceptional circumstances—even when police have probable cause—and the decision in Watson allowing warrantless arrests based upon probable cause. He wrote, “Logic therefore would seem to dictate that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement at least to the same extent as searches.” But he nonetheless joined the majority because of “history and experience.” He explained as follows:

“The Court’s opinion emphasizes the historical sanction accorded warrantless felony arrests. In the early days of the common law most felony arrests were made upon personal knowledge and without warrants. So established were such arrests as the usual practice that Lord Coke seriously questioned whether a justice of the peace, receiving his information secondhand instead of from personal knowledge, even could authorize an arrest by warrant. By the late 18th century it had been firmly established by Blackstone, with an intervening assist from Sir Matthew Hale, that magistrates could issue arrest warrants upon information supplied by others. But recognition of the warrant power cast no doubt upon the validity of warrantless felony arrests, which continued to be practiced and upheld as before. There is no historical evidence that the Framers or proponents of the Fourth Amendment, outspokenly opposed to the infamous general warrants and writs of assistance, were at all concerned about warrantless arrests by local constables and other peace officers.”

“The historical momentum for acceptance of warrantless arrests, already strong at the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, has gained strength during the ensuing two centuries. Both the judiciary and the legislative bodies of this Nation repeatedly have placed their imprimaturs upon the practice and, as the Government emphasizes, law enforcement agencies have developed their investigative and arrest procedures upon an assumption that warrantless arrests were valid so long as based upon probable cause.”

Note that Justice Powell’s concurrence in Watson referred to “warrantless felony arrests,” and the majority referred to “the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence.” What about warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the officer’s presence, about which the officer has probable cause to believe suspects have committed? For example, if a shopkeeper describes a suspect in detail and reports seeing him steal a candy bar, police would likely have probable cause to arrest the suspect for larceny, and in many jurisdictions such minor theft would be a misdemeanor. May the officer arrest the suspect without a warrant? Common law generally did not allow such arrests, but states now have statutes allowing them (some for all misdemeanors, others only for certain misdemeanors). Although the Supreme Court has not decided the question, the answer appears to be that if states wish to, they may authorize their police to conduct such arrests. See, e.g., William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo.
L. Rev. 771, 811–17 (1993); State v. Walker, 138 P.3d 113, 120 (Wash. 2006) (“every federal circuit court that has addressed the issue has found the Fourth Amendment does not require the misdemeanor to occur in the officer’s presence in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid”).

In the next case, the Court considered an officer who used the authority granted under United States v. Watson—which allows warrantless arrests—in an arguably unreasonable manner. The question was not whether the Justices approved of the challenged police behavior; they did not. Instead, the Court decided whether warrantless arrests for certain minor criminal offenses are “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

Supreme Court of the United States

Gail Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

Decided April 24, 2001 – 532 U.S. 318

Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. We hold that it does not.

I

A

In Texas, if a car is equipped with safety belts, a front-seat passenger must wear one, and the driver must secure any small child riding in front. Violation of either provision is “a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not less than $25 or more than $50.” Texas law expressly authorizes “[a]ny peace officer [to] arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation” of these seatbelt laws, although it permits police to issue citations in lieu of arrest.

In March 1997, petitioner Gail Atwater was driving her pickup truck in Lago Vista, Texas, with her 3-year-old son and 5-year-old daughter in the front seat. None of them was wearing a seatbelt. Respondent Bart Turek, a Lago Vista police officer at the time, observed the seatbelt violations and pulled Atwater over. According to Atwater’s complaint (the allegations of which we assume to be true for present purposes), Turek approached the truck and “yell[ed]” something to the effect of “[w]e’ve met before” and “[y]ou’re going to jail.” He then called for backup and asked to see Atwater’s driver’s license and insurance documentation, which state law required her to carry. When Atwater told Turek that she did not have the papers because her purse had been stolen the day before, Turek said that he had “heard that story two-hundred times.”

Atwater asked to take her “frightened, upset, and crying” children to a friend’s house nearby, but Turek told her, “[y]ou’re not going anywhere.” As it turned out, Atwater’s friend learned what was going on and soon arrived to take charge of the children. Turek then handcuffed Atwater, placed her in his squad car, and drove her to the local police station, where booking officers had her remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and empty her pockets. Officers took Atwater’s “mug shot” and placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about one hour, after which she was taken
before a magistrate and released on $310 bond.

Atwater was charged with driving without her seatbelt fastened, failing to secure her children in seatbelts, driving without a license, and failing to provide proof of insurance. She ultimately pleaded no contest to the misdemeanor seatbelt offenses and paid a $50 fine; the other charges were dismissed.

B

Atwater and her husband, petitioner Michael Haas, filed suit in a Texas state court against Turek and respondents City of Lago Vista and Chief of Police Frank Miller. So far as concerns us, petitioners (whom we will simply call Atwater) alleged that respondents (for simplicity, the City) had violated Atwater’s Fourth Amendment “right to be free from unreasonable seizure” and sought compensatory and punitive damages.

The City removed the suit to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. [T]he District Court ruled the Fourth Amendment claim “meritless” and granted the City’s summary judgment motion. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s decision and affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment for the City. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limits police officers’ authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses. We now affirm.

II

Atwater’s specific contention is that “founding-era common-law rules” forbade peace officers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of “breach of the peace,” a category she claims was then understood narrowly as covering only those nonfelony offenses “involving or tending toward violence.” Although her historical argument is by no means insubstantial, it ultimately fails.

A

[The Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of English legal history.] Having reviewed the relevant English decisions, as well as English and colonial American legal treatises, legal dictionaries, and procedure manuals, we simply are not convinced that Atwater’s is the correct, or even necessarily the better, reading of the common-law history.

B

An examination of specifically American evidence is to the same effect. Neither the history of the framing era nor subsequent legal development indicates that the Fourth Amendment was originally understood, or has traditionally been read, to embrace Atwater’s position.

What we have here, then, is just the opposite of what we had in Wilson v. Arkansas [514 U.S. 927 (1995) (Chapter 7)]. There, we emphasized that during the founding era a number of States
had “enacted statutes specifically embracing” the common-law knock-and-announce rule; here, by contrast, those very same States passed laws extending warrantless arrest authority to a host of nonviolent misdemeanors, and in so doing acted very much inconsistently with Atwater’s claims about the Fourth Amendment’s object. We simply cannot conclude that the Fourth Amendment, as originally understood, forbade peace officers to arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the peace.

Nor does Atwater’s argument from tradition pick up any steam from the historical record as it has unfolded since the framing, there being no indication that her claimed rule has ever become “woven ... into the fabric” of American law. The story, on the contrary, is of two centuries of uninterrupted (and largely unchallenged) state and federal practice permitting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the peace.

Small wonder, then, that today statutes in all 50 States and the District of Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests by at least some (if not all) peace officers without requiring any breach of the peace, as do a host of congressional enactments. The American Law Institute has long endorsed the validity of such legislation, and the consensus, as stated in the current literature, is that statutes "remov[ing] the breach of the peace limitation and thereby permit[t]ing arrest without warrant for any misdemeanor committed in the arresting officer’s presence” have “never been successfully challenged and stan[d] as the law of the land.”

III

While it is true here that history, if not unequivocal, has expressed a decided, majority view that the police need not obtain an arrest warrant merely because a misdemeanor stopped short of violence or a threat of it, Atwater does not wager all on history. Instead, she asks us to mint a new rule of constitutional law on the understanding that when historical practice fails to speak conclusively to a claim grounded on the Fourth Amendment, courts are left to strike a current balance between individual and societal interests by subjecting particular contemporary circumstances to traditional standards of reasonableness. Atwater accordingly argues for a modern arrest rule, one not necessarily requiring violent breach of the peace, but nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling need for immediate detention.

If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail. She was a known and established resident of Lago Vista with no place to hide and no incentive to flee, and common sense says she would almost certainly have buckled up as a condition of driving off with a citation. In her case, the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment. Atwater’s claim to live free of pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her case.

But we have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review. Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards
sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government’s side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules.

[C]omplexions arise the moment we begin to think about the possible applications of the several criteria Atwater proposes for drawing a line between minor crimes with limited arrest authority and others not so restricted.

One line, she suggests, might be between “jailable” and “fine-only” offenses, between those for which conviction could result in commitment and those for which it could not. The trouble with this distinction, of course, is that an officer on the street might not be able to tell. It is not merely that we cannot expect every police officer to know the details of frequently complex penalty schemes, but that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the scene of an arrest. Is this the first offense or is the suspect a repeat offender? Is the weight of the marijuana a gram above or a gram below the fine-only line? Where conduct could implicate more than one criminal prohibition, which one will the district attorney ultimately decide to charge? And so on.

But Atwater’s refinements would not end there. She represents that if the line were drawn at nonjailable traffic offenses, her proposed limitation should be qualified by a proviso authorizing warrantless arrests where “necessary for enforcement of the traffic laws or when [an] offense would otherwise continue and pose a danger to others on the road.” The proviso only compounds the difficulties. Would, for instance, either exception apply to speeding? At oral argument, Atwater’s counsel said that “it would not be reasonable to arrest a driver for speeding unless the speeding rose to the level of reckless driving.” But is it not fair to expect that the chronic speeder will speed again despite a citation in his pocket, and should that not qualify as showing that the “offense would ... continue” under Atwater’s rule? And why, as a constitutional matter, should we assume that only reckless driving will “pose a danger to others on the road” while speeding will not?

There is no need for more examples to show that Atwater’s general rule and limiting proviso promise very little in the way of administrability. It is no answer that the police routinely make judgments on grounds like risk of immediate repetition; they surely do and should. But there is a world of difference between making that judgment in choosing between the discretionary leniency of a summons in place of a clearly lawful arrest, and making the same judgment when the question is the lawfulness of the warrantless arrest itself. It is the difference between no basis for legal action challenging the discretionary judgment, on the one hand, and the prospect of evidentiary exclusion or (as here) personal § 1983 liability for the misapplication of a constitutional standard, on the other. Atwater’s rule therefore would not only place police in an almost impossible spot but would guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests that would occur. For all these reasons, Atwater’s various distinctions between permissible and impermissible arrests for minor crimes strike us as “very unsatisfactory line[s]” to require police officers to draw on a moment’s notice.

Just how easily the costs could outweigh the benefits may be shown by asking, as one Member of this Court did at oral argument, “how bad the problem is out there.” The very fact that the law
has never jelled the way Atwater would have it leads one to wonder whether warrantless misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention, and there is cause to think the answer is no. So far as such arrests might be thought to pose a threat to the probable-cause requirement, anyone arrested for a crime without formal process, whether for felony or misdemeanor, is entitled to a magistrate’s review of probable cause within 48 hours, and there is no reason to think the procedure in this case atypical in giving the suspect a prompt opportunity to request release. Many jurisdictions, moreover, have chosen to impose more restrictive safeguards through statutes limiting warrantless arrests for minor offenses. It is of course easier to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one through the Constitution, simply because the statute can let the arrest power turn on any sort of practical consideration without having to subsume it under a broader principle. It is, in fact, only natural that States should resort to this sort of legislative regulation, for it is in the interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, which carry costs that are simply too great to incur without good reason. Finally, and significantly, under current doctrine the preference for categorical treatment of Fourth Amendment claims gives way to individualized review when a defendant makes a colorable argument that an arrest, with or without a warrant, was “conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [his] privacy or even physical interests.”

The upshot of all these influences, combined with the good sense (and, failing that, the political accountability) of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement officials, is a dearth of horribles demanding redress. Indeed, when Atwater’s counsel was asked at oral argument for any indications of comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor arrests, he could offer only one. We are sure that there are others, but just as surely the country is not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests. That fact caps the reasons for rejecting Atwater’s request for the development of a new and distinct body of constitutional law.

Accordingly, we confirm today what our prior cases have intimated: the standard of probable cause “applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance’ the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.” If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.

IV

Atwater’s arrest satisfied constitutional requirements. There is no dispute that Officer Turek had probable cause to believe that Atwater had committed a crime in his presence. She admits that neither she nor her children were wearing seatbelts. Turek was accordingly authorized (not required, but authorized) to make a custodial arrest without balancing costs and benefits or determining whether or not Atwater’s arrest was in some sense necessary.

Nor was the arrest made in an “extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [her] privacy or ... physical interests.” Atwater’s arrest was surely “humiliating,” as she says in her brief, but it was no more “harmful to ... privacy or ... physical interests” than the normal custodial arrest. She was handcuffed, placed in a squad car, and taken to the local police station, where officers asked her to remove her shoes, jewelry, and glasses, and to empty her pockets. They then took her photograph and placed her in a cell, alone, for about an hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate, and released on $310 bond. The arrest and booking were inconvenient and
embarrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Court of Appeals’s en banc judgment is affirmed.

Justice O’CONNOR, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.

The Court recognizes that the arrest of Gail Atwater was a “pointless indignity” that served no discernible state interest and yet holds that her arrest was constitutionally permissible. Because the Court’s position is inconsistent with the explicit guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, I dissent.

A full custodial arrest, such as the one to which Ms. Atwater was subjected, is the quintessential seizure. When a full custodial arrest is effected without a warrant, the plain language of the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrest be reasonable.

A custodial arrest exacts an obvious toll on an individual’s liberty and privacy, even when the period of custody is relatively brief. The arrestee is subject to a full search of her person and confiscation of her possessions. If the arrestee is the occupant of a car, the entire passenger compartment of the car, including packages therein, is subject to search as well. The arrestee may be detained for up to 48 hours without having a magistrate determine whether there in fact was probable cause for the arrest. Because people arrested for all types of violent and nonviolent offenses may be housed together awaiting such review, this detention period is potentially dangerous. And once the period of custody is over, the fact of the arrest is a permanent part of the public record.

We have said that “the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State’s interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense.” If the State has decided that a fine, and not imprisonment, is the appropriate punishment for an offense, the State’s interest in taking a person suspected of committing that offense into custody is surely limited, at best. This is not to say that the State will never have such an interest. A full custodial arrest may on occasion vindicate legitimate state interests, even if the crime is punishable only by fine. Arrest is the surest way to abate criminal conduct. It may also allow the police to verify the offender’s identity and, if the offender poses a flight risk, to ensure her appearance at trial. But when such considerations are not present, a citation or summons may serve the State’s remaining law enforcement interests every bit as effectively as an arrest.

Because a full custodial arrest is such a severe intrusion on an individual’s liberty, its reasonableness hinges on “the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” In light of the availability of citations to promote a State’s interests when a fine-only offense has been committed, I cannot concur in a rule which deems a full custodial arrest to be reasonable in every circumstance. Giving police officers constitutional carte blanche to effect an arrest whenever there is probable cause to believe a fine-only misdemeanor
has been committed is irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment’s command that seizures be reasonable. Instead, I would require that when there is probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless the officer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion” of a full custodial arrest.

The record in this case makes it abundantly clear that Ms. Atwater’s arrest was constitutionally unreasonable. Atwater readily admits—as she did when Officer Turek pulled her over—that she violated Texas’ seatbelt law. While Turek was justified in stopping Atwater, neither law nor reason supports his decision to arrest her instead of simply giving her a citation. The officer’s actions cannot sensibly be viewed as a permissible means of balancing Atwater’s Fourth Amendment interests with the State’s own legitimate interests.

The Court’s error [] does not merely affect the disposition of this case. The per se rule that the Court creates has potentially serious consequences for the everyday lives of Americans. A broad range of conduct falls into the category of fine-only misdemeanors.

To be sure, such laws are valid and wise exercises of the States’ power to protect the public health and welfare. My concern lies not with the decision to enact or enforce these laws, but rather with the manner in which they may be enforced. Under today’s holding, when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a fine-only misdemeanor offense has occurred, that officer may stop the suspect, issue a citation, and let the person continue on her way. Or, if a traffic violation, the officer may stop the car, arrest the driver, search the driver, search the entire passenger compartment of the car including any purse or package inside, and impound the car and inventory all of its contents. Although the Fourth Amendment expressly requires that the latter course be a reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances of the offense, the majority gives officers unfettered discretion to choose that course without articulating a single reason why such action is appropriate.

Such unbounded discretion carries with it grave potential for abuse. The majority takes comfort in the lack of evidence of “an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests.” But the relatively small number of published cases dealing with such arrests proves little and should provide little solace. Indeed, as the recent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual. After today, the arsenal available to any officer extends to a full arrest and the searches permissible concomitant to that arrest. An officer’s subjective motivations for making a traffic stop are not relevant considerations in determining the reasonableness of the stop. But it is precisely because these motivations are beyond our purview that we must vigilantly ensure that officers’ poststop actions—which are properly within our reach—comport with the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of reasonableness.

The Court neglects the Fourth Amendment’s express command in the name of administrative ease. In so doing, it cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness. I respectfully dissent.
The result in *Atwater* may exemplify a maxim popularized by Justice Antonin Scalia, who once observed during a speech, “A lot of stuff that’s stupid is not unconstitutional.” Justice Scalia added that during a prior speech, he had proposed that all federal judges should receive a stamp with the words “STUPID BUT CONSTITUTIONAL” that could be used on complaints; then someone sent him one. Scalia, like others expressing similar sentiments, was known to argue that if you wish to prohibit stupid (but constitutional) conduct, you should contact your legislature, not federal judges.

If students encounter examples in this book of disagreeable police (or prosecutorial) conduct that the Court has deemed constitutional, they may wish to ask themselves two questions: (1) Is it plausible that a legislature can solve the problem that the Court has declined to solve, and (2) what specific suggestions might I have for my legislator? Most students are far more likely to become legislators than Supreme Court Justices.

After deciding in *Atwater* that the Fourth Amendment allows warrantless arrests even for minor crimes, the Court faced an odd set of facts in *Virginia v. Moore*. There, the Court considered a warrantless arrest conducted in violation of a state law. The issue was whether violating state law made the arrest “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

**Supreme Court of the United States**

**Virginia v. David Lee Moore**

Decided April 23, 2008 – 553 U.S. 164

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by making an arrest based on probable cause but prohibited by state law.

I

On February 20, 2003, two city of Portsmouth police officers stopped a car driven by David Lee Moore. They had heard over the police radio that a person known as “Chubs” was driving with a suspended license, and one of the officers knew Moore by that nickname. The officers determined that Moore’s license was in fact suspended, and arrested him for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license, which is punishable under Virginia law by a year in jail and a $2,500 fine. The officers subsequently searched Moore and found that he was carrying 16 grams of crack cocaine and $516 in cash.
Under state law, the officers should have issued Moore a summons instead of arresting him. Driving on a suspended license, like some other misdemeanors, is not an arrestable offense except as to those who “fail or refuse to discontinue” the violation, and those whom the officer reasonably believes to be likely to disregard a summons, or likely to harm themselves or others. The intermediate appellate court found none of these circumstances applicable, and Virginia did not appeal that determination.

Moore was charged with possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute it in violation of Virginia law. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence from the arrest search. Virginia law does not, as a general matter, require suppression of evidence obtained in violation of state law. Moore argued, however, that suppression was required by the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, and after a bench trial found Moore guilty of the drug charge and sentenced him to a 5-year prison term, with one year and six months of the sentence suspended. The conviction was reversed by a panel of Virginia's intermediate court on Fourth Amendment grounds, reinstated by the intermediate court sitting en banc, and finally reversed again by the Virginia Supreme Court. We granted certiorari.

III

A

When history has not provided a conclusive answer, we have analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional standards of reasonableness “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” That methodology provides no support for Moore’s Fourth Amendment claim. In a long line of cases, we have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.

Our decisions counsel against changing this calculus when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires. We have treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law. We have applied the same principle in the seizure context. We thought it obvious that the Fourth Amendment’s meaning did not change with local law enforcement practices—even practices set by rule. While those practices “vary from place to place and from time to time,” Fourth Amendment protections are not “so variable” and cannot “be made to turn upon such trivialities.”

Some earlier [decisions] excluded evidence obtained in violation of state law, but those decisions rested on our supervisory power over the federal courts, rather than the Constitution.

B

We are convinced that the approach of our prior cases is correct, because an arrest based on probable cause serves interests that have long been seen as sufficient to justify the seizure. Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to conduct an in-custody investigation.
Moore argues that a State has no interest in arrest when it has a policy against arresting for certain crimes. That is not so, because arrest will still ensure a suspect’s appearance at trial, prevent him from continuing his offense, and enable officers to investigate the incident more thoroughly. State arrest restrictions are more accurately characterized as showing that the State values its interests in forgoing arrests more highly than its interests in making them; or as showing that the State places a higher premium on privacy than the Fourth Amendment requires. A State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional.

If we concluded otherwise, we would often frustrate rather than further state policy. Virginia chooses to protect individual privacy and dignity more than the Fourth Amendment requires, but it also chooses not to attach to violations of its arrest rules the potent remedies that federal courts have applied to Fourth Amendment violations. Virginia does not, for example, ordinarily exclude from criminal trials evidence obtained in violation of its statutes. Moore would allow Virginia to accord enhanced protection against arrest only on pain of accompanying that protection with federal remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, which often include the exclusionary rule. States unwilling to lose control over the remedy would have to abandon restrictions on arrest altogether. This is an odd consequence of a provision designed to protect against searches and seizures.

Incorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would produce a constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable than the one we rejected in Atwater. The constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply as the underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed. The Virginia statute in this case, for example, calls on law enforcement officers to weigh just the sort of case-specific factors that Atwater said would deter legitimate arrests if made part of the constitutional inquiry. It would authorize arrest if a misdemeanor suspect fails or refuses to discontinue the unlawful act, or if the officer believes the suspect to be likely to disregard a summons. Atwater specifically noted the “extremely poor judgment” displayed in arresting a local resident who would “almost certainly” have discontinued the offense and who had “no place to hide and no incentive to flee.” It nonetheless declined to make those considerations part of the constitutional calculus. Atwater differs from this case in only one significant respect: It considered (and rejected) federal constitutional remedies for all minor-misdemeanor arrests; Moore seeks them in only that subset of minor-misdemeanor arrests in which there is the least to be gained—that is, where the State has already acted to constrain officers’ discretion and prevent abuse. Here we confront fewer horribles than in Atwater, and less of a need for redress.

Finally, linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would cause them to “vary from place to place and from time to time.” Even at the same place and time, the Fourth Amendment’s protections might vary if federal officers were not subject to the same statutory constraints as state officers.

We conclude that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
Moore argues that even if the Constitution allowed his arrest, it did not allow the arresting officers to search him. We have recognized, however, that officers may perform searches incident to constitutionally permissible arrests in order to ensure their safety and safeguard evidence. We have described this rule as covering any “lawful arrest” with constitutional law as the reference point. That is to say, we have equated a lawful arrest with an arrest based on probable cause: “A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” Moore correctly notes that several important state-court decisions have defined the lawfulness of arrest in terms of compliance with state law. But it is not surprising that States have used “lawful” as shorthand for compliance with state law, while our constitutional decision in *Robinson* [*v.* *Iowa*, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)], used “lawful” as shorthand for compliance with constitutional constraints.

The Virginia Supreme Court may have concluded that *Knowles v. Iowa*, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)] required the exclusion of evidence seized from Moore because, under state law, the officers who arrested Moore should have issued him a citation instead. This argument might have force if the Constitution forbade Moore’s arrest, because we have sometimes excluded evidence obtained through unconstitutional methods in order to deter constitutional violations. But the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone, and as we have just concluded, it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. That Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest.

We reaffirm against a novel challenge what we have signaled for more than half a century. When officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment.

The Fourth Amendment, today’s decision holds, does not put States to an all-or-nothing choice in this regard. A State may accord protection against arrest beyond what the Fourth Amendment requires, yet restrict the remedies available when police deny to persons they apprehend the extra protection state law orders. Because I agree that the arrest and search Moore challenges violated Virginia law, but did not violate the Fourth Amendment, I join the Court’s judgment.

* * *

In our next chapter, we consider a form of seizure less robust than an arrest—a “stop and frisk.”
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Chapter 20

Stop & Frisk

This chapter concerns the law enforcement tactic known as “stop and frisk.” Although such conduct is less invasive than an arrest, the “stop” is nonetheless a seizure that must be “reasonable” to be lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The “frisk” is a search that also must be reasonable to be lawful.

Our reading will review (1) the basic definition of “stop and frisk” and the Court’s justification for allowing it absent probable cause, (2) the difference between a stop and frisk and a full arrest (which requires probable cause), and (3) what police may do during a “Terry stop,” as these stops and frisks have come to be known.

We begin with *Terry v. Ohio*, which sets forth the doctrine permitting “stop and frisk” in some circumstances and which has given its name to the practice.

Supreme Court of the United States

**John W. Terry v. State of Ohio**
Decided June 10, 1968 – 392 U.S. 1

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances.

Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to the statutorily prescribed term of one to three years in the penitentiary. Following the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, the prosecution introduced in evidence two revolvers and a number of bullets seized from Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton, by Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden. At the hearing on the motion to suppress this evidence, Officer McFadden testified that while he was patrolling in plain clothes in downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon of October 31, 1963, his attention was attracted by two men, Chilton and Terry, standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue. He had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them. However, he testified that he had been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35 and that he had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He explained that he had developed routine habits of observation over the years and that he would “stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day.” He added: “Now, in this case when I looked over they didn’t look right to me at the time.”

His interest aroused, Officer McFadden took up a post of observation in the entrance to a store 300 to 400 feet away from the two men. “I get more purpose to watch them when I seen their movements,” he testified. He saw one of the men leave the other one and walk southwest on
Huron Road, past some stores. The man paused for a moment and looked in a store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and walked back toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same store window. He rejoined his companion at the corner, and the two conferred briefly. Then the second man went through the same series of motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walking on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store window again, and returning to confer with the first man at the corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen trips. At one point, while the two were standing together on the corner, a third man approached them and engaged them briefly in conversation. This man then left the two others and walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton and Terry resumed their measured pacing, peering and conferring. After this had gone on for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men walked off together, heading west on Euclid Avenue, following the path taken earlier by the third man.

By this time Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious. He testified that after observing their elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window on Huron Road, he suspected the two men of “casing a job, a stick-up,” and that he considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate further. He added that he feared “they may have a gun.” Thus, Officer McFadden followed Chilton and Terry and saw them stop in front of Zucker’s store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them earlier on the street corner. Deciding that the situation was ripe for direct action, Officer McFadden approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names. At this point his knowledge was confined to what he had observed. He was not acquainted with any of the three men by name or by sight, and he had received no information concerning them from any other source. When the men “mumbled something” in response to his inquiries, Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other two, with Terry between McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing. In the left breast pocket of Terry’s overcoat Officer McFadden felt a pistol. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. At this point, keeping Terry between himself and the others, the officer ordered all three men to enter Zucker’s store. As they went in, he removed Terry’s overcoat completely, removed a .38-caliber revolver from the pocket and ordered all three men to face the wall with their hands raised. Officer McFadden proceeded to pat down the outer clothing of Chilton and the third man, Katz. He discovered another revolver in the outer pocket of Chilton’s overcoat, but no weapons were found on Katz. The officer testified that he only patted the men down to see whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until he felt their guns. So far as appears from the record, he never placed his hands beneath Katz’ outer garments. Officer McFadden seized Chilton’s gun, asked the proprietor of the store to call a police wagon, and took all three men to the station, where Chilton and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons.

On the motion to suppress the guns the prosecution took the position that they had been seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest. The trial court rejected this theory, stating that it “would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension” to find that Officer McFadden had had probable cause to arrest the men before he patted them down for weapons. However, the court denied the defendants’ motion on the ground that Officer McFadden, on the basis of his experience, “had reasonable cause to believe ... that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation should be made of their action.” Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer had the right to pat down the outer clothing of these
men, who he had reasonable cause to believe might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory “stop” and an arrest, and between a “frisk” of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. The frisk, it held, was essential to the proper performance of the officer’s investigatory duties, for without it “the answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible.”

After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and Terry waived jury trial and pleaded not guilty. The court adjudged them guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District, Cuyahoga County, affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed their appeal. We granted certiorari. We affirm the conviction.

I

The question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [Terry’s] right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure.

We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts to the forefront difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity—issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court. Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to “stop and frisk”—as it is sometimes euphemistically termed—suspicious persons.

On the one hand, it is frequently argued that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess. For this purpose it is urged that distinctions should be made between a “stop” and an “arrest” (or a “seizure” of a person), and between a “frisk” and a “search.”

On the other side the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search. It is contended with some force that there is not—and cannot be—a variety of police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest.

In this context we approach the issues in this case mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street. No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before us. Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating approval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.
Having thus roughly sketched the perimeters of the constitutional debate over the limits on police investigative conduct in general and the background against which this case presents itself, we turn our attention to the quite narrow question posed by the facts before us: whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.

II

Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. That is, we must decide whether and when Officer McFadden “seized” Terry and whether and when he conducted a “search.” There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as “stop” and “frisk” that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Constitution. We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs “seizures” of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime—“arrests” in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a “search.” Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a “petty indignity.” It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

The danger in the logic which proceeds upon distinctions between a “stop” and an “arrest,” or “seizure” of the person, and between a “frisk” and a “search” is twofold. It seeks to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and the citizen. And ... it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation. This Court has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. The scope of the search must be “strictly tied to and justified by” the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.

The distinctions of classical “stop-and-frisk” theory thus serve to divert attention from the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security. “Search” and “seizure” are not talismans. We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a “technical arrest” or a “full-blow search.”

In this case there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden “seized” petitioner and subjected him to a “search” when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing. We must decide whether at that point it was reasonable for Officer McFadden to have interfered with petitioner’s personal security as he did. And in determining whether the seizure and search were “unreasonable” our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether “probable cause” existed to justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case. We deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden’s conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary “first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,” for there is “no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.” And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. It is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the action taken was appropriate? And simple “good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.” If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.

Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and extent of the governmental interests involved. One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection. It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation.

The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden’s taking steps to investigate petitioner’s suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden’s invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.

We cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights which must be accepted if police officers are to be conceded the right to search for weapons in situations where probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking. Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.

Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

IV

We must now examine the conduct of Officer McFadden in this case to determine whether his search and seizure of petitioner were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. He had observed Terry, together with Chilton and another man, acting in a manner he took to be preface to a “stick-up.” We think on the facts and circumstances Officer McFadden detailed before the trial judge a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer’s safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden’s hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery—which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons—and nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis. Thus, when Officer McFadden approached the three men gathered before the display window at Zucker’s store he had observed enough to make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed; and nothing in their response to his hailing them, identifying himself as a police officer, and asking their names served to dispel that reasonable belief. We cannot say his decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment; the record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so.

We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases. Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.
The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of these standards. Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions. He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He never did invade Katz’ person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his patdown which might have been a weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.

V

We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

The opinion of the Court disclaims the existence of “probable cause.” If loitering were in issue and that was the offense charged, there would be “probable cause” shown. But the crime here is carrying concealed weapons; and there is no basis for concluding that the officer had “probable cause” for believing that that crime was being committed. Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate would, therefore, have been unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if there is a showing of “probable cause.” We hold today that the police have greater authority to make a “seizure” and conduct a “search” than a judge has to authorize such action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again.

[Police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. At the time of their “seizure” without a warrant they must possess facts concerning the person arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that “probable cause” was indeed present. The term “probable cause” rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as “reasonable suspicion.”]
To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people through a constitutional amendment.

There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.

Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can “seize” and “search” him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.

* * *

Selections from opinions in the next case, United States v. Place, were included in the assignment for Chapter 5. In that chapter, the case was presented to illustrate that dog sniffs in public places—in and of themselves—do not constitute searches. In this chapter, we return to the case to study what constitutes a permissible seizure of “effects.”

Supreme Court of the United States

**United States v. Raymond J. Place**

Decided June 20, 1983 – **462 U.S. 696**

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics. Given the enforcement problems associated with the detection of narcotics trafficking and the minimal intrusion that a properly limited detention would entail, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such a detention. On the facts of this case, however, we hold that the police conduct exceeded the bounds of a permissible investigative detention of the luggage.

I

Respondent Raymond J. Place’s behavior aroused the suspicions of law enforcement officers as he waited in line at the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket to New York’s LaGuardia Airport. As Place proceeded to the gate for his flight, the agents approached him and requested his airline ticket and some identification. Place complied with the request and consented to a search of the two suitcases he had checked. Because his flight was about to depart, however, the agents decided not to search the luggage.
Prompted by Place’s parting remark that he had recognized that they were police, the agents inspected the address tags on the checked luggage and noted discrepancies in the two street addresses. Further investigation revealed that neither address existed and that the telephone number Place had given the airline belonged to a third address on the same street. On the basis of their encounter with Place and this information, the Miami agents called Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorities in New York to relay their information about Place.

Two DEA agents waited for Place at the arrival gate at LaGuardia Airport in New York. There again, his behavior aroused the suspicion of the agents. After he had claimed his two bags and called a limousine, the agents decided to approach him. They identified themselves as federal narcotics agents, to which Place responded that he knew they were “cops” and had spotted them as soon as he had deplaned. One of the agents informed Place that, based on their own observations and information obtained from the Miami authorities, they believed that he might be carrying narcotics. After identifying the bags as belonging to him, Place stated that a number of police at the Miami Airport had surrounded him and searched his baggage. The agents responded that their information was to the contrary. The agents requested and received identification from Place—a New Jersey driver’s license, on which the agents later ran a computer check that disclosed no offenses, and his airline ticket receipt. When Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, one of the agents told him that they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to try to obtain a search warrant and that Place was free to accompany them. Place declined, but obtained from one of the agents telephone numbers at which the agents could be reached.

The agents then took the bags to Kennedy Airport, where they subjected the bags to a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics detection dog. The dog reacted positively to the smaller of the two bags but ambiguously to the larger bag. Approximately 90 minutes had elapsed since the seizure of respondent’s luggage. Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning, when they secured a search warrant from a magistrate for the smaller bag. Upon opening that bag, the agents discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine.

Place was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. In the District Court, Place moved to suppress the contents of the luggage seized from him at LaGuardia Airport. The District Court denied the motion. Place pleaded guilty to the possession charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal of the conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. We granted certiorari and now affirm.

II

In the ordinary case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized. Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the

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1 [Footnote by editors] Although the driving distance from LaGuardia airport to JFK is only about ten miles, those familiar with New York traffic realize that taking someone’s luggage from one of those airports to the other is nearly certain to cause significant inconvenience.
exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present.

In this case, the Government asks us to recognize the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of warrantless seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on the basis of less than probable cause, for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investigation, short of opening the luggage, that would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities' suspicion. Specifically, we are asked to apply the principles of Terry v. Ohio to permit such seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the luggage contains contraband or evidence of a crime. In our view, such application is appropriate.

The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of “the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. When the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than probable cause.

We examine first the governmental interest offered as a justification for a brief seizure of luggage from the suspect’s custody for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investigation. The Government contends that, where the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a reasonable belief that a traveler’s luggage contains narcotics, the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to pursue further investigation is substantial. We agree.

Against this strong governmental interest, we must weigh the nature and extent of the intrusion upon the individual's Fourth Amendment rights when the police briefly detain luggage for limited investigative purposes. On this point, respondent Place urges that the rationale for a Terry stop of the person is wholly inapplicable to investigative detentions of personality. Specifically, the Terry exception to the probable-cause requirement is premised on the notion that a Terry-type stop of the person is substantially less intrusive of a person’s liberty interests than a formal arrest. In the property context, however, Place urges, there are no degrees of intrusion. Once the owner’s property is seized, the dispossession is absolute.

We disagree. The intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature and extent. The seizure may be made after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as here, from the immediate custody and control of the owner. Moreover, the police may confine their investigation to an on-the-spot inquiry—for example, immediate exposure of the luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog—or transport the property to another location. Given the fact that seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime.
In sum, we conclude that when an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.

The purpose for which respondent’s luggage was seized, of course, was to arrange its exposure to a narcotics detection dog. Obviously, if this investigative procedure is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent’s luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test—no matter how brief—could not be justified on less than probable cause.

[The Court then held that “exposure of respondent’s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”]

III

We [next] examine whether the agents’ conduct in this case was such as to place the seizure within the general rule requiring probable cause for a seizure or within Terry’s exception to that rule.

The precise type of detention we confront here is seizure of personal luggage from the immediate possession of the suspect for the purpose of arranging exposure to a narcotics detection dog. Particularly in the case of detention of luggage within the traveler’s immediate possession, the police conduct intrudes on both the suspect’s possessory interest in his luggage as well as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary. The person whose luggage is detained is technically still free to continue his travels or carry out other personal activities pending release of the luggage. Moreover, he is not subjected to the coercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement or to the public indignity of being personally detained. Nevertheless, such a seizure can effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return. Therefore, when the police seize luggage from the suspect’s custody, we think the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the person’s luggage on less than probable cause. Under this standard, it is clear that the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop.

The length of the detention of respondent’s luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause. [I]n assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursue their investigation. We note that here the New York agents knew the time of Place’s scheduled arrival at LaGuardia, had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent’s Fourth Amendment interests. Thus, although we decline to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop, we have never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here and cannot do so on the facts presented by this case.
Although the 90-minute detention of respondent’s luggage is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion. In short, we hold that the detention of respondent’s luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics.

IV

We conclude that, under all of the circumstances of this case, the seizure of respondent’s luggage was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of his luggage was inadmissible, and Place’s conviction must be reversed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed.

* * *

The next case sheds further light on the permissible scope of investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion. In particular, it helps to illustrate how long a person may be detained for a “Terry stop.”

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. William Harris Sharpe
Decided March 20, 1985 – 470 U.S. 675

Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether an individual reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be detained for a period of 20 minutes, when the detention is necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited investigation of the suspected criminal activity.

I

A

On the morning of June 9, 1978, Agent Cooke of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle on a coastal road near Sunset Beach, North Carolina, an area under surveillance for suspected drug trafficking. At approximately 6:30 a.m., Cooke noticed a blue pickup truck with an attached camper shell traveling on the highway in tandem with a blue Pontiac Bonneville. Respondent Savage was driving the pickup, and respondent Sharpe was driving the Pontiac. The Pontiac also carried a passenger, Davis, the charges against whom were later dropped. Observing that the truck was riding low in the rear and that the camper did not bounce or sway appreciably when the truck drove over bumps or around curves, Agent Cooke concluded that it was heavily loaded. A quilted material covered the rear and side windows of the camper.
Cooke’s suspicions were sufficiently aroused to follow the two vehicles for approximately 20 miles as they proceeded south into South Carolina. He then decided to make an “investigative stop” and radioed the State Highway Patrol for assistance. Officer Thrasher, driving a marked patrol car, responded to the call. Almost immediately after Thrasher caught up with the procession, the Pontiac and the pickup turned off the highway and onto a campground road. Cooke and Thrasher followed the two vehicles as the latter drove along the road at 55 to 60 miles an hour, exceeding the speed limit of 35 miles an hour. The road eventually looped back to the highway, onto which Savage and Sharpe turned and continued to drive south.

At this point, all four vehicles were in the middle lane of the three right-hand lanes of the highway. Agent Cooke asked Officer Thrasher to signal both vehicles to stop. Thrasher pulled alongside the Pontiac, which was in the lead, turned on his flashing light, and motioned for the driver of the Pontiac to stop. As Sharpe moved the Pontiac into the right lane, the pickup truck cut between the Pontiac and Thrasher’s patrol car, nearly hitting the patrol car, and continued down the highway. Thrasher pursued the truck while Cooke pulled up behind the Pontiac.

Cooke approached the Pontiac and identified himself. He requested identification, and Sharpe produced a Georgia driver’s license bearing the name of Raymond J. Pavlovich. Cooke then attempted to radio Thrasher to determine whether he had been successful in stopping the pickup truck, but he was unable to make contact for several minutes, apparently because Thrasher was not in his patrol car. Cooke radioed the local police for assistance, and two officers from the Myrtle Beach Police Department arrived about 10 minutes later. Asking the two officers to “maintain the situation,” Cooke left to join Thrasher.

In the meantime, Thrasher had stopped the pickup truck about one-half mile down the road. After stopping the truck, Thrasher had approached it with his revolver drawn, ordered the driver, Savage, to get out and assume a “spread eagled” position against the side of the truck, and patted him down. Thrasher then holstered his gun and asked Savage for his driver’s license and the truck’s vehicle registration. Savage produced his own Florida driver’s license and a bill of sale for the truck bearing the name of Pavlovich. In response to questions from Thrasher concerning the ownership of the truck, Savage said that the truck belonged to a friend and that he was taking it to have its shock absorbers repaired. When Thrasher told Savage that he would be held until the arrival of Cooke, whom Thrasher identified as a DEA agent, Savage became nervous, said that he wanted to leave, and requested the return of his driver’s license. Thrasher replied that Savage was not free to leave at that time.

Agent Cooke arrived at the scene approximately 15 minutes after the truck had been stopped. Thrasher handed Cooke Savage’s license and the bill of sale for the truck; Cooke noted that the bill of sale bore the same name as Sharpe’s license. Cooke identified himself to Savage as a DEA agent and said that he thought the truck was loaded with marihuana. Cooke twice sought permission to search the camper, but Savage declined to give it, explaining that he was not the owner of the truck. Cooke then stepped on the rear of the truck and, observing that it did not sink any lower, confirmed his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He put his nose against the rear window, which was covered from the inside, and reported that he could smell marihuana. Without seeking Savage’s permission, Cooke removed the keys from the ignition, opened the rear of the camper, and observed a large number of burlap-wrapped bales.
resembling bales of marihuana that Cooke had seen in previous investigations. Agent Cooke then placed Savage under arrest and left him with Thrasher.

Cooke returned to the Pontiac and arrested Sharpe and Davis. Approximately 30 to 40 minutes had elapsed between the time Cooke stopped the Pontiac and the time he returned to arrest Sharpe and Davis. Cooke assembled the various parties and vehicles and led them to the Myrtle Beach police station. That evening, DEA agents took the truck to the Federal Building in Charleston, South Carolina. Several days later, Cooke supervised the unloading of the truck, which contained 43 bales weighing a total of 2,629 pounds. Acting without a search warrant, Cooke had eight randomly selected bales opened and sampled. Chemical tests showed that the samples were marihuana.

B

Sharpe and Savage were charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied respondents’ motion to suppress the contraband, and respondents were convicted. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions. We granted the petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals again reversed the convictions. We granted certiorari and we reverse.

II

The only issue in this case [ ] is whether it was reasonable under the circumstances facing Agent Cooke and Officer Thrasher to detain Savage, whose vehicle contained the challenged evidence, for approximately 20 minutes.\footnote{If the 20-minute stop was lawful, then the search of the vehicle was justified by the automobile exception because the odor of marijuana provided probable cause to believe drugs would be found.} We conclude that the detention of Savage clearly meets the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness.

Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on\textit{ Terry} stops. While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion,” we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. Much as a “bright line” rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.

In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the
court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. A creative judge engaged in post hoc
evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the
objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But “[t]he fact that the protection of the
public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, itself,
render the search unreasonable.” The question is not simply whether some other alternative was
available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it.

We readily conclude that, given the circumstances facing him, Agent Cooke pursued his
investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner. During most of Savage’s 20-minute detention,
Cooke was attempting to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the local police who
remained with Sharpe while Cooke left to pursue Officer Thrasher and the pickup. Once Cooke
reached Officer Thrasher and Savage, he proceeded expeditiously: within the space of a few
minutes, he examined Savage’s driver’s license and the truck’s bill of sale, requested (and was
denied) permission to search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper and noted that the truck did
not move, confirming his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He then detected the odor
of marijuana.

Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law
enforcement officers. Respondents presented no evidence that the officers were dilatory in their
investigation. The delay in this case was attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of
Savage, who sought to elude the police as Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road.
Except for Savage’s maneuvers, only a short and certainly permissible pre-arrest detention
would likely have taken place. The somewhat longer detention was simply the result of a
“graduate[d] ... respons[e] to the demands of [the] particular situation.”

We reject the contention that a 20-minute stop is unreasonable when the police have acted
diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay about which he complains. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

**Notes, Comments, and Questions**

The Court decided in *Illinois v. Caballes* (Chapter 5) that when a motorist is lawfully held for a
traffic stop, police use of drug-sniffing dogs to investigate a vehicle is not a “search.” In
*Rodriguez v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), the Court considered whether police may
lengthen a traffic stop for the purpose of conducting such a dog sniff.

A police officer pulled over Dennys Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of a Nebraska state
highway, which is unlawful. During the stop, the officer asked Rodriguez why he had driven on
the shoulder and, after receiving an answer, “gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and
proof of insurance.” He then ran “a records check on Rodriguez” before returning to question
Rodriguez and his passenger. Next, the officer returned to his car again, ran a records check on
the passenger, and “began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder of
the road.” Rodriguez made no objection to any of this conduct.
After writing the warning ticket and presenting it to Rodriguez (along with other documents the officer had collected during the stop), the officer asked Rodriguez for permission to walk a drug dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle. Rodriguez declined, and the officer ordered Rodriguez to stay put, which he did. The officer brought the dog, and when the dog “alerted to the presence of drugs,” the officer searched the car and found “a large bag of methamphetamine.” Rodriguez was eventually convicted of “possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine.”

Rodriguez argued that the officer impermissibly extended the traffic stop—after it was essentially finished—so that he could conduct the dog sniff. Rodriguez argued further that the extension constituted an unlawful seizure. The Court agreed.

In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court wrote:

“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. ‘[A] relatively brief encounter,’ a routine traffic stop is ‘more analogous to a so-called “Terry stop” ... than to a formal arrest.’ Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’ Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”

The Court wrote that while activities related to traffic enforcement—such as checking a driver’s license and registration—are permissible parts of a traffic stop, “[a] dog sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ Candidly, the Government acknowledged at oral argument that a dog sniff, unlike the routine measures just mentioned, is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop. Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.”

The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that so long as the total length of the stop remains reasonable, an officer may extend it to conduct a dog sniff.

“The Government argues that an officer may ‘incremental[ly]’ prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances. The Government’s argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation. The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in fact do. In this regard, the Government acknowledges that ‘an officer always has to be reasonably diligent.’ How could diligence be gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it? If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.’ [A] traffic stop ‘prolonged beyond’ that point is ‘unlawful.’ The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’"
In his dissent, Justice Alito first argued that the Court should have avoided the constitutional question decided in the case because “the police officer did have reasonable suspicion [of illegal drug activity], and, as a result, the officer was justified in detaining the occupants for the short period of time (seven or eight minutes) that is at issue.” Then, he argued that the Court’s holding was baseless and impractical, suggesting that officers will delay completing the permitted activities of a traffic stop if they wish to conduct dog sniffs.

“The Court refuses to address the real Fourth Amendment question: whether the stop was unreasonably prolonged. Instead, the Court latches onto the fact that Officer Struble delivered the warning prior to the dog sniff and proclaims that the authority to detain based on a traffic stop ends when a citation or warning is handed over to the driver. The Court thus holds that the Fourth Amendment was violated, not because of the length of the stop, but simply because of the sequence in which Officer Struble chose to perform his tasks.”

“The rule that the Court adopts will do little good going forward. It is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the length of future traffic stops. Most officers will learn the prescribed sequence of events even if they cannot fathom the reason for that requirement.”

The next case concerns whether during a Terry stop, police may demand that a suspect identify himself, under threat of prosecution if the suspect does not comply.

Supreme Court of the United States

Larry D. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada

Decided June 21, 2004 – 542 U.S. 177

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to identify himself during a stop allowed by Terry v. Ohio. He challenges his conviction under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

The sheriff’s department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop.

The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had “any identification on [him],”

[Footnote by editors] The Magistrate Judge found that detention for the dog sniff was not independently supported by individualized suspicion. Because the Court of Appeals did not decide this question, the Supreme Court did not address the question and wrote that it could be considered on remand.
which we understand as a request to produce a driver’s license or some other form of written identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification. The unidentified man became agitated and insisted he had done nothing wrong. The officer explained that he wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing there. After continued refusals to comply with the officer’s request for identification, the man began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: The officer asked for identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer placed him under arrest.

We now know that the man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with “willfully resist[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office.” The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the officer in carrying out his duties under § 171.123, a Nevada statute that defines the legal rights and duties of a police officer in the context of an investigative stop. Section 171.123 provides in relevant part:

“1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.

....

“3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.”

Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township. The court agreed that Hiibel’s refusal to identify himself as required by [Nevada Law] “obstructed and delayed Dove as a public officer in attempting to discharge his duty.” Hiibel was convicted and fined $250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge in a divided opinion. We granted certiorari.

II

NRS § 171.123(3) is an enactment sometimes referred to as a “stop and identify” statute. Stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity.

Stop and identify statutes have their roots in early English vagrancy laws that required suspected vagrants to face arrest unless they gave “a good Account of themselves.” The Court has recognized [] constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes. In Brown v. Texas, [443 U.S. 47 (1979)] the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect
was involved in criminal activity. Four Terms later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify statute on vagueness grounds. Th[at] law [ ] required a suspect to give an officer “credible and reliable” identification when asked to identify himself. The Court held that the statute was void because it provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, resulting in “virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.”

The present case begins where our prior cases left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs.

III

Hiibel argues that his conviction cannot stand because the officer’s conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree.

Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. “[I]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a Terry stop must be limited. The officer’s action must be “justified at its inception, and ... reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”

Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops. Obtaining a suspect’s name in the course of a Terry stop serves important government interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as this, where the police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.

Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer. [T]he Fourth Amendment does not impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against the government. As a result, the Fourth Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to answer questions. This case concerns a different issue, however. Here, the source of the legal obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment. Further, the statutory obligation does not go beyond answering an officer’s request to disclose a name.
The principles of *Terry* permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a *Terry* stop. The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.” The Nevada statute satisfies that standard. The request for identity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a *Terry* stop. The threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the Nevada statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its duration or its location. A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid *Terry* stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

It is clear in this case that the request for identification was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified” the stop. The officer’s request was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a *Terry* stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State’s requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court is affirmed.

Justice BREYER, with whom Justice SOUTER and Justice GINSBURG join, dissenting.

[T]his Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents make clear that police may conduct a *Terry* stop only within circumscribed limits. And one of those limits invalidates laws that compel responses to police questioning.

In *Terry v. Ohio*, the Court considered whether police, in the absence of probable cause, can stop, question, or frisk an individual at all. The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the “right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person.” At the same time, it recognized that in certain circumstances, public safety might require a limited “seizure,” or stop, of an individual against his will. The Court consequently set forth conditions circumscribing when and how the police might conduct a *Terry* stop. They include what has become known as the “reasonable suspicion” standard. Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion, set forth further conditions. Justice White wrote: “Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”

About 10 years later, the Court, in *Brown v. Texas*, held that police lacked “any reasonable suspicion” to detain the particular petitioner and require him to identify himself. Then, five years later, the Court wrote that an “officer may ask the [*Terry*] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. *But the detainee is not obliged to respond.*” *Berkemer v. McCarty*, [468 U.S. 420 (1984)].

This lengthy history—of concurring opinions, of references, and of clear explicit statements—means that the Court’s statement in *Berkemer*, while technically dicta, is the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement of the law. And that law has remained
undisturbed for more than 20 years. There is no good reason now to reject this generation-old statement of the law.

The majority presents no evidence that the rule enunciated by Justice White and then by the Berkemer Court, which for nearly a generation has set forth a settled Terry stop condition, has significantly interfered with law enforcement. Nor has the majority presented any other convincing justification for change. I would not begin to erode a clear rule with special exceptions.

I consequently dissent.

Notes, Comments, and Questions

Perceptions of Stop-and-Frisk

In Terry v. Ohio, the majority wrote, “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” The Court held that the “reasonable suspicion” standard struck a sensible compromise between individual liberty and law enforcement realities.

In dissent, Justice Douglas warned, “To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.” He argued that “if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’ him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.”

In the subsequent half century, the debate over stop-and-frisk tactics has remained heated. Opponents of the practice have argued that it visits humiliation on suspects for limited benefit and that police apply the tactic in a racially biased manner. For example, a federal court in New York found that the NYPD unconstitutionally focused disproportionately on Black and Hispanic suspects when stopping and frisking New Yorkers. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially stayed the ruling of the district court pending appeal, but the city dropped the appeal after the election of a mayor who campaigned on a promise to comply with the district court. See J. David Goodman, “De Blasio Drops Challenge to Law on Police Profiling,” N.Y. Times (March 5, 2014).

The case in favor of stop-and-frisk was articulated by Heidi Grossman, New York City’s lead attorney in the Floyd trial. She said, “Our defense is that we go to where the crime is. And once we go to where the crime is, we have our police officers keep their eyes open, make observations; and only when they make observations, do they go and make reasonable suspicion stops.” She added that when police conduct stop-and-frisk in areas with high minority populations, “the majority of victims are black and Hispanics in the area. They are begging for help, and they want
to be able to walk to and from work in a safe way. And so it is incumbent upon us to have our officers go out there and do their job, and keep the city safe.” See “The Argument for Stop-and-Frisk,” NPR (May 22, 2013).

For the perspective of some New Yorkers who have been repeatedly stopped and frisked and find the experience intensely unpleasant, see Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, Op-Doc: Season 1, “The Scars of Stop-and-Frisk,” N.Y. Times (June 12, 2012); Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, “Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For Being a F**king Mutt,’” The Nation (Oct. 8, 2012) (secret recording by teen of himself being stopped, along with interview of anonymous police officer about department practices).

What are the best (most convincing) arguments in favor of allowing police to stop and frisk suspects without probable cause?

In our next chapter, we will study how the Court has defined “reasonable suspicion.” A more demanding definition—vaguely close to probable cause—would narrow the set of situations in which police may “stop and frisk” suspects. A less strict definition—something beyond a mere hunch but not much further—would give greater discretion to police.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Chapter 21

Reasonable Suspicion

In this chapter we review the Court’s efforts to define “reasonable suspicion,” which is required for stops and frisks under Terry v. Ohio. Critics of stop and frisk practices complain that the Court has set too low a standard, thereby allowing law enforcement to stop pretty much anyone, particularly in neighborhoods with high crime rates. Advocates for stop and frisk counter that a stricter standard would undermine effective policework.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Ralph Arvizu

Decided Jan. 15, 2002 – 534 U.S. 266

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court.

Respondent Ralph Arvizu was stopped by a border patrol agent while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A search of his vehicle turned up more than 100 pounds of marijuana.

On an afternoon in January 1998, Agent Clinton Stoddard was working at a border patrol checkpoint along U.S. Highway 191 approximately 30 miles north of Douglas, Arizona. Douglas has a population of about 13,000 and is situated on the United States-Mexico border in the southeastern part of the State. Only two highways lead north from Douglas. Highway 191 leads north to Interstate 10, which passes through Tucson and Phoenix. State Highway 80 heads northeast through less populated areas toward New Mexico, skirting south and east of the portion of the Coronado National Forest that lies approximately 20 miles northeast of Douglas.

The checkpoint is located at the intersection of 191 and Rucker Canyon Road, an unpaved east-west road that connects 191 and the Coronado National Forest. When the checkpoint is operational, border patrol agents stop the traffic on 191 as part of a coordinated effort to stem the flow of illegal immigration and smuggling across the international border. Agents use roving patrols to apprehend smugglers trying to circumvent the checkpoint by taking the backroads, including those roads through the sparsely populated area between Douglas and the national forest. Magnetic sensors, or “intrusion devices,” facilitate agents’ efforts in patrolling these areas. Directionally sensitive, the sensors signal the passage of traffic that would be consistent with smuggling activities.

Sensors are located along the only other northbound road from Douglas besides Highways 191 and 80: Leslie Canyon Road. Leslie Canyon Road runs roughly parallel to 191, about halfway between 191 and the border of the Coronado National Forest, and ends when it intersects Rucker Canyon Road. It is unpaved beyond the 10-mile stretch leading out of Douglas and is very rarely traveled except for use by local ranchers and forest service personnel. Smugglers commonly try to avoid the 191 checkpoint by heading west on Rucker Canyon Road from Leslie Canyon Road.
and thence to Kuykendall Cutoff Road, a primitive dirt road that leads north approximately 12 miles east of 191. From there, they can gain access to Tucson and Phoenix.

Around 2:15 p.m., Stoddard received a report via Douglas radio that a Leslie Canyon Road sensor had been triggered. This was significant to Stoddard for two reasons. First, it suggested to him that a vehicle might be trying to circumvent the checkpoint. Second, the timing coincided with the point when agents begin heading back to the checkpoint for a shift change, which leaves the area unpatrolled.

Stoddard drove eastbound on Rucker Canyon Road to investigate. As he did so, he received another radio report of sensor activity. It indicated that the vehicle that had triggered the first sensor was heading westbound on Rucker Canyon Road. He saw the dust trail of an approaching vehicle about a half mile away. Stoddard had not seen any other vehicles and, based on the timing, believed that this was the one that had tripped the sensors. He pulled off to the side of the road at a slight slant so he could get a good look at the oncoming vehicle as it passed by.

It was a minivan, a type of automobile that Stoddard knew smugglers used. As it approached, it slowed dramatically, from about 50-55 to 25-30 miles per hour. He saw five occupants inside. An adult man was driving, an adult woman sat in the front passenger seat, and three children were in the back. The driver appeared stiff and his posture very rigid. He did not look at Stoddard and seemed to be trying to pretend that Stoddard was not there. Stoddard thought this suspicious because in his experience on patrol most persons look over and see what is going on, and in that area most drivers give border patrol agents a friendly wave. Stoddard noticed that the knees of the two children sitting in the very back seat were unusually high, as if their feet were propped up on some cargo on the floor.

At that point, Stoddard decided to get a closer look, so he began to follow the vehicle as it continued westbound. Shortly thereafter, all of the children, though still facing forward, put their hands up at the same time and began to wave at Stoddard in an abnormal pattern. It looked to Stoddard as if the children were being instructed. Their odd waving continued on and off for about four to five minutes.

Several hundred feet before the Kuykendall Cutoff Road intersection, the driver signaled that he would turn. At one point, the driver turned the signal off, but just as he approached the intersection he put it back on and abruptly turned north onto Kuykendall. The turn was significant to Stoddard because it was made at the last place that would have allowed the minivan to avoid the checkpoint. Also, Kuykendall, though passable by a sedan or van, is rougher than either Rucker Canyon or Leslie Canyon Roads, and the normal traffic is four-wheel-drive vehicles. Stoddard did not recognize the minivan as part of the local traffic agents encounter on patrol, and he did not think it likely that the minivan was going to or coming from a picnic outing. He was not aware of any picnic grounds on Turkey Creek, which could be reached by following Kuykendall Cutoff all the way up. He knew of picnic grounds and a Boy Scout camp east of the intersection of Rucker Canyon and Leslie Canyon Roads, but the minivan had turned west at that intersection. And he had never seen anyone picnicking or sightseeing near where the first sensor went off.
Stoddard radioed for a registration check and learned that the minivan was registered to an address in Douglas that was four blocks north of the border in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling. After receiving the information, Stoddard decided to make a vehicle stop. He approached the driver and learned that his name was Ralph Arvizu. Stoddard asked if respondent would mind if he looked inside and searched the vehicle. Respondent agreed, and Stoddard discovered marijuana in a black duffel bag under the feet of the two children in the back seat. Another bag containing marijuana was behind the rear seat. In all, the van contained 128.85 pounds of marijuana, worth an estimated $99,080.

Respondent was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana. He moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. After holding a hearing where Stoddard and respondent testified, the District Court for the District of Arizona ruled otherwise. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. Because the “balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security” tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity “may be afoot.”

When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” Although an officer’s reliance on a mere “hunch” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.

Our cases have recognized that the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract. But we have deliberately avoided reducing it to “a neat set of legal rules.” We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases. [It] does not take into account the “totality of the circumstances,” as our cases have understood that phrase. The court appeared to believe that each observation by Stoddard that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to “no weight.” Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.

[T]he Court of Appeals’ approach would seriously undercut the “totality of the circumstances” principle which governs the existence vel non of “reasonable suspicion.” Take, for example, the court’s positions that respondent’s deceleration could not be considered because “slowing down after spotting a law enforcement vehicle is an entirely normal response that is in no way indicative of criminal activity” and that his failure to acknowledge Stoddard’s presence provided no support because there were “no ‘special circumstances’ rendering ‘innocent avoidance ...
improbable.” We think it quite reasonable that a driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer might well be unremarkable in one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in another (such as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona). Stoddard was entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s inhabitants. To the extent that a totality of the circumstances approach may render appellate review less circumscribed by precedent than otherwise, it is the nature of the totality rule.

Having considered the totality of the circumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer and District Court Judge, we hold that Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to believe that respondent was engaged in illegal activity. It was reasonable for Stoddard to infer from his observations, his registration check, and his experience as a border patrol agent that respondent had set out from Douglas along a little-traveled route used by smugglers to avoid the 191 checkpoint. Stoddard’s knowledge further supported a commonsense inference that respondent intended to pass through the area at a time when officers would be leaving their backroads patrols to change shifts. The likelihood that respondent and his family were on a picnic outing was diminished by the fact that the minivan had turned away from the known recreational areas. Corroborating this inference was the fact that recreational areas farther to the north would have been easier to reach by taking 191, as opposed to the 40-to-50–mile trip on unpaved and primitive roads. The children’s elevated knees suggested the existence of concealed cargo in the passenger compartment. Finally, Stoddard’s assessment of respondent’s reactions upon seeing him and the children’s mechanical-like waving, which continued for a full four to five minutes, were entitled to some weight.

A determination that reasonable suspicion exists [] need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct. Undoubtedly, each of these factors alone is susceptible of innocent explanation, and some factors are more probative than others. Taken together, we believe they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for Stoddard’s stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

* * *

In California v. Hodari D. (Chapter 19), the majority speculated in a footnote whether “it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police,” and the dissent retorted that innocent persons might flee police for a variety of reasons. Because the question was not before the Court, the Justices did not decide whether flight from police was sufficiently suspicious to justify—by itself—a Terry stop. In the next case, the Court considered the merits of the question.
Supreme Court of the United States

Illinois v. William aka Sam Wardlow

Decided Jan. 12, 2000 – 528 U.S. 119

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two of the officers caught up with him, stopped him and conducted a protective patdown search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers’ stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

On September 9, 1995, Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were driving the last car of a four car caravan converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions. The officers were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers.

As the caravan passed 4035 West Van Buren, Officer Nolan observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Nolan and Harvey turned their car southbound, watched him as he ran through the gangway and an alley, and eventually cornered him on the street. Nolan then exited his car and stopped respondent. He immediately conducted a protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience it was common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions. During the frisk, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officer then opened the bag and discovered a .38-caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition. The officers arrested Wardlow.

The Illinois trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Wardlow’s conviction, concluding that the gun should have been suppressed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the stop and subsequent arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari and now reverse.

This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street, is governed by the analysis we first applied in Terry. In Terry, we held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. The officer must be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” of criminal activity.

Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four-car caravan that was converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the officers anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts. It
was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee. An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.

In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. We conclude Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further.

Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida v. Royer, [460 U.S. 491 (1983)] where we held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. And any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.

Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way. But in this case the officers found respondent in possession of a handgun, and arrested him for violation of an Illinois firearms statute. No question of the propriety of the arrest itself is before us.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[The dissent agreed with the majority that flight from police could sometimes create cause for suspicion and thereby “by itself, be sufficient to justify a temporary investigative stop of the kind authorized by Terry.” It agreed too that the Court was correct in not “authorizing the temporary detention of anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer.” In other words, sometimes flight alone justifies a Terry stop, and sometimes it does not. “Given the diversity and frequency of possible motivations for flight, it would be profoundly unwise to endorse either per se rule.” The dissent differed from the majority in its discussion of why innocent persons might flee from officers:]

Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither “aberrant” nor “abnormal.” Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement investigations into their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient.

[The dissent quoted from Albery v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896), as follows:]

“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’ Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury—not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves.”

[The dissent then concluded “that in this case the brief testimony of the officer who seized respondent does not justify the conclusion that he had reasonable suspicion to make the stop.” The dissent argued that the officer’s testimony was vague and could not even demonstrate that Wardlow’s “flight was related to his expectation of police focus on him.”]

Notes, Comments, and Questions

The Court in Wardlow announced that “unprovoked flight” in a “high crime area”—particularly an area of heavy narcotics trafficking—justifies a Terry stop. It is not certain what other factors, when combined with flight, are sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. It seems likely, however, that once flight is part of the analysis, not much additional ground for suspicion is needed to give officers discretion to stop a suspect.
What guidance does the Court give on what a “high-crime area” is? What comes to your mind as you think of high-crime areas? Would official statistics (for example, records of arrests organized by neighborhood) provide an accurate picture of which neighborhoods have the most crime? How do race and poverty play into our notions of high crime areas? Is a fraternity house (or a neighborhood of such houses, nicknamed “Greektown”) a high-crime area? Why or why not?

Consider a college student fleeing a police officer who arrives at a fraternity party in response to a noise complaint. May the officer chase the student down and conduct a Terry stop? Why or why not?

Now imagine that same college student is walking in a high-poverty, primarily minority neighborhood in the middle of an afternoon. He sees two police officers walking toward him, and he runs in the other direction. Does this conduct justify Terry stop? Why or why not?

As students have likely already noticed, a great deal of Fourth Amendment cases result from enforcement of laws banning the possession, manufacture, and sale of certain drugs. Because police spend substantial time on drug enforcement, officers have come to recognize common characteristics and behaviors of persons involved in the drug trade. The next case concerns the relevance of such observations to a finding of reasonable suspicion.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Andrew Sokolow

Decided April 3, 1989 – 490 U.S. 1

Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Andrew Sokolow was stopped by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents upon his arrival at Honolulu International Airport. The agents found 1,063 grams of cocaine in his carry-on luggage. When respondent was stopped, the agents knew, inter alia, that (1) he paid $2,100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20 bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the DEA agents did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop respondent, as required by the Fourth Amendment. We take the contrary view.

This case involves a typical attempt to smuggle drugs through one of the Nation’s airports. On a Sunday in July 1984, respondent went to the United Airlines ticket counter at Honolulu Airport, where he purchased two round-trip tickets for a flight to Miami leaving later that day. The tickets were purchased in the names of “Andrew Kray” and “Janet Norian” and had open return dates. Respondent paid $2,100 for the tickets from a large roll of $20 bills, which appeared to contain a total of $4,000. He also gave the ticket agent his home telephone number. The ticket agent noticed that respondent seemed nervous; he was about 25 years old; he was dressed in a black jumpsuit and wore gold jewelry; and he was accompanied by a woman, who turned out to be Janet Norian. Neither respondent nor his companion checked any of their four pieces of luggage.
After the couple left for their flight, the ticket agent informed Officer John McCarthy of the Honolulu Police Department of respondent's cash purchase of tickets to Miami. Officer McCarthy determined that the telephone number respondent gave to the ticket agent was subscribed to a “Karl Herman,” who resided at 348-A Royal Hawaiian Avenue in Honolulu. Unbeknownst to McCarthy (and later to the DEA agents), respondent was Herman’s roommate. The ticket agent identified respondent’s voice on the answering machine at Herman’s number. Officer McCarthy was unable to find any listing under the name “Andrew Kray” in Hawaii. McCarthy subsequently learned that return reservations from Miami to Honolulu had been made in the names of Kray and Norian, with their arrival scheduled for July 25, three days after respondent and his companion had left. He also learned that Kray and Norian were scheduled to make stopovers in Denver and Los Angeles.

On July 25, during the stopover in Los Angeles, DEA agents identified respondent. He “appeared to be very nervous and was looking all around the waiting area.” Later that day, at 6:30 p.m., respondent and Norian arrived in Honolulu. As before, they had not checked their luggage. Respondent was still wearing a black jumpsuit and gold jewelry. The couple proceeded directly to the street and tried to hail a cab, where Agent Richard Kempshall and three other DEA agents approached them. Kempshall displayed his credentials, grabbed respondent by the arm, and moved him back onto the sidewalk. Kempshall asked respondent for his airline ticket and identification; respondent said that he had neither. He told the agents that his name was “Sokolow,” but that he was traveling under his mother’s maiden name, “Kray.”

Respondent and Norian were escorted to the DEA office at the airport. There, the couple’s luggage was examined by “Donker,” a narcotics detector dog, which alerted on respondent’s brown shoulder bag. The agents arrested respondent. He was advised of his constitutional rights and declined to make any statements. The agents obtained a warrant to search the shoulder bag. They found no illicit drugs, but the bag did contain several suspicious documents indicating respondent’s involvement in drug trafficking. The agents had Donker reexamine the remaining luggage, and this time the dog alerted on a medium-sized Louis Vuitton bag. By now, it was 9:30 p.m., too late for the agents to obtain a second warrant. They allowed respondent to leave for the night, but kept his luggage. The next morning, after a second dog confirmed Donker’s alert, the agents obtained a warrant and found 1,063 grams of cocaine inside the bag.

Respondent was indicted for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. The United States District Court for Hawaii denied his motion to suppress the cocaine and other evidence seized from his luggage. Respondent then entered a conditional plea of guilty to the offense charged.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed respondent’s conviction by a divided vote. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. We now reverse.

The Court of Appeals held that the DEA agents seized respondent when they grabbed him by the arm and moved him back onto the sidewalk. The Government does not challenge that conclusion, and we assume—without deciding—that a stop occurred here. Our decision, then, turns on whether the agents had a reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing when they encountered him on the sidewalk.
The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” We think the Court of Appeals’ effort to refine and elaborate the requirements of “reasonable suspicion” in this case creates unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In evaluating the validity of a stop such as this, we must consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.”

The rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, in which evidence available to an officer is divided into evidence of “ongoing criminal behavior,” on the one hand, and “probabilistic” evidence, on the other, is not in keeping with the statements from our decisions. It also seems to us to draw a sharp line between types of evidence, the probative value of which varies only in degree. The Court of Appeals classified evidence of traveling under an alias, or evidence that the suspect took an evasive or erratic path through an airport, as meeting the test for showing “ongoing criminal activity.” But certainly instances are conceivable in which traveling under an alias would not reflect ongoing criminal activity: for example, a person who wished to travel to a hospital or clinic for an operation and wished to conceal that fact. One taking an evasive path through an airport might be seeking to avoid a confrontation with an angry acquaintance or with a creditor. This is not to say that each of these types of evidence is not highly probative, but they do not have the sort of ironclad significance attributed to them by the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, the factors in this case that the Court of Appeals treated as merely “probabilistic” also have probative significance. Paying $2,100 in cash for two airplane tickets is out of the ordinary, and it is even more out of the ordinary to pay that sum from a roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that amount of cash. Most business travelers, we feel confident, purchase airline tickets by credit card or check so as to have a record for tax or business purposes, and few vacationers carry with them thousands of dollars in $20 bills. We also think the agents had a reasonable ground to believe that respondent was traveling under an alias; the evidence was by no means conclusive, but it was sufficient to warrant consideration. While a trip from Honolulu to Miami, standing alone, is not a cause for any sort of suspicion, here there was more: surely few residents of Honolulu travel from that city for 20 hours to spend 48 hours in Miami during the month of July. Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion.

We do not agree with respondent that our analysis is somehow changed by the agents’ belief that his behavior was consistent with one of the DEA’s “drug courier profiles.” A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a “profile” does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent.

We hold that the agents had a reasonable basis to suspect that respondent was transporting illegal drugs on these facts. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Because the strongest advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are frequently criminals, it is easy to forget that our interpretations of such rights apply to the innocent and the guilty alike. In the present case, the chain of events set in motion when respondent Andrew Sokolow was stopped by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents at Honolulu International Airport led to the discovery of cocaine and, ultimately, to Sokolow’s conviction for drug trafficking. But in sustaining this conviction on the ground that the agents reasonably suspected Sokolow of ongoing criminal activity, the Court diminishes the rights of all citizens “to be secure in their persons,” as they traverse the Nation’s airports. Finding this result constitutionally impermissible, I dissent.

The Fourth Amendment cabins government’s authority to intrude on personal privacy and security by requiring that searches and seizures usually be supported by a showing of probable cause. The reasonable-suspicion standard is a derivation of the probable-cause command, applicable only to those brief detentions which fall short of being full-scale searches and seizures and which are necessitated by law enforcement exigencies such as the need to stop ongoing crimes, to prevent imminent crimes, and to protect law enforcement officers in highly charged situations. By requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to such seizures, the Fourth Amendment protects innocent persons from being subjected to “overbearing or harassing” police conduct carried out solely on the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics such as race.

To deter such egregious police behavior, we have held that a suspicion is not reasonable unless officers have based it on “specific and articulable facts.” It is not enough to suspect that an individual has committed crimes in the past, harbors unconsummated criminal designs, or has the propensity to commit crimes. On the contrary, before detaining an individual, law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect that he is engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment.

In my view, a law enforcement officer’s mechanistic application of a formula of personal and behavioral traits in deciding whom to detain can only dull the officer’s ability and determination to make sensitive and fact-specific inferences “in light of his experience.” Reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier characteristics runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-by-case police work of subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment and detention. This risk is enhanced by the profile’s “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.” In asserting that it is not “somehow” relevant that the agents who stopped Sokolow did so in reliance on a prefabricated profile of criminal characteristics, the majority thus ducks serious issues relating to a questionable law enforcement practice, to address the validity of which we granted certiorari in this case.

*     *     *

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Reasonable Suspicion Based on Tips

Police rely on information volunteered by persons outside of law enforcement to conduct investigations. Witnesses to crimes, suspects themselves, and others willing to provide relevant information to help officers do their work. The Court has decided a handful of cases concerning how much a “tip” from an informant contributes to a finding of reasonable suspicion.

Supreme Court of the United States

Alabama v. Vanessa Rose White
Decided June 11, 1990 – 496 U.S. 325

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Based on an anonymous telephone tip, police stopped respondent’s vehicle. A consensual search of the car revealed drugs. The issue is whether the tip, as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. We hold that it did.

On April 22, 1987, at approximately 3 p.m., Corporal B.H. Davis of the Montgomery Police Department received a telephone call from an anonymous person, stating that Vanessa White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey’s Motel, and that she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attaché case. Corporal Davis and his partner, Corporal P. A. Reynolds, proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace Apartments. The officers saw a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight in the parking lot in front of the 235 building. The officers observed respondent leave the 235 building, carrying nothing in her hands, and enter the station wagon. They followed the vehicle as it drove the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel. When the vehicle reached the Mobile Highway, on which Dobey’s Motel is located, Corporal Reynolds requested a patrol unit to stop the vehicle. The vehicle was stopped at approximately 4:18 p.m., just short of Dobey’s Motel. Corporal Davis asked respondent to step to the rear of her car, where he informed her that she had been stopped because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in the vehicle. He asked if they could look for cocaine, and respondent said they could look. The officers found a locked brown attaché case in the car, and, upon request, respondent provided the combination to the lock. The officers found marijuana in the attaché case and placed respondent under arrest. During processing at the station, the officers found three milligrams of cocaine in respondent’s purse.

Respondent was charged in Montgomery County Court with possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine. The trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, and she pleaded guilty to the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama concluded that respondent’s motion to dismiss should have been granted and reversed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. [W]e granted the State’s petition for certiorari. We now reverse.
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the circumstances—the whole picture” that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. The [Illinois v.] Gates Court applied its totality-of-the-circumstances approach in this manner, taking into account the facts known to the officers from personal observation, and giving the anonymous tip the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of reliability as established through independent police work. The same approach applies in the reasonable-suspicion context, the only difference being the level of suspicion that must be established. Contrary to the court below, we conclude that when the officers stopped respondent, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity and that the investigative stop therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

It is true that not every detail mentioned by the tipster was verified, such as the name of the woman leaving the building or the precise apartment from which she left; but the officers did corroborate that a woman left the 235 building and got into the particular vehicle that was described by the caller. With respect to the time of departure predicted by the informant, Corporal Davis testified that the caller gave a particular time when the woman would be leaving, but he did not state what that time was. He did testify that, after the call, he and his partner proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace Apartments to put the 235 building under surveillance. Given the fact that the officers proceeded to the indicated address immediately after the call and that respondent emerged not too long thereafter, it appears from the record before us that respondent’s departure from the building was within the timeframe predicted by the caller. As for the caller’s prediction of respondent’s destination, it is true that the officers stopped her just short of Dobey’s Motel and did not know whether she would have pulled in or continued past it. But given that the 4-mile route driven by respondent was the most direct route possible to Dobey’s Motel but nevertheless involved several turns, we think respondent’s destination was significantly corroborated.

The Court’s opinion in Gates gave credit to the proposition that because an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity. Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude in this case that the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.

We think it also important that, as in Gates, “the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.” The fact that the officers found a car precisely matching the caller’s description in front of the 235 building is an example of the former. Anyone could have “predicted” that fact because it was a condition presumably existing
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at the time of the call. What was important was the caller’s ability to predict respondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information—a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs. The general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent would shortly leave the building, get in the described car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel. Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities. When significant aspects of the caller’s predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.

Although it is a close case, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of respondent’s car. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Millions of people leave their apartments at about the same time every day carrying an attaché case and heading for a destination known to their neighbors. Usually, however, the neighbors do not know what the briefcase contains. An anonymous neighbor’s prediction about somebody’s time of departure and probable destination is anything but a reliable basis for assuming that the commuter is in possession of an illegal substance—particularly when the person is not even carrying the attaché case described by the tipster.

The record in this case does not tell us how often respondent drove from the Lynwood Terrace Apartments to Dobey’s Motel; for all we know, she may have been a room clerk or telephone operator working the evening shift. It does not tell us whether Officer Davis made any effort to ascertain the informer’s identity, his reason for calling, or the basis of his prediction about respondent’s destination. Indeed, for all that this record tells us, the tipster may well have been another police officer who had a “hunch” that respondent might have cocaine in her attaché case.

Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa White’s excursion. In addition, under the Court’s holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed. Fortunately, the vast majority of those in our law enforcement community would not adopt such a practice. But the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as well as from those who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes a mockery of that protection.

I respectfully dissent.

*   *   *

Chapter 41 — Page 466
The stop in *White* was made upon reasonable suspicion; then the suspect consented to the automobile search. Without consent, could the officer search the car? Why or why not?

In the next case, the Court distinguished *Alabama v. White* and found that the information provided by a tipster did not justify a *Terry* stop.

Supreme Court of the United States

**Florida v. J.L.**

Decided March 28, 2000 – 529 U.S. 266

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court.

The question presented in this case is whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that person. We hold that it is not.

I

On October 13, 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. So far as the record reveals, there is no audio recording of the tip, and nothing is known about the informant. Sometime after the police received the tip—the record does not say how long—two officers were instructed to respond. They arrived at the bus stop about six minutes later and saw three black males “just hanging out [there].” One of the three, respondent J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm, and J.L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements. One of the officers approached J.L., told him to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J.L.’s pocket. The second officer frisked the other two individuals, against whom no allegations had been made, and found nothing.

J.L., who was at the time of the frisk “10 days shy of his 16th birth[day],” was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. He moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search, and the trial court granted his motion. The intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari and now affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

II

Our “stop and frisk” decisions begin with *Terry v. Ohio*. In the instant case, the officers’ suspicion that J.L. was carrying a weapon arose not from any observations of their own but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.” As we have recognized, however, there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion
to make the investigatory stop.” The question we here confront is whether the tip pointing to J.L. had those indicia of reliability.

The tip in the instant case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in *Alabama v. White* and essential to the Court’s decision in that case. The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. That the allegation about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search. All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L. If *White* was a close case on the reliability of anonymous tips, this one surely falls on the other side of the line.

Florida contends that the tip was reliable because its description of the suspect’s visible attributes proved accurate: There really was a young black male wearing a plaid shirt at the bus stop. The United States as *amicus curiae* makes a similar argument, proposing that a stop and frisk should be permitted “when (1) an anonymous tip provides a description of a particular person at a particular location illegally carrying a concealed firearm, (2) police promptly verify the pertinent details of the tip except the existence of the firearm, and (3) there are no factors that cast doubt on the reliability of the tip....” These contentions misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a *Terry* stop.

An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.

A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States as *amicus* is, in essence, that the standard *Terry* analysis should be modified to license a “firearm exception.” Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this position.

Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions. Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed criminals pose to public safety; *Terry*’s rule, which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than demanding that officers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this very concern. But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would prove too far. Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target’s unlawful carriage of a gun. Nor could one securely confine such an exception to allegations involving firearms. If police officers may properly conduct *Terry* frisks on the basis of bare-boned tips about guns, it would be reasonable to maintain [] that the police should similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned tips about narcotics. As we clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in *Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143* (1972),]
and White, the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied.

The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk. Nor do we hold that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports and schools, cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.

Finally, the requirement that an anonymous tip bear standard indicia of reliability in order to justify a stop in no way diminishes a police officer’s prerogative, in accord with Terry, to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been legitimately stopped. We speak in today’s decision only of cases in which the officer’s authority to make the initial stop is at issue. In that context, we hold that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams and White does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.

The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is affirmed.

*   *   *

Look closely at the tips in White and J.L. Is there a good basis for distinguishing the two? Would you be able to predict when an officer should (and should not) form reasonable suspicion from a tip?

In 2014, the Court applied White and J.L. to a tip concerning a dangerous driver on a California highway. As the caustic dissent indicates, the Court’s decision in Navarette v. California has been widely read as lowering the amount of evidence necessary to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.

Supreme Court of the United States

Lorenzo Prado Navarette v. California

Decided April 22, 2014 – 572 U.S. 393

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

After a 911 caller reported that a vehicle had run her off the road, a police officer located the vehicle she identified during the call and executed a traffic stop. We hold that the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated.
I

On August 23, 2008, a Mendocino County 911 dispatch team for the California Highway Patrol (CHP) received a call from another CHP dispatcher in neighboring Humboldt County. The Humboldt County dispatcher relayed a tip from a 911 caller, which the Mendocino County team recorded as follows: “Showing southbound Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David-94925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.” The Mendocino County team then broadcast that information to CHP officers at 3:47 p.m.

A CHP officer heading northbound toward the reported vehicle responded to the broadcast. At 4:00 p.m., the officer passed the truck near mile marker 69. At about 4:05 p.m., after making a U-turn, he pulled the truck over. A second officer, who had separately responded to the broadcast, also arrived on the scene. As the two officers approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. A search of the truck bed revealed 30 pounds of marijuana. The officers arrested the driver, petitioner Lorenzo Prado Navarrete, and the passenger, petitioner José Prado Navarrete.

Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Both the magistrate who presided over the suppression hearing and the Superior Court disagreed. Petitioners pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and were sentenced to 90 days in jail plus three years of probation.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. We granted certiorari and now affirm.

II

The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops—such as the traffic stop in this case—when a law enforcement officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” The standard takes into account “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” Although a mere “hunch” does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less” than is necessary for probable cause.

These principles apply with full force to investigative stops based on information from anonymous tips. We have firmly rejected the argument “that reasonable cause for an investigative stop can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person.” Of course, “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.” That is because “ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations,” and an anonymous tipster’s veracity is “by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.” But under appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.”
The initial question in this case is whether the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to credit the allegation that petitioners’ truck “ran the [caller] off the roadway.” Even assuming for present purposes that the 911 call was anonymous, we conclude that the call bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account. The officer was therefore justified in proceeding from the premise that the truck had, in fact, caused the caller’s car to be dangerously diverted from the highway.

By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 8D94925—the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving. That basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip’s reliability. A driver’s claim that another vehicle ran her off the road necessarily implies that the informant knows the other car was driven dangerously.

There is also reason to think that the 911 caller in this case was telling the truth. Police confirmed the truck’s location near mile marker 69 (roughly 19 highway miles south of the location reported in the 911 call) at 4:00 p.m. (roughly 18 minutes after the 911 call). That timeline of events suggests that the caller reported the incident soon after she was run off the road. That sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially reliable.

Another indicator of veracity is the caller’s use of the 911 emergency system. A 911 call has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with immunity. As this case illustrates, 911 calls can be recorded, which provides victims with an opportunity to identify the false tipster’s voice and subject him to prosecution. The 911 system also permits law enforcement to verify important information about the caller. None of this is to suggest that tips in 911 calls are per se reliable. Given the foregoing technological and regulatory developments, however, a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system. The caller’s use of the 911 system is therefore one of the relevant circumstances that, taken together, justified the officer’s reliance on the information reported in the 911 call.

Even a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” We must therefore determine whether the 911 caller’s report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness. We conclude that the behavior alleged by the 911 caller, “viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount[s] to reasonable suspicion” of drunk driving. The stop was therefore proper.

Reasonable suspicion depends on ““the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”” Under that commonsense approach, we can appropriately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound indicia of drunk driving. Indeed, the accumulated experience of thousands of officers suggests that these sorts of erratic behaviors are strongly correlated with drunk driving. Of course, not all traffic infractions imply intoxication. Unconfirmed reports of driving without a seatbelt or slightly over the speed limit, for example, are so tenuously connected to drunk driving that a stop on those grounds alone would be constitutionally suspect. But a reliable tip alleging the dangerous behaviors discussed above generally would justify a traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving.
The 911 caller in this case reported more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving. Instead, she alleged a specific and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct: running another car off the highway. That conduct bears too great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness. Running another vehicle off the road suggests lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judgment, or some combination of those recognized drunk driving cues. And the experience of many officers suggests that a driver who almost strikes a vehicle or another object—the exact scenario that ordinarily causes “running [another vehicle] off the roadway”—is likely intoxicated. As a result, we cannot say that the officer acted unreasonably under these circumstances in stopping a driver whose alleged conduct was a significant indicator of drunk driving.

III

Like White, this is a “close case.” As in that case, the indicia of the 911 caller’s reliability here are stronger than those in J. L., where we held that a bare-bones tip was unreliable. Although the indicia present here are different from those we found sufficient in White, there is more than one way to demonstrate “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the indicia of reliability in this case sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road. That made it reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to execute a traffic stop. We accordingly affirm.

Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting.

Law enforcement agencies follow closely our judgments on matters such as this, and they will identify at once our new rule: So long as the caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic stop. This is not my concept, and I am sure would not be the Framers’, of a people secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal of California.

The California Highway Patrol in this case knew nothing about the tipster on whose word—and that alone—they seized Lorenzo and José Prado Navarette. They did not know her name. They did not know her phone number or address. They did not even know where she called from (she may have dialed in from a neighboring county).

The Court says that “[b]y reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle ... the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge.” So what? The issue is not how she claimed to know, but whether what she claimed to know was true. The claim to “eyewitness knowledge” of being run off the road supports not at all its veracity; nor does the amazing, mystifying prediction (so far short of what existed in White) that the petitioners’ truck would be heading south on Highway 1.

All that has been said up to now assumes that the anonymous caller made, at least in effect, an accusation of drunken driving. But in fact she did not. She said that the petitioners’ truck ““[r]an
That neither asserts that the driver was drunk nor even raises the likelihood that the driver was drunk. The most it conveys is that the truck did some apparently nontypical thing that forced the tipster off the roadway, whether partly or fully, temporarily or permanently. Who really knows what (if anything) happened? The truck might have swerved to avoid an animal, a pothole, or a jaywalking pedestrian.

But let us assume the worst of the many possibilities: that it was a careless, reckless, or even intentional maneuver that forced the tipster off the road. Lorenzo might have been distracted by his use of a hands-free cell phone or distracted by an intense sports argument with Jose. Or, indeed, he might have intentionally forced the tipster off the road because of some personal animus, or hostility to her “Make Love, Not War” bumper sticker. I fail to see how reasonable suspicion of a discrete instance of irregular or hazardous driving generates a reasonable suspicion of ongoing intoxicated driving. What proportion of the hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of careless, reckless, or intentional traffic violations committed each day is attributable to drunken drivers? I say 0.1 percent. I have no basis for that except my own guesswork. But unless the Court has some basis in reality to believe that the proportion is many orders of magnitude above that—say 1 in 10 or at least 1 in 20—it has no grounds for its unsupported assertion that the tipster’s report in this case gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of drunken driving.

Bear in mind that that is the only basis for the stop that has been asserted in this litigation. The stop required suspicion of an ongoing crime, not merely suspicion of having run someone off the road earlier. And driving while being a careless or reckless person, unlike driving while being a drunk person, is not an ongoing crime. In other words, in order to stop the petitioners the officers here not only had to assume without basis the accuracy of the anonymous accusation but also had to posit an unlikely reason (drunkenness) for the accused behavior.

In sum, at the moment the police spotted the truck, it was more than merely “possible” that the petitioners were not committing an ongoing traffic crime. It was overwhelmingly likely that they were not.

It gets worse. Not only, it turns out, did the police have no good reason at first to believe that Lorenzo was driving drunk, they had very good reason at last to know that he was not. The Court concludes that the tip, plus confirmation of the truck’s location, produced reasonable suspicion that the truck not only had been but still was barreling dangerously and drunkenly down Highway 1. In fact, alas, it was not, and the officers knew it. They followed the truck for five minutes, presumably to see if it was being operated recklessly. And that was good police work. While the anonymous tip was not enough to support a stop for drunken driving, it was surely enough to counsel observation of the truck to see if it was driven by a drunken driver. But the pesky little detail left out of the Court’s reasonable-suspicion equation is that, for the five minutes that the truck was being followed (five minutes is a long time), Lorenzo’s driving was irreproachable. Had the officers witnessed the petitioners violate a single traffic law, they would have had cause to stop the truck, and this case would not be before us. And not only was the driving irreproachable, but the State offers no evidence to suggest that the petitioners even did anything suspicious, such as suddenly slowing down, pulling off to the side of the road, or turning somewhere to see whether they were being followed. Consequently, the tip’s suggestion of ongoing drunken driving (if it could be deemed to suggest that) not only went uncorroborated;
it was affirmatively undermined.

A hypothetical variation on the facts of this case illustrates the point. Suppose an anonymous tipster reports that, while following near mile marker 88 a silver Ford F-150, license plate 8D949925, traveling southbound on Highway 1, she saw in the truck’s open cab several five-foot-tall stacks of what was unmistakably baled cannabis. Two minutes later, a highway patrolman spots the truck exactly where the tip suggested it would be, begins following it, but sees nothing in the truck’s cab. It is not enough to say that the officer’s observation merely failed to corroborate the tipster’s accusation. It is more precise to say that the officer’s observation discredited the informant’s accusation: The crime was supposedly occurring (and would continue to occur) in plain view, but the police saw nothing. Similarly, here, the crime supposedly suggested by the tip was ongoing intoxicated driving, the hallmarks of which are many, readily identifiable, and difficult to conceal. That the officers witnessed nary a minor traffic violation nor any other “sound indici[um] of drunk driving,” strongly suggests that the suspected crime was not occurring after all. The tip’s implication of continuing criminality, already weak, grew even weaker.

Resisting this line of reasoning, the Court curiously asserts that, since drunk drivers who see marked squad cars in their rearview mirrors may evade detection simply by driving “more careful[ly],” the “absence of additional suspicious conduct” is “hardly surprising” and thus largely irrelevant. Whether a drunk driver drives drunkenly, the Court seems to think, is up to him. That is not how I understand the influence of alcohol. I subscribe to the more traditional view that the dangers of intoxicated driving are the intoxicant’s impairing effects on the body—effects that no mere act of the will can resist. Consistent with this view, I take it as a fundamental premise of our intoxicated-driving laws that a driver soused enough to swerve once can be expected to swerve again—and soon. If he does not, and if the only evidence of his first episode of irregular driving is a mere inference from an uncorroborated, vague, and nameless tip, then the Fourth Amendment requires that he be left alone.

The Court’s opinion serves up a freedom-destroying cocktail consisting of two parts patent falsity: (1) that anonymous 911 reports of traffic violations are reliable so long as they correctly identify a car and its location, and (2) that a single instance of careless or reckless driving necessarily supports a reasonable suspicion of drunkenness. All the malevolent 911 caller need do is assert a traffic violation, and the targeted car will be stopped, forcibly if necessary, by the police. If the driver turns out not to be drunk (which will almost always be the case), the caller need fear no consequences, even if 911 knows his identity. After all, he never alleged drunkenness, but merely called in a traffic violation—and on that point his word is as good as his victim’s.

Drunken driving is a serious matter, but so is the loss of our freedom to come and go as we please without police interference. To prevent and detect murder we do not allow searches without probable cause or targeted Terry stops without reasonable suspicion. We should not do so for drunken driving either. After today’s opinion all of us on the road, and not just drug dealers, are at risk of having our freedom of movement curtailed on suspicion of drunkenness, based upon a phone tip, true or false, of a single instance of careless driving. I respectfully dissent.

* * *

Chapter 41 — Page 474
This concludes our review of the substantive search and seizure law that the Court has based upon the Fourth Amendment. We turn next to interrogations.

**FOURTH AMENDMENT FLOWCHART EXERCISE**

Flowcharts can help students visualize what they have learned. The goal is not to memorize the example chart presented here but instead to create a new chart that helps one to connect material from throughout the book. Your authors recommend that when students make their own charts, they add additional detail, such as case names or chapter numbers. For example, in the box asking whether there was a “search” or “seizure” at all, students might add information related to dog sniffs, aerial surveillance, the open fields doctrine, thermal imaging, garbage collection, and other items included in the early chapters of this book.

In the box asking if there was a valid warrant, students might add information related to the particularity requirement, as well as other sources of challenges to validity.

This chart focuses on the Fourth Amendment. Later in the book, a different sample chart focuses on the *Miranda* Rule.

These charts have two primary purposes. One is that when the charts are finished, they can serve as study aids. The other is that the creation of the charts—even if students never review them after finishing them—forces students to consider material more carefully than they otherwise might, which helps with learning and with retention of information. Also, fellow students can help spot misunderstandings that, were they not in a chart, would remain uncorrected. Study group members might wish to bring charts to share with classmates.

Note that the “Fourth Amendment violation” box asks students to consider what remedy might be available to the person whose rights were violated. A separate chart devoted to remedies (such as the exclusionary rule) would be worth creating after students cover that material.